Holding

The High Court may, under Section 15(5), consider subsequent facts, appoint a local Commissioner and rely on its report, and its reversal of factual findings does not exceed its revisional jurisdiction.

Summary

The landlord filed an eviction petition under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, alleging non‑payment of rent, unauthorised sub‑letting and that the shop was dilapidated and unfit for human habitation. The trial court ordered eviction, but the appellate court set aside the order, finding the building not unsafe and the sub‑letting unproved. The landlord then sought revision before the High Court; during the pendency (after 18 years) he obtained the appointment of a local Commissioner whose report described a roof hole and large cracks, concluding the premises were unfit. The High Court relied on this fresh evidence, reversed the appellate finding and allowed eviction. The tenant appealed to the Supreme Court, questioning whether the High Court could, under Section 15(5) of the Act, appoint a commissioner, admit new evidence and overturn factual findings. The Supreme Court held that the High Court may consider subsequent facts and fresh evidence, and its reliance on the commissioner’s report did not exceed its revisional jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court, exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, could reverse findings of fact based on fresh evidence such as a local Commissioner’s report.
Whether the High Court could appoint a local Commissioner while exercising its revisional jurisdiction and rely on the report to decide the case.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 115
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949s. 13, s. 15(5)

Subjects

rent controlevictionrevisional jurisdictionsubsequent factslocal commissionerEast Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Actcivil procedurelandlord-tenantbuilding unfit for habitation

Judgment

A LEKH RAJ
v.
MUNI LAL AND ORS.

FEBRUARY 6, 2001

B [A.P. MISRA AND D.P. MOHAPATRA, JJ.]

Rent Control and Eviction:

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949: Section 15(5).
c Revisiona/ Jurisdiction-Subsequent events-Landlord filed eviction
petition against tenant on the grounds, inter alia, that the building was in
a dilapidqted condition and hence unfit for human habitation-Trial court
allowed the petition-But Appellate Court held that the condition of building
was neither unsafe nor unfit for human habitation-revision petition filed-
D during pendency of revision, after 18 years, landlord filed application for
appointment of local Commissioner-High Court allowed the application
and relying on the report of local Commissioner held that the building was
unfit for human habitation-Correctness of-Held: A court can take into
consideration subsequent facts, event or happening which are relevant-
E Hence, High Court committed no error in the appointment of local
Commissioner and considering and relying on his report.

"Legality and propriety" Scope and ambit of-Held; High Court under
its supervis01y revisional jurisdiction can examine the "legality" or
"propriety" of an order-However, it should be between limited revisional
F jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC and i:vider appellate jurisdiction-Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908, Section 115.

Words and Phrases:

"legality and propriety "-Meani11g of-Jn the context of Section 15(5)
G of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
The respondent-landlord filed an eviction petition against the appellant-
tenant under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,
1949 on the grounds, inter alia, that the building was in a dilapidated condition
not fit for human habitation. The trial court decreed the petition. The appellate
H court held that the building was neither unfit nor unsafe for human habitation
864
LEKH RA.Iv. MUNI LAL 865
and set aside the order of the trial court. A
Being aggrieved the respondent filed a revision petition before the High
Court. During the pendency of the revision petition, after 18 years the
respondent filed an application for appointment of a local Commissioner which
was allowed. The High Court, based on the report of the local Commissioner,
held that the building '!as unfit for human habitation and allowed the B
respondent's eviction petition. Hence this appeal.

The following questions arose before this Court:-

(1) Whether the High Court under its Revisional Jurisdiction which C
limits it to examine the "legality and propriety" of the appellate court's
order was justified in reversing its finding based on evidence on record?

(2) Whether the High Court could tiave appointed a local Commissioner
while exercising its revision al jurisdiction and to reverse the finding of the
appellate court based on the report of such Commissioner? D
Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: I. The language of Section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction Act, 1949 clearly spells out that the High Court's jurisdiction is E
neither restricted to what is under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 nor is it as large as power of the appellate Authority. The High Court
under its supervisory revisional jurisdiction could examine the "legality" or
"propriety" of any order. This "legality" or "propriety" widens the scope of
the High Court, which is larger than the power of revision under the Civil
Procedure Code. But in no case it confers power to set aside the findings of F
fact by reappraisal of evidence. In doing so it would be trespassing its
jurisdiction. However, good reason for drawing a different conclusion, it cannot
be construed to be within jurisdiction. Thus courts have to carve out a field
for the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 15(5), emanating
froin the words "legality" and "propriety" which should be between limited G
revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC and wider appellate
jurisdiction.

Lachman Dass v. Santokh Singh, 119951 4 SCC 202; Shiv Lal v. Sat
Parkash, 119931 Supp. 2 SCC 345 and Mohini Sura) Bhan v. Vinod Kumar
Mital, 1198611 sec 687, relied on. H
866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (200 I] I S.C.R.

A 2. In case subsequent event or fad having bearing on the issues or
relief in a suit or proceeding, to which any party seeks to bring on record,
the court should not shut its door. All laws and procedures including
functioning of courts are all in aid to confer justice to all who knock its door.
Courts should interpret the law not in derogation of justice but in its aid.
Thus bringing on record subsequent event, which is relevant, should be
B permitted to be brought on record to render justice to a party. But the court
in doing so should be cautious not to permit it in a routine manner. It should
refuse where a party is doing so to delay the proceedings, harass other party
or doing so for any other ulterior motive. The courts even before admitting
should examine, whether the alleged subsequent event has any material
C bearing on issues involved and which would materially affect the result.

3. The respondent through his application states that the roof of the
shop has since fallen down and its condition further deteriorated, during the
pendency of the revision, sought for the appointment of a Local Commissioner
which was allowed. On these facts, in view of the issue, whether the
D_ accommodation in question is fit for human habitation, with the long passage
of eighteen years, if fresh assessment was sought through a Local
Commissioner, it cannot be said, in allowing such Commission, the High
Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction.

4. A Court could take into consideration subsequent facts, event or
E happening which are relevant, and in the present case after expiry of about
two decades if fresh Local Commissioner was appointed to find out the
condition of shop, and it found two big cracks on two walls of the disputed
shop, it cannot be said that consideration of such evidence to be illegal.

5.1. On the facts and circumstances of this case, where fresh evidence
F was permitted to be brought on record, reversing of the finding of fact by the
High Court, while exercising Revisional jurisdiction, cannot be said to be
such that it acted beyond its jurisdiction vested to it under the law.

S.2. Once, court could being on the record, subsequent fact, event or
G happening, which h,as direct bearing on the issues or relief claimed, on the
facts and circumstances of this case, then the High Court committed no
error of jurisdiction to permit the Commissioner's report to be placed on the
record and then on which to rely while exercising power under Section 15(5)
of the Act.

H Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders, 119751 I
LEKH RA.Iv. MUNI LAL [MISRA, .I.) 867
SCC 770 and Ramesh Kumar v. Kesha Ram, (19921 Supp 2 SCC 623, referred· A
to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1057-1058
of 2001.

From the Judgment and Order dated 24.3.2000 of the Punjab and Haryana B
High Court in C.R. No .. 2740/80 and C.M. No. 365-CII of2000.

Rajinder Sachar and Sanjay Parikh for the Appellant.

Jaspal Singh, Ms. J.S. Wad, Ashish Wad and Ms. Niharika Bahl for the
Respondents. c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MISRA, J. Leave granted.

The present appeals are by the defendant-tenant as against the order D
dated 24th March, 2000 passed by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction
by which it reversed the finding of the appellate court that the disputed shop
in question is not unsafe for human habitation. The questions raised in these ,
appeals are:

( 1) Whether the High Court under its revisional jurisdiction which E
limits to examine the "legality and propriety" of the appellate
court order was justified in reversing its findings based on
evidence on record.

(2) Whether the High Court could have appointed a local
Commissioner while exercising its revisional jurisdiction and to F
reverse the finding of the appellate court based on the report of
such Commissioner.
In order to appreciate the controversies we are herewith giving some of
the essential facts. The appellant took the disputed shop on rent from one
Aya Ram who sold the said shop to one Prakash RanL The respondents nos. G
I to 8 are Lrs. of this Prakash Rani, who filed petition' for eviction against the
appellant under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,
1949 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') from the dis~uted shop. The eviction
petition was based on three grounds: (a) The appellant has not paid the rent
from 2nd July, 1968, (b) He has sub-let the shop without taking the permission
of the landlord and (c) the building is in dilapidated condition with cracks H
868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [200 I] I S.C.R.

A hence not fit for human habitation requiring demolition and reconstructio11.
The appellant denied all these and other allegations made in the petition. The
trial court decreed the eviction petition. It held that the appellant tendered the
rent on 24.10.1975 about which no grievance was made by the respondent-
landlord at the time of arguments, the shop was sub-let by the appellant, and
the disputed shop is unfit for human habitation. The appellant filed appeal
B and the Appellate Court set aside the trial court findings. It held that sub-
letting has not been proved. It further, on the basis of evidence on record,
held that it cannot be said that the cracks in the building have made it unfit
or unsafe for human habitation. Aggrieved by this the respondent fi!ed
revision in the High Com1. During the pendency of the said revision an
C application was moved by respondents for appointment of a local Commissioner
which was objected through written objection by the appellant. The said local
Commissioner submitted his report to the court, the relevant portion of his
report is quoted hereunder: .....:-

" ... there was a hole in the roof measuring 13" x 12" which had
D been temporarily shut from the interior side with the help of wooden
planks by giving the support of sticks and from the upper side this
hole was found and 4 Sallies near the hole were in a decayed condition
and wooden planks near the hole were in a bad condition due to
seepage of w<..ter from the hole of the roof... .. The outerside of the right
side wall of the shop, there was a big crack on the beginning of the
E wall extending from top to more than middle of the wall. This crack
measuring 2"x 7.5" (deplh) from the upper side and 1.5'' x 6.5" from
the lower side and in the end of the same wall, there was also a big
crack measuring 2"x 8" from the upperside, 2"x7" from the lower side
and the roof of the passage was in a totally damaged condition which
F did not cover the shop but covers the passage."

The appellant filed objection to this report pointing certain anomalies
with a prayer to ignore this report and appoint another local Commissioner.
The High Court confirmed as against respondent-landlord, the finding of the
Appellate Court on the question of sub-letting. However, it reversed its
G finding based on the said local Commissioner's report by holding that the
disputed shop is unfit for human habitation. The appellant being aggrieved
by this order has filed the present appeal.

The submission is, power of revision cannot be construed to empower
court to reappraise the evidence and disturb the findings of fact recorded by
H the Appellate Court. Having limited revisional jurisdiction the High Court was
LEKH RA.Iv. MUNI LAL (MISRA, .I.] 869
not justified in interfering with the finding recordtd by the Appellate Court. A
To appreciate this submission the revisional power of the High Court
under sub-section 5 of Section 15' of the aforesaid Act is quoted hereunder:

"15(5): The High Court may, at any time, on the application of any
aggrieved party or on its own motion, call and examine the records B
relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act for
the purpose of satisfying itse:'f as to the legality or propriety of such
order/proceedings and may p'ass an order in relation thereto as it may
deem fit.

The law on the subject is well settled. The language of this sub- section C
clearly spells out, High Court jurisdiction is neither restricted to what is under
Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code nor it is as large as power of the
---x Appellate Authority. The High Court under its supervisory revisional
jurisdiction could examine the "legality" or "propriety" of any order. This
"legality" or "propriety" widens the scope of the High Court which is larger D
than the power of revision under Civil Procedure Code. But in no case it
confers power to set aside findings of fact by reappraisal of evidence. In
doing so it would be trespassing its jurisdiction. However, good reason for
drawing a different conclusion it cannot be construed to be within jurisdiction.
Thus courts have to carve out a field for the exercise of revisional jurisdiction
under sub-section (5) of Section 15, emanating from the words "legality" and E
"propriety" which should be between limited revisional jurisdictional under
Section 115 CPC and wider appellate jurisdiction.

Strong reliance h<1s been placed for the appellant in Lachman Dass v.
Santokh Singh. (1995] 4 SCC 202. This Court was considering the revisional
jurisdiction of the High Court under sub- section (6) of Section I 5 under the F
Haryana Rent Control Act which is para materia with the revisional power
under the aforesaid Act under which we are considering. This Court held:

"In the present case sub-section (6) of Section I 5 of the Act confers
revisional power on the High Court for the purpose of satisfying itself G
with regard to the legality or propriety of an order or proceeding taken
under the Act and empowers the High Court to pass such order in
relation thereto as it may deem fit. The High Court will be justified in
interfering with the order in revision if it finds that the order of the
appellate authority suffers from a material impropriety or illegality.
From the use of the expression "Legality or propriety of such order H
870 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [200 I] I S.C.R.

A or proceedings" occurring in sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act,
it appears that no doubt the revisional power of the High Court under
the Act is wider than the power under Section 115 of the Code of Civil
·-
...,...-

Procedure which is confined to jurisdiction, but is also not so wide
as to embrace within its fold all the attributes and characteristics of
an appeal and disturb a concurrent finding of fact properly arrived at
B without recording a finding that such conclusions are perverse or
based on no evidence or based on a superficial and perfunctory
approach."

For the appellant, reliance is also placed on Shiv Lal v. Sat Parkash and
C Anr., [ 1993] Supp. 2 SCC 345. It was held:

"While exercising jurisdiction under Section 15(5) of the Act the Court
does not act as a regular third appellate court and can interfere only
within the scope of the sub-section. In the present case, the High
Court, on being misled by its view that the cession of tenancy is a
D necessary element of Section 13(2)(iv), the High Court proceeded to
re- examine the evidence on the records, and reversed the finding of
facts concurrently arrived at by the trial Court and the first appellate
court. An examination of the facts and circumstances of this case
indicates that the reconsideration of the evidence by the High Court )._-.
was not justified."
E
On the other hand learned counsel for the appellant has relied on Mrs.
Mohini Sura) Bhan v. Vinod Kumar Mital, [1986] I SCC 687. This Court
observed:
..
"It cannot be disputed that the powers of the High Court under
F Section 15(5) of the Act are wide and not confined merely to examining
the legality of the appellate authority's order nor are those powers
akin to the revisional powers of the High Court under Section 115 of
the.CPC."

The pith and substance of these authorities, to which appellant relies
G
is that Court under its revisional jurisdiction cannot disturb finding of facts
nor could it reappraise evidence on record, it can only interfere if there is
"--t" ...
impropriety and illegality in the impugned order. One of the submissions for
the appellant is that the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction should not
have permitted the inspection of the disputed shop by the local Commissioner
H while exercising its revisional jurisdiction. The submission is, the revisional
LEKH RAJ v. MUNI LAL [MISRA, J.] 871
court could only take into consideration the fact existing on the date of filing A
of the eviction petition supported by evidence on record, thus by bringing
on record the aforesaid report of the local Commissioner which was called
after 18 years of the pendency of the revision in the High Court cannot be
said to be within the jurisdiction of the Revisional Courts.

The law on the subject is at,o settled. In case subsequent event or fact B
having bearing on the issues or relief in a suit or proceeding, to which any
party seek to bring on record, the Court should not shut its door. All laws
and procedures including functioning of courts are all in aid to confer justice
to all who knocks its door. Courts should interpret the law not in derogation
of justice but in its aid. Thus bringing on record subsequent event, which is C
relevant, should be permitted to be brought on record to render justice to a
party. But the court in doing so should be cautious not to permit it in a
-X routine. It should refuse where a party is doing so to delay the proceedings,
harass other party or doing so for any other ulterior motive. The courts even
before admitting should examine, whether the alleged subsequent event has
any material bearing on issues involved and which would materially effect the D
result. In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders, [1975]
I SCC 770, this Court has very clearly held to the same effect:

"It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief
must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal E
proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid
and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, after the lis has
come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or
the manner of moulding, it is brought diligently to the notice of the
tribunal, it cannot blink as it or be blind to events which stultify or
render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of F
procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a
view to promote substantial justice -subject, of course, to the absence
of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we
contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts
to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, G
absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in
-_.,.-· law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for
applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition
that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and
meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current
realities, the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautious H
872 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [200 I) I S.C.R.

A cognizance of events and de'velopments subsequent to the institution
of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are
scrupulously obeyed."

This Court in Ramesh Kumar v. Kesha Ram, (1992] Supp. 2 SCC 623
held:
B "The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations
of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement
of the !is. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent
events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement
of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of
c the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a 'cautious
cognizance' of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the
relief. In Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri,
Chief Justice Sir Maurice Gwver observed: (AIR p.6)
,_
"But with regard to the question whether the court is entitled
D to take into account legislative changes since the decision under
appeal was given, I desire to point out that the rule adopted by
the Supreme Court of the United States is the same as that which
I think commends itself to all three members of this Court. In
Patlerson v. State of Alabama, Hughes C.J. said:

E We have frequently held that in the exercise of our
appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct
error in the judgment under review but to make such
disposition of the case as justice requires. And in
determining what justice does require, the court is bound
to consider any change, either in fact or law, which has
F supervened since the judgment was entered.
This decision also relied in the case of Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v.
The Motor & General Traders, (1975] I SCC 770 (supra).

In the background of the aforesaid well settled legal principle we perused
G the application of the respondent dated 31st March, I 999, before the High
Court, for the appointment of a local Commissioner. It is unfortunate, but the
fact is that civil revision remained pending in the High Court for more than
I 8 years when the said application was made. The relevant portion of the
application is quoted hereunder:-

H "That during the pendency of the present revision petition, the roof of
LEKH RAJ v. MUNI LAL [MISRA, J.] 873
the shop in dispute has also fallen down and the condition of the shop in A
dispute has further deteriorated as would be clear from a perusal of the
photographers attached as ANNEXURE P-1. It is well settled that subsequent
events which have taken place during the pendency of the revision petition
can and should be taken into consideration and the relief moulded accordingly.

The respondent through this application states that the roof of the B
,.,.. shop has since also fallen down and its condition further deteriorated, during
the pendency of this revision, hence sought for the appointment of a local
Commissioner which was allowed. On these facts, in view of the issue,
whether the accommodation in question is fit for human habitation, with the
long passage of eighteen years, if fresh assessment was sought through a c
local Commissioner, it cannot be said, in allowing such Commission the High
Court exceeded in its revisional jurisdiction.
-)Ir

Now, we proceed to examine the submissions for the appellant, which
is primarily based on the objections recorded in his reply affidavit to the
respondent's application for the appointment ofa local Commissioner and the D
objections dated I 0th January, 2000 to the said Commissioner's report dated
7th July, 1999. The objection as recorded therein are: (a) when the application
for ejactment was filed, there was no crack in the wall of the disputed shop;
~' (b) the cracks are from the 'Dehori' side which are in possession of the
landlord; (c) Similarly when the application for ejactment was made the roof
E
of the shop was in absolute perfect condition; (d) the landlord has deliberately
damaged the roof for which the appellant filed a complaint to the police. Each
of these objections has no force. The objection with respect to the cracks on
the wall and the condition of the roof is, when the application for eviction

• was filed there were no cracks in the wall. This objection has no merit, as per
own evidence of the appellant, he testified existence of such cracks but said, F
for this reason it cannot be said it to be unfit for human condition. The
submission that court could only take into consideration on the facts existing
on the date of suit only has also no merit.

In view of the legal principle we have stated herein before, a Court G
could take into consideration subsequent facts, event or happening which are
relevant, and in the present case after expiry of about two decades if fresh
local Commissioner was appointed to find out the condition of shop, and it
found two big cracks on two walls of the disputed shop, it cannot be said
consideration of such evidence to be illegal. On the merits it is submitted, one
of the cracks is on the 'Dehori' side which is in possession of the landlord. H
I
874 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (200 I] I S.C.R.

A Even if this to be, this would make no difference for drawing any inference
about the condition of the wall. There are always two sides of any wall, cracks ~
on any side of the wall, if it weakens the wall, may not be on the side of such
an occupant, it would make no difference. Even if the cracks on the wall are
on the other side whic1' is a passage, still as it constitutes the same wall as
that of the shop would have the same result. If the cracks have weakened the
B wall, it would crumble not withstanding it is not on the side of the shop. This
coupled with the condition of the roof which deteriorated as found by the
local Commissioner would be a valid consideration to find whether the shop ....
is unfit for human consumption. So far the submission that the appellant has
filed a complaint against the landlord for causing damage to the roof, we have
C perused the FIR. Though FIR records allegations directly against the landlord
but records no allegation of landlord damaging the roof.

Next submission is based on the objection filed to the local Commissioner ~ -
report. The objection is, the tenant was not allowed to go on the roof to which
landlord has an access. If he was permitted he could have pointed out to the
D Commissioner that hole has been dug purposely and deliberately by the
landlord. Further, the Commissioner remained closet in the room with the
landlord for about half an hour. He sought this local Commissioner's report
be ignored and another local Commissioner be appointed. We do not find any
error in the High Court judgment in not issuing another local Commissioner.
E The appellant merely sought to show that roof of the disputed shop was
damaged by the landlord, to proof this how Commissioner would have been
able to find this.

The question whether the roof was damaged by the landlord or was
damaged because of the building being old and dilapidated is a question of
F fact, proof of it could only be, if at all, through leading evidence and not
through a local Commissioner. A local Commissioner could only report the
fact of existing condition of the building and not who did it. It was open for
him, if appellant so desired for praying to the Court to grant time to lead
evidence in this regard. Since court permitted, a local Commissioner to report,
G so it would have granted the prayers for leading evidence. Hence we do not
find any of the objections raised by the appellant, have any merit. The High
Court considered the said report, and there exists a hole on the roof which
is not disputed. It further records, even if the same is ignored, there are big
cracks found by the Commissioner on the beginning of the wall extending
from top to more than middle, and another big crack on another wall. The
H report records the depth of the crack, not merely the length of the crack
LEKH RAJ v. MUNI LAL [MISRA, J.] 875

showing the bad condition of the two walls of the disputed shop. Mere length A
of crack by itself may not have foundation to hold its condition of structure
of the shop to be bad but it would be, where the crack measures 2" x 7.5"
depth in one wall on the upper side and 1.5'' (illegible) on the lower side and
another crack measuring 2" x 8" from the upper side and 2" x 7" from the lower
side. This along with condition of roof, if was considered by the High Court B
to draw the inference of the condition of the shop, it cannot be said such
finding is perverse or illegal which calls for int~rference by this Court. Once
the said local Commissioner's report was brought on the record, as part of
evidence to show the subsequent event or condition of building, it was
incumbent on the High Court to have considered it, which it rightly did and
if in doing so an inference is drawn, that the disputed accommodation is not C
fit for human habitation it is not such which calls for interference. Normally,
as revisional court, it could not have embarked upon recording finding of
facts but where any subsequent fact was legally brought on record, it could
enter into and decide the question, which could inevitably include recording
finding of fact.
D
Lastly, the submission was that the case may be remitted back to the
court for permitting the appellants to lead evidence to contradict, what is
brought through the Commissioner's report. We have examined this aspect
also. Normally if parties so desire, in a case where fresh facts are brought on
the record as a relevant subsequent event, the court grants such prayer. In E
the present case, we find that before the High Court, at no stage, the appellant
made any such request. Even in this appeal before us, the appellant could not
point any such ground been raised. It is not even pleaded nor raised any
ground that the High Court refused such a request for leading any such
evidence.
F
In view of these facts in the present case we do not find any merit even
of this last submission. In view of the finding recorded by us we record our
conclusions to the aforesaid two questions raised in the appeals to the
following effect:

(1) On the facts and circumstances of this case, where fresh evidence G
was permitted to be brought on the record, reversing of the
. finding of fact by the High Court, while exercising revisional
jurisdiction, cannot be said to be such that it acted beyond its
jurisdiction vested to it under the law.

(2) Once, court could bring on the record, subsequent fact, event H
876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (200 I) I S.C.R.

A or happening, which has direct bearing on the issues or relief
claimed, on the facts and circumstances of this case, then the
High Court committed no error of jurisdiction to permit the
Commissioner report to be placed on the record and then on
which to rely while exercising its revisional power under sub-
section 5 of Section 15 of the aforesaid Act.
B
In view of the aforesaid findings recorded by us we do not find any
merit in these appeals, which are accordingly dismissed with costs on the
parties.

C Lastly, learned counsel made request to grant substantial time to the
appellant to vacate the premises in question as he has been in possession
of this shop for a very long time, otherwise it would affect his business
adversely. Looking to the facts and circumstances of this case we grant time ~-
to the appellant to vacate the premises in question by or before 31st December,
2001 subject to the usual undertaking to be filed within four weeks from today.
D
v.s.s. Appeals dismissed.