KUNAPAREDDY @ NOOKALA SHANKA BALAJIversusKUNAPAREDDY SWARNA KUMAR! & ANR.

                            [2016] 2 S.C.R. 608



A         KUNAPAREDDY @ NOOKALA SHANKA BALAJI
                                     v.
             KUNAPAREDDY SWARNA KUMAR! & ANR.
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 516of2016)
B                             APRIL 18, 2016
                [A.K. SIKRI AND R.K. AGRAWAL, JJ.J
        Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - ss. 18 to 22 - Petition/complaint
  filed under the provisions of the Act of 2005 - Power of the court to
c allow  amendment to the petition/complaint originally filed - Held:
  Court dealing with the application under DV Act has power and/or
  jurisdiction to allow the amendment of the said application -
  Amendment can be allowed if it becomes necessary in view of
  subsequent events and or to avoid multiplicity of litigation - Ifpower
  to amend the complaint/application is not read into the said
D provision, the very purpose of the Act would be defeated in many
  cases - Procedure is the handmaid ofjustice and is to come to the
  aid of the justice rather than defeating it - On facts, the petition
  filed is essentially u!ss. 18 and 20 of the Act and the proceedings
  are pred01i1inantly of civil nature, governed by the Code - There
  was escalation ofprices - It cannot be said that wife was not entitled
E
  to file another application claiming the reliefs which she sought to
  include in the pending application by way of amendment - Thus,
  amendment rightly allowed by the courts below.
         Dismissing the appeal, the Court
F      HELD: 1.1 The prayers which were made by respondent
  no.1 in the original petition and prayer 'A' thereof relates to
  Section 9 of the Domestic Violence ACf,°"'2005. However, in prayer
  'B', the respondent no.1 also sought relief of grant of monthly
  maintenance to her as well as.her children. This prayer falls within
  the ambit of Section 20 of the DV Act. In fact, prayer 'A" is covered
G by Section 18 which empowers the Magistrate to grant such a
  protection which is claimed by the respondent no.1. Therefore,
  the petition is essentially under Sections 18 and 20 of the DV
  Act, though in the heading these provisions are not mentioned.
  However, that may not make any difference and, therefore, no
H
                                    608
     KUNAPAREDDY @ NOOKALA SHANKA BALAJ! v.                             609
          KUNAPAREDDY SWARNA KUMAR!

issue was raised by the appellant on this count. In respect of the       A
petition filed under Sections 18 and 20 of the DV Act, the
proceedings .are to be gover~ed by the Code, as provided under
Section 28 of the DV Act. At the same time, it cannot be disputed
that these proceedings are predominantly of civil nature. [Para
12) [615-C-E)
                                                                         B
     L2 The very purpose of enacting the DV Act was to provide
for a remedy which is an amalgamation of civil rights of the
complainant i.e aggrieved person. Intention was to protect women
against domestic violence of any kind, especially that occurring
within the family as the civil law does not address this phenomenon
in its entirety. It is for this reason, that the Scheme of the Act       c
provides that in the first instance, the order that would be passed
by the Magistrate, on a complaint ·by the aggrieved person, would
be of a civil nature and if the said order is violated, it assumes
the character of criminality. [Para 13] [615-F-G)
     1.3 All the reliefs that can be granted by the Magistrate           D
under section 18 to 22 of the DV Act are of civil nature. Section
23 vests the Magistrate with the power to grant interim ex-parte
orders. It is, thus, clear that various kinds of reliefs which can be
obtained by the aggrieved person are of civil nature. At the same
time, when there is a breach of such orders passed by the                E
Magistrate, Section 31 terms such a breach to be a punishable
offence. Merely because Section 28 of the DV Act provides for
that the proceedings under some of the provisions including
Sections ..18 and .20 are essentially of civil nature. Under Section
125 of the Code as well, a woman and children can claim
maintenance. At the same time these proceedings are treated              F
essentially as of civil nature. [Paras 14, 15) (617-H; 618-A-C)
     1.4 It cannot be said that the Court dealing with the
applicatioffunder DVAct has no power and/or jurisdiction to allow
the amendment of the said application. If the amendment becomes
necessary in view of subsequent events [escalation of prices in          G
the instant case] or to avoid multiplicity of litigation, Court will
the have power to permit such an amendment. It is said that
procedure is the handmaid of justice and is to come to the aid of
the justice rather than defeating it. It is nobody's case that
respondent no. 1 was not entitled to file another application            H
610            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       (2016] 2 S.C.R.



A     claiming the reliefs which she sought to include in the pending
      application by way of amendment. If that be so, there is no reason,
      why the applicant be not allowed to incorporate this amendment
      in the pending application rather than filing a separate application.
      It is not that there is a complete ban/bar of amendment in the
      complaints in criminal Courts which are governed by the Code,
B
      though undoubtedly such power to allow the amendment has to
      be exercised sparingly and with caution under limited
      circumstances. [Para 17] [618-H; 619-A-B]
           1.5 Even in criminal cases governed by the Code, the Court
      is not powerless and may allow amendment in appropriate cases.
c     One of the circumstances where such an amendment is to be
      allowed is to avoid the multiplicity of the proceedings. [Para 18]
      [620-H]
           1.6 The provisions of sub-section (2) of section 28 of the DV
      Act gain significance. Whereas proceedings under certain sections
D     of the DV Act as specified in sub-Section (1) of Section 28 are to
      be governed by the Code, the Legislature at the same time
      incorporated the provisions like Sub-Section(2) as well which
      empowers the Court to lay down its own procedure for disposal
      of the application under Section 12 or Section 23(2) of the DV
E     Act. This provision has been incorporated by the Legislature
      keeping a definite purpose in mind. Under Section 12, an
      application can be made to a Magistrate by an aggrieved person
      or a Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of the
      aggrieved person to claim one or more reliefs under the said
      Act. Section 23 deals with the power of the Magistrate to grant
 F    interim and ex-parte orders and sub-Section (2) of Section 23 is a
      special provision carved out in this behalf. [Para 19] [621-B-D]
            1. 7 The reliefs that can be granted by the final order or an by
      interim order, most of these reliefs are of civil nature. If the power
      to amend the complaint/application etc. is not read into the said
G     provision, the very purpose which the Act attempts to sub-serve
      itself may be defeated in many cases. The amendment was rightly
      allowed by the trial court and there is no blemish in the impugned
      judgment of the High Court affirming the order of the trial court.
      [Paras 20, 21] [621-F-G]
H
     KUNAPAREDDY@ NOOKALA SHANKA BALAJI v.                                     611
          KUNAPAREDDY SWARNA KUMAR!

      Ramesh Chander Kaushal vs. Venna Kaushal (1978) 4                         A
      SCC 70:1978 (3) SCR 782; S.R.Sukumar vs. S. Sunaad
      Raghuram (2015) 9 SCC 609 - referred to.
                         Case Law Reference
      1978 (3) SCR 782           referred to         Para 16
      (2015) 9 SCC 609           referred to         Para 17                    B
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
5l6of2016.
     From the Judgment and Order dated 26. I 1.2015 of the High Court
of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State ofTelangana and the State of
Andhra Pradesh in CRLRC No. 2897 of20!5.                                        c
     Shail Kumar Dwivedi, Gunnam Venkateswara Rao and Siddharth
Krishna Dwivedi for the appellant.
    Guntur, Prabhakar, Q V. R. Choudary, K. Shivraj Chouduri and A.
Chandra Sekhar for the respondents.
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                                 D

     A. K. SIKRI, J. l. Leave granted.
      2. Learned counsel for both the parties have been finally heard at
this stage.
      3. The issue that arises for consideration in the instant case is
                                                                                 E
whether a court dealing with the petition/complaint filed under the
provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to
as 'the DY Act') has power to allow amendment to the petition/complaint
originally filed. This issue has arisen in the petition/complaint filed by
respondent no. I/wife. Respondent No. I herein, who is the wife of the
appellant, has filed a case against the appellant and his family members         F
before the Court oflind Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, West
Godavari, Eluru under Sections 9B & 37(2)(C) of the DY Act which is
registered as Domestic Violence Case No. 20/2008. It may be mentioned
h,ere that the said petition now stands transferred to the Court of Judicial
First Class Magistrate (Mobile Court), Eluru and has been renumbered
                                                                                G
as DY Case No. 29/2012. In this case, respondent no. I has leveled
various allegations against the appellant and his family members inter
alia alleging that the appellant and his family members used to harass
her physically as well as mentally and by also demanding dowry. It is
further alleged that she was driven out from her matrimonial home in the
month of March, 2015 and initially she took. shelter at her brother's house     H
612              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2016] 2 S.C.R.


A     along with the children in Eluru. Thereafter, on the appellant tendering
      an apology to respondent no. I by coming to Eluru they put up their
      family together in Gadam Ramakrishna's House atAshok Nagar, Eluru,but
      the things did not change. The following prayers are made in the said
      petition:
 B            "a) to provide protection to the life and limb of the complainant in
              the hands of the respondents;
              b) to grant monthly maintenance of Rs. 5 ,000/- to the complainant
              and her children each towards her maintenance, medicines etc.
              and her children education and maintenance;
 c            c) to grant such other reliefor reliefs if the Hon'ble Court deems
              fit and proper in the circumstances of the case."
           4. Respondent no. I has also filed a divorce petition before the Court
      of Senior Civil Judge, West Godavari, Eluru wherein she has made an
      application for interim maintenance as well. Thereafter, she also filed a
 D    maintenance petition under Sections 23(2) and 24 of the Hindu Marriage
      Act, 1955 before the Court of Family Judge, Eluru.
            5. On receiving notice in DV Petition, family members of the
      appellant filed a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the High Court of
      Judicature at Hyderabad for the States ofTelengana and Andhra Pradesh
 E    for quashing the proceedings in the said DV Petition. This petition was
      allowed by the High Court vide order dated 17.04.2009 thereby quashing
      the domestic violence proceedings against the family members of the
      appellant on the ground that there was no specific allegations against
      them. After the DV Petition was transferred to the Court of Judicial
      First Class Magistrate, Eluru, respondent no. I filed an application seeking
 F
      amendment of the petition. By way of the said amendment petition,
      respondent no. I wanted to amend the prayer clause by incorporating
      some more prayers, as is clear from the following amendment in this
      behalf which was sought by respondent no.I:
         "a) To provide protection to life and limb of the complainant in the
 G
              hands of the respondent.
         b)     To grant monthly maintenance of Rs. 15,000/-to the complainant
                 and her 2"' child to their maintenance instead ofRs.5000/-
         c)     Direct the respondent to return the Sridhana amount of
 H              Rs.3,00,000/- and 15 sovereigns of gold ornaments and other
        KUNAPAREDDY @ NOOKALA SHANKA BALAJI Y.                                  613
        KUNAPAREDDY SWARNA KtJMARI [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

           sari samanas and marriage batuvu presented to the respondent          A
           worth about 2 sovereigns wrist watch, 7 sovereign gold chain
           presented by the complainant and her parents.
   d)     Direct the respondent to pay the compensation of Rs.15 lakhs
          to the complaint for subjecting the compliant to physical and
           mental harassments besides including acts of Domestic Violence.       B
   e)     Direct the respondent to return the sari samans and other goods
           like worth more than Rs. I 0,00,000/- as per the list annexed
          herewith.
   t)     Direct the respondent to pay the cost of, litigation to the tune of
          Rs.25,000/- so far spent by the complainant persuing her               c
          litigation.
   g)     Direct the I" respondent to provide separate residence by taking
          rent portion with monthly rent of Rs. I 0,000/-
   h)     Directing the respondent to return the original study certificates,    D
          medical certificates, deposits certificates and receipts etc.
           in the prayer portion paragraphs the following amendment by
           deleting the prayer original para
. b)      to grant monthly maintenance of Rs.5,000/- to the complainant
          and her children each towards her maintenance, medicines etc.          E
          and her children education and maintenance."
      6. The appellant herein opposed the said application. However,
the learned Trail Court after hearing both the parties allowed the
amendment. The appellant raised an objection that there was no" power
with the court to allow amendment of such a petition/complaint in the            F
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code').
This contention was rejected by the trial court on the premise that section
26 of the DY Act, which entitles a civil court, a family court or a criminal
court as well to grant any relief which is available to the complain~;1t
under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 & 22 of the said Act, gives an indication
thatthe provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure would squarely apply           G
and, therefore, the court had the power to allow amendment of the petition/
complaint, more so, when it was necessary for the purpose of determining
the real matter in controversy and to prevent multiplicity of the litigation.
        7. This order was challenged by the appellant by filing an appeal
                                                                                 H
614            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2016] 2 S.C.R.


A     before the Com1 of District and Sessions Judge, Eluru. The District and
      Sessions Judge, Eluru set aside the order of the Trial Court holding that
      there was no specific provision for amendment of the complaint and
      allowed the appeal of the appellant. Aggrieved by that order, respondent
      no. I filed a revision petition in the High Court which has been allowed
      by the High Court vide impugned judgment permitting respondent no. I
B
      to amend the petition/complai1it, thereby setting aside the order of the
      District and Sessions Judge and restoring the order of the Trial Court.
            8. As mentioned above, in the present appeal preferred by the
      appellant questioning the validity of the order of the High Court, the
      contention of the appellant is thatthere is no such an provision under the
c     DY Act which permits the Trial Court to allow such amendment. On
      this issue, we have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length.
           9. The contention of Mr. G.V. Rao, learned counsel appearing for
      the appellant was that the proceedings under the DY Act are governed
      by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure as prescribed under
D     Section 28 of the DY Act and there is no provision for amendment in the
      Code. He fm1her submitted that the court below was wrong in treating
      the application for amendment under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of
      Civil Procedure which has no application to the proceedings under the
      DY Act.
 E         I 0. In order to decide the aforesaid issue, we may take note of .
      some of the salient provisions of the DY Act as well as relevant Rules
      framed under the said Act. We have gone through the concerned
      provisions of the Code. We may start our discussion with Section 28 of
      the DY Act which reads as under:
 F          "28. Procedure.-{ I) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, all
            proceedings under sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and
            offences under section 31 shall be governed by the provisions of
            the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).
            (2) Nothing in sub-section (I) shall prevent the court from laying
 G          down its own procedure for disposal of an application under section
            12 or under sub-section (2) of section 23."
           11. No doubt this provision provides that all proceedings under
      Sections 12, 19 to 23 as well as offences under Section 31 are to be
      governed by the provisions of the Code. The instant petition, as noted
 H    above, is filed under Section 98 and 37(2)(C) of the DY Act. Section 9
        KUNAPAREDDY @ NOOKALA SHANKA BALAJI V.                                    615
        KUNAPAREDDY SWARNA KUMAR! [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

   enumerates duties and functions of Protection Officer and Clause (b) of         A
   sub-Section (1) thereof reads as under:
         "(b) to make a domestic incident report to the Magistrate, in such
         form and in such manner as may be prescribed, upon receipt of a
         complaint of domestic violence and forward copies thereof to the
         police officer in charge of the police station within the local limits    B
         of whose jurisdiction domestic violence is alleged to have been
         committed and to the service providers in that area;"
         12. We have already mentioned the prayers which were made by
   respondent no. I in the original petition and prayer' A' thereof relates to
   Section 9. However, in prayer' B', the respondent no. I also sought relief      c
   of grant of monthly maintenance to her as well as her children. This
   prayer falls within the ambit of Section 20 of the DV Act. In fact, prayer
   'A" is covered by Section 18 which empowers the Magistrate to grant
   such a protection which is claimed by the respondent no. I. Therefore,
   the petition is essentially under Sections 18 and 20 of the DV Act, though
   in the heading these provisions are not mentioned. However, that may            D
   not make any difference and, therefore, no issue was raised by the
   appellant on this count. In respect of the petition filed under Sections 18
   and 20 of the DV Act, the proceedings are to be governed by the Code,
   as provided under Section 28 of the DV Act. At the same time, it cannot
   be disputed that these proceedings are predominantly of civil nature.           E
          13. In fact, the very purpose of enacting the DV Act was to provide
    for a remedy which is an amalgamation of civil rights of the complainant
    i.e aggrieved person. Intention was to protect women against violence
    of aiw kind, especially that occurring within the family as the civil law
    does not address this phenomenon in its entirety. It is treated as an offence F
    under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The purpose of enacting
    the law was to provide a remedy in the civil law for the protection of
    women from being victims of domestic violence and to prevent the
    occurrence of domestic violence in the society. It is for this reason, that
    the Scheme of the Act provides that in the first instance, the order that
   'would be passed by the Magistrate, on a complaint by the aggrieved G
·~ person, would be of a civil nature and if the said order is violated, it
    assumes the character of criminality. In order to demonstrate it, we may -
    reproduce the introduction as well as relevant portions of the Statement
    of Objects and Reasons of the said Act, as follows:
                                                                                   H
616      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           (2016] 2 S.C.R.


A     "INTRODUCTION.
      The Vienna Accord of 1994 and the Beijing Declaration and the
      Platform for Action ( 1995) have acknowledged that domestic
      violence is undoubtedly a human rights issue. The United Nations
      Committee on Convention on Elimination of All Forms of
B     Discrimination Against Women in its General Recommendations
      has recommended that State parties should act to protect women
      against violence of an' kind, especially that occurring within the
      family. The phenomenon of domestic violence in India is widely
      prevalent but has remained invisible in the public domain. The
      civil law does not address this phenomenon in its entirety. Presently,
c     where a woman is subjected to cruelty by her husband or his
      relatives, it is an offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal
      Code. Jn order to provide a remedy in the civil law for the
      protection of women from being victims of domestic violence and
      to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the society the
D     protection of Women from Domestic Violence Bill was introduced
      in the Parliament.
      STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS
      Domestic violence is undoubtedly a human Right issue and serious
      deterrent to development. The Vienna Accord of 1994 and the
 E    Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action (1995) have
      acknowledged this. The United Nations Committee on Convention
      on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
      (CEDAW) in its General Recommendation NO. XIJ (1989) has
      recommended that State parties should act to protect women
      against violence of any kind especially the occurring within the
 F    family.
        xxx                       xxx                        xxx
      3. It is, therefore, proposed to enact a law keeping in view the
      rights guaranteed under articles I 4, 15 and 2 I of the Constitution
      to provide for a remedy under the civil law which is intended to
 G    protect the woman from being victims of domestic violence and
      to prevent the occurrence ofdomestic violence in the society.
      4. The Bill, inter alia, seeks to provide for the following:-
      xxx                         xxx                        xxx
      (ii) It defines the expression "domestic violence" to include actual
 H
       KUNAPAREDDY @ NOOKALA SHANKA BALAJI V.                                     617
       KUNAPAREDDY SWARNA KUMAR! [A.K. SIKRI, J.)

        abuse or threat or abuse that is physical, secual, verbal, emotional       A
        or economic. Harassment by way ofunlawful dowry demands to
        the woman or her relatives would also be covered under this
        definition.
        (iii) It provides for the rights of women to secure housing. It also
      . provides for the right of a woman to reside in her matrimonial             B
        home or shared household, whether or not she has any title or
        rights in such home or household. 'This right is secured by a
        residence order, which is passed by the Magistrate.
        (iv) It empowers the Magistrate to pass protection orders in favour
        of the aggrieved person to prevent the respondent from aiding or           c
        committing an act of domestic violence or any other specified act,
        entering a workplace or any other place frequented by the
        aggrieved person, attemptin'gthe communicate with her, isolating
        any assets used by both the parties and causing violence to the
        aggrieved person, her relatives or others who provide her
        assistance from the domestic violence."                                    D

         14. Procedure forobtaining orderof reliefs is stipulated in Chapter
   IV of the DY Act which comprises Sections 12 to 29. Under Section 12
   an application can be made to the Magistrate by the aggrieved person or
   Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person.
   The Magistrate is empowered; under Section 18, to pass protection order.        E
   Section 19 of the DY Act authorizes the Magistrate to pass residence
   order which may include restraining the respondent from dispossessing
   or disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person or directing the
   respondent to remove himself from the shared household or even
    restraining the respondent or his relatives from entering the portion of       F
   the shared household in which the aggrieved person resides etc. Monetary
   reliefs which can be granted by the Magistrate under Section 20 of the
    DY Act include giving of the relief in respect of the loss of earnings, the
., medical expenses, the loss caused due to destruction, damage or removal
   of any property from the control of the aggrieved· person and the
    maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any.          G
   Custody can be decided by the Magistrate which was granted under
   Section 21 ofthe DY Act. Section 22 empowers the Magistrate to grant
   compensation and damages forthe injuries, including m~ntal torture and
   emotional distress, caused by the domestic violence committed by the
    appellant. All the &foresaid reliefs that can be granted by the Magistrate
                                                                                   H.
618             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2016] 2 S.C.R.


A     are of civil nature. Section 23 vests the Magistrate with the power to
      grant interim i:x-parte orders. It is, thus, clear that various kinds ofreliefs
      which can be obtained by the aggrieved person are of civil nature. At
      the same time, when there is a breach of such orders passed by the
      Magistrate, Section 31 terms such a breach to be a punishable offence.
B           15. In the aforesaid scenario, merely because Section 28 of the
      DV Act provides for that the proceedings under some of the provisions
      including Sections 18 and 20 are essentially of civil nature. We may take
      some aid and assistance from the nature of the proceedings filed under
      Section 125 of the Code. Under the said provision as well, a woman and
      children can claim maintenance. At the-'same time these proceedings
c     are treated essentially as of civil nature.
           16. Ip Ramesh Chander Kaushal vs. Ve1111a Kaushal (1978) 4
      SCC 70, Justice Krishna Iyer, dealing with the interpretation of Section
      125 of the Code, observed as follows:

D            "9. This provision is a measure of social justice and specially enacted
             to protect women and children and falls within the constitutional
             sweep of Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39. We have no doubt
             that sections of statutes calling for construction by courts are not
             petrified print but vibrant words with social functions to fulfill.
             The brooding presence of the constitutional empathy for the weaker
 E           sections like women and children must inform interpretation ifit
             has to have social functions to fulfill. The brooding presence of
             the constitutional empathy for the weaker sections like women
             and children must inform interpretation ·if it has to have social
             relevance. So viewed, it is possible to be selective in picking out
 F           that interpretation out of two alternatives which advance the cause
             of the derelicts."
            17. We understood in this backdrop, it cannot be said thatthe Court
      dealing with the applicati~n under DV Act has no power and/or
      jurisdiction to allow the amendment of the said application. If the
 G    amendment becomes necessary in view of subsequent events [escalation
      o[prices in the instant case] or to avoid multiplicity oflitigation, Court
      will the have power to permit such an amendment. It is said that procedure
      is the handmaid of justice and isto come to the aid of the justice rather
      than defeating it. It is nobody's case that respondent no. 1 was not
      entitled to file another application claiming the reliefs which she sought
 H    to include in the pending application by way of amendment. If that be so,
     KUNAPAREDDY @ NOOKALA SHANKA BALAJI V.-                                  619
     KUNAPAREDDY SWARNA KUMAR! [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

we see no reason, why the applicant be not allowed to incorporate this         A
amendment in the pending application rather than filing a separate
application. It is not that there is a complete ban/bar of amendment in
the complaints in criminal Courts which are governed by the Code, though
undoubtedly such power to allow the amendment has to be exercised
sparingly and with caution under limited circumstances. The
                                                                               B
pronouncement on this is contained in the recent judgment of this Court
in S.RSukumar vs. S. Sunaad Raghuram (2015) 9 SCC 609 in the
follo.Y>'.ing paras:
      "I 7. Insofar as merits of the contention regarding allowing  , of
      amendment application, it is true that there is no specific provision
      in the Code to amend either a complaint or a petition filed under
                                                                               c
      the provisions of the Code, but the Courts have held that the
      petitions seeking such amendment to correct curable infirmities
      can be allowed even in respect of complaints. In U .P. Pollution
      Control Board vs. Modi Distillery And Ors., (1987) 3 SCC 684,
      wherein the name of the company was wrongly mentioned in                 D
      the complaint that is, instead of Modi Industries Ltd. The name
      of the company was mentioned as Modi Distiliery and the name
      was sought to be amended. In such factual background, this Court
      has held as follows:-
      " ... The learned Single Judge has focused his attention only       E
      on the [pie] technical flaw in the complaint and has failed to
      comprehend that the flaw had occurred due to the recalcitrant
      attitude _of Modi Distillery and furthermore the infinnity is one
      which could be easily removed by having the matter remitted to
      the Chief Judicial Magistrate with a direction to call upon the .
      appellant to make the formal amendments to the averments            F
      contained in para 2 of the complaint so as to make the controlling
      company of the industrial unit figure as the concerned accused
      in the complaint. All,that has to be done is the making of a formal
      application for amendment by the appellant for leave to amend
      by substituting the name of Modi Industries Limited, the company G
      owning the industrial unit, in place of ModLOistillery ....
      Furthermore, the legal infirmity is of such-a nature which could
      be easily cured ..."
       18. What is discernible from the U.P. Pollution Control Board's
       case is that easily curable legal infirmity could be cured by means
                                                                               H
620            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           (2016] 2 S.C.R.


A           of 'a formal application for amendment. If the .amendment sought
            to be made relates to a simple infirmity which is curable by means
            of a formal amendment and by allowing such amendment, no
            prejudice could be caused to the other side, notwithstanding the
            factthat there is no enabling provision in the Code for entertaining
            such amendment, the Court may permit such :an amendment to
B
            be made. On the contrary, ifthe amendment sought to be made
            in the complaint does not relate either to a curable infirmity or the
            same cannot be corrected by a formal amendment or if there
            is likelihood of prejudice to the other side, then the Court shall
            not allow such amendment in the complaint.
c           19. In the instant case, the amendment application was filed on
            24.05.2001 to carry out the amendment by adding paras ll(a)
            and 11 (b ). Though, the proposed amendment was not a formal
            amendment, but a substantial one, the Magistrate allowed the
            amendment application mainly on the ground that no cognizance
D           was taken of the complaint before the disposal of amendment
            application. Firstly, Magistrate was yet to ,apply the judicial mind
            to the contents of the complaint and had not taken cognizance
            of the matter. Secondly, since summons was yet to be ordered to
            be issued to the accused, no prejudice would be caused to the
            accused. Thirdly, the amendment did not change the original nature
 E          of the complaint being one for defamation. Fourthly, the publication
            of poem 'Khalnayakaru' being in the nature of subsequent event
            created a new cause of action in favour of the respondent which
            could have been prosecuted by the respondent by filing a separate
            complaint and therefore to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, the
 F          trial court allowed the amendment application. Considering these
            factors which weighed in the mind of the courts .below, in our
            view, the High Court rightly declined to interfere with the order
            passed by the Magistrate allowing the amendment application and
            the impugned order does not suffer from any serious infirmity
            warranting interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article
 G           136.ofthe Constitution oflndia."
            18. What we are emphasising is that even in criminal cases governed
      by the Code, the Court is not powerless and may allow amendment--in
      appropriate cases. One of the circumstances where such an amendment
      is to be allowed is to avoid the multiplicity of the proceedings. The
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      KUNAPAREDDY @ NOOKALA SHANKA BALAJI V.                                   621
      KUNAPAREDDY SWARNA KUMARI [A.K. SIKRI, J.)

argument of the learned cou!nsel for the appellant, therefore, that there       A
is no power of amendment l\as to be negated.
     19. In this context, prov·isions of Sub-Section (2) of Section 28 of
the DV Act gain significan.ce. Whereas proceedings under certain
sections of the DV Act as specified in sub-Section ( 1) of Section 28 are
to be governed by the Code, the> Legislature at the same time incorporated      B
the provisiqns like sub-Section .(2) as well which empowers the Court to
lay down its own procedure for disposal of the application under Section
 12 or Section 23(2) of the DV A•ct. This provision has been incorporated
by the Legislature keeping a defi 11ite purpose in mind. Under Section 12,
an application can be made to a Magistrate by an aggrieved person or a
Protection Officer or any other ptlrson on behalf of the aggrieved person       c
to claim one or more reliefs under·the sa.id Act. Section 23 deals with the
power of the Magistrate to grant interim and excparte orders and sub-
section (2) of Section 23 is a special provision carved out in this behalf
which is as follows:
       "(2) lfthe Magistrate is sati,;fied that an application prima facie      D
       discloses thatthe respondent' is committing, or has committed an
       act of domestic violence or that there is a likelihood that the
       respondent may commit an act\ of domestic viqlence, he may grant
       an ex parte order on the basis of the affidavit in such forni, as
       may be prescribed, of the agtgrieved person under section 18,             E
       section 19, section 20, section12J or, as the case may be, sectioo
       22 against the respondent."
      20. The reliefs that can be granted by the.final order or an by
interim order, have already been pointml out above wherein it is noticed
that most of these reliefs are of civil n.atllre. If the power to amend the     F
complaint/application etc. is not read i'nto the aforesaid provision, the
very purpose which the Act attempts to ,;ub-serve itself may be defeated
in many cases.
     21. We, thus, are of the opinion ti 1at the amendment was rightly
allowed by the Trial Court and there is no blemish in the impugned              G
judgment of the High Court affirming the order of the Trial Court. This
appeal is, thus, devoid ofany merits and ,is, accordingly, dismissed with
costs.
Nidhi Jain .                                               Appeal dismissed.

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