Holding

A landlord may raise both sections 12(1)(e) and 12(1)(g) together; both grounds can be considered, and a decree passed on both is treated as mainly under clause (e), invoking section 17 of the Act.

Summary

Kusum Devi, the landlady, filed a suit for eviction of tenant Mohan Lal under sections 12(1)(e) and 12(1)(g) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, claiming a bona‑fide need for residential occupation and for repairs because the premises were unsafe. The trial court and the first appellate court granted eviction on both grounds, but the High Court set aside the decrees, holding that the two grounds could not be pleaded together. The Supreme Court examined whether a landlord may rely on both clauses in a single suit and whether a decree can be passed on both grounds. It held that the Act does not prohibit raising both grounds together; the court must assess each on its merits, and when both are granted the decree is deemed mainly under clause (e), so the provisions of section 17, not section 18, apply. Consequently, the High Court’s decision was reversed, the appeal was allowed, and the decree for eviction under both clauses was restored.

Issues considered

Can a landlord plead both sections 12(1)(e) and 12(1)(g) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, in a single eviction suit?
Whether a decree of eviction can be granted on both grounds simultaneously.
Which statutory provisions (section 17 or section 18) apply when eviction is ordered on both clauses.
Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the lower courts' decrees by following the decision in Smt. Parmeshwari Devi v. Thakur Nathu Singh.

Legislation cited

Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947s. 13(1)(g), s. 13(1)(hh)
Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961s. 21(1)(h), s. 21(1)(o)
Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961s. 12(1)(e), s. 12(1)(g), s. 17, s. 18

Subjects

evictionbona fide requirementlandlordtenantMadhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Actsection 12(1)(e)section 12(1)(g)section 17section 18mutual exclusivity

Judgment

!<-
[2009) 5 S.C.R. 606
~ --
A . ' KUSUM DEVI
v.
MOHAN LAL (DEAD) BY L.RS.
(Civil Appeal No. 2876 of 2001)
APRIL 8, 2009
B
[B.N. AGRAWAL AND G.S. SINGHVI, JJ.]

MADHYA PRADESH ACCOMMODATION CONTROL.
ACT, 1961:
c ss.12(1)(e) and 12(1)(g) - Suit for eviction on both the :
grounds - Under Clause (e) for persot]al requirement for I
residential purposes as also under Clause (g) for carrying out I
repairs due to premises having become unsafe for human
habitation - Held: There is no provision in the Act preventing > °'-
D
a landlord from raising grounds enumerated under Clauses
(e) and (g) together in a suit for eviction - Court is required to
consider both the grounds on merits as they are mutually
exclusive but not destructive of each other - In the instant
case, trial court and first appellate court having found the
E requirements of suit premises by landlady under Clauses (e)
and (g) proved, rightly granted decree of eviction under both
the clauses.

ss. 17 and 18 - Applicability of - HELD: In case decree
.l.-
F for eviction is passed only under clause (e) of s.12(1),
provisions of s. 17 would apply- But if eviction is ordered under
clause (g) alone, s.18 would apply- However, where decree
is passed under Clauses (e) and (g) both, it shall be deemed
to have been passed mainly under Clause (e) and, therefore,
G provisions of s. 17 would apply and not of s. 18.
Appellant's suit for eviction was decreed by the trlal _i.•
court, inter alia, on the ground of bona fide need for
residential purpose uls 12(1)(e) of the Madhya Pradesh
H 606
L

KUSUM DEVI v. MOHAN LAL (DEAD) BY L.RS. 607

- ~
Accommodation Control Act, 1961 as also u/s 12(1)(g) for A
carrying out repairs in the suit'premises as it had become
·~
unsafe for human habitation. The first appellate court
affirmed the decree. In the second appeal filed by the
respondent-tenant, the High Court set aside the decree
passed by both the courts below as in its opinion no B
~~
decree could be granted if the grounds enumerated
under Clauses (e) and (g) of s.12(1) of the Act, were taken
together in a suit for eviction and in such a case both the
claims could not be held to be bona fide.

Allowing the appeal, the Court c
HELD: 1.1. What is to be ascertained by the court in
a suit for eviction under Clauses (e) and (g) of s.12(1) of
.., the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961
is the bona fide requirement of the landlord; under Clause D
.r---"
(e) for own occupation and under clause (g} for carrying
out repairs, etc. in the suit premises. If, on the basis of
the pleadings and evidence led, the court is satisfied that
the landlord has established his bona fide requirement of
the suit premises for his own occupation or for any E
member of his family under Clause (e}, it may order
eviction of tenant under the said clause. There is no
provision in the Act preventing a landlord from raising
grounds enumerated under clauses (e) and (g) of sub-
section (1) of s.12 of the Act together in a suit for eviction. F
-J. Once the bona fide requirement under Clause (e) is held
to have been proved, the mere fact of having
simultaneously pleaded in the plaint that the suit
premises, having become unsafe or unfit for human
habitation, are bona fide required for carrying out repairs,
G
which could not be done without the premise$ being
vacated, does not affect the bona fide requirement of a
~
landlord under Clause (e). Therefore, once bona fide
requirement of a landlord for own occupation stands
established and a decree for eviction is granted under the
H
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 5 S.C.R.

A relevant provision, it is well within the right of the landlord
to either move to the building without or after carrying out
repairs. [Para 9 and 14] [616-C, D; 620-E-H]

1.2. In a case where eviction has been sought both
8 on the grounds of bona fide requirement by the landlord
for occupation of the premises for himself or any member
of his family, as required under s.12(1)(e) of the Act and
for carrying out repairs, as enumerated under s.12(1 )(g)
of the Act, the court is required to consider both the
grounds on merits, as they are mutually exclusive, but not
C destructive of each other. In case decree for eviction is
passed only under Clause (e), the landlord would be
entitled to move into the premises without or after making
any repairs, and the provisions of s.17 of the Act would
apply. But if the same is passed under Clause (g) alone,
D the provisions of s.18 would apply. However, in case
decree is passed under clauses (e) and (g) both, in that
eventuality, the same shall be deemed to have been
passed mainly under clause (e}, and, as such, the
provisions of s.17 of the Act would alone apply and not
E s.18. [Para 25] [627-F, G, H; 628-A]

1.3. In the case on hand, the trial court as well as the
first appellate court, having found the requirements of
suit premises by the landlady under clauses (e) and (g)
F proved, rightly granted decree for eviction under both the
clauses. The High Court was not justified in setting aside
the said decrees by following the judgment in the case
of Smt. Parrneshwari Devi* as the law laid down therein
runs contrary to the principles laid down by this Court
G In the case of Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta** and other
decisions. The judgment of the High Court is set aside
and that rendered by the first appellate court confirming
the decree for eviction is restored. [Para 26 and 27] [628-
C; 628-E]
H
KUSUM DEVI v. MOHAN LAL (DEAD) BY L.RS. 609
·~· -t'

*Smt. Panneshwari Devi vs. Thakur Nathu Singh, 1998 A
(1) MPJR 462, overruled.

**Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta vs. lndradaman Amratlal
Sheth, AIR 1964 SC 1676; P.S. Pareed Kaka & Ors. vs.
Shafee Ahmed Saheb, (2004) 3 SCR 412; Modem Tailoring
~"'
B
Hall vs. H.S. Venkusa and Ors. (1997) 5 SCC 315 and
Radhey Shyam & Ors. vs. Kalyan Mal, (1984) 4 SCC 447,
relied on.

Krishna Das Nandy vs. Bidhan Chandra Roy, AIR 1959
,.. Calcutta 181 and Smt. Rohinibai vs. Vishnumurthy, 1980 (1) c
ILR (Karnataka) 340, referred to.
,
Matthew James Mckenna & Anr. Vs. Porter Motors Ltd.,
.... (1956) AC 688 and Betty's Cafes Ltd. Vs. Phillips Furnishing
t --~
Stores Ltd., (1959) AC 20, referred to. D
Case Law Reference:
1998 (1) MPJR 462 overruled para 1
AIR 1964 SC 1676 relied on para 15
E

- (2004) 3 SCR 412
(1997) 5 sec 315
(1984) 4 sec 447 ..
relied on
relied on
relied on
para 17
para 18
para 19
> -A
(1956) AC 688 para 21
F
referred to
(1959) AC 20 referred to para 22
AIR 1959 Calcutta 181 referred to para 23
1980 (1) ILR (Karnataka) 340 referred to para 24 G

~ .. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
2876 of 2001.

" H
610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 5 S.C.R.

A From the Judgment and Order dated 2.8.1999 of the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jaipur in Second Appeal No. 468
of 1995.

H.L. Agarwal, Akshat Srivastava, P.P. Singh and lnderjeet
Yadav for the Appellants.
8
Sakesh Kumar, Yogmaya Agnihotri and Ashok Kumar
Singh for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c B.N. AGRAWAL, J. 1. The appellant - landlady filed a suit
for eviction of respondent-tenant from the suit premises under
Section 12 (1)(a), (c), (e), {g) and (o) of the Madhya Pradesh
Accommodation Control Act, 1961 [hereinafter referred to as
'the Act']. Decreeing the suit, the trial court directed the
D respondent to deliver vacant possession of the suit premises
to the appellant and to pay the unpaid rental of Rs. 1080/- to
her within one month. Being aggrieved, the respondent filed an
appeal in the Court of lllrd Additional District Judge, Damoh.
Dismissing the appeal, the first appellate court held that the
E appellant was entitled to get vacant possession of the suit
premises from the respondent only under clauses {e) and {g)
of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act. Aggrieved thereby,
the respondent filed an appeal before the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh. The High Court, by the impugned judgment, following
F the judgment in the case of Smt. Parmeshwari Devi vs. Thakur
Nathu Singh, 1998 (1) MPJR 462, a decision of the same High
Court - while allowing the appeal and setting aside the decrees
of eviction granted by both the courts below under clauses (e)
and {g) of Section 12{1) of the Act, held that no decree could
G be passed ifthe grounds enumerated under clauses {e) and (g)
are taken together in a suit for eviction as both the claims could
not be held to be bona fide. Hence, this appeal by special leave.
2. Briefly put, the facts are that the appellant herein
H purchased a two-storied building, namely, Ward No. 1, Damoh,
KUSUM DEVI v. MOHAN LAL (DEAD) BY L.RS. 611
..... ~ [B.N. AGRAWAL, J.]
A
-
by a registered Sale Deed dated 13.6.1986 from one Mahindra
Raja Jain and respondent herein, who was inducted as tenant
by the ex-owner Mahindra Raja Jain in the first floor of the said
house and was residing in the suit premises at the time of its
purchase by the appellant, became tenant of the appellant.
' .A Since the respondent had not paid rent since 1979, the right B
to recover the same was assigned to the appellant by the ex-
owner. Failure of the respondent to pay rental resulted in a
notice being sent by the appellant on 29th August, 1986, but
despite that respondent did not pay rental to the appellant. On
20th July, 1987, appellant filed a suit for eviction against the c
respondent on grounds, inter alia, of bona fide need for
residential purpose under Section 12(1)(e) and for carrying out
repairs in the suit premises as it had become unsafe for human
habitation under Section 12(1)(g), which repairs, according to
~-._,f
the appellant, could not be carried out until the suit premises D
were vacated by the respondent. It was stated that since - at
the time of purchase - the accommodation available with the
appellant on the ground floor was inadequate, the appellant had
to hire a room in the same locality for the purpose of keeping
the household goods. It was further stated that keeping in view
the large family of the appellant consisting of a retired husband, E
five married daughters, who keep visiting her regularly, and
marriageable sons, the appellant and his family was facing
acute shortage of residential accommodation. '

-A 3. The respondent contested the said suit and filed a F
written statement, denying the title of the appellant as well as
the grounds on which his eviction from the suit premises was
sought, stating as follows:-

"Since the year 1953-54, I am a tenant in the suit house. I
G
had taken this house on rent from Sunder Lal Jain ...... The
plaintiff used to live in the ground floor portion of the house
•_;
along with her husband and one child and the remaining
members of the family had been married. The Plaintiff had
~
taken on rent some rooms in Asati Dharmashala. Mohinder
H
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 5 S.C.R.
~
~
A Raja is the son of Sunder Lal Jain, who used to live in
London. This house has been sold by Mohinder Raja to
the Plaintiff..... Kusum Devi had sent me notice before the
Nalish ... I had never given any rent to Kusum Devi. ...This
-
is true to suggest that in the year 1965 I came to know that
B Mohinder Raja is the son of Sunder Lal Vaidya Raj .... I
indicated this as the wrong statement because I did not
know that he had any right over the suit property. When
Mohinder Raja went away after executing the registry of
the suit house only then I came to know that Mohinder Raja
c was the owner of the suit house. I came to know after going
through the notice that Mohinder Raja was the owner of
the suit house. This is true to suggest that on 13.6.86 the
registry of the suit house had been executed ... The suit
house was constructed in 1948 .. .This is true to suggest
that on the first floor, where my latrine is located, to its side
D )._. ~
Basant Khanwilker's house is situated. The walls of the suit
house side where Basant Khanwilkar is living ... are in bad
condition. The bricks of that side have been washed away .
. This is true to suggest that there one crack has been
formed in the roof of the house. This crack is just above
E
the partition. This is true to suggest that the son of the
plaintiff who used to live with her in the suit house has
reached the age of marriage. The elder son of the Plaintiff
has been married. He used to pay visit to plaintiffs place.
All the five daughters of the plaintiff have been married and
F they also used to visit the plaintiffs place. This is true to A-
suggest that the husband of the plaintiff is a retired
postmaster."

As stated above, the trial court, after considering the
G pleadings of both the parties and analyzing the evidence led,
decreed the suit of the appellant-plaintiff on all the grounds
taken in the suit and directed the respondent-tenant to deliver _\..
vacant possession of the suit premises to the appellant within
one month. The said judgment of the trial court was
H unsuccessfully challenged by the respondent by filing an appeal
KUSUM DEVI v. MOHAN LAL (DEAD) BY L.RS. 613

..... ·- [B.N. AGRAWAL, J.]
before the first appellate court in relation to grounds A
enumerated under clauses (e) and (g). Being aggrieved, the
respondent carried the matter - by way of Second Appeal - to
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, which, while reversing the
....
judgment of the first appellate court, held that no decree could
"' ~'
be granted if the grounds enumerated under clauses (e) and B
' (g) are taken together in a suit for eviction as both the claims
could not be held to be bona fide. In so holding, the High Court
followed the judgment in the case of Smt. Parmeshwari Devi
[supra].
_,
'
4. Shri H.L.Agrawal, learned senior counsel appearing on c
behalf of the appellant, submitted that both the courts below
having concurrently found the requirement of suit premises by
the appellant bona fide for the purpose of residence under
Section 12 (1) (e) and for carrying out repairs under Section
,>-...A 12 (1) (g) as the accommodation had become unsafe/unfit for D
human habitation, it was not open to the High Court to go into
the question whether both the grounds for eviction under
Section 12 (1) (e) and Section 12 (1) (g) could be taken
together or not. The High Court, therefore, has committed a
grave error by going into that question and holding that if E
grounds for eviction under Section 12 (1)(e) and 12 (1) (g) are
raised together, both the claims could not be held to be bona
fide and no decree could be granted at the same time.
~ _J. 5. On the other hand, Shri Sakesh Kumar, learned counsel F
appearing on behalf of the respondent, has submitted that by
the impugned judgment, the High Court has rightly set aside
the decree of both the courts below granted under Section 12
(1)(e) and Section 12(1)(g) as both the grounds, being
contradictory to and destructive of each other, could not be
G
taken together in a suit for eviction.
•j 6. Before considering the rival submissions of both the
parties, it would be useful to refer to the relevant provisions of
-{
the Act, which are set out hereunder: -
H
~
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 5 S.C.R.

A "Section 12: Restriction on eviction of tenants:-
-· ,,
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in
any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any civil
Court against .a tenant for his eviction from any
~
accommodation except on one or more of the following
B ,.-~

grounds only, namely:

(e) that the accommodation let for residential purposes is
required bonafide by the landlord for occupation as a
residence for himself or for any member of his family, if
c he is the owner thereof, or for any person f9r whose benefit
the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such
person has no other reasonably suitable residential
accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or
town concerned;
D
(g) that the accommodation has become unsafe, or unfit
for human habitation and is required bonafide by the
landlord for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried
out without the accommodation being vacated;"
E According to clause (e), a landlord can file a suit for
eviction of tenant if the accommodation let for residential
purpose is required bona fide by him for occupation as a
residence for himself or for any member of his family if he is
the owner thereof, provided the landlord has no other
!.-
F reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in
his occupation in the city or town concerned. Under clause (g),
what is required to be established by a landlord seeking
eviction is that the accommodation has become unsafe, or unfit
for human habitation and is bona fide required by him for the
G purpose of carrying out repairs, etc., and that such repairs
cannot be carried out without the accommodation being
vacated. Therefore, in a suit for eviction under Section 12(1)e) ..
_

and Section 12(1 )(g), what the court is required to see is the
bona fide requirement of the landlord; under the former clause
H for occupation of the landlord or any member of his family and
I
-<
KUSUM DEVI v. MOHAN LAL (DEAD) BY L.RS. 615
'.. , [B.N. AGRAWAL, J.)
~
+-
under the latter, for the purpose of carrying out repairs. A

7. There are provisions in the Act that provide sufficient
protection to the tenants against whom decree of eviction is
granted under clauses (e) and (g). Section 17 of the Act
provides that a landlord on recovery of possession of any B
·-' accommodation from the tenant in pursuance of order made
under clauses (e) or (D shall not, except with the permission of
the Rent Controlling Authority, re-let whole or any part of the
accommodation so recovered within two years from the date
of obtaining such possession. It further provides that failure of
the landlord to occupy the premises so recovered within two
c
months of obtaining the possession or, after occupation within
two months, if it is re-let, within two years from the date of
obtaining such possession, to any person other than the evicted
tenant without obtaining the permission of the Rent Controlling
>"- -1 Authority or is transferred to any other person for reasons which D
do not appear to the Rent Controlling Authority to be bona fide,
the Rent Controlling Authority may, on application made to it in
this behalf by such evicted tenant, direct the landlord to put the
tenant in possession or pay him such compensation as the
Rent Controlling Authority thinks fit. E

8. Section 18 of the Act provides that the court while
granting decree on the grounds specified in clause (g) or (h)
of sub-section (1) of Section 12, shall ascertain from the tenant
_J whether he would like to be placed in occupation of the F
accommodation or part thereof from which he is to be evicted
and on his so electing, shall record the fact of the election in
the order specifying the date on or before which he shall deliver
possession so as to enable the landlord to commence the work
of repairs or building or re-building, as the case may be, and
G
on the tenant delivering the possession within the date
specified, the landlord shall, within one month of the completion
-"'_)_
of such work, place the tenant in occupation of the
accommodation or part thereof. It further provides that on failure
,
of the landlcrd, after having obtained possession of the
H
616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 5 S.C.R.

A premises within the date specified in the order, to commence
the work of repairs, etc., within one month of the specified date
or complete the work in a reasonable time or after completion
of the work, to place the tenant in occupation of the premises,
the Court may, on application made to it in this behalf by the
B evicted tenant within the prescribed time, order the landlord to
place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation or part
thereof or to pay to the tenant such compensation as the court
thinks fit.

9. As stated above, what is to be ascertained by the court
C in a suit for eviction under clauses (e) and (g) is the bona fide
requirement of the landlord; under clause (e) for own occupation
and under clause (g) for carrying out repairs, etc. in the suit
premises. If, on the basis of the pleadings and evidence led,
the court is satisfied that the landlord has established his bona
D fide requirement of the suit premises for his own occupation
or for any member of his family under clause (e), it may order
eviction of tenant under the said clause. Once such a decree
is passed, the landlord, by grant of such decree in his favour,
gets a right to either move to the building so vacated without
E or after making repairs, alterations, additions, etc.

10. In the case on hand, both the courts below concurrently
found that the appellant required the premises for her own use
and, therefore, granted a decree for eviction under Section
F 12(1}{e). We have been taken through the pleadings and the
evidence led in both the courts below and find that, while
arriving at the finding of bona fide requirement of the suit
premises by the appellant, both the courts below very carefully
considered the pleadings of the parties and analyzed the
G evidence on record. In fact, the respondent himself, in his written
statement, spoke about the factum of large family of the
appellant and her having taken on rent some accommodation
in the locality for keeping household goods. The relevant
portion of the written statement of the respondent is reproduced
below:-
H
KUSUM DEVI v. MOHAN LAL (DEAD) BY L.RS. 617
[B.N. AGRAWAL, J.)
j +-
''The plaintiff used to live in the ground floor portion of the A
house along with her husband and one child and the
1
remaining members of the family had been married. The
Plaintiff had taken on rent some rooms in Asati
Dharmashala. This is true to suggest that the son of the
~
plaintiff who used to live with her in the suit house has B
reached the age of marriage. The elder son of the Plaintiff
has been married. He used to pay visit to plaintiffs place.
All the five daugMers of the plaintiff have been married and
they also used to visit the plaintiffs place. This is true to
suggest that the husband of the plaintiff is a retired c
postmaster. ... ".

We, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the findings
concurrently recorded by both the courts below on the aspect
of bona fide requirement of the suit premises by the appellant
~ for her use under ~ection 12(1 )(e). In our view, the trial court D
as well as the first appellate court have rightly come to the
conclusion that trie requirement of suit premises by the appellant
was bona fide and granted decree under clause (e).
11. Having held that the present case is one where the E
appellant has established her bona fide requirement of the suit
premises for residential purpose under clause (e), we now turn
to the grounds raised by the appellant under clause (g) i.e., that
the accommodation having become unsafe or unfit for human
-) habitation, she bona fide required the same for carrying out F
repairs, etc., and that such repairs could not be carried out
without the accommodation being vacated. Both the courts
below have relied upon the statements of Puran Chand [PW.2],
Khemchand Asati [PW.3], Bhagawati Prasad [PW.4], C.K.
Shrivastava [PW.5] and Mohinder Raja Jain [PW.6] and Exhibit G
P-6. All these witnesses in their depositions have categorically
stated that the suit premises were in a dilapidated condition,
,._ -"- that there were cracks on the walls and that the building, being
very old, has become quite weak. PW.5 - Shri C.K. Srivastava,
,.
an official of the Public Works Department, in his deposition
H
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 5 S.C.R.
._,, ~
A has stated that the suit house needed special repairs and that
the repairs could not be carried out without getting the house
vacated. Exhibit P.6 is a notice dated 16.9.87 sent by one Mr.
Khanwilker, whose house is next to the appellant, stating that
the suit premises were in rundown condition, which was posing
B a danger to the safety of life and property. Even the respondent ~
in his written statement has admitted about the dilapidated
condition of the suit building, the relevant portion of which is as
under:-

'The suit house was constructed in 1948... This is true to
c suggest that on the first floor, where my latrine is located,
to its side Basant Khanwilker's house is situated. The walls
of the suit house side where Basant Khanwilkar is
living ... are in bad condition. The bricks of that side have
been washed 9way. This is true to suggest that there one
D ).. _ __..
crack has been formed in the roof of the house. This crack
is just above the partition."

On the basis of the statements of PWs. 2 to 6 and Exhibit
P-6 as also the written statement of the respondent, both the
E courts below were quite justified in arriving at a finding that the
appellant has succeeded in proving her bona fide requirement
under Section 12 (1 )(g) as well and accordingly granted a
decree for eviction against the respondent on that ground as
well.
F A-
12. This brings us to the question whether in a suit for
eviction the grounds enumerated under clauses (e) and (g) of
Section 12 (1) can be raised together by a landlord. As stated
above, the High Court, by the impugned judgment, following
Smt. Parmeshwari Devi [supra], held that no decree could be
G granted if the grounds enumerated under clauses (e) and (g)
are taken together in a suit for eviction as both the claims could
_,\.A
not be held to be bona fide.

13. In Smt. Parmeshwari Devi [supra], plaintiff filed a suit
H for eviction of defendant on the grounds enumerated under
KUSUM DEVI v. MOHAN LAL (DEAD) BY L.RS. 619
[B.N. AGRAWAL, J.]
~

i-
clauses (e) and (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act. A
While the trial court granted a decree of eviction under clause
(h), but not under clause (e), the first appellate court, on appeal
being preferred by the defendant challenging grant of eviction
decree under clause (h) and on cross objection being filed by
the plaintiff seeking decree under clause (e) as well, dismissed B
,-',
the appeal filed by the defendant and allowed the cross
objection filed by the plaintiff and granted decree of eviction
under clause (e) as well. On appeal being preferred by the
defendant, the High Court, while allowing the appeal and setting
aside decrees of eviction granted by the trial court and the first
appellate court under clauses (e) and (h) of sub-section (1) of
c
Section 12 of the Act, observed as under: -

"... this court is of the view that no difficulty would arise if
the respondent had approached the court without asserting

- _.. that he wanted to reconstruct the house or demolish it, D
provided he required the accommodation for his residence.
In the case of Rarriniklal Pitamabardas Mehta vs.
lndradaman Amratlal Sheth, AIR 1964 SC 1676 it was held
that once it is proved that landlord required the house bona
fide, it did not matter if he occupied the house after E

- reconstructing or demolishing it. Therefore, we take it that
it is well established that once the bona fide requirement
under section 12 ( 1) (e) of the Act. is proved together with
other ingredients of that Section, it would not be of any
-;> consequence whether the accommodation is occupied as F
such or the house is reconstructed or demolished as such
or the house is reconstructed or demolished for the
purpose of residence, but the landlord could not let it out
within two years of obtaining possession unless conditions
mentioned in Section 17 are satisfied ..... the court has no G
option to say that:respondent could not have pleaded bona
fide requirement for residence as well as bona fide
•. >· ;_ requirement for reconstruction simultaneously. Both the
pleas destroy each other. It is true that under Order VII Rule
7 of the Code of Civil Procedure alternative reliefs are
H
620 "suPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 5 S.C.R.
~
~ '
A permitted. It is also well established that alternative and
inconsistent claims have been permitted by courts subject
to rider that law permits a court to do so."

The High Court further observed as under: -
B "this court is of the view that the plea of the respondent/ )-.,

landlord that he required the suit house bona fide for the
residence of himself and that of the members of his family
cannot stand together with the plea of the landlord that he
required the suit house bona fide for reconstruction. On
c the contrary, the requirement of bona fide reconstruction
of the suit house cannot be pleaded simultaneously with
the plea of bona fide requirement for persona residence.
Both the pleas are mutually destructive of each other and
the very fact that they were pleaded together shows that
D none of them are bona fide ....the landlord can take only
one of pleas so that it be bona fide. The moment he
chooses the second with the first both destroy each other"

14. There is no provision in the Act preventing a landlord
from raising grounds enumerated under clauses (e) and (g) of
E sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act together in a suit for
eviction. In a given case like the present one, raising both the
grounds together, what the court is required to see is whether -
the bona fide requirement of the landlord to occupy the
premises for his own occupation has been proved or not. Once
F the bona fide requirement under clause (e) is held to have been ..I, -

proved, the mere fact of having simultaneously pleaded in the
plaint that the suit premises, having become unsafe or unfit for
human habitation, are bona fide required for carrying out
repairs, which could not be carried out without the premises
G being vacated, does not affect the bona fide requirement of a
landlord under clause (e). Therefore, once bona fide
requirement of a landlord for own occupation stands ~ _..._

established and a decree for eviction is granted under the .;

relevant provision, it is well within the right of the landlord to
H either move to the building without or after carrying out repairs.
KUSUM DEVI v. MOHAN LAL (DEAD) BY L.RS. 621
[B.N. AGRAWAL. J.]
/
f-
15. In Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta vs. lndradaman A
Amrat/a/ Sheth, AIR 1964 SC 1676, a decision of a 3-judge
Bench of this Court, referred in Smt. Parmeshwari Devi [supra],
respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for ejectment of the defendant-
tenant from the suit premises on the grounds of bona fide
requirement for own occupation under clause (g), which is B
~·--'
analogous to clause (e) in the case on hand, and for making
additions, alterations and necessary changes in the suit
premises, it being in dilapidated condition, under clause (hh)
of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel
and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, which is more c
or less similar to clause (g) in the case on hand. Finding that
the respondent bona fide required the premises for his own
occupation, the trial court decreed the suit on both the grounds.
Agreeing with the views of the trial court, the first appellate court
dismissed the appeal preferred by the defendant-tenant. The D
4
~
defendant -tenant then preferred a revision before the High
Court, which was also dismissed. On appeal by special leave
being preferred to this Court, the sole question that arose before
this Court was whether the case of the respondent-plaintiff fell
within the provisions of Section 13(1}(g) or Section 13(1)(hh) E
of the said Act. After having answered the question that the
case of the respondent-plaintiff fell within the provisions of
Section 13(1)(g), this Court observed at page 1678 as under:-

"....we agree with the courts below that the respondent's
_j case falls under cl. g when he bona fide requires tbe F
premises for his own occupation. The mere fact that he
intends to make alterations in the house either on account
of his sweet will or on account of absolute necessity in view
of the condition of the house, does not affect the question
of his requiring the. house bona fide and reasonably for his G
occupation, when he has proved his need for occupying
the house. There is no such prohibition either in the
) ,.(
to
language of cl. g or in any other provision of the act the
effect that the landlord must occupy the house for
residence without making any alterations in it. There could H
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 5 S.C.R.

-\ -
'
A not be any logical reason for it."

After so observing, this court held at page 1679 as under:-

"we are therefore of opinion that once the landlord
establishes that he bona fide requires the premises for his
B occupation, he is entitled to recover possession of it from
tenant in view of the provisions of sub-cl. g of Section 13
(1) irrespective of the fact whether he would occupy the
premises without making any alteration to them or after
making the necessary alterations."
c
16. There is a long line of decisions wherein, in identical
situations, the principle laid down in Ramniklal [supra] has been
reiterated by this Court.

17. In P.S. Pareed Kaka & Ors. vs. Shafee Ahmed Saheb,
D (2004) 3 SCR 412, a 2-Judge Bench of this Court, while ,_ ....
interpreting clauses (h) and 0) of sub-section 1 of Section 21
of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, which clauses are
analogous to clauses (e) and (g) of sub-section (1) of Section
12 of the Act in the present case, held, at page 419, as under:-
E
"... the trial court has miserably failed to consider whether
the need as put forth is bona fide, reasonable or not. The
High Court on re-appreciation of evidence, came to the
conclusion that the need is bona fide and the building
F required demolition and reconstruction .... it is in evidence .\ -
that the premises is very old and the building therein is
dilapidated and portions of the building have also
collapsed. It is also in evidence that the rear outhouse
building has already collapsed. In these circumstances, it
G cannot be said that the said need is not bona fide or
unreasonable. It is not for the tenant to suggest that there
is no need to demolish the existing building and construct
the new building. The landlord is entitled to make use of
his property for any reasonable purpose. If the landlord
-'• .
chooses to use it for residential purpose, the tenant cannot
H
KUSUM DEVI v. MOHAN LAL (DEAD) BY L.RS. 623
[B.N. AGRAWAL, J.]
~
say that he should not do so." A
.... It was further held at page 420 as under:-

"Law is well settled on this aspect. Even if the building is
in a good condition, if it is not suitable for the requirement
of the landlord, he can always demolish even a good B
building and put up a new building to suit his requirements.
It is not necessary for the landlord to prove that the
condition of the building is such that it require immediate
demolition particularly when the premises is required by
the landlord. Therefore, it has t.o be held that the finding of c
the trial court cannot be sustained and the High Court on
re-appreciation of the evidence, rightly so, held that the
landlord has established that his need for all the four
__,. petition schedule premises is bona fide and reasonable."

- -t 18. In Modern Tailoring Hall vs. H.S. Venkusa and Ors.,
(1997) 5 sec 315, this Court was dealing with a case in which
D

the landlord had sought eviction of the tenant under clauses (h)
and Q) of sub-section 1 of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent
Control Act,1986, which correspond to clauses (e} and (g) in
E
the present case. While dismissing the appeal of the tenant and
declining to take a view contrary to one expressed in Ramnikla/
[supra], this Court, at page 317, held as under:-
" .... The ground of eviction given in the two provisions being
-) mutually exclusive have flowing therefrom separate F
individual rights and obligations and they cannot be
permitted to overlap so as to confer on the court the
discretion of employing one provision over the other. An
application of the landlord, if not falling under Section 21
(1) (h), would on its own, merit dismissal. The court cannot G
treat it in its discretion as one under Section 21 (1 )Q) and
order an unwanted eviction. The distinction qualitatively
.. ~
has to be maintained. We therefore, decline to take a view
to the contrary, even if it be possible, than the one taken
by the high court based as it is on the decision of this court H
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 5 S.C.R.

A in Ramnik/a/ Pitambardas Mehta vs. lndradaman
Amrat/al Sheth."

19. In Radhey Shyam & Ors. Vs. Kalyan Mal, (1984) 4
--
SCC 447, this Court followed Ramnik/a/ [supra] and while
dismissing appeal of the tenant, at page 449 observed as
8
u~e~- A-

"a case more or less similar on facts had come up before
this Court in Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta v.
lndradaman Amratla/ Sheth which arose from
c proceedings taken under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and
Lodging House, Rates Control Act 57 of 1947. There the
eviction was sought under Section 13 (1)(g) and 13 (1) (hh)
of that Act. Section 13 (1) (g) of that Act corresponds to
section 12 (1) (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation ..
D Control Act and Section 13 (1 )(hh) of that Act corresponds
to Section 12 (1)(g), namely, that the building is required
,. ..
for effecting either repairs or alterations. This court has
observed in that case that once the landlord establishes
that he bona fide requires the premises for his occupation,
E he is entitled to recover possession of it from the tenant
under the provisions of sub-clause (g) of Section 13 (1)
irrespective of the fact whether he would occupy the
premises without making any alterations or after making
the necessary alterations .... '.
F After so observing, it was held at page 449 as under: -
"Though the facts of that case are slightly different in that
the requirement was for occupation after making some
alterations whereas in the present case the requirement
G is for locating the landlord's factory after demolishing and
re-constructing the building, the principle deducible from
that decision would apply to the facts of even these cases
We agree with Mr. U.R. Lalit, learned counsel for the
respondent landlord that the order of eviction is based
H mainly under Section 12 (1 )(f) of the Act and that from the
KUSUM DEVI v. MOHAN LAL (DEAD) BY L.RS. 625
[8.N. AGRAWAL, J.]
mere fact that Section 12(1)(h) also is added would not A
make the order of eviction only one under Section 12(1 )(h)
of the Act and Section 18 of the Act will not be attracted."

20. We may now notice some more decisions wherein
also clauses akin to clauses (e) and (g) were interpreted in the 8
way they have been in Ramniklal [supra] and other decisions
referred to above.

21. In Matthew James Mckenna & Anr. Vs. Porter Motors
Ltd., (1956) AC 688, while construing clauses (h) and (m) of
sub-section (1) of Section 24 of Tenancy Act, 1948 of New C
Zealand, and dismissing the appeal of the appellant-tenant, the
Privy Council held as under:-

"........ The real question turns on the meaning of "his or
their own occupation." Apart from paragraph (m) there D
would be no doubt that a landlord required demised
premises for his own occupation although he was intending
for \he purposes of his occupation to make substantial
alterations, or put up a wholly new building. The difficulty
arises from the existence of paragraph (m). Is that to be E
construed as covering all demolition or reconstructions
cases, including those where the landlord will remain in
occupation, or do the words of paragraph (h) limit its
operation.

Their Lordships are of the opinion that its scope is F
so limited. This gives their natural meaning to the words
"for his or their own occupation" while leaving a scope for
paragraph (m), which accords with the distinction plainly
drawn by paragraphs (g) and (h) between landlords who
require to relet or resell and landlords who require to G

.
)
occupy ........ ."

22. In Betty's Cafes Ltd. Vs. Phillips Furnishing Stores
Ltd., (1959) AC 20, the House of Lords, while dismissing
appeal of the tenant, whose eviction was sought by the landlord H
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009) 5 S.C.R.

~

A under clauses (f) and (g) of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954,
held that the fact that the landlords might intend to occupy the
rebuilt premises themselves did not deprive them of the right
to possession under paragraph (f), since they could satisfy its
conditions; such a deprivation was not implied in it when read
B with paragraph (g).
23. In Krishna Das Nandy vs. Bidhan Chandra Roy, AIR
1959 Calcutta 181, a 2-Judge Bench of the Calcutta High Court,
while answering a question whether bona fide requirement for
own occupation of a landlord would include building or re-
c building of the suit premises so as to make the premises livable
as per his requirement, observed at pages 188-189 as under:-

"The plaintiffs case is that he requires the disputed
premises for building and/or re-building for his own
D occupation or, in other words, that he requires it for his own r
occupation and, for that purpose, he will build and/or re-
build it. .... Where the requirement is for building and re-
building, that must be for purposes other than the landlord's
own occupation and where the requirement is for the
E landlord's own occupation, no question of building and re-
building should arise; or, to put it straight, if the landlord's
case is that he requires the premises for building and re-
building, he cannot claim to occupy it himself and if his case
be that he requires it for his own occupation, he must
F occupy it as it is and must on his own showing or ,4. -
admission, it will not be fit for his own occupation unless
built and/or rebuilt, his case of requirement for his own
occupation must fail under the statute."

After so observing, the Court held at page 189 as under:-
G
"... occupation of the premises for purposes of building and/

'.
or rebuilding in order to make it fit for one's own occupation
would be part of such occupation".

24. In Smt. Rohinibai vs. Vishnumurthy, 1980 (1) ILR 340,
H
KUSUM DEVI v. MOHAN LAL (DEAD) BY L.RS. 627
~
[B.N. AGRAWAL, J.]
a 2-Judge Bench of the Karnataka High Court, in an identical A
~'
situation, held at pages 344-345 as under:-

"It is no doubt true that there could not be an order of
eviction both under clauses (h} and 0) of Section 21 (1) of
.,,_i.
the Act. This is clear from not only the wording of clauses B
(h) and 0) of Section 21 (1) of the Act, but also provisions
of Sections 25 to 28 of the Act. Under clause (h) an order
of eviction could be made only for the purposes of bona
fide use and occupation of the premises by the landlord.
However, as pointed out in the aforesaid decisions, the
• clause does not require that a landlord after securing an
c
order of eviction of tenant from a premises should occupy
it as it existed on the date of eviction. There is no restriction

- -;--
on the landlord to have alteration or to have new
construction after demolishing the premises as existed on
the date of eviction .... In the nature of things the scope of D
clause (h) is entirely different from clause U). Therefore,
there could not be an order of eviction on boththe grounds
specified in clauses (h) and U). It is for this reason , they
are mutually exclusive but this does not mean that a
landlord seeking eviction on the grounds mentioned in E
clause (h) cannot plead that he wants to occupy the
premises after demolition and reconstruction, and that by
taking such a plea the case goes outside the scope of
clause (h) and falls under clause O)."
-- ) F
25. In view of the foregoing discussion, we hold that in a
case where eviction has been sought both on the grounds of
bona fide requirement by the landlord for occupation of the
premises for himself or any member of his family, as required
under Section 12(1 )(e) of the Act and for carrying out repairs,
G•
as enumerated under Section 12(1 )(g) of the Act, the court is
'\
<
» ;
required to consider both the grounds on me~its, as they are
mutually exclusive, but not destructive of each other. In case
''
decree for eviction is passed only under clause (e), the landlord
would be entitled to move into the premises without or after
HI
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 5 S.C.R.
~

A making any repairs and the provisions of Section 17 of the Act
would apply. But if the same is passed under clause (g) alone,
the provisions of Section 18 would apply. However, in case
decree is passed under clauses (e) and (g) both, in that
eventuality, the same shall be deemed to have been passed
B mainly under clause (e), as such the provisions of Section 17 ...._
of the Act would alone apply and not Section 18 thereof.

26. In the case on hand, the trial court as well as the first
appellate court, having found the requirements of suit premises
by the landlady under clauses (e) and (g) proved, rightly granted
c decree for eviction under both the clauses. In our view, High •
Court was not justified in setting aside the said decrees by
following the judgment in the case of Smt. Parmeshwari Devi
[supra] as law laid down therein runs contrary to the principles
laid down by this Court in the case of Ramnik/al Pitambardas
...
D Mehta [supra] and other decisions referred to above. 1

27. In the result, the appeal is allowed, impugned judgment
of the High Court is set aside and the same rendered by first
appellate court confirming decree for eviction is restored. The
E respondent are granted six months' time to vacate the suit
premises on furnishing usual undertaking to this Court within
eight weeks from today. There shall be no order as to costs.

RP. Appeal allowed.
).,, - "'