LICIL ANTONYversusSTATE OF KERALA&ANR.
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 274
- Decided
- 15 April 2014
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- C K PRASAD
Holding
A COFEPOSA detention order is not void for delay if the delay is satisfactorily explained and the live link with the prejudicial activity is maintained; likewise, a reasonable service delay and omission of a bail order do not vitiate the detention.
Summary
The appellant, wife of a man detained under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA), challenged the order of preventive detention on the grounds of an alleged inordinate delay between the alleged smuggling of red sanders (17 Nov 2012) and the issuance of the detention order (6 May 2013), as well as a delay in serving the order and the failure to consider a bail order from another court. The Supreme Court held that a delay in passing a COFEPOSA detention order is not fatal if it is satisfactorily explained and the "live link" between the prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention remains intact. The Court found the delay in this case adequately explained, noted that the order was served within a reasonable time, and observed that the bail conditions were not material to the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction. Consequently, the order of detention was upheld and the appeal dismissed.
Issues considered
- The adequacy of the explanation for the delay between the prejudicial activity and the issuance of a COFEPOSA detention order.
- Whether a delay in the execution (service) of a COFEPOSA detention order vitiates the order.
- Whether the detaining authority's failure to consider a bail order and its conditions invalidates the detention order.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
[2014] 14 S.C.R. 317
LICIL ANTONY A
v.
STATE OF KERALA&ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 872 of2014)
B
APRIL 15, 2014
[CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD AND
PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, JJ.]
Preventive Detention - Smuggling of red sanders in
India and abroad -Detention order passed under c
COFEPOSA - Challenged on ground that there was
inordinate delay in passing the order which itself vitiated the
same - Held: There has to be live link between the prejudicial
activity and the order of detention - In case of delay, that has
to be satisfactorily explained - Delay in issuing the order of o
detention, if not satisfactorily explained, itself is a ground to ·
quash the order of detention - On facts, it cannot be said that
there was undue delay in passing the order of detention and
that live nexus with the prejudicial activity had snapped -
Order of detention not fit to be quashed on the ground of delay E
in passing the same - Further, on facts, order of detention.
also could not be said to have been vitiated on ground of
delayed execution - Omission by the detaining authority to
consider bail order passed by the triarcourt not crucial and,
in no way affected its subjective satisfaction - No error in the F
order of detention and the order passed by the High Court,
refusing to quash the same - Conservation of Foreign
Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974.
The appellant is the wife of detenu and aggrieved
by the order passed by the High Court declining to G
quash the order of detention passed under the
Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention· of
Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPO~Af.
H
317
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 14 S.C.R.
A Challenging the order of detention, it was
contend.ed on behalf of the appellant that there was
·inordinate delay in passing the order of detention and
that itself vitiated the same. It was pointed out that the
last prejudicial activity which prompted the detaining
B authority to pass the ord.er of detention had taken place
on 171h of November, 2012; whereas the order of
detention was passed on 5th of May, 2013; and that delay
in passing the order was not explained ...
The respondents admitted that the sponsoring
C authority wro.te about the necessity of preventive
detention in its letter dated 171h of December, 2012 for
the prejudicial activity of the detenu which had taken
place on 17th of November,' 2012 and the order of
detention was passed on 5th of May, 2013 but contended
D that this delay was sufficiently explained; and further that
mere delay itself is not sufficient to hold that the order of
detention is illegal. ·
Dismissing the appeal,. the Court
E HELD:1.1. There has to be live link between the
·prejudicial activity and the order of detention.
COFEPOSA intends to deal with persons engaged in
smuggling activities who pose a serious threat to the
economy and thereby security of the nation. Such
F persons by virtue of their large resources and influence
cause delay in making of an order of detention. While
dealing with the question ofdelay in making an order of
detention, the court is required to be. circumspect and
has to take a pragmatic view. No hard and fast formula
G is possible to be"iaid or has been laid in this regard.
However, one thing is clear that in case of delay, that
has to be satisfactorily explained. After all, the purpose
of preventive detention· is to take immediate steps for
preventing the detenu from indulging in prejudicial
H
LICIL ANTONYv. STATE OF KERALA 319
.activity. If there is undue and long delay between the A
prejudicial activity and making of the order of detention
and the delay has not been explained, the order of
detention becomes vulnerable. Delay in issuing the
order of detention, if not satisfactorily explained, itself is
a ground to quash the order of detention. No rule with B
precision has been formulated in this regard. The test
of proximity is not a rigid or a mechanical test. In case of
undue and long delay the court has to investigate
whether the link has been brol<en in the circumstances
of each case. [Page 7][325-D-H; 326-A] C
1.2. In the instant case, the prejudicial activity which
prompted the sponsoring authority to recommend for
detention of the detenu under COFEPOSA had taken
place on 17'h of November, 2012. The allegation related
to export of red sanders through International Container D
Trans-shipment Terminal. The sponsoring authority took
some time to determine whether the prejudicial activity
of the detenu justifies detention. During the inquiry it
transpired that the detenu and two others were part of a ·
well-organised gang operating in smuggling of red E
sanders in India and abroad. It is only thereafter that on
17'h of December, 2012, the sponsoring authority made
recommendation for the detention of the detenu and two
others under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA. As the
allegation had international ramification, the time taken F
by the sponsoring authority in making recommendation
cannot be said to be inordinate. The proposals of the
sponsoring authority were received in the office of the
detaining authority on 21•1 of December, 2012. As
detention affects the liberty of a citizen, it has to be G
scrutinised and evaluated with great care, caution and
circumspection. The detaining authority upon such
scrutiny and evaluation deci~ed on 251hof January, 2013
to place the proposals before the screening committee·
H
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014]14 S.C.R.
A and forwarded the-same to it on 1•t of February, 2013. If
one expects care and caution in scrutiny and evaluation
of the proposals, the time taken by the detaining
authority to place the proposals before the screening
committee cannot be said to have been taken after
B inordinate delay. The meeting of the screening
committee took place on 1•1 of February, 2013 in which
the cases of the detenu and the two others were
considered. The screening committee concurred with.
the recommendation of the sponsoring authority. As
c stated by the respondents in ttie counter affidavit, the
record of the sponsoring ·authority, the sc·reening
'· committee and other . materials consisted of over 1000
pages.. .,.
As the final call was to be taken .
by the detaining
authority, it was expected to· scrutinise, evaluate and
D analyse all the matf!rials in detail. After the said process,
the detaining authority decided on 1 Slh of April, 2013 to
detain the detenu and two others. The time· taken for
coming to the decision 'has I
sufficiently
,. . .
been
. -
explained.
After
•
the-decision
. .
to detain
r -
the detenu
..
and two others
E was taken, .draft grounds were prepared and approved
on 19t• of Aprll, 2013. As one of the detenue was a
Tamilian, the grounds :of detention were translated in
Malyalam and Tamil which took ~ome time and ultimately
sufficient number of copies and the documents relied
F on were prepared by 3,•d of May, 2013. Thereafter, the
order of detention was passed on St• of May, 2013. It
cannot thus be sa.id thatthere is undue delay in passing
the order of detention and the live nexus between the
prejudicial activity has snapped. The question whether
G the prejudicial activity of a person necessitating to pass
an order of detention is proximate to the time when the
order is made di' the live link between the prejudicial
activity and the purpose of detention is snapped
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.
H Even in. a case of undue _or long delay between ttie
LICIL ANTONYv. STATE OF KERALA 321
prejudicial activity and the passing of detention order, if A
the same is satisfactorily explained and a tenable and
reasonable explanation is offered, the order of detention
is not vitiated. There is distinction between the delay in
making of an order of detention under a law relating to
preventive detention like COFEPOSA and the delay in B
complying with procedural safeguards enshrined under ·
Article 22(5) of the Constitution. The order of detention
is notfitto be quashed on the ground of delay in passing
the same. [Paras 10; 12)(328-F-H; 329•A-H; 330-A-E]
Adishwar Jain v. Union of India (2006) 11 SCC c
339 : 2006 (7) Supp1.'scR 801; Rajinder Arora
v. Union of India (2006) 4 sec .796 : 2006 (3)
SCR 9 and M. Ahamedkutty v. Union of India
(1990) 2 sec 1 : 1990 (1) sp~ 209 - relied on.
D
2. The appellant then assailed the order of detention
on the ground of its delayed ·execution. Though undue
and unexplained delay in execution of the order of
detention vitiates it, but in the facts of the present case,
it cannot be said that such delay has occurred. The · E
order of detention dated 6th of May, 2013 was served on
the detenu on 11 1" of June, 2013. It is expected of the
detaining authority to take recourse to ordinary process
at the first instance for service of the order of dP.t!'ntinn
on a detenu and it is only after the order of detention is F
not senied through the said proc.ess that recourse to
the modes provided under Section 7 of the COFEPOSA
are to be resorted. Here, in the present case, that
occasion· did not arise as the order of detention was
served on the detenu on 11 1h of June, 2013. Therefore,
· the order of detention cannot be said to have been G
vitiated on this ground also. [Para 12)(331-F-H;
332-A-B]
3. The detenu i.e, the appellant's husband had been
arrested in a case of Andhra Pradesh and while granting H
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . : · [2014] 14 S.C.R. .
A bail, the trial court at Andhra Pradesh had put some
conditions. The case of appellant that the order granting
bail to the detenu by Andhra Pradesh court and the
conditions put were not considered by the. detaining
·authority; while passing the order of detention cannot
8 be accepted, lt_cannot be expected from the detaining
authority to know each and every detail concerning the
detenu in different parts of the country. Not only this, · ·
the conditions imposed while granting bail to the detenu
in no way restrains him from continuing with his
C prejudicial activity or the consequences, if he continues
to indulge. The bail order passed by the trial court in
Andhra Pradesh is not a crucial and vital document and
the omission by the detaining authority to consider the
same has, in no way affected its subjective satisfaction.
D [Paras 13, 14][332-C, E-H; 333-A-B] . . .
4. There was no er~or in the order of detention and
the order passed by the High Court, refusirig to quash
the same. [Para 15][333~CJ . · · · · ·' . · •·
Case Law Reference:
E
2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 801 relied on ' : Para 9
2006 (~) .scR 9 . relied on . Para 1.0
1990 (1) SCR 209 relied on Para 12
I
F .. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
Appeal No. 872 of2014.
From the judgment and order dated 06: 11.2013 of the
High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in W. P. {Criminal) No. 412
of2013. ·
G
Raghenth Basanat,Arjun Singh Bhati, Hardeep Singh, ·
Senthil Jagadeesan,Advs. for the Appellant.
M. T. George, Adv. forthe Respondents.
H
UCIL ANTONYv. STATE OF KERALA-~ .323
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J; Petitioner Licil
Antony happens to be the wife of detenu Antony Morris and
aggrieved by the order dated 6th of November, 2013 passed
by a Division Bench of the !(erala High Court in Writ Petition
(Criminal) No. 412 of2013 declining to quash the order of
-B '
detention passed under Conservation of Foreign Exchange
and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, hereinafter
referred to as "COFEPOSA", has preferred this special leave
petition. •
c
1. Leave granted.
2. Shorn of unnecessary details, facts giving rise to the
present appeal are that on the allegation that the appellant's
husband Antony Morris, hereinafter referred to as the detenu,
intended to export red sanders through International Container D
Trans-shipment Terminal, was arrested on 17th of November,
2012 by the· Directorate of Revenue Intelligence and a case
was registered against him. He was released on bail by the
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences),
Ernakulam. The Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, E
hereinafter referred to as 'DRI', by-its letter dated 17th of
December, 2012 made recommendation. for the detenu's
detention besides two others under Sectio·n 3 of the
CQFEPOSA alleging that they are part of a well-organised
gang operating in smuggling of red sanders in India and F
abroad. The proposals of the ORI, hereinafter referred to as
the sponsoring authority, were received in the office of the
detaining authority on 21st of December, 2012. The detaining
authority after scrutiny and evaluation. of the proposals and the
documents, decided on 25th of January, 2013 to place the. G
proposals before the screening 'committee and forwarded_ the
same to it on 1'' of February, 2013. The proposals of the.
detenu's detention along with two others were considered by
the screening committee which concurred with t~e
H
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 14 S.C.R.
A recommendation of the sponsoring authority. The detaining
autho~ity considered the facts and circumstances of the case
as also the reports of the sponsoring authority and the
screening committee and olher materials running over 1000
pages and took decision on 15th of April, 2013 to detain the
B detenu and two others. Draft grounds for detention in English
were approved on 19th ofApril, 2013 and as one of the detenue
was a Tamilian, time till 3'" of May, 2013 was taken for translation .
of the documents relied on in Malyalam aod Tamil and for
preparation of sufficient number of copies. Ultimately, with a
C view to prevent the detenu from engaging in the smuggling of
goods, the detaining authority passed order of detention dated
6'" of May, 2013. It was served on the detenu on 11th of June,
2013. The grounds of detention dated 8'" of May, 2013 were
made available to the detenu on 13'" of June, 2013. The
o detenu was produced beforetheAdvisory Board, which found
sufficient grounds for his continued detention and, accordingly,
the detaining authority issued order dated 24 111 ofAugust, 2013,
and confirmed the order of detention for a period of one year
with effect from 11'" of June, 2013, the date of detention.
E 3. It is relevant here to state that detenu was earlier
arrested in connection with Kallur Police Station FIR No.57 of
2012 under Section 29and 32 ofA.P. ForestAct, 1937; Section
29 of the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972; Section 55(2) of the
Biological Diversity Act, 2002; Rule 3 of.the AP. Sandalwood
F and Red Sanders Wood Transit Rules, .1969 and Section 379
of the Indian Penal Code. Judicial Magistrate (First Class),
Pakala by order dated 30'h of November, 2012 released him
on bail and while doing so directed him to appear before the
· .. · concerned police station on specified days .
.G 4. The appellant challenged her husband's detention
. before the High Court in a writ petition. By the impugned order
the same has been dismissed.
5. Mr. Raghenth Basant, leamed counsel for the appellant
H submits that there is inordinate delay in passing the order of
LICIL ANTONYv. STATE OF KERALA 325
[CHANDRAMUALI KR. PRASAD, J.]
detention and that itself vitiates the same. He points out that A
the last prejudicial activity which prompted the detaining
authority to pass the order of detention had taken place on
171hof November, 2012; whereas the order of detention has
been passed on 6'h of May, 2013. He submits that delay in
;)assing the order,has not been explained. B
6. Mr. M.T. George, learned counsel appearing on behalf
)f the respondents does not join issue and admits that the
>ponsoring authority wrote about the necessity of preventive
detention in its letter dated 17'h of December, 2012 for the
prejudicial activity of the detenu which had taken place on 17frl C
Jf November, 2012 and the order of detention was passed on
f)frl of May, 2013 but this delay has sufficiently been explained.
He submits that mere delay itself is not sufficient to hold that
the order of detention is illegal.
D
7. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival
submissions and we have no doubt in our mind that there has
to be live link between the prejudicial activity and the order of
detention. COFEPOSA intends to deal with persons engaged
in smuggling activities who pose a serious threat to the E
economy and thereby security of the nat.ion. Such persons by
virtue of their large resources and influence cause delay in
making of an order of detention. While dealing with the
question of delay in making an order of detention, the court is
required to be circumspect and has to take a pragmatic view. F
No hard and fast formula is possible to be laid or has been
laid in this regard. However, one thing is clear that in case of
delay, that has to be satisfactorily explained. After all, the
purpose of preventive detention is to take immediate steps
for preventing the detenu from indulging in prejudicial activity. G
If there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activity
and making of the order of detention and the delay has not
been explained, the order of detentior:i becomes vulnerable.
Delay in issuing the order of detention, if not satisfactorily
explained, itself is a ground to quash the order of detention.
H
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 14 S.C.R.
A No rule with.precision has been formulated in this regard. The
test of proximity is not a rigid or a mechanical test. In case of
undue and long delay the court has to investigate whether the
link has been broken in the circumstances of each case.
8. There are a large number of authorities which take
8 this view and, therefore, it is unnecessary to refer to all of them.
In the case of Adishwar Jain v. Union of India (2006) 11 SCC
339, this Court observed as follows_:
"8. Indisputably, delay to some extent stands explained.
c But, we fail to understand as to why despite the fact that
the proposal for detention was made on 2-12-2004, the
· order of detention was passed after four months. We must
also notice that in the meantime on 20-12-2004, the ·
authorities of the ORI had clearly stated that transactions
after -11-10-2003 were not under the scrutiny stating:
0
" ... In our letter mentioned above, your office was
requested not to issue the OEPB scripts to Mis Girnar
lmpex Limited and Mis Siri Amar Exports, only in
respect of the pending application, if any, filed by these
E parties up to the date of action i.e. 11-10-2003 as the
past exports were under scrutiny being doubtful as per
the intelligence received in this office. This office never
intended to stop the export incentives occurring to the
parties, afterthe date of action i.e. 11-10-2003. In the
F civil (sic) your office Letter No. R L. -21Misc. Am-20031
Ldh dated 17-5-2004 is being referred to, which is
not received in this office. You are, therefore, requested
to supply photocopy of the said letter to the bearer of
this letter as this letter is required for filing reply to the
G Hon'ble Court." ·
9. Furthermore, as noticed hereinbefore, the authorities
of the ORI by a letter dated 28-~-2005 requested the bank
to defreeze the bank accounts of the appellant.
H
LICIL ANTONYv. STATE OF KERALA 327
[CHANDRAMUALI KR. PRASAD, J.]
10. The said documents, in our opinion, were material. A
11. It was, therefore, difficultto appreciate why order of
detention could not be passed on the basis of the
materials gathered by them.
12. It is no doubt true that if the delay is sufficiently B
explained, the same would not be a ground for quashing
an order of detention under COFEPOSA, but as in this
case a major part of delay remains unexplained."
9. Further, this Court had the occasion to consider this
question in the case of Rajinder Arora v. Union of India, (2006) C
4 sec 796 in which it has been held as follows:
"20. Furthermore no explanation whatsoever has been
offered by the respondent as to why the order of detention
has been issued after such a long time. The said question
0
has also not been examined by the Authorities before
issuing the order of detention.
21. The question as regards delay in issuing the order of
detention has been held to be a valid ground for quashing
an order of detention by this Court in T.A. Abdul Rahman E
v. State of Kera/a (1989) 4 SCC 741 stating: (SCC pp.
748-49, paras 10-11)
"10. The conspectus of the above decisions can be
summarised thus: The question whethE?r the prejudicial
activities of a person necessitating to f?ass an order F
of detention is proximate to the time when the order is
made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities
and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on
the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard-
and-fast rule can be precisely formulated that would G
be applicable under all circumstances and no
exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf.
It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or
mechanical test by merely counting number of nionths ·
H
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 14 S.C.R.
A between the offending acts and the order of detention.
However, when there is undue and long delay between
the prcjudiciai activities and the passing of detention
order, the court has to scruiinise whether the detaining
authority°has satisfact~rily examined such a delay and
8 afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to
why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon
to answer and further the court has to investigate
whetperthe causal connection has been broken in the
circumstances of each case.
11. ,Similarly when there is unsatisfactory and
unexplained delay between the date of order of
detention and the date. of securing the arrest of the
detenu, such a delay would throw considerable doubt
on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of
D · · the detaining authority leading to a legitimate inference
thatthe detaining authority was not really and genuinely
satisfied as. regards the necessity for detaining the
a
detenu with view to p~eventing him from acting in a
prejudicial manner."
E
.22. The delay caused in this case in issuing the order of
detention has not been explained. In fact, no reason in·
that behalf whatsoever has been assigned at all."
10. Bearir:ig in mind the principles aforesaid, we proceed
Fto examine the facts of the. present case. Prejudicial activity
which prompted the sponsoring authority to recommend for
detention of the detenu under COFEPOSA had taken place
on 17'h of November, 2012. The allegation related to export of
red sanders through International ContainerTrans-shipment
G Terminal. The sponsoring authority took some time to
determine whether the prejudicial activity of the detenu justifies
detention. During the inquiry it transpired that the detenu and
two others were part of a well-organised gang operating in
smuggling of red sanders in India and abroad. It is only
H
LICIL ANTONYv. STATE OF KERALA 329
[CHANDRAMUALI KR. PRASAD, J.]
thereafter that on 171h of December, 2012, the sponsoring A
authority made recommendation for the detention of the detenu
and tWo others under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA. As the
allegation had international ramification, the time taken by the
sponsoring authority in making recommendation cannot be
said to be inordinate. The proposals of the sponsoring B
authority were received in the office of the detaining authority
on 21" of December, 2012. As detention affects the liberty of
·a citizen, it has to be scrutinised and evaluated with great care,
caution and circumspection. The detaining authority upon •
such scrutiny and evaluation decided on 25th of January, 2013 C
to place the proposals before the screening comniittee and
forwarded the same to it on 1" of February, 2013. If one expects
ca.re and caution in scrutiny and evaluation of the proposals,
the time taken by the detaining authority to place the proposals
before the ·screening committee cannot be said to have been D
taken after inordinate delay. The meeting of the screening
committee took place on 1•1 of February, 2013 in which the
cases of the detenu and the two others were considered. The
screening committee concurred with the recommendation of
the sponsoring authority.. As stated by the respondents in the E
counter affidavit, the record of the sponsoring authority, the
screening committee and _other materials consisted of over
1000 pages. As the final call was to be taken by the detaining
authority, it was expected fa scrutinise, evaluate and analyse
all the materials in detail. After the said process, the detaining F
authority decided on 15th of April, 2013 to detain the deteno
and two others. The time taken for coming to· the decision has
sufficiently been explained. After the decision to detain the
detenu and two others was taken, draft grounds were prepared
and approved on 19'" of April, 2013. As one of the deten1.1e G
was a Tamilian, the grounds of detention were translated in
Malyalam and Tamil which took some time and ultimately
sufficient number of copies and the documents relied on were
prepared by 3rd of May, 2013. Thereafter, the order of detention
was passed oh-6'" of May, 201 ~- ·
H
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 14 S.C.R.
A · 11. From what we have stated above, it cannot be said
that there is undue delay in passing the order of detention and
· the live nexus between the prejudicial activity has snapped.
As observed earlier, the question whether the prejudicial
activity of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention
B is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live link
between the prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention
is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each
.case. Even in a case of undue or long delay between the
prejudicial activity and the passing of detention order, if the
C same is satisfactorily explained and a tenable and reasonable
explanation is offered, the order of detention is not vitiated.
We must bear in mind that distinction exists between the delay
in making of an order of detention under a law relating to
preventive detention like COFEPOSA and the delay in
o complying with procedural safeguards enshrined under Article
22(5) of the Constitution. In view of the factual scenario as
aforesaid, we are of the opinion thatthe order of detention is
not fit to be quashed on the ground of delay in passing the
same. The conclusion which we have reached is in tune with
. E what has been observed by this Court in the case of M .
. Ahamedkutiy v. Union of India, (1990) 2 SCC 1. It reads as
follows:
"10 .. ~ ..... Mere delay in making of an order of detention
under a law like the COFEPOSA Act enacted for the
F purpose of dealing effectively with persons engaged in
smuggling and foreign exchange racketeering who, owing
to their large resources and influence, have been posing
a serious threat to the economy and thereby to the security
of the nation, the courts should not merely on account of
G the delay in making of an order of detention assume that
such delay, if not satisfactorily explained, must necessarily
give rise to an inference that there was .no sufficient
material for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining
authority or that such subjective satisfaction was not
H
LICIL ANTONYv. STATE OF KERALA 331
[CHANDRAMUALI KR. PRASAD, J.]
genuinely reached. Taking of such a view would not be A
warranted unless the court finds that the grounds are stale
or illusory or that there was no real nexus between the·
grounds and the impugned order of detention. In that
case, there was no explanation for the delay between
February 2, and May 28, 1987, yet it could not give rise B
· to legitimate inference that the subjective satisfaction
arrived at by the District Magistrate was not genuine or
that the grounds were stale or illusory or that there was
no rational connection between the grounds and the
order of detention." · · C
12. Mr. Basant, then assails the order of detention on the
ground of its delayed execution. He points out that the order
of detention was passed on 5th of May, 2013 whereas it was
served on the detenu on 11th of June, 2013. He submits that
had the detenu been absconding, the appropriate Government D
ought to have taken recourse to Section 7 of the COFEPOSA.
Section 7 of the COFEPOSA confers power on the detaining
authority to make a report to a competent Magistrate in relation
to an abscondir.ig person .so as to apply the provisions of
Section 82, 83, 84 and 85 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. E
It also provides for publication of an order in the Official
Gazette, directing the detenu to appear. It is an admitted
position that no such. report or publication was made.
Accordingly, Mr. Basant submits that the order of detention is
vitiated on the ground of delay in its execution also.. In support F
of the submission he has placed reliance on a large number
of authorities. We are entirely in agreement with Mr. Basant
that undue and unexplained delay in execution of the order of
detention vitiates it, but in the facts of the present case, it cannot
be said that such delay has occurred. As stated earlier, the G
" order of detention dated 6th of May, 2013 was served on the
detenu on 11th of June, 2013. It is expected of the detaining
authority to take recourse to ordinary process at the first
instance for service of the order of detention on a detenu and
H
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 14 S.C.R.
A it is only after the order of detention is not served through the
said process that recoutse to the modes provided under
Section 7 of the COFEPOSA are to be resorted. Here, in the
present case, that occasion did. not arise as the order of
detention was served on the·detenu on 11 1h of June, 2013.
B Therefore, in our opinion; the order of detention cannot be said
to have been vitiated on this ground also.
13~ Lastly, Mr. Basant submits that the detenu was
arrested in a case atAndhra Pradesh and while granting bail,
. the trial court atAndhra Prade.sh put following conditions:
c
"7) The petitioner/accused No.4 shall appear and sign
before the concerned Station House Officer in between
10.30 AM to 2.00 PM on the first week Wednesday of
every succeeding month for a period till the date of filing
D of charge sheet or until further orders and co-operate
with the Investigating Officer.
8) The petitioner/accused No.4 shall nottamper with the
evi.dence of prosecution witnesses in any way."
E 14. Mr. Basant submits that the order granting bail to the·
detenu and the conditions put have not been considered by
the detaining authority, while passing the order of detention.
He submits that an order of preventive detention deprives a
citizen of his precious fundamental right of liberty and as such,
the detaining authority erred in passing the order of detention
F without considering the same. Mr. George, however, submits
that as the said order was passed by the trial court atAndhra
Pradesh, it was not within the knowledge of the detaining
authority. In any view of the matter, according to him, the same
has no relevance in decision making process and, therefore,
. G the omission to consider that will not render the order of
detention unconstitutional. On thoughtful consideration of the
rival submissions, the plea put forth by Mr. George commends
us. We· cannot expect the detaining authority to know each.·.
a.nd every detail concerning the detenu in different parts of the
.H
LICIL ANTONYv. STATE OF KERALA 333
[CHANDRAMUALI KR. PRASAD, J.]
country. Not only this, the conditions imposed while granting A
bail to the detenu which we have reproduced above in no way
restrains him from continuing with his prejudicial activity or the
consequences, if he continues to indulge. We are in
agreement with the High Court that the bail order passed by
the trial court in Andhra Pradesh is not a crucial and vital B
document and the omission by the detaining authority to
consider the same has, in no way affected its subjective
satisfaction.
15. From the conspectus cifwhatwe have observed, we
do 'not find any error in the order of detention and the o.rder C
passed by the High Court, refusing to quash the same. In the
result, we do not find any merit in the appeal and the same is
dismissed accordingly.
D
Bibhuli Bhushan Bose Appeal dismissed.
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