LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIAversusSANJEEV BUILDERS PVT. LTD. AND ORS.

                            [2017] 10 S.C.R. 208



A            LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA
                                      v.
              SANJEEV BUILDERS PVT. LTD. AND ORS.
                      (Civil Appeal No. 16964 of2017)
B                           OCTOBER 24, 2017
            [KURIAN JOSEPH AND R. BANUMATHI, JJ.]
         Letters Patent Appeal: Maintainability of- The Letters Patent
  Appeal lie from the judgment which affect the vital and valuable
  rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the parties
c concerned   - In the instant suit for specific performance of agreement
  of sale of suit property, the single judge of High Court allowed
  impleadment application filed by assignee 27 years after the suit -
  Letters Patent Appeal against the order of si;;g!r! judge - Dismissed
  on the f?1v1111d that the substitution of assignee does not affect the
D rights oj uppellant on merits and that appellant could challenge
  the assiiw1wnt after the final decree - Held: The order allowing
  the application impleading third respondent as assignee filed after
  27 years of filing of the suit vitally affects the valuable rights of the
  appellant - The order allowing amendment of plaint by impleading
  third respondent as 'Plaintiff no.3' on the basis of alleged assignment
E
  of agreement decides a vital question which concerns the rights of
  the parties and hence is a 'judgment" to maintain the Letters Pate/If
  Appeal witl;f.'1 the meaning of Clause I 5 - Therefore Letters Patent
  Appeal is maintainable.
          Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:
F
        Or. 22 r.10 - Scope of - Held: Or.22 1: 10 enables only
  continuance of suit by leave of court - ft is the duty of the court to
  decide whether leave to be granted or not to the person or to the
  assignee to continue the suit - The discretion to implead or not to
  implead parties who apply to continue the suit must be exercised
G judiciously and not arbitrarily - In the instant case, High Court
   was not right in holding that mere alleged transfer/assignment of
  the agreement would be sufficient to grant leave to third respondent
  to continue the suit - From the filing of the suit in 1986, over the
  years, valuable right of defence accrued to the appellant; such
H valuable right of defence could not be defeated by granting leave
                                  208
   LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA v. SANJEEV                         209
             BUILDERS PVT. LTD. AND ORS.

 to the third respondent to continue the suit in the application filed A
 under Or.22 r.10 after 27 years of filing of the suit - Single judge
 was not right in saying that impleading third respondent as Plaintiff
 No.3 would cause no prejudice to the appellant and that the issues
 ccm be raised at the time of trial.
       Or. 22 r.10 - Amendment of suit - The application was filed        B
after 27 years of filing of the suit - Of course, the power to allow
the a111endment of suit is wide and the court should not adopt hyper
technical approach - In considering amendment applications, court
should adopt liberal approach and amendments are to be allowed
to avoid multiplicity of litigations - Mere delay is not a gmund for
rejecting the amend111ent - But in the case in hand, the parties are      c
not rustic litigants; all the respondents are companies and the dispute
between the parties is a commercial litigation - In such facts and
circumstances, the ame11d111ent prayed in the Chamber Summons filed
under 01:22 1: JO CPC ought not to have been allowed, as the sa111e
would cause serious prejudice to the appellant.                           D
       Specific perfor111ance: Limitation             l111pleadment
 application - Held: In a suit for specific performance, application
.for impleadment must be filed within a reasonable time - The
 application filed for impleading third respondent as Plaintiff No.3
 was not filed within reasonable time - No explanation is offered for     E
 such an inordinate delay of 27 years, which was not kept in view by
 the High Court.
       Allowing the appeal, the Court
       HELD: 1.1 Clause 15 of Letters Patent provides for intra-
court appeals against the judgment of Single .Judge of the High           F
Court. The right of the Letters Patent Appeal to the High Court
depends upon whether or not the decision of the Single Judge
appealed from affects the merits of the question between the
parties and their \'aluable rights. Whether an order is a 'judgment'
or an 'interlocutory order' depends upon whether or not, it has           G
finally decided the rights of the parties and whether it has the
effect of affecting the rights of the parties. For an order to be a
'judgment', it is not always necessary that it should put an end to
the controversy or terminate the suit. An 'interlocutory order'
determining the rights of the parties in one way or other is also a
                                                                          H
210           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [:W17] l0 S.C.R.


A     'judgment'. The Letters Patent Appeal would lie from the judgment
      which would affect the vital and valuable rights of the parties and
      which work serious injustice to the parties concerned. [Para 9,
      10) [215-A-D]
            Shah Babula/ Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania and Anr.
B           (1981) 4 SCC 8 : [1982] 1 SCR 187 - relied on.
        1.2 The order allowing the application impleading
  respondent no.3 as assignee (Order XXII Ruic 10 CPC) after 27
  years of filing of the suit vitally affects the valuable rights of the
  appellant. The order allowing amendment of plaint by impleading
c respondent No.3 as 'Plaintiff N9.3' on the basis of alleged
  assignment of agreement dated 24.08.1987 decides a vital
  question which concerns the rights of the parties and hence is a
  'judgment' to maintain the Letters Patent Appeal. Allowing of
  such application after 27 years of filing suit for specific
  performance would cause serious prejudice to the appellant-
D defendant depriving valuable right of defence available to the
  appellant and hence the order of Single Judge allowing the
  Chamber Summons is a 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause
  15 of the Letters Patent Appeal. [Para 11) [217-A-B]
          2. Under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC, when there has been
 E an assignment or devolution of interest during the pendency of a
   suit, the suit may, by leave of the Court, be continued by or against
   person to or upon whom such interest has been assigned or
   devolved and this entitles the person who has acquired an interest
   in the subject-matter of the litigation by an assignment or creation
 F or devolution of interest pende11te lit~ or suitor or any other person
   interested, to apply to the Court for leave to continue the suit.
   When the plaintiff assigns/transfers the suit during the pendency
   of the suit, the assignee is entitled to be brought on record and
   continue the suit. Order XXII Rule 10 CPC enables only
   continuance of the suit by the leave of the court. It is the duty of
 G the court to decide whether leave to be granted or not to the
   person or to the assignee to continue the suit. The discretion to
   implead or not to implead parties who apply to continue the suit
   must be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. [Para 12] [217-
   G-H; 218-A]
H
  LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION· OF INDIA v. SANJEEV                       211
            BUILDERS PVT. LTD. AND ORS.

       3. The High Court was not right in holding that mere alleged     A
transfer/assignment of the agreement would be sufficient to grant
leave to respondent No.3 to continue the suit. From the filing of
the suit in 1986, over the years, valuable right of defence accrued
to the appellant; such valuable right of defence cannot be defeated
by granting leave to the third respondent to continue the suit in
                                                                        B
the application filed under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC after 27
years of filing of the suit. The Single Judge was not right in saying
that impleading respondent No.3 as Plaintiff No.3 would cause
no prejudice to the appellant and that the issues can be raised at
the time of trial. [Para 13] [218-B-C]
      4. In a suit for specific performance, application for            C
impleadment must be filed within a reasonable time. The
application filed for implcading respondent No.3 as Plaintiff No.3
was not filed within reasonable time. No explanation is offered
for such an inordinate delay of 27 years, which was not kept in
view by the High Court. [Para 14] [218-D 219-D]                         D
      Vidur lmpex and Traders Private Limited and Others v.
      Tosh Apartments Private Limited and Others (2012) 8
      SCC 384 : [2012] 10 SCR 307 - relied on.
      5. An application under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC seeking
leave of the court to continue the suit by the assignee/third           E
respondent was not actually filed. Chamber Summons No.187 of
2014 was straight away filed praying to amend the suit which would
have been the consequential amendment, had the leave to
continue the suit been granted by the court. [Para 15] [219-E]
       6. The application was filed after 27 years of filing of the     F
suit. Of course, the power to allow the amendment of suit is wide
and the court should not adopt hyper technical approach. In
considering amendment applications, court should adopt liberal
approach a11d amendments are to be allowed to avoid multiplicity
of litigations. Mere delay is not a ground for rejecting the            0
amendment. But in the case in hand, the parties are ·not rustic
litigants; all the respondents are companies and the dispute
between the parties is a commercial litigation. In such facts and
circumstances, the amendment prayed in the Chamber Summons
filed under Order XXII Ruic 10 CPC ought not to have been
allowed, as the same would cause serious prejudice to the               H
212            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2017] 10 S.C.R.


A appellant. The impugned order, allowing Chamber Summons filed
  after 27 years of the suit would take away the substantial rights
  of defence accrued to the appellant and the same cannot be
  sustained. [Para 16] [219-F-H; 220-A]
            Mrs. Saradambal Ammal v. E. R. Kandasamy Goundar
B           and Others (1947) 2 MLJ 374; Jawalzarlal v. Smt.
            Saraswatibai Babula/ Joshi and Others AIR 1987 Born.
            276 - referred to
                             Case Law Reference
      [1982] 1 SCR 187                relied on                Para 10
c
      [2012] 10 SCR 307               relied on                Para 14
           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 16964
      of20!7
         From the Judgment and Order dated 22.08.2014 of the High Court
 D ofJudicature at Bombay in Appeal No. 285 of2014 in Chamber Summons
   No. 187 of 2014 in Suit No. 894of1986.
            D. N. Goburdhan, Ms. Palla vi Chopra, Advs. for the Appellant.
         Shekhar Naphade, Sr. Adv., Mahesh Agarwal, N. Janardhan,
 E Ankur Saigal, Munjaal Bhatt, Navjot Singh, E. C. Agrawala, Ms. Shally
   Bhasin, Advs. for the Respondents.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            R. BANUMATHI, J. !. Leave granted.
            2. This appeal arises out of the judgment of the High Court of
 F    Judicature at Bombay dated 22.08.2014, in and by which, the Division
      Bench dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant thereby affirming the
      order of the Single Judge in Chamber Summons No.187 of 2014 by
      which the respondent No.3 was impleaded as Plaintiff No.3 in Suit
      No.894 of 1986.
 G       3. The respondent No. I filed suit No.894 of 1986 against the
   appellant for specific performance of the agreement of sale dated
   08.06.1979 by which the appellant is said to have agreed to sell the suit
   property to respondent No. I and in the alternative directing the appellant
   to pay a sum of Rs.10,75,021.05 with further interest on the sum of
 H Rs.4,52,778/- at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of the suit till
  LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA v. SANJEEV                               213
    BUILDERS PVT. LTD. AND ORS. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

payment or realization. According to the appellant. the said agreement         A
has been rescinded on 28.11.1984. The respondent No.1 is said to have
assigned the interest to respondent No.2, their sister concern.
        4. In the year 2014, respondent No.3-Kedia Construction
Company Limited filed Chamber Summons No. 187/2014 stating that
subsequent to the filing of the suit, with the consent of respondent No.2, B
Plaintiff No.1/respondent No. I had assigned its interest to respondent
No.3 for a consideration of Rs.23,31,000/- by an agreement for sale
dated 24.08.1987. The Chamber Summons was filed to implead
respondent No.3 as PlaintiffNo.3 and praying to amend the suit pursuant
to the agreement of sale in its favour. The appellant opposed the Chamber
Summons on the ground that the respondent No.3 was not a bona fide c
assignee or a necessary party and that the issues in the suit were framed
on 31.01.2014 and that there has been an inordinate delay of 27 years in
filing the application which has not been explained. It was also contended
that the agreement dated 08.06.1979 in favour of respondent No. I itself
was terminated on 28.11.1984 and the respondent No.I/Plaintiff No. I D
could not have transferred any right to the respondents.
        5. The Single Judge held that the issue as to whether the interest
of respondent Nos.1 and 2 can be transferred to respondent No.3 has to
be tried in the suit and not at that stage and delay in filing the application
cannot be a ground for not impleading the respondent No.3. The chamber E
judge held that the agreement dated 08.06.1979 permits assignment of
rights and there is no requirement therein for permission being taken
from the appellant. The court relied on the Madras High Court judgment
in Mrs. Saradambal Ammal v. E. R. Kandasamy Go11ndar and
Others (1947) 2 MLJ 374 wherein it was held that such assignment of
contractual rights was permissible under Order XXll Rule 10 CPC. The F
Single Judge also relied upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in
Jawaliarlal v. Smt. Saraswatibai Babula/ Joshi and Others AIR 1987
Bom. 276, wherein it was held that the detailed enquiry was not needed
under Order XXII Rule I 0 CPC and that there need be only a ['rima
facie satisfaction that the interest has been assigned and the grounds on o
merits need not be considered. The court noted that though the suit was
filed in 1986, the same was listed for the first time only in 2000 and then
in 2007, in 2008 and later in 2014. Observing that no prejudice will be
 caused to the appellant, the Chamber Summons was allowed vide order
 dated 16.04.2014 and costs ofRs.10,000/- was directed to be paid to the
                                                                               1-1
214            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 10 S.C.R.


A     appellant. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred the Letters Patent
      Appeal which came to be dismissed holding that the proposed amendment
      did not affect the case of the appellant. on merits and that the appellant
      could challenge the assignment in favour of respondent No.3 after the
      final decree. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of Letters Patent Appeal,
      the appellant has preferred this appeal.
B
             6. Mr. Goburdhan, learned counsel for the appellant contended
      that when the suit for specific performance was pending from 1986 and
      the same was well within the knowledge ofrespondents, the amendment
      made in the year 2014 impleading respondent No.3 as Plaintiff No.3
      under the guise of application under Order XXII Rule l 0 CPC, is a
c     sheer abuse of law. Counsel further submitted that there was a gross
      delay of 27 years in filing the impleadment application and the High
      Court glossed over the law and facts and erred in allowing the application
      without keeping in view an inordinate delay of '27 years in filing the
      application.
D        7. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents Mr.
  Shekhar Naphade submitted that the order allowing the application in
  Order XXII Rule 10 CPC is in the nature of an interim order and not
  finally determined the rights of the parties and hence no Letters Patent
  Appeal will lie. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that
E respondent No.3 claims as an assignee of the rights of the respondent
  Nos. I and 2 and has the right to continue the suit and the order allowing
  impleading application does not affect the rights of the parties. It was
  further contended that the rights of respondent No. I under the agreement
  of sale is a transferable right to sue and the assignee having acquired the
  right during the pendency of the suit for specific performance. It was
F submitted that the provisions of Order XXII Rule I0 CPC enables the
  assignee to make an application to the court to imp lead as party to continue
  the suit for which the provisions of Limitation Act do not apply. It was
  submitted by a well-reasoned order that learned Single Judge allowed
  the Chamber Summons and the Division Bench rightly dismissed the
G appeal and the impugned order does not suffer from any error of law
  warranting interference.
            8. We have carefully considered· the rival contentions and perused
      the impugned judgment and materials on record.
            9. First contention is that the order of Single Judge was not a
H     'judgment' finally affecting the rights of the parties and the non-
  LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA v. SANJEEV                               215
    BUILDERS PVT. LTD. AND ORS. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal. Clause 15 of Letters Patent A
provides for intra-cou1t appeals against the judgment of Single Judge of
the High Court. The right of the Letters Patent Appeal to the High Court
depends upon whether or not the decision of the Single Judge appealed
from affects the merits of the question between the parties and their
valuable rights. Whether an order is a 'judgment' or an 'interlocutory B
order' depends upon whether or not, it has finally decided the rights of
the parties and whether it has the effect of affecting the rights of the
parties. For an order to be a 'judgment', it is not always necessary that
it should put an end to the controversy or terminate the suit. An
'interlocutory order'determining the rights of the parties in one way or
other is also a 'judgment'.                                               C
       10.Elaborating upon nature of 'interlocutory order' or
"judgment" and observing that the Letters Patent Appeal would lie from
the judgment which would affect the vital and valuable rights of the
parties and which work serious injustice to the parties concerned, in
Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania and Anr. ( 1981) 4 SCC 8,              D
it was held as under:-
       "106. Thus, the only point which emerges from this decision is
       that whenever a trial Judge decides a controversy which affects
       valuable rights of one of the parties, it must be treated to be a
       judgment within the meaning of the letters patent.                      E


       114. In the course of the trial, the trial Judge may pass a number
       of orders whereby some of the various steps to be taken by the
       parties in prosecution of the suit may be of a routine nature while
       other orders may cause some inconvenience to one party or the           F
       other, e.g., an order refusing an adjournment, an order refusing
       to summon an additional witness or documents, an order refusing
       to condone delay in filing documents, after the first date of hearing
       an order of costs to one of the parties for its default or an order
       exercising discretion in respect of a procedural matter against         0
       one party or the other. Such orders are purely interlocutory and
       cannot constitute judgments because it will always be open to
       the aggrieved party to make a grievance of the order passed
       against the party concerned in ~he appeal against the final
       judgment passed by the trial Judge.
                                                                               H
216            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] IO S.C.R.


A             115. Thus, in other words every interlocutory order cannot be
              regarded as a judgment but only those orders would be judgments
              which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable
              rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party
              concerned. Similarly, orders passed by the trial Judge deciding
              question of admissibility or relevancy of a document also cannot
B
              be treated as judgments because the grievance on this score can
              be corrected by the appellate court in appeal against the final
              judgment.
              116. We might give another instance of an interlocutory order
              which amounts to an exercise of discretion and which may yet
c             amount to a judgment within the meaning of the letters patent.
              Suppose the trial Judge allows the plaintiff to amend his plaint or
              include a cause of action or a relief as a result of which a vested
              right of limitation accrued to the defendant 1s taken away and
              rendered nugatory. It is manifest that in such cases. although the
D             order passed by the trial Judge is purely discretionary and
              interlocutory. it causes gross injustice to the defendant who is
              deprived of a valuable right of defence to the suit. Such an order.
              therefore. though interlocutory in nature contains the attributes
              and characteristics of finality and must be treated as a judgment
              within the meaning of the letters patent. This is what was held
E             by this Court in Shanti Kumcir case U974! 2 SCC 387. as
              discussed above.
              117. Let us take another instance of a similar order which may
              not amount to a judgment. Suppose, the trial Judge allows the
              plaintiff to amend the plaint by adding a particular relief or taking
F             an additional ground which may be inconsistent with the pleas
              taken by him but is not barred by limitation and does not work
              serious injustice to the <lefondant who woLLld have ample
              opportunity to disprove the amended plea taken by plaintiff at
              the trial. In such cases, the order of the trial Judge would only be
G             a simple interlocutory order without containing <my quality of
              finality and would therefore not be a judgment within the meaning
              of clause 15 of the letters patent." [Underlining added]
             11. Applying the above principle to the case in hand, we find that
      the order allowing the •tpplication impleading respondent No.3 as assignee
H     (Order XXII Rule JO CPC) after 27 years of filing of the suit vitally
   LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA v. SANJEEV                                217
     BUILDERS PVT. LTD. AND ORS. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

affects the valuable rights of the appellant. The order allowing amendment       A
of plaint by impleading respondent No.3 as 'Plaintiff No.3' on the basis
of alleged assignment of agreement dated 24.08.1987 decides a vital
question which concerns the rights of the parties and hence is a
'judgment' to maintain the Letters Patent Appeal. In our view, allowing
of such application after 27 years of filing suit for specific performance       B
would cause serious prejudice to the appellant-defendant depriving
valuable right of defence available to the appellant and hence the order
of Single Judge allowing the Chamber Summons is a 'judgment' within
the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal.
        12. The stand of respondent No.3 is that it claims as an assignee
of the rights of respondent Nos. I and 2 and that it has the right to continue   C
the suit under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC and the provisions oflimitation,
do not apply to such an application. To appreciate merits of this contention,
we may usefully refer to Order XXII Rule 10 CPC, which reads as
under:-
        ORDER XXII: DEATH,                        MARRIAGE             AND       D
        INSOLVENCY OF PARTIES


        10. Procedure in case of assignment before final order in
        suit." ( 1) In other cases of an assignment, creation or devolution      E
        of any interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may, by
        leave of the Court, be continued by or against the person to or
        upon whom such interest has come or devolved.
        (2) The attachment of a decree pending an appeal therefrom
        shall be deemed to be an interest entitling the person who procured
                                                                                 F
        such attachment to the benefit of sub-rule (1).
Under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC, when there has been an assignment or
devolution of interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may, by
leave of the Court, be continued by or against person to or upon whom
such interest has been assigned or devolved and this entitles the person
                                                                            G
who has acquired an interest in the subject-matter of the litigation by an
assignment or creation or devolution of interestpendente lite or suitor
or any other person interested, to apply to the Court for leave to continue
the suit. When the plaintiff assigns/transfers the suit during the pendency
of the suit, the assignee is entitled to be brought on record and continue
the suit. Order XXII Rule 10 CPC enables only continuance of the suit H
218             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] I 0 S.C.R.



A     by the leave of the court. It is the duty of the court to decide whether
      leave to be granted or not to the person or to the assignee to continue the
      suit. The discretion to implead or not to implead parties who apply to
      continue the suit must be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily.
             13. The High Court was not right in holding that mere alleged
B transfer/assignment of the agreement would be sufficient to grant leave
      to respondent No.3 to continue the suit. From the filing of the suit in
      1986, over the years, valuable right of defence accrued to the appellant;
      such valuable right of defence cannot be defeated by granting leave to
      the third respondent to continue the suit in the application filed under
      Order XXII Rule I 0 CPC after 27 years of filing of the suit. The learned
c     Single Judge was not right in saying that impleading respondent No.3 as
      Plaintiff No.3 would cause no prejudice to the appellant and that the
      issues can be raised at the time of trial.
              14. In a suit for specific performance, application for impleadment
      must be filed within a reasonable time. Considering the question of
D     impleadment of party in a suit for specific performance after referring
      to. various judgments, in Vidur lmpex and Traders Private Limited
      and Others v. Tosh Apartments Private Limited and Others (2012) 8
      sec 384 summarized the principles as under:-
              "41. Though there is apparent conflict in the observations made
E             in some of the aforementioned judgments, the broad principles
              which should govern disposal of an application for impleadment
              are:
              41.1. The court can, at any stage of the proceedings, either on
              an application made by the parties or otherwise, direct
F             impleadment of any person as party, who ought to have been
              joined as plaintiff or defendant or whose presence before the
              court is necessary for effective and complete adjudication of the
              issues involved in the suit.
              41.2. A necessary party is the person who ought to be joined as
G             party to the suit and in whose absence an effective decree cannot
              be passed by the court.
              41.3. A proper party is a person whose presence would enable
              the court to completely, effectively and properly adjudicate upon
              all matters and issues, though he may not be a person in favour
H             of or against whom a decree is to be made.
   LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA v. SANJEEV                              219
     BUILDERS PVT. LTD. AND ORS. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

        41.4. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party,      A
        the court does not have the jurisdiction to order his impleadment
        against the wishes of the plaintiff.
        41.5. In a suit for specific performance, the court can order
        impleadment of a purchaser whose conduct is above board, and
        who files application for being joined as party within reasonable      B
        time of his acquiring knowledge about the pending litigation.
        41.6. However, ifthe applicant is guilty of contumacious conduct
        or is beneficiary of a clandestine transaction or a transaction
        made by the owner of the suit prop~rty in violation of the restniint
        order passed by the court or the application is unduly delayed         c
        then the court will be fully justified in declining the prayer for
        impleadment."
In light of the above principles, considering the case in hand, in our view,
the application fiied for impleading respondent No.3 as Plaintiff No.3
was not filed within reasonable time. No explanation is offered for such       D
an inordinate delay of 27 years, which was not kept in view by the High
Court.
      15. Be it noted that an application under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC
seeking leave of the court to continue the suit by the assignee/third
respondent was not actually filed. Chamber Summons No.187 of 2014              E
was straight away filed praying to amend the suit which would have
been the consequential amendment, had the leave to continue the suit
been granted by the court.
        16. As pointed out earlier, the appli~ation was filed after 27 years
of filing of the suit. Of course, the power to allow the amendment of suit
                                                                               F
is wide and the court should not adopt hyper technical approach. In
considering amendment applications, court should adopt liberal approach
and amendments are to be allowed to avoid multiplicity of litigations.
We are conscious that mere delay is not a ground for rejecting the
amendment. But in the case in hand, the parties are not rustic litigants;
all the respondents are companies and the dispute between the parties is       G
a commercial litigation. In such facts and circumstances, the amendment
prayed in the Chamber Summons filed under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC
ought not to have been allowed, as the same would cause serious prejudice
to the appellant. In our view, the impugned order, allowing Chamber
Summons No.187 of 2014 filed after 27 years of the suit would take             H
220             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 10 S.C.R.


A away the substantial rights of defence accrued to the appellant and the
  same cannot be sustained.
             17. In the result, the impugned judgment is set aside <md the appeal
      is allowed. Chamber Summons No.187 of 2014 in Suit No.894 of 1986
      stands dismissed. No order as to costs.
B

      Devika Gujral                                               Appeal allowed.