Supreme Court of India

LAXMAPPA BHIMAPPA HULSGERI BY LRS. AND ORS.versusHANUMAPPA SHETTEPPA KORWAR AND ORS.

Citation: 2004 INSC 261
Decided: 13 April 2004
Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
Bench: S RAJENDRA BABU

Holding

Civil courts lack jurisdiction to determine tenancy status under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act; such questions must be referred to the Land Reforms Tribunal, and the lower‑court decrees are set aside.

Summary

The first respondent filed a suit claiming ownership and possession of a disputed parcel of land, alleging that his father had relinquished his rights and later sold the land to the appellant. The appellant contended that the father had taken loans, created a mortgage, and granted a 60‑year lease, making the appellant a tenant, and that subsequent sale deeds were either invalid or did not affect his tenancy. The trial court awarded half the share to the plaintiff, but the first appellate court reversed, holding the appellant was a tenant and that the sale deeds were invalid. The Karnataka High Court later reversed again, declaring the appellant a co‑owner entitled to possession, but subsequently recalled that order. The Supreme Court held that questions of tenancy as of 1 March 1974 fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Karnataka Land Reforms Tribunal under Sections 132 and 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, and civil courts cannot decide them. Consequently, all lower‑court decrees were set aside and the matter remitted to the trial court to refer the tenancy issue to the Tribunal, with a status‑quo order on possession.

Issues considered

Whether the appellant was a tenant of the suit land on 1 March 1974 under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act.
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to possession if the appellant is deemed a tenant.
Whether the civil courts have jurisdiction to decide tenancy questions under Sections 132 and 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act.
Whether the sale deeds dated 16 April 1963 and 16 December 1960 are valid and convey title.

Legislation cited

Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948s. 64(3)
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Hindu Succession Act
Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961s. 132, s. 133, s. 5
Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964s. 133

Subjects

land tenuretenancyland reformstitle disputepossessionland revenue recordstribunal jurisdictioninvalid sale deedvested rightsagricultural land

Judgment

LAXMAPPA BHIMAPPA HULSGERI BY LRS. AND ORS. A
v.
HANUMAPPA SHETTEPPA KORWAR AND ORS.

,_ APRIL 13, 2004

[S. RAJENDRA BABU, DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN AND B
G.P. MATHUR, JJ.]

Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964; Section 133/Karnataka Land
Reforms Act; Ss. 5, 132 & 133/Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,
1948; Section 64(3) :
c
Suit for declaration of title of disputed /arid filed by son-Suit decreed
by trial Court in respect ofhalfshare ofsuit /and-Reversed by first appellate
Court holding that though first respondent and his mother possess proprietary
rights in the suit land but these rights extinguished since vesting of the lands D
in Government from 1.3.1974, subject to rights of landlords and tenants
thereon-Appeal allowed by High Court holding first respondent as a co-
owner entitled for recovery ofpossession of the suit land-Judgment recalled
by the High Court but later confirmed its earlier view with certain additional
reasons-On appeal, Held: The findings of the first appellate Court that since
in the records of the Land Revenue Authority, the appellant/Vendee was a E
tenant, he would be treated as tenant but he had not acquired the title under
the sale deeds which were invalid-However, the question whether he was a
tenant, could not have been decided by it-It should have been decided by a
Tribunal constituted under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act-Hence, the decree
passed by the Courts below set aside and matter remitted to Trial Court to .
F
refer the question to Land Reforms Tribunal for adjudication-Parties to
maintain status quo till disposal of the case by the Trial Court-Directions
issued

Recalling of Judgment by the Court-Effect of-Held: Entire judgment
'
stood upset and not available for the Court to concur with the reasoning- G
Civil Procedure Code, 1908.

First respondent filed a declaratory suit against appellant (Vendee)
for declaring himself and his younger brother as owners of the disputed
land and for other incidental reliefs. He submitted that the land originally
93 II
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004} SUPP. I S.C.R.

A owned by his father, who had relinquished his rights in the property in
favour of the first respondent and his ycunger brother on consideration
by executing a registered deed dated 26.4.1960. Later, his father sold the
same property/land by executing a registered sale deed dated 16.4.1963 1
in favour of the appellant. However, the appellant claimed that father of .
B
the first respondent borrowed certain sum of money from him and in lieu t
thereof created a mortgage deed in respect of the suit property in his
favour and subsequently he borrowed further sum of money from him
and executed an advance lease deed for a period of 60 years in respect of
the suit land. Thus he was shown as tenant in the revenue records. Later,
father and mother of the first respondent approached him, took a further i.
c sum of money and executed registered sale deeds dated 26.4.60 and
16.12.60 respectively in respect of certain portion of the suit property after
obtaining requisite permission from the land Revenue Authority.

Trial Court decreed the suit in respect of half share of the ·suit land.
On appeal, findings of the trial Court were upset by the first Appellate
D Court holding that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant
became the tenant in respect of the entire land; that the relinquishment
deed was not valid; that since mother of first respondent executed the sale
deed in re~pect of certain portion of the land owned by her without
obtaining requisite permission from the land Revenue Authority, no title
could be passed in that document in favour of the appellant; that first l-
E
respondent, and after death of his younger brother, his mother were the
co-owners in respect of certain portion of the land but their proprietary
rights became extinguished from l.3.I974 when the rights in the tenanted
land had vested with the Government as per provisions of the Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. High Court allowed th'! second
F appeal holding that first respondent as a co-owner of the suit land was
entitled to the relief as claimed for recovery of possession of the suit
property. Later, High Court recalled its order and finally disposed of the
matter concurring with the earlier judgment giving additional reasons
therefor. Hence the present appeal.

G Allowing the appeal, the Court'
;._
HELD: I.I. The High Court merely referred to Section 133 of the
Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 to state that some of the entries in
t·.
the revenue records indicated that the appellant was not in possession of r
the lands. However, the first appellate Court after referring to the order
H

I
L.B. HULSGERI v. H.S. KORWAR 95
of permission granted by the jurisdictional Tahsildar concluded that since A
in these documents the appellant had been described as a tenant, he should
be presumed to be a tenant notwithstanding the entries appearing in the
record of rights. The presumption arising under Section 133 of the
Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 will, by itself, not be enough and if
the same could be disturbed such a presumption can be decided with
reference to any other material. While the first appellate Court gave B
importance to the permission granted by the Tahsildar (Ex.D-14), the High
Court said that it is of no consequence. However, in the circumstanc«!s of
the case the finding recorded by the first appellate Court is final. But in
the second order made by the High Court it set out various principles
which really have no bearing on the matter. The Court had to examine C
the effect of the documents on record and come to the conclusion one way
or the other. The first appellate Court considered the effect of these
documents and came to the conclusfon that it had been established that
the appellant was in possession of the suit land only in the capacity of a
tenant and he had not acquired title under the sale deeds in question since D
the said sale deeds were invalid. [101-B-C-D-E)

1.2. No civil court can decide any question as to whether Jand in
dispute is an agricultural land or whether the person claiming to b«! in
possession thereof is or is not a tenant of the said land as on 1.3.1974. All
tenancies came to an end in terms of Section 5 of the Act. Thus, what is E
contemplated by Sections 132 and 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms
Act is that if there is any existing tenancy rights as on 1.3.1974 then Civil
Court shall have to frame an issue relating to tenancy and refer the same
to the Tribunal. [102-B-C)

1.3. When the High Court recalled its earlier order, the entire F
judgment stood upset and it was no longer available for the Court to either
concur or accept that reasoning. [100-F)

1.4. The question whether on 1.3.1974 when the Act came into force
the appellant was a tenant in respect of the tand in question or not, could
not have been decided by Civil Courts. Hence, the decrees passed by the G
Courts below are set aside and the matter is remitted to the Trial Court
to refer issue 10-A, to Land Reforms Tribunal for adjudication and report.
The parties shall maintain status quo as to possession of the land until
disposal of matters before the Tribunal and. the Trial Court [J 02-E·Fl

H
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2089 of 1998.

From the Judgment and Order dated 17.11.97 of the Kamataka High
Court in R.S.A.No. 205 of 1988

S.K. Kulkarni, M. Gireesh Kumar, Ankur S. Kulkarni, Kh. Nabin Singh
B and Ms. Sangeeta Kumar for the Appellants.

Rajesh Mahale, R.C. Kohli and K.C. Sundarshan for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

C RAJENDRA BABU, J. A suit was filed by the first respondent for
declaration that he and third Respondent Fakirawwa are the owners of the
suit land and for possession from the original Appellant (Laxmappa) and for
other incidental reliefs. He had imp leaded his father as second defendant in
the suit and his mother as third defendant. It is claimed that his father was
a spend thrift; that since he and his younger brother did not want to continue
D to be joint and on receiving a sum of Rupees One thousand relinquished his
interest in the joint family property by executing a registered deed dated
26.4.1960; that thereafter he and his younger brother became owners in
possession of the said properties; that about 4 or 5 years later his younger
brother died and in terms of the Hindu Succession Act their mother succeeded
E to his share; that thus the said properties came under his and his mother's
ownership and possession; when the matter stood thus even though his father
had relinquished his rights over the plaint schedule land, he executed a
registered sale deed on I6.4.1963 in favour of the appellant and put him in
possession of the same; he claimed that the said sale in favour of Appellant
is not binding on him and his mother.
F
The appellant denied the execution of the relinquishment deed dated
26.4.1960 and contended that as the father of the first respondent had incurred
debts and for discharge of the same borrowed from the appellant a sum of
Rs.2000 and created a mortgage in 1950 in his favour in respect of entire
land in R.S. No. 15/A measuring ll Acres 16 guntas. Again the father of lst
G respondent borrowed Rs. 3000 and executed an advance lease deed ('Agavu
Lavani') in favour of respondent for a period of 60 years and executed a
registered deed on 26.8.1952 in respect of entire acre of 11 acres 16 guntas
of land. His name is included in revenue records as tenant in ME I 014 and
has been in possession thereof since then. During the subsistence of that lease
H the father of the first respondent again approached the appellant for money·
L.B. HULSGERI v. H.S. KORWAR [RAJENDRA BABU. J.] 97

for family necessity and to discharge his prior debts and took a sum of Rs. A
1000 and executed a registered sale deed dated 26.4.1960 in respect of an
extent of 5 acres 30 guntas on the northern side in that land after obtaining
the requisite permission from the jurisdictional Tahsildar; that thus the appellant
became the absolute owner of that portion of 5 acres 30 guntas; that the
mother of the first respondent was also in need of money for family necessity
and for discharging the debt due by her husband borrowed a loan of Rs. 2000 B
from him and executed a registered sale deed in that behalf on 16.12.1960
acting as the guardian of the first respondent and his younger brother who
were minors at that time; that from that date onwards he became the absolute
owner also and has been in possession of the same; that the father of the first
respondent, who was again in need of money, executed a registered sale deed C
in favour of the appellant for a sum of Rs. 1000 on 16.4.1983 in respect of
certain lands after obtaining permission of the Tahsildar and thus the said two
sale deeds dated 16.12.1960 and 16.4.1963 were legally valid and binding on
defendants 2 and 3 and the plaintiff. In this manner, the appellant claimed
that he became the absolute owner of the entire extent of 11 acres 16 guntas
both as a tenant and subsequently as a full owner thereof and continued to D
be in possession of the said land as a tenant. He also raised certain contentions
regarding limitation and that he had perfected his title by adverse possession
over the land. He also alternatively contended that if the deed of transfer
dated 16th April 1963 is invalid, his tenancy rights were not affected and
from l.3.1974 the tenanted land vested in Government and that, therefore, E
the plaintiff is not entitled to seek the relief of possession from him. He also
contended that the relinquishment deed referred to in the plaint was not a
genuine one and did not affect his rights; that the plaintiff and defendants
Nos. 2 and 3 had continued to be the members of a joint family and that the
second defendant was its manager.
F
On this basis several issues were raised by the trial court. Two issues
are with reference to claims regarding tenancy and they are :

"IOA. If the sale deed dated 16.4.1963 is invalid whether the tenancy
rights of defendant-I subsists on l.3.1974?
G
l OB. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to possession if defendant- I is
held to be a tenant on the date of suit?"
' i
I& The trial court held on these two issues as follows :

"25. Issue No. JOB: There is no question of any tenancy rights involved H
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A in· this suit. No pennission of the Tehsildar was obtained for the
execution of the sale deed by defendant No. 3. Moreover, defendant
No. l has taken a sale deed from defendant No. 2 on the allegation
that defendant No. 2 is the owner of the suit land. Before that,
defendant No. I had recognised the title of the minor plaintiff and his
brother Yallappa by taking agreement and sale deed is to be held
B invalid. Therefore, having taken a document from defendant No. 2,
he cannot now content that he is a tenant of the suit land. Hence, my
findings on issue No. I OB is answered in the negative.

26. Issue No. JOA: The defendant No. I was not the tenant of the suit
land on 1.3.1974 or on the date of suit."
c
The trial court decreed the suit in respect of half share of suit land.

On appeal, the said findings of the trial court were upset and the suit
filed by the first respondent was dismissed.

D The learned District Judge noticed that the land comprised in R.S. No.
15 measuring 11 acres 16 guntas was the ancestral property of the second
defendant and that, therefore,· the plaintiff was also a coparcener of the land.
But there are several registered documents filed in the court in the shape of
Ex. P-2, D-10, D-11, D-13, D-I2 and D-6. As found by the first appellate
E court, registered lease deed dated 26.4.I960, which is Ex. P-2, had not been
acted up at all at any rate in respect of the suit land. The first appellate court
also found that Ex. D- IO; which is a registered lease deed in respect of entire
.extent of I I acres I6 guntas, became effective at least partially because
admittedly the second defendant had sold the northern extent of 5 acres 30
guntas to the appellant under the registered sale deed Ex. D- I I dated 26.4.1960
F after obtaining the permission of the jurisdictional Tahsildar to effect that
sale. But on the same day, he executed sale deed Ex. D- I I and release deed
Ex. P-2 and both the documents were scribed by PW-2. Therefore, the first
appellate court found that the first defendant cannot be heard that he was not
aware of the execution of the release deed because that document and Ex. D-
G I I had come into existence simultaneously. Thus the question of importance
is whether the trial court was justified in concluding that under Ex. D- I 0 the
first defendant did not become the tenant in respect of the suit land which is
the southern portion of the survey number and that the release effected under
Ex. P-2 was acted upon. The second defendant had no right to effect the sale
of the suit land in favour of the appellant under Ex. D-8 after obtaining the
H pennission of the Tahsildar on the same date as evidenced by Ex. D-14.
L.B. HULSGERI v. H.S. KOR WAR [RAJENDRA BABU, J.] 99

However, if it is to be concluded that under Ex. D-10 the first defendant A
became tenant in respect of the entire survey number, the lower court's
judgment and decree releasin8 the plaintiffs half share in the suit land will
have to be set aside. On appreciation of the documents and the oral evidence
in the case, the first appellate court held that the entries in the various revenue
records showed that the suit land measuring 5 acres 16 guntas was either
under a personal cultivation of the second defendant or of two other tenants B
upto 1960-61. It was never the case of the plaintiff that his father had
personally cultivated the suit land for a couple of years and then leased it to
two others for.one year each and there was again personal cultivation of it.
If the first defendant was riot the tenant at all in respect of the entire land in
view of Ex. D-1 O it W!lS improbable that an attempt was made as far back as C
1963 by defendants l and 3 to obtain the permission of the jurisdictional
Tahsildar for selling away the suit land to the first defendant. Therefore, the
suit was filed nearly 12 years after the order was passed by the Tahsildar. He ·
found that Ex. D-14 disclosed that the tenant in occupation of the suit land
during those days was the appellant and there was no need for initiating
proceeding before the Tahsildar. The first appellate court, therefore, found D
that under Ex. D-10 the first defendant became the tenant in occupation in
respect of the northern extent of 5 acres 30 guntas only and not the southern
suit land measuring 5 acres 26 guntas and that he was the tenant in respect
of the entire extent of 11 acres 16 guntas of land. On examination of the
documents, the first appellate court also gave a finding that the relinquishment E
deed was not valid and upheld the view of the trial court that the second
defendant had no subsisting rights in the suit land to be conveyed to the first
defendant .under Ex. D-6 and that, therefore, the first defendant got no rights
under that document over the suit land. The learned District Judge found that
the finding recorded by the trial court on several issues was justified in the
circumstances of the case; that Ex. D-12 executed by the third defendant in F
respect of an extent of 3 acres 26 guntas was not after obtaining permission
of the jurisdictional Tahsildar as required under Section 64(3) of the Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 and, therefore, no title could pass
in that document; that Ex.D-12 was void. The finding of the trial court in this
regard was not upheld. Ex. D-6 and 12 did not convey any proprietary rights G
to the first defendant at all in respect of the suit land and the plaintiff and the
third defendant were the co-owners of that extent but those rights of the!r's ,
became extinguished from l.3.1974 having regard to the provisions of the
Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. Therefore, it came to
the conclusion t~at the plaintiffs suit required to be dismissed. The learned
Judge found that the plaintiff-first respondent had no status as a co-owner of H
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A the suit land as on the date of the suit. Neither the first respondent nor his
father had any rights in respect of the same during the vesting of the tenanted
lands in the Government subject to the rights of landlords and tenants, specially
saved under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 and, therefore, the said
cross-objections filed were dismissed.

B Thereafter, the matter was carried in second appeal. The High Court
allowed second appeal by an order made on 9.3.1985 and the judgment and
decree passed by the first appellate court was set aside and held that the
appellant as a co-owner of the suit land is entitled to the relief claimed for
recovery of possession over the entire suit land. Subsequently, the order
C made on 9 .3 .1995 allowing the second appeal was recalled and the appeal
was posted for fresh hearing. On 17.1 LI 997 the High Court finally disposed
of the appeal after referring to the judgment dated 9.3.1995 by stating that
it concurs with the earlier order but gave certain additional reasons. This is
how, the learned Judge stated :-

D "It is also necessary to place on record that this appeal is disposed of
in the same manner mentioned in the last paragraph above by another
single Judge of this Court; that judgment was recalled on the technical
objection ofnon-impleading of the L.Rs of one of the parties. However,
that was disposed of on merits, taking into consideration the legal
position as well. I have concurred with the earlier view, though I
E have give additional point in support of that view."

It is difficult to appreciate the course adopted by the learned Judge. If
all the parties had not been present who could have been impleaded then the
judgment rendered thereto will not be one which was decided in the presence
of all the parties. Therefore, when the earlier order dated 9.3.1995 was recalled,
F the entire judgment stood upset and is no longer available for the learned
Judge either to concur or accept that reasoning. We may have to treat that
part of reasoning as part of his judgment to properly appreicate the case.

Whether the appellant became the owner in possession of the entire suit
G land by virtue of registered sale deed Ex. D-6 dated 16th April 1963 and in
the event that sale deed is found to be invalid for any reason, the sale deed
Ex.D-12 dated 16.12.1960 is binding on the plaintiff in respect of extent of
5 acres 26 guntas and whether his rights in respect of the remaining extent
as a tenant are not affected and even if the said sale deed Ex.D-12 is also
found to be invalid, then his rights as a tenant in respect of the entire suit land
H is protected. It is also to be seen whether the reliefs. claimed by the first
. L.B. HULSGERI v. H.S. KORWAR[RAJENDRABABU, J.] 101

respondent in the suit land is tenable and as a co-owner with the third defendant A
he is entitled to those reliefs in respect of the entire suit land.

These aspects were not looked into by the High Court in the course of
its first order. The High Court merely referred to Section 133 of the Kamataka
Land Revenue Act, 1964 to state that some of the entries in the revenue
records indicated that the appellant was not in possession of the lands. 'B
However, the first appellate court after referring to the order of permission
granted by the jurisdictional Tahsildar concluded that since in the said
documents the appellant had been described as a tenant, he, therefore, should
be presumed to be a tenant notwithstanding the entries appearing in the
record ofrights. The presumption arising under Section 133 of the Kamataka C
Land Revenue Act, 1964 will, therefore, by itself, not be enough and if the
same could be disturbed such a presumption can be decided with reference
to any other material. While the first appellate court gave importance to Ex.
D-14 the permission granted by the Tahsildar, the High Court said that it is
of no consequence. However, in the circumstances of the case the finding
recorded by the first appellate court is final. It has taken the view that D
description of the appellant in the order of permission granted by the
jurisdictional Tahsildar would tilt the matter which clearly indicated that the
appellant was the tenant in respect of the entire land. But in the second order
made by the High Court the learned Judge. has gone on to set out various
principles which really have no bearing on the matter. The court had to E
examine the effect of the documents on record and come to the conclusion ,
one way or the other. The first appellate court considered the effect of these
documents and came to the conclusion that it had been established that the
appellant was in possession of the suit land only in the capacity of a tenant
and he had not acquired title under the sale deeds in question since the s?id
sale deeds were invalid. F
A contention now put forth before us is that in view of the fact that the
sales having been effected in respect of the suit lands the tenant's rights stood
extinguished and proprietary rights were replaced or the tenant's rights stood
converted to the proprietary rights cannot be accepted because when the sale
transaction itself has been held to be invalid, there was no transaction in the G
eye of law and in the absence of such transaction, there was no circumstance
which obliterated the rights arising as a tenant. Thus it is contended that the
rights stood unaffected and in this context, it is necessary to examine the
contention put forth before us is that the issue as to tenancy ought to have
been referred to the Land Reforms Tribunal and ought not to have been H
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A decided by the trial court itself.
Section 132 of the Kamataka Land Reforms Act bars the jurisdiction
of civil courts in matters, which are to be decided by a Tribunal. Section 133
of the Kamataka Land Reforms Act provides for suits and other proceedings
that are required to be decided by a Tribunal under the Act. No civil court
B can decide any question as to whether land in dispute is an agricultural land
or whether the person claiming to be in possession thereof is or is not a
tenant of the said land as on 1.3.1974. All tenancies came to an end on
1.3.1974 under Section 5 of the Act. Thus, what is contemplated by Sections
132 and 133 of the Kamataka Land Reforms Act is that if there is any
C existing tenancy right as on 1.3.1974 then civil cqurt shall have to frame an
issue relating to tenancy and refer the same to Tribunal.

In the present case, the suit had been brought by the first respondent
for various reliefs including that of possession and that right had been defeated
on the ground that on the relevant date the suit lands were tenanted lands and,
D therefore, from 1.3.1974 he did not have rights as owner and the land having
vested in the State and on that basis suit had been dismissed. It is not so
much as to declare the rights of the first appellant that such finding had been
recorded but it is more to defeat the claim of the appellant. Whether the first
defendant can protect his possession otherwise or not is not to be decided in
these proceedings. Prima facie, the first appellate court could not hold that
E the a,ppellant was a tenant in respect of the land and issues. IO-A and 10-B
should have been decided only by a Tribunal constituted under the Kamataka
Land Reforms Act. The question whether on 1.3.1974 when the Act came
into force the appellant was a tenant in respect of the land in question or not
could not have been decided by civil courts. Hence, the decrees passed by
p High Court, First Appellate Court and trial court are set aside and the matter
is remitted to the trial court to refer issue I 0-A to Land Reforms Tribunal for
adjudication and report. In the meanwhile, the parties shall be directed to
maintain status quo as to possession of the land until disposal of matters
before the Tribunal and the trial court.

G In the result, the appeal is allowed· accordingly.

S.K.S. Appeal allowed.

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