LAFARGE AGGREGATES & CONCRETE INDIA P. LTDversusSUKARSH AZAD & ANR
- Citation
- 2013 INSC 602
- Decided
- 10 September 2013
- Disposal
- Dismissed
Holding
Both appeals are dismissed—one on lack of merit and the other on delay and merit—while the respondents are directed to pay the appellant Rs.5 lakh as equitable compensation.
Summary
Lafarge Aggregates & Concrete India Ltd. (appellant) lodged a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act after a cheque of Rs.2.5 lakh issued by the managing director of the respondents was stopped, leading to its dishonour. The respondents filed a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC offering to pay the cheque amount and obtained an ex‑parte order from the High Court quashing the complaint; the appellant’s application to recall that order was dismissed. The appellant appealed both the dismissal of the recall application and the ex‑parte order. The Supreme Court held that the appeal against the recall order lacked merit because the appellant failed to show sufficient cause for non‑appearance, and the appeal against the ex‑parte order was barred by a 359‑day delay and also lacked merit. However, in the interest of equity, the Court directed the respondents to pay the appellant a lump sum of Rs.5 lakh as compensation and interest for the stopped cheque.
Issues considered
- The maintainability and merit of the appeal against the High Court's order dismissing the application to recall the ex‑parte order.
- Whether the appeal against the ex‑parte order quashing the Section 138 complaint is barred by delay and merits dismissal.
- The liability of the respondents to pay the cheque amount despite the quashing of the criminal complaint.
- The interpretation of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act with respect to a stop‑payment instruction.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order IX r.13
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 482
- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881s. 138, s. 139, s. 140, s. 141, s. 142
Subjects
Judgment
[2013] 11 S.C.R 74
A LAFARGE AGGREGATES & CONCRETE INDIA P. LTD
v.
SUKARSH AZAD & ANR
(Criminal Appeal No. 1941 of 2013)
SEPTEMBER 10, 2013
B
[GYAN SUDHA MISRA AND
PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, JJ.]
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - s. 138 - Code of
C Civil Procedure, 1908- Order IX r.13 - Dishonour of cheque
of amount Rs.2,50,0001- - On the ground of 'stop payment'
instruction - Complaint uls. 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act
- Petition u/s. 482 - High Court quashed the complaint and
the consequential proceedings, by ex-parte order -
D Application for recall of the ex-parte order dismissed -
Present appeals against the order dismissing the application
for recalling the ex-parte order and also against the ex-parte
order - Held: Appeal against the order in application for
recalling the ex-parte order is devoid of merit as the applicant
E failed to offer sufficient cause for his non-appearance on the
date when the complaint was quashed - The appeal against
the ex-parte order is liable to be dismissed on the ground of
delay as well as on merit - However, in the interest of equity,
justice and fair play, direction to make payment to the
F complainant for a sum of Rs.5 lakhs, which would be treated
as an overall amount including interest and compensation
towards the cheque for which 'stop payment 'instruction was
issued.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
G No.1941 of 2013.
From the Judgment & Order dated 09.11.2010 of the High
Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM No. 55019
of 2010 in Crl. Misc. No. 20203 of 2010.
H 74
LAFARGE AGGREGATES & CONCRETE INDIA P. 75
LTD v. SUKARSH AZAD
WITH A
Crl. A. No. 1942 of 2013.
Ajay Bhargava, Vanita Bhargava, Nitin Mishra, Abhijeet
Swaroop, Khaitan & Co. for the Appellant.
B
Sudhir Walia, Abhishek Atrey for the Respondents.
The following Order of the Court was delivered by
ORDER
c
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant herein has challenged the order passed
by the High Court whereby it t.ias allowed the petition filed by
the respondents herein, who are the Directors in a company D
known as M/s. Ria Constructions Ltd. and was pleased to
quash the complaint lodged by the appellant as also all
consequential proceedings pending before the Magistrate in
regard to the complaint lodged by the appellant for an offence
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
E
3. Admittedly, the accused no. 2 in the complaint had
issued the cheque in favour of the appellant for a sum of
Rs.2,50,000/-, which was dishonoured as there was instruction
of 'stop payment' by the Managing Director. This led to the
lodgment of a complaint at the instance of the petitioner in which F
proceedings started.
4. At this stage, the respondents herein filed a petition
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
{"Cr.P.C." for short) praying for quashing of the complaint and G
all consequential proceeding wherein the respondents had
offered to tender the cheque amount of Rs.2,50,000/- to the
appellant who had lodged the complaint alleging that the stop
payment instructions by the respondents was illegal which
made the offence triable in a summary procedure before the
Magistrate. As already stated, the respondents offered to pay H
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 11 S.C.R.
A the cheque amount of Rs.2,50,000/- which had been
dishonoured due to instructions of stop payment.
5. The High Court allowed the petition filed by the
respondents herein for quashing of the proceeding but the said
8 order was passed ex-parte. The appellant, therefore, filed an
application for recall of the said order but the High Court
dismissed the application for recall on the ground. that the
averments in the complaint did not meet the test laid .down by
this Court in the matter of N.K. Wahi Vs. Shekhar Singh and
C others, 2007 (9) SCC 481. It is this order which' is under
challenge in this special leave petition at the instance of the
appellant-complainant.
6. We have heard counsel for the appellant as also the
respondents and taking an overall view of the matter, we are
D · of the opinion that this appeal is not fit to be entertained against
rejection of the application for recall of the order by which the
proceedings against the respondents herein had been quashed
by the High Court. Nevertheless, we are conscious of the fact
that the appellant should not be deprived of the amount for which
E the respondents had stopped payment which led to the
lodgment of the complaint. We; therefore, suggested to the
respondents that they should honour the cheque which had
been issued by them by making the payment along with the
interest, which would be in the nature of compensation for stop
F payment instructions at their instance and that amount by way
of lump sum amount including interest and compensation would
be around Rs.5 lakhs.
7. The respondents have agreed to pay the said amount
but the appellant has refused to accept the payment and
G insisted that the appeal against rejection of the recall
application should be allowed by this Court. Counsel for the
appellant submitted that merely because the accused has
offered to make the payment at a later stage, the same cannot
compel the complainant-appellant to accept it and the
H complainant-appellant would be justified in pursuing the
LAFARGE AGGREGATES & CONCRETE INDIA P. 77
LTD v. SUKARSH AZAD
complaint which was lodged under the Negotiable Instruments A
Act, 1881. In support of his submission, counsel for the .
Appellant also relied on a citation of Rajneesh Aggafllfal Vs. ·
Amit J. Bhalla (2001) 1 SCC 631.
8. However, we do not feel persuaded Jo accept this B
submission as the appellant has to apprise himself that the
primary object and reason of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881, is not merely penal in nature but is ·to- maintain the
efficiency and value of a negotiable instrument-by making the
accused honour the negotiable instrument and paying the C
amount for which the instrument had been executed.
9. The object of bringing Sections 138 to 142 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act on statute appears to be to
inculcate faith in the efficacy of banking operations and
credibility in transacting business of negotiable instruments. D
Despite several remedy, Section 138 of the Act i~ intended to
prevent dishonesty on the part of the drawer of negotiable
instrument to draw a cheque without sufficient funds in his
account maintained by him in a bank and induces the payee
or holder in due course to act upon it. Therefore, once a cheque E
is drawn by a person of an account maintained by him for
payment of any amount or discharge of liability or debt or is
returned by a bank with endorsement like (I) refer to drawer (ii)
exceeds arrangements and (iii) instruction for stop payment
and like other usual endorsement, it amounts to dishonour within F
the meaning of Section 138 of the Act. Therefore, even after
issuance of notice if the payee or holder does not make the
payment within the stipulated period, the statutory presumption
would be of dishonest intention exposing ·to criminal liability.
10. But in the instant case, the negotiable instrument which G
admittedly is a cheque was issued by respondent no. 2 who is
the managing director and the contesting respondents herein
against whom the proceedings have been quashed are not the
director of the company in a statutory capacity and, therefore,
the payments towards cheque in any case could not have been H
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 11 S.C.R.
A made by them and it was respondent no. 2 who was liable to
honour the cheque. Nevertheless, the respondents offered to
make the payment to the appellant/complainant, yet the
appellant refused to accept the payment and pursued the
complaint which was quashed by the High Court on which date
B the appellant had failed to appear without sufficient cause.
Thereafter, if the High Court refused to recall that order, we do
not consider that there were sufficient grounds necessarily to
recall the order quashing the complaint.
11. However, in the interest of equity, justice and fairplay,
C we deem it appropriate to direct the respondents to make the
payment to the appellant by issuing a demand draft in their
favour for a sum of Rs.5 lakhs, which would be treated as an
overall amount including interest and compensation towards the
cheque for which stop payment instructions had been issued.
D If the same is not acceptable to the appellant, it is 'their choice
but that would not allow them to prosecute the respondents
herein in pursuance to the complaint which they have lodged
implicating these two respondents.
E 12. Besides this, the appellant also ought to take note of
the fact that these appeals are not directed against the order
by which the complaint had been quashed insofar as these two
respondents are concerned but it is directed against the order
of the High Court by which it refused to recall the order by which
F the complaint had been quashed. The appellant had failed to
offer any sufficient cause for their non-appearance on the date
when the complaint had been quashed and if we were to be
driven to merely taking a technical view of the matter, these
appeals could have been rejected even on the.ground of non-
G sufficiency of material furnished by the appellant in the High
Court against refusal to recall the order in which case the
petitioner cannot realise even the amount towards the cheque
issued in their favour. But considering the fact that the appellant
would be deprived of their due amount of Rs.2,50,000/-, we
delved into the factual details and considered just and
H
LAFARGE AGGREGATES & CONCRETE INDIA P. 79
LTD v. SUKARSH AZAD
appropriate to direct the respondents to make the payment for A
the sake of substantial justice to the complainant-appellant as
also in view of the analogous appeal, arising out of
SLP{Crl)No. 1145/ 2012 directed against the order dated 10th
September, 2010 passed in Crl.Misc.No.20203 of 2010
whereby the High Court had allowed the petition filed by the B
respondents herein under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 and was pleased to quash the proceedings
against them. It was in this context that we thought it appropriate
to direct the respondents to make the payment towards the
cheque in which stop payment instructions had been issued. c
Besides this, the appeal is time barred by 359 days for which
also we see no justification. On the one hand, the appellant has
sought to impress upon this Court to take a technical view of
the matter by urging that the respondents had not made the
payment during the 15 days notice period, even though that had D
been offered at a later stage, but ignoring his own conduct he
expects this Court to condone the huge delay of 359 days in
filing the appeal, which is fit to be rejected outright.
13. Hence, appeal arising out SLP{Crl) No. 1327 of 2011
is dismissed on merit and appeal arising out of SLP{Crl) No. E
1145 of 2012 is dismissed on the ground of delay as also on
merits subject to the direction of payment to the appellant by
the respondents.
K.K.T. Appeals dismissed.
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