Holding

A disclaimer of the landlord's title must be clear and unequivocal; the appellant's pleadings did not meet this requirement, so eviction under s.13(1)(f) was not justified.

Summary

Kundan Mal occupied a premises from 1953 and, after the death of the original owner, recognized Gurudutta as his landlord and paid rent. In 1973 he received a municipal notice to remove the structure and sued the municipality, while Gurudutta sued him for alleged non‑payment of rent and denial of his title. The lower courts held that the plaintiff’s pleadings amounted to a disclaimer of the landlord’s title and ordered eviction under section 13(1)(f) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the plaint and found no clear, unequivocal denial of the landlord’s title; the plaintiff merely described his possession as that of a tenant and did not claim any title. Consequently, the Court held that the statutory ground for eviction was not satisfied and set aside the decree, allowing the appeal with costs.

Issues considered

Whether the appellant's pleadings constitute a clear and unequivocal disclaimer of the landlord's title within the meaning of clause (f) of section 13(1) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950.

Legislation cited

Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950s. 13(1)(f)
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. 111(g)

Subjects

disclaimerevictionlandlord‑tenantRajasthan Premises Actsection 13(1)(f)title deniallease forfeitureTransfer of Property Act

Judgment

KUNDAN MAL
v. +
GURUDUTTA
• 25, 1989
JANUARY

/M.fl. KANIA. AND LA.LIT MOHAN SHARMA, JJ.]

/lajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950:
Section 13(1)(f)-Tenant denying title of landlord-When arises-
f)e11ial to be clear and in unequivocal terms.

The appellant was inducted into the structure in question by tbe
C O\l'l'er in 1953. In 19(i9, tbe owner died and some dispute arose between
his lq:al representatives and the respondent. The dispute was finally
decided in favour of the respondel!t. The appellant duly recognised him
;is landlord and started paying rent.

p II! 1973, in response to a notice received from tbe Municipal
Aut!torities asking him to remove the disputed structure on the ground
!hat it was erected on Government land, the appellant was forced to file
a ~uit in the Civil Court, challenging the validity of the notice and
praying f!Jr injunction against the Municipal authorities from interfer- "'
jµg with hjs possessipn.
E
Tile resp!ll•dent thereafter filed a suit against the appellant on the
gnmn!ls of dffault in payment of rent and denial of his title by him. It
was alleged that the al'pellant l!ad challenged the respondent's title in
the plaitit filed in the earlier suit. The case of default in payment of rent
W?~ ·rejected, b11t the suit was decreed on the ground of denial of title.
F
On appeal, the Additional District Judge confirmed the decree
and held that the statements in the plaint amounted to disclaimer and,
in aqy event, the appellant had failed to acknowledge the landlord's title
therein and consequently he was liable to eviction under cl.(f) of s. 13(1)
of the Act. The aPl'ellant's second appeal was also rejected hy the High
q C\l\IIt. >1t the ild~~iol!c stage.

AU\l~Wl: th• 1,1ppeal,

"t:U>:. \II 1;1r11viclbtg disclaimer as a ground for eviction of a
tt:WIP.A ii! cl.(t;) l)f s. 13(1) of the Raj3sthan Premises (Control of Rent
H 31!d IJ:viction) Act, 1950, the Legislature decided to give effect to the
330
KiJNDAN MAL v. GURUDUTTA [SilARMJ;, J.] :Hi
provisions of cl.(g) of s. Ill of the Transfer of Property Act, Ii!Si. tlie
A
ptincipie of forfeiture on disciaimer is founded on the rule that a iiiaii
cannot apj>tohate and reprobate at the same time. Since the tonse-
quen~e of iij>plying the rule is very serious, it must be held that tlie
deillai has to be clear and in unequivocal terms. [3j4C-i> I

In the instant case, the 1973 suit was not direcied against an'y of
the defendants excepting the Municipality and the statements in tlie
plaint were made by way of giving the background in' whieh the
impugned notice by the Municipal officers had been issned. No teiief
against the other defendants including the present respondent was
prayed for. Even interpreting the plaibt in a manner as tatonrahie to
the landlord as may be possible it has iii be accepted that the dotumeiit
cannot be construed to clearly deny the respondent's title in unamhigtt-
t
ous terms. One thing that is coiispicuous is that the appeliailf did not
claim any title in himself. He expressly described the character of his
possession as that of a tenant. Examining the entire plaint in this back-
ground the ground contemplated under s. 13(1)(f) of the Act is ilot made
out. [3348, E-FI '

Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur
and another, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1923, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. iiJ48
of 1980. E

From the Judgment and Order dateci 11.3.80 of the Rajasiha11
High Court in S.A. No. 52 of 1980.

S. Ganesh and P.H. Parekh for the Appellant.

S.S. Khanduja for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SHARMA, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the
decision of the Rajasthan High Court confirming the decree of G
eviction of the appellant from certain premises under s. 13(1)(f) of ihe
Raj,,sthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950
(hereinafter referred to as the Act), on the ground that he had denied
the title of the respotident-landlotd.

2. The appellant has been in possession of the siftictute in goes- H
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 1 S.C.R.

tion since 1953, when he was inducted therein by the owner one
A
Nawab M. Ali Khan. In 1969 Nawab M. Ali Khan died, and it appears
that some dispute arose between his legal representatives and the pre-
sent respondent no. !. It further appears that the dispute was finally
settled in favour of the respondent no. 1 and according to the case of
the appellant he duly recognised him as his landlord and started paying
B rent. In 1973 the appellant received a notice from the Municipal
authorities asking him to remove the disputed structures on the ground
that it was erected on Government land. According to the appellant's
case, the notice was issued at the instance of the respondent no. I, who
was anxious to evict the appellant. The appellant, in the situation, was
forced to file a suit in the civil court challenging the validity of the
notice and praying for injunction against the Municipal authorities
c from interfering with his possession. The respondent no. 1 filed the
present suit on the twin grounds of default in payment of rent and
denial of his title. The case of default in payment of rent was rejected
but the suit was decreed on the ground of denial of title. On appeal,
the Additional District Judge confirmed the decree. The appellant's
D second appeal was also rejected by the High Court at the admission
I stage.

3. The appellant's plaint in the earlier suit by which it is sug-
gested that he challenged the respondent's title was filed in the present
case and marked as Ext. !. The first appellate court has while record-
E ing its finding against the appellant observed that the statements in the
plaint amount to disclaimer and, in any event, it appears that the
appellant failed to acknowledge the land-lord's title therein and conse-
quently he was liable to eviction under clause (f) of s. 13(1) of the Act,
which reads as follows:

F "13. Eviction of tenants.-(!) Notwithstanding any-
thing contained in any law or contract; no Court shall pass
any decree, or make any order, in favour of a landlord,
whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the
tenant (xxx) so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent
therefore to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is
G satisfied.-

(a) A_.

(f) that the tenant has renounced his character as'
H such or denied the title of the landlord and the
KUNDAN MAL'· GURUDUTTA [SPARMA, J.[ 333

...+ latter has not waived his right or condoned the
conduct of the tenant; or"
A

We do not agree. There is no statement in the plaint at all challening
the landlord's right and there was no occasion for the appellant to deal
·with this aspect in view of the scope of his suit. On the other hand, the
pleading shows that he described the nature of his possession as that of B
• .l a tenant and the interest of the present respondent no. 1, who was

~ defendant no. 2 in that suit, as that of a landlord.

t 4. Mr. S.S. Khanduja, the learned counsel for the respondent,
relied on the last sentence of paragraph 1 of the plaint, as mentioned
below, and contended that since the defendant no. 2 was not one of the
heirs of the deceased Nawab M. Ali Khan, this sentence should be
c
.. ~ read as denial of his title:

"He sold out some portion of his property .in his life time
and the remaining property came to be owned by his heirs
i.e. defendants no. 2 to 6." D

Firstly it has to be noticed that although the respondent was wrongly
described as an heir, his title to the property was acknowledged.
Further this sentence cannot be read in isolation. The position is
)I;
explained in paragraph 5 of the above noted plaint in the following
terms: E
f·

• "5. That the land where the stall type.Kachhi shops of the

,
plaintiffs have been constructed, the Defendant No. 2 has
built his house after taking the land on a long term lease
from Nawab Mukarram Ali Khan. In between these there
is a Pukka 'Dola'. There is dispute about the ownership of F
the land between the Defendant No. 2 and the Defendant
No. 3 to 6 since the death of Nawab Mukarram Ali Khan in
the year 1969. Later on the matter has been compromised
in between the four heirs, the Defendant No. 2 developed a
bad motive and he wants that anyhow the plaintiffs should
be evicted from the premises as early as possible and he. G
should occupy the same."
-,}<.
The argument is that the title of the respondent (defendant No. 2 in
the earlier case) was nowhere accepted in the plaint. After mentioning
the dispute between him and the legal representatives of the deceased
Nawab the appellant did not proceed to clarify the position. So far as H
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] I S.C.R.

A the statement in paragraph No. I of the plaint is concerned, the grie- +-
vance is that the title of the landlord was denied, if not completely then
at least in part by describing the defendants 3 to 6 as co-owners with
him. We are not in a position to agree with the contention of the
learned counsel that for these reasons the appellant has to be evicted.
Even interpreting the plaint in a manner as favourable to the landlord
B as may be possible, it has to be accepted that the document cannot be ).._
construed to clearly deny the respondents' title in unambiguous terms.
One thing that is conspicuous is that the appellant did not claim any

c
title in himself. We expressly described the character of his possession
as that of a tenant. Is it in this situation permissible to forfeit his lease
on the ground of disclaimer of title? In providing disclaimer as a
ground for eviction of a tenant in clause (f) of s. 13(1) of the Act, the
-1
Legislature decided to give effect to the provisions of clause (g) of
s. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. The principle of forfeiture on 'i
disdaimer is founded on the rule that a man cannot approbate and
reprobate at the same time. Since the consequence of applying the rule
is very serious, it must be held that the denial has to be clear and in
D unequivocal terms. The decision of this Court in Mohammad Amir
Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur and another, A.I.R. 1965
S.C. 1923, relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant high-
lights this aspect. The facts in that case would show that the tenant
there had made statements against his landlord which were far more '>!
serious than those in the case before us and still was not penalised. It
. .._ E may be appreciated that in the present case the 1973 suit was not

;!
t
directed against any of the defendants excepting the Municipality and
the statements in the plaint referred to above were made by way of
giving the background in which the impugned notice by the Municipal

~~
officers had been issued. No relief against the other defendants includ-
ing the present respondent was prayed for. Examining the entire plaint
F in this background we are of the opinion that the ground contemplated
under s. 13(1)(f) of the Act is not made out. We, therefore, set aside
the judgments of the courts below and dismiss the suit. The appeal is
accordingly allowed with costs throughout.

N.l'.V. Appeal allowed.