Holding

The High Court's order quashing the FIR is set aside because the exercise of power under Section 482 was impermissible at the investigation stage and the required parameters were not observed.

Summary

The respondents were charged with theft for allegedly taking possession of a complainant's land while executing a warrant of possession. They filed an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking quashment of the FIR. The Punjab and Haryana High Court, without detailed reasoning, quashed the FIR, holding that the allegations could be examined only if objections were filed against the warrant officer's actions. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the investigation was still incomplete and that a High Court cannot assess evidential material at such a stage; it may only determine prima facie whether sufficient grounds exist for proceeding. The Court emphasized the parameters for exercising inherent powers under Section 482 and noted that the High Court's order was non‑reasoned and failed to apply those parameters. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and allowed the appeal.

Issues considered

The propriety of exercising inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash an FIR when the investigation is incomplete.
Whether a High Court may consider annexures and untested material as evidence in a Section 482 petition.
Whether the High Court's non‑reasoned order complied with the parameters laid down for exercising Section 482.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 155(2), s. 156(1), s. 438, s. 482

Subjects

inherent powersSection 482 CrPCquashment of FIRinvestigation stageabuse of processnon‑reasoned ordercriminal procedure

Judgment

[2008] 13 S.C.R. 544

r--
A LAKHWANT SINGH
V.
JASBIR SINGH AND ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 281 of 2003)
SEPTEMBER 16, 2008
8
[DR. ARIJIT PASYAT AND G.S. SINGHVI, JJ.] ••
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 482 - Inherent
powers of High Court - Exercise of - Parameters laid down -
c Discussed - On facts, investigation was not complete and that
stage it was not permissible for High Court to look into materi-
als - High Court quashed FIR by non-reasoned order - It did
not keep in view the parameters laid down for exercise of power
u/s 482 - Thus, order of High Court set aside.
D FIR was registered against the respondent for the al-
leged commission of theft. It was stated that the respon- .,. . -
dents while executing the order in the!r favour, illegally took
the possession of the complainant's land in execution of
warrant of possession. Respondents filed an application
E u/s 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the FIR. High Court held that ,-
FIR could not be registered on basis of the said allegations;
and that the said aspect could be examined if objections
were filed before the concerned Court that warrant officer/
bailiff acted beyond the warrant of possession, and al-
F lowed the application. Hence the present appeal.
Appellant referring to the annexure contented that
the Single Judge without even analyzing the factual and
legal aspects, by an abrupt conclusion should not have
quashed the proceedings; that the challan had already
G been filed in the Court, and the Judicial Magistrate had
committed the case to the Sessions Judge; and that while
considering the application filed in terms of Section 438
cr.P.C., the Additional Sessions Judge, passed a detailed ...,.,
order highlighting the role played by respondents.
H 544
\..
LAKHWANT SINGH v. JASBIR SINGH 545
_ _, ANO ORS.

Allowing the appeal, the Court A
HELD: The investigation was not complete and at
that stage it was .impermissible for the High Court to look
into materials, the acceptability of which is essentially a
matter for trial. While exercising jurisdiction under Sec-
( ... ).. tion 482 Cr.P.C, it is not permissible for the Cou{t to act as B
if it was a trial court. Even when charge is framed at that
stage, the Court has to only prima facie be satisfied about
the existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused. For that limited purpose, the Court can evalu-
ate material and documents on records but it cannot ap- c
preciate evidence. The Court is not required to appreci-
ate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced
are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. The Court
should not act on annexures to the petition under sec-
tion 482 Cr.PC., which cannot be termed as evidence with- D
---,'
out being tested and proved. The non-reasoned order of
the High Court does not reveal that the parameters relat-
ing to exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. were
kept in view. Thus, the order of the High Court is directed
to be set aside. [Paras 10 and 12] [553-D-F; 554-A-B] E
R.P. Kapur v State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866; State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; The Janata
Dal etc. v. H.S. Chowdhary and Ors., etc. AIR 1993 SC 892; '"
Dr. Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar and Anr. AIR 1964 SC 1;
Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar and Ors. AIR 1990 F
SC 494; State of Bihar and another v. P P Sharma, I.A. S. and
another 1992 Suppl (1) SCC 222; Rupan Deof Bajaj (Mrs.)
and Anr. v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and another 1995 (6) sec
194; State of Kera/a and Ors. v. 0. C. Kuttan and Ors. 1999 (2)
sec 651; State of UP v. o. P Sharma 1996 (7) sec 705; G
Rashmi Kumar (Smt.) v Mahesh Kumar Bhada 1997 (2) SCC
397; Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Anr.
---... 1999 (8) SCC 728; Rajesh Bajaj v State NCT of Delhi and
Ors. AIR 1999 SC 1216; State of Karnataka v M. Devendrappa
and another 2002 (3) SCC 89;Jehan Singh v Delhi Admn. H
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.
).--
J\ 1974 (4) SCC 522; Chand Ohawan v. Jawahar Lal 1992 (3)
SCC 317; State of Orissa v Saro} Kumar Sahoo 2005 (13)
SCC 540; R.P Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 -
relied on.
Case Law Reference
B
AIR 1960 SC 866 Relied on. 5 .( ..
1992 Supp (1) sec 335 Relied on. 6
AIR 1993 SC 892 Relied on. 7
AIR 1964 SC 1 Relied on. 7
c AIR 1990 SC 494 Relied on. 7
1992 Suppl (1) sec 222 Relied on. 7
1995 (6) sec 194 Relied on. 7
1999 (2) sec 651 Relied on. 7
D
1996 (7) sec 105 Relied on. 7
1997 (2) sec 397 Relied on. 7
1999 (8) sec 128 Relied on. 7
AIR 1999 SC 1216 Relied on. 7
E
2002 (3) sec 89 Relied on. 8
1974 (4) sec 522 Relied on. 9
1992 (3) sec 317 Relied on. 10
2005 (13) sec 540 Relied on. 11
F
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDCTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 281 of 2003
From the Final Judgment and Order dated 19.7.2002 of
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Crimi-
G nal Misc. No. 40022-M of 1999 (0 & M)

Ravindra Bana for the Appellant.
Manju Bhagat, Monohar Singh Bakshi, Ehraz Zafar, Vineet
Bhagat (for Debasis Misra) and Kuldip Singh for the Respon-
H dents.
---4 LAKHWANT SINGH v. JASBIR SINGH 547
' AND ORS.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is to
the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court allowing the application filed under Sec-
• > tion 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the
'Cr.P.C.'). Respondents had filed an application praying for B
quashing the First Information Report (in short the 'FIR') regis-
tered against them foi alleged commission of theft on 13.7.1999.
Statement in the FIR was that while executing the order in their
favour possession of land of the complainant was illegally taken
in execution of warrant of possession. The High Court accepted c
the prayer holding that the aforesaid aspect of the matter can
be examined if any objections are filed before the concerned
Court that warrant officer/bailiff acted beyond the warrant of
possession, and this could not give rise to registration of the
_,__,,
crime and, therefore, the matter is before us. D
2. Learned counsel for the appellant had referred to docu-
ment appearing at Annexure R/6 and submitted that without even·
analyzing the factual and legal aspects, by an abrupt conclu-
sion the learned Single Judge should not have quashed the pro-
ceedings. With reference to the objections filed before the High E
Court it was pointed out that the challan had already been filed
in the Court, and learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class had com-
mitted the case to the court of Sessions Judge, Amritsar. Cer-
tain other factual aspects have also been referred to. It was
further pointed out that while considering the application filed in F
terms of Section 438 Cr.P.C., learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Amritsar had passed a detailed order highlighting the
role played by respondents 1 to 5.
3. Learned counsel for respondents 1 to 5 supported the
G
judgment of the trial Court.
---( 4. Exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in a case
of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does
not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the
inherE: ;1t power which the Court possessed before the enact- H
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.

A ment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which
the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give
effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the
process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of jus-
tice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflex-
B ible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdic-
tion. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can pro-
vide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore,
have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which
are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties im-
C posed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds ex-
pression in the Section which merely recognizes and preserves
inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or
criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as
inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary
to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration
0 ..,- -
of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alique concedit,
conceciitur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the
law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it
cannot exist). While exercising powers under the Section, the
Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. lnher-
E ent jurisdiction under the Section though wide has to be exer-
cised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such
exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the
Section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real
and substantial justice for the administration of which alone
F courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of jus-
tice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to
produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It
would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action
which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice.
G In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any
proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to
abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceed-
ings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no of-
fence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the
H question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it
LAKHWANT SINGH v. JASBIR SINGH 549
AND ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the com- A
plainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even
if the allegations are accepted in toto.
5. In R.P Kapur v. State of Punjab (AIR 1960 SC 866),
this Court summarized some categories of cases where inher- ·
ent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceed- 8
ings.

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
against the institution or continuance e.g. want of
sanction; c
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or
complaint taken at its face value and accepted in
their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
_..,,, (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there
0
is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence
adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
6. In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in
mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal
evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsis- E
tent with the accusations made, and a case where there is le-
gal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support
the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon
an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or F
whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would
not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial
process no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression or
needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judi-
cious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts G.
and circumstances into consideration before issuing process,
lest it would be ari instrument in the hands of a private com-
plainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly.
At the same time the Section is not an instrument handeq over
to ar accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its H
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. (2008] 13 S.CR.

A sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Sect.on
482 of the Cede and the categories of cases where the Hign
Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable
offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this
B Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC
335) A note of caution was, however, added that the power
should be exercised sparingiy and that too in rarest of rare
cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as
foliows:
c "(1) .Wtiere the allegations made in the first information
.. report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused.
D
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do
not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
·investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)
of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate ·
E within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
F.l.R. or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the commission
F of any offence and· make out a case against the
. accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the F.l.R. do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by
G a Police Officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under S. 155(2) of the Code .
(5) .. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis
of which no prudent person can ever reach a just
H
--f LAKHWANT SINGH v JASBIR SINGH 551
AND ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

conclusion that there is sufficient ground for A
proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
~
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
the institution and continuance of the proceedings B
and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code
or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress
for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended c
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
.~,.-

7. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High D
Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are very wide and the very
plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise.
Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this
power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should
not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court E
being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from
giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts
are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not
been collected and produced before the Court and the issues
involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot F
be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of
course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases
in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdic-
tion of quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See : The Janata
Dal etc. v. H. S. Chowdhary and others, etc. (Al R 1993 SC 892)
G
Dr. Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar and another (Al R 1964
. ._, SC 1)). It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the
case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order
to determine whether a cQnviction would be sustainable and on
such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings ore
H
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R. \- -

A to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material
before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded
with. In proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the in-
herent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a
case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is
B frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in
the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance
. ..

has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court
to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is not, however, necessary that there
should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find
c out whether the case would end in conviction or acquitta!. The
complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on con-
sideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made
on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or
offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the
D complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there r-

would be no justification for interference by the ~:.;;1> Court. When
an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is
registered, then the ma la tides of the informant would be of sec-
ondary importance. It is the material collected during the inves-
E tigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the
accused person. The allegations of mala tides against the in-
formant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the ba-
sis for quashing the proceeding. (See : Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v.
R. Prasanna Kumar and others (AIR 1990 SC 494), State of
F Bihar and another v. P P Sharma, /.A.S. and another (1992
r
"
Suppl (1) SCC 222), Rupan Deal Bajaj (Mrs.) and another v.
Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and another (1995 (6) SCC 194), State
of Kera/a and others v. 0. C. Kuttan and others (1999 (2) sec
651), State of UP v. 0. P Sharma (1996 (7) SCC 705), Rashmi
Kumar (Smt.) v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada (1997 (2) SCC 397),
G
Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and another
(1999 (8) SCC 728), Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi and
y--
others AIR 1999 SC 1216).
8. These aspects were highlighted in State of Karnataka
H v. M. Devendrappa and another (2002 (3) SCC 89).
LAKHWANT SINGH v. JASBIR SINGH 553
-i AND ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

9. In Jehan Singh v. Delhi Admn. (1974 (4) SCC 522) while A
considering a case under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 (in short "the Old Code") corresponding to Sec-
tion 482 CrPC, it was observed as follows: (AIR p.1146)

),-
~ "Where at the date of filing the petition under Section 561-
A, no charge-sheet or a complaint has been laid down in B
court and the matter is only at the stage of investigation by
police, the court cannot, in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction under Section 561-A, interfere with the statutory
powers of the police to investigate into the alleged offence,
and quash the proceedings, Even assuming that the c
allegations in the FIR are correct and constitute an offence
so as to remove the legal bar to institute proceedings in
court, the court cannot at that stage appraise the evidence
collected by the police in their investigation. Any petition
_-.,~ under Section 561-A at such a stage is, therefore, D
prerriature and incompetent." (SCC p. 526, paras 16-18)
10. It is to be noted that the investigation )NaS not com-
plete and at that stage it was impermissible for the High Court
to look into materials, the acceptability of which is essentially a
matter for trial. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 E
Cr.P.C, it is not permissible for the Court to act as if it was a trial
court. Even when charge is framed at that stage, the Court has
to only prima facie be satisfied about the existence of sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused. For that limited
purpose, the Court can evaluate material and documents on F
records but it cannot appreciate evidence. The Court is not re-
quired to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materi-
als produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. In
Chand Ohawan v. Jawahar Lal (1992 (3) SCC 317), it was ob-
served that when the materials relied upon by a party are re- G
quired to be proved, no inference can be drawn on the basis of
·-"'"'! those materials to conclude the complaint to be unacceptable.
The Court should not act on annexures to the petitions under
Section 482 CrPC, which cannot be termed as evidence with-
out being tested and proved. H
554 SUPREME C.'.OLJRT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.

A 11 These aspects are highlighted in State of Orissa v.
Saroj Kumar Sahoo (2005 (13) SCC 540)
12. Practically non-reasoned order of the High Court does
not reveal that the parameters relating to exercise of power
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. were kept in view. The inevitable
B conclusion is that order of the High Court deserves to be set
aside. We direct accordingly.
13. The appeal is allowed.

N.J. Appeal allowed.