LULLU VAS (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH LRSversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

454                      [2019]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    4 S.C.R. 454               [2019] 4 S.C.R.


A            LULLU VAS (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH LRS
                                        v.
                      STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
                         (Civil Appeal No. 1973 of 2019)
B                             FEBRUARY 22, 2019
                        [N. V. RAMANA AND
                  MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, JJ.]
            Maharashtra Slum Areas Act, 1971 – Disputed property
C     vested in the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM-
      respondent no.2) – Appellants’ predecessor-in-interest submitted
      application to MCGM seeking lease of the said land and paid
      earnest money – Slum structures pre-existing on the said land –
      1971 Act enacted – Said area entitled for redevelopment – Slum
      dwellers formed co-operative housing society (respondent no.4) –
D     Slum rehabilitation of the said area approved by the Slum
      Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) by issuing Letter of Intent (LoI) vide
      order dtd.16.06.1999 – Respondent no.4 appointed developer
      (respondent no.5) for implementation of slum rehabilitation scheme
      and build new flats – Writ petition filed before High Court,
E     challenging order dtd.16.06.99 – Liberty to the appellants to file
      representation before the High Power Committee (HPC) – HPC vide
      order dtd. 20.06.09 directed SRA to pass orders on merits – SRA
      revalidated the LoI in favour of the respondent nos.4 &5– HPC
      vide order dtd. 05.02.11 set aside the said order – MCGM issued
      letter dtd. 17.01.15 withdrawing its earlier orders claimed as
F     acceptance of the claim of appellants’ predecessor-in-interest as
      lessees – Appellants filed suit challenging letter dtd.17.01.15– Suit
      pending adjudication – Respondent nos.4&5 filed writ petition
      challenging order dtd 05.02.11 – High Court set aside the order
      dtd 05.02.11 allowing the respondents to proceed with the
G     redevelopment – On appeal, held: At this stage of litigation, Court
      not inclined to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit or to decide
      questions of law on merits which call for detailed scrutiny, as these
      issues are the subject matter of the trial – Adjudication of the
      dispute, presently before the Court has to be based on principles of
      equity – Very basis of the appellants’ right, i.e. the lease deed, is
H
                                         454
      LULLU VAS (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH LRS v.                          455
               STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

itself disputed as there exists no registered document to that effect–   A
Appellants averred that their name appears in the Estate Department
records as lessees– HPC’s order dtd. 20.06.09 declared the
appellants to be lessees for 999 years – Said order not challenged
by the respondents, it has now attained finality – This very issue is
the subject matter of the pending civil suit– Refrained from making
                                                                         B
any observations regarding the same – Balance of convenience tilts
in favour of the respondents, as the completion of the scheme is in
greater public interest – However, appellants contend that they have
paid consideration in exchange of the lease-hold right which is the
subject matter of the trial – Appellants granted liberty to make such
prayer, supported by relevant materials, before the trial court in the   C
pending suit – Any observation made by the High Court affecting
the merit of the matter, set aside – Not necessary to pass any orders
in the Contempt Petition preferred by the appellants and the same is
disposed of – Development Control Regulations – Regulation 33
(10) – Equity.
                                                                         D
      Disposing of the appeal, the Court
       HELD: 1.1 At this stage of litigation Court is not inclined
to attempt to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit or to decide
questions of law on merits which call for elaborate arguments or
detailed scrutiny, as these issues are the subject matter of the         E
trial. The aforesaid contentions raised by the parties are to be
resolved during the trial. The adjudication of the dispute has to
be based on principles of equity. The party seeking the remedy
has to make out a prima facie case on merits, and has to satisfy
the court that there is some basis to its claim regarding the
existence of his right. Further, the court must balance the              F
comparative hardship or mischief which is likely to occur from
withholding the relief, against that which would likely arise from
granting it. It has to be further established that non-interference
by the court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party
seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the        G
party except to grant the relief sought. [Paras 22, 25]
[465-A, B, D, E]
      1.2 The very basis of the appellants’ right, i.e., the lease
deed, is itself disputed as there exists no registered document
to that effect. The appellants have taken the plea that by paying        H
456            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2019] 4 S.C.R.


A     consideration towards the leasehold rights they now have a vested
      interest over the suit property. The appellants have averred that
      the name of the appellants appears in the records of the Estate
      Department as the lessees. Furthermore, the Court’s attention
      has been drawn to the fact that the first order of the HPC, dated
      20.06.2009, declares the appellants to be lessees for 999 years.
B
      As the aforementioned order has not been challenged by the
      respondents, it has now attained finality. This very issue is the
      subject matter of the pending civil suit, making any observations
      regarding the same is being refrained. Slum Act is a beneficial
      legislation meant to ameliorate the poor condition of slum
C     dwellers. The legislative purpose behind this enactment is to
      provide statutory protection to the rights of slum dwellers in
      furtherance of their fundamental right to shelter and other basic
      amenities, enabling them to lead a dignified life as reflected in
      the Constitution. As such, where the rights of the appellants need
      to be analysed in light of the Slum Act, it is necessary to balance
D
      the interests of the appellants with that of the slum dwellers. In
      the present case, the slum dwellers, who are the primary
      beneficiaries of the redevelopment scheme, are not only at risk
      of losing their shelter, but also their means of livelihood. Ultimately
      it is the slum dwellers who are suffering. There is nothing on
E     record to show that they have the support of 70% of the slum
      dwellers as mandated by the statute. Moreover, the appellants
      can be adequately compensated in the event of their success in
      the trial and, as such, have failed to prove any irreparable injury
      which cannot be remedied. In a situation such as this, where rights
      of the parties have not yet crystalized, and no irreparable injury
F
      can accrue to the plaintiff pending trial, the entire case then
      revolves around the principles of comparative convenience.
      [Paras 27-29][466-B-G; 467-B, C]
            1.3 The balance of convenience in the present case tilts in
      favour of the respondents, as the completion of the scheme is in
G     greater public interest. The appellants have vehemently
      contended that they have paid consideration in exchange of the
      lease-hold right which is the subject matter of the trial. In order
      to substantiate their claim, the appellants have produced multiple
      documents on records, the genuineness of which is seriously
H     doubted by the respondent authorities. The main grievance of
        LULLU VAS (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH LRS v.                       457
                 STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

the appellant’s is that in case they succeed in the trial, they may     A
not be placed in a position to enjoy the benefits arising out of the
suit property. Their interest can be protected only if respondent
no. 5 (developer) is injuncted from disposing of 50% of the free
saleable area. No material was produced so as to ascertain the
quantum of damages that may have accrued to the appellants.
                                                                        B
Further, respondent no. 5 cannot be prohibited from disposing of
the free saleable area, as it is only performing its contractual
obligations and cannot be penalized for any irregularity committed
by the respondent authorities. A specific averment has been made
by respondent no. 2 that, in the event the appellants succeed
before the trial court, they shall be entitled to adequate              C
damages.[Paras 30-32][467-D-G]
      1.4 The appellants are granted liberty to make such a prayer,
supported by relevant materials, before the trial court in the
pending suit. Further, the appellants are granted the liberty to
implead necessary parties before the trial court. In view of the        D
pending civil suit, any observation made by the High Court which
affects the merit of the matter is hereby set aside. Any
observations made herein shall not act in prejudice against the
appellants during the trial on merits. It is not necessary to pass
any orders in the Contempt Petition preferred by the appellants,
which stands disposed of. [Paras 33-35][467-H; 468-A-C]                 E

        Balasaheb Arjun Torbole v. Administrator and
        Divisional Commissioner (2015) 6 SCC 534 : [2015]
        6 SCR 750 – referred to.
                        Case Law Reference                              F
[2015] 6 SCR 750                referred to             Para 28
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1973
of 2019
      From the Judgment and Order dated 07.06.2018 of the High
                                                                        G
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 1507 of 2011.
                                 With
        Contempt Petition (C) No. 123 of 2019 IN SLP (C) No. 15944 of
2018.
                                                                        H
458            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 4 S.C.R.


A            Atmaram N. Nandkarni, ASG, Dr. Abhishek M. Singhvi, Jokim
      Reis, Kapil Sibal, Shekhar Naphade, Shyam Divan, Baswa Prabhu Patil,
      Neeraj K. Kaul, Sr. Advs., Aman Vachher, Yadunath Chaudhary, Dhiraj,
      Ashutosh Dubey, Mrs. Madhurima Mridul, Abhishek Chauhan, Mrs.
      Anshu Vachher, Mrs. Rajshree Dubey, Mrs. Manisha Kapadia, Milind
      Nar, P. N. Puri, Ajay Bhargava, Mrs. Abhisar, Nikhil Rohatgi, Paras
B
      Anand, Sarthak Sharma, Ms.Swati Jain, Shashank Khurana (for M/
      S.Khaitan & Co.), Kishan Gaikwad, Ashish Wad, Mrs.Jayashree Wad,
      Sidharth Mahajan, Ms. Sukriti Jaggi, Uday B. Dube, Vikas Mehta, Kunal
      Vajani, Mithun Shashank, Jayant Rastogi, Sumeer Sodhi, Ashish Tiwari,
      Surya Kamal Mishra, Jaibir Sethi, Satish Vig, Preshit Surshe, Nishant
C     Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, Sumeer Sodhi, Advs. for the appearing
      parties.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            N. V. RAMANA, J. 1. Leave granted.
D            2. The present appeal arises out of the impugned judgment dated
      07.06.2018, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ
      Petition No. 1507 of 2011 with Notice of Motion No.206 of 2018, wherein
      the High Court allowed the Writ Petition preferred by the respondent
      nos. 4 and 5 and set aside the order of the High-Power Committee
      (hereinafter referred to as “HPC”) dated 5.02.2011 along with the
E     consequential orders of the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (hereinafter
      referred to as “SRA”) (respondent no. 3). Further, the High Court also
      directed respondent no. 3 to undertake necessary actions for the
      redevelopment of the suit property.
             3. Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of the case are as
F     follows: The Government of Bombay acquired the disputed property
      (now Worli Estate Scheme No. 58) prior to 1945, and vested the same in
      the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (hereinafter referred to
      as “MCGM”). Thereafter, on 04.06.1945, the appellants’ predecessor-
      in-interest, Lullu Vas, submitted an application to the MCGM seeking
G     lease of the said land for residential purposes and paid an earnest money
      of Rs. 8,232. The appellants contend that the MCGM decided to give
      leasehold rights in perpetuity to Lullu Vas. At that time, about 70 slum
      structures were pre-existing on the said land. Since Lullu Vas demanded
      possession, on 05.11.1965, the MCGM handed over symbolic possession
      of the said plot on “as is where is basis”- when it was still occupied by
H     the encroaching hutments.
      LULLU VAS (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH LRS v.                             459
       STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [N. V. RAMANA, J.]

       4. In 1971, the Maharashtra Slum Areas Act (hereinafter referred     A
to as “Slum Act”)was enacted. Subsequently, in 1976 photo-passes were
issued to the slum dwellers who were residing in the disputed area and
the said area attained the status of the declared slum, entitled for
redevelopment under Regulation 33 (10) of the Development Control
Regulations read with the provisions of the Slum Act.
                                                                            B
       5. In 1996, the slum dwellers residing on the said land formed a
co-operative housing society “New Sagar Vihar” (respondent no. 4)
and submitted a proposal for slum rehabilitation to the SRA, and the
same was approved by issuing a Letter of Intent (hereinafter referred
to as “LoI”) and an Intimation of Approval (hereinafter referred to as
“IoA”) on 16.06.1999. In furtherance of the above, a commencement           C
certificate was issued on 13.10.1999 and respondent no. 4 appointed a
developer (respondent no. 5) and promoter for the implementation of
the slum rehabilitation scheme and to build new flats.
        6. Meanwhile, Lullu Vas and her family started residing outside
India. Lullu Vas expired on 04.02.1997. In 2008, Mr. Shailesh Chheda,       D
who claimed that he was the general power of attorney holder of the
appellants (legal representatives of Lullu Vas), filed W.P No. 2714/2008
before the High Court against the State of Maharashtra and six others
challenging the order of the SRA dated 16.06.1999 whereby the SRA
had issued the LoI and IoA to respondents no. 4 and 5. The writ petition    E
was withdrawn vide order dated 17.12.2008, with liberty to the appellants
to file a representation before the HPC.
       7. Mr. Shailesh Chheda thereafter approached the HPC in Appeal
No. 148 of 2008, seeking quashing of the order dated 16.06.1999 granting
LoI in favour of the respondents no. 4 and 5. The HPC, upon hearing         F
the parties, vide order dated 20.06.2009 concluded that the land belonged
to the respondent no. 3 (MCGM) and the appellants are lessees for 999
years. However, as the LoI had lapsed and respondents no. 4 and 5 had
filed a separate application for revalidation of the LoI dated 16.06.1999
before the SRA, the HPC directed the SRA to hear both the parties and
pass orders on the merits of the case.It may be noted that the aforesaid    G
first order of the HPC has not been challenged by the Respondents.
       8. Vide order dated 23.08.2010, the CEO, SRA, after hearing
both sides, revalidated the LoI in favour of the respondents no. 4 and 5.
The above order of revalidation by the SRA was challenged by the
                                                                            H
460             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 4 S.C.R.


A     appellants in Appeal No. 2 of 2011 before the HPC. This appeal was
      allowed by order dated 05.02.2011 and consequently, the order of the
      CEO, SRA dated 23.08.2010, was set aside. Consequently, vide order
      dated 06.09.2013, the SRA allowed the application preferred by the
      appellants seeking to record the scheme.
B            9. Subsequent to the aforesaid order of the SRA, respondent no.
      2 (MCGM) issued letter dated 17.01.2015 withdrawing/cancelling its
      earlier orders, decisions and communications which were claimed as
      acceptance of the claim of late Lullu Vas as lessees, observing that the
      claims were founded upon erroneous representation based on legally
      inadmissible documents. It was found that not only were the lease
C     documents invalid for want of adequate seal and signature, but also that
      the appellants had failed to make any effort to remove the encroachments.
      Moreover, in the absence of a registered lease deed, neither the original
      applicant nor the appellants herein have any rights whatsoever in the
      disputed property.
D            10. Aggrieved, the appellants filed LC Suit No. 456 of 2016 in the
      City Civil Court, challenging the aforesaid letter dated 17.01.2015 issued
      by respondent no. 2 to be illegal and void. Additionally, the appellants
      also sought for a declaration that they are the lessees of MCGM. It is to
      be noted that this suit is still pending final adjudication. In the said suit,
E     the appellants had filed Notice of Motion No. 1110 of 2016 seeking
      temporary injunction against the respondents from obstructing or
      disturbing the appellants’ possession. Vide order dated 07.03.2018, the
      Notice of Motion was partly allowed and the respondent no. 2 and 4
      were temporarily restrained, pending suit, from acting upon or
      implementing the decision/communication dated 17.01.2015.
F
             11. In the meantime, in 2011, respondents no. 4 and 5 filed Writ
      Petition No. 1507 of 2011, which is the subject matter of challenge before
      us. By way of this Writ Petition, respondents no. 4 and 5 challenged the
      second order passed by the HPC dated 05.02.2011 cancelling the LoI
      issued in their favour. Subsequent to the order dated 07.03.2018 in Notice
G     of Motion No. 1110 of 2016 in LC Suit No. 456 of 2016 wherein the
      temporary injunction was granted in favour of the appellants, the
      respondents no. 4 and 5 preferred Notice of Motion No. 206 of 2018,
      seeking stay of the order dated 05.02.2011 in Appeal No. 2 of 2011
      before the HPC.
H
      LULLU VAS (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH LRS v.                                   461
       STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [N. V. RAMANA, J.]

       12. Vide order dated 07.06.2018, the court disposed of the Writ            A
Petition filed by respondents no. 4 and 5 by setting aside the order of the
HPC dated 05.02.2011, and quashing and setting aside the consequential
orders or letters of the SRA dated 06.06.2011 and 06.09.2013.
        13. The High Court, while disposing of the Writ Petition, observed
that at the time the application was preferred by Lullu Vas, the disputed         B
property was already encroached upon by slum dwellers. The numbers
of these slum dwellers kept on increasing due to the inaction of the
appellants. In light of the same, the appellants’ plea seeking execution of
the lease in their favour stood frustrated and the appellants therefore
could not object to the redevelopment of the said land. Moreover, the
slum dwellers agreed to join the rehabilitation scheme and 70% of the             C
dwellers appointed respondent no. 5 as their developer in compliance
with Clauses 1.11 and 1.15 of Appendix-IV of the Development Control
Regulations. On the other hand, the appellants failed to show any such
compliance. Furthermore, taking into account the delay in implementation
of the rehabilitation scheme, the High Court rejected the appellants’ plea        D
seeking a stay on the redevelopment. Aggrieved by the aforesaid
impugned order, the appellants have preferred this Special Leave Petition.
        14. The learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants, Dr.
A. M Singhvi, submitted that the High Court was not justified in holding
that there is no lease granted in favour of the appellants despite the            E
letter dated 22.07.1976 and the subsequent correspondence confirming
the lease granted in perpetuity in favour of the appellants. On the contrary,
the appellants have the best rights of lease in their favour as the corporation
itself has recorded the names of the appellants as lessees, as has the
estate department. Further, the corporation has failed to prove that the
appellants have breached any terms of the lease agreement. Additionally,          F
respondent no. 2, who has failed to clear the encroachments, should not
be allowed to benefit from its inaction. Therefore, the said land is validly
vested upon the appellants-lessees, and being private land, the Slum Act
cannot be enforced on the same. The learned counsel also contended
that the LoI obtained by respondents no. 4 and 5 was obtained on the              G
false representation that the State of Maharashtra was the real owner
of the property. The learned counsel stated that the order passed by the
HPC in favour of the appellants, which has attained finality, as well as
the order of the Trial Court dated 07.03.2018, wherein the Notice of
Motion filed in LC Suit No. 456 of 2016 was partly allowed and the
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462             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 4 S.C.R.


A     respondent no. 2 was temporarily restrained, strengthens the presumption
      of prima-facie case in their favour. The counsel for appellants rested
      his submissions by stating that not granting protection at the present
      stage will make the pending civil suit infructuous.
             15. On the contrary, the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Shekhar
B     Naphade, appearing for respondent no. 3 (SRA), submitted that the
      appellants have no locus as they, being prospective lessees, do not have
      any interest in the property. In the present case, the land-owning authority
      is the municipality, and hence the appellants have no role to play. Even if
      they had any semblance of a right in equity, it stands extinguished by the
      application of specific provisions of the Slum Act which, being a welfare
C     legislation, takes precedence over the rights of the appellants and gives
      the government the power to acquire property in the slum rehabilitation
      area. Furthermore, the Slum Act also empowers the competent authority
      to declare a certain area as a slum rehabilitation area. The statute itself
      gives preferential rights to the society of the slum dwellers by providing
D     that where 70 % or more of the eligible hutment-dwellers in a slum
      agree to join a rehabilitation scheme, it may be considered for approval.
      Hence, the entire statutory scheme cannot be frozen at the instance of
      the appellants and a statutory authority cannot be injuncted from
      performing its duty. Moreover, in the pending civil Suit being LC Suit
      No. 456/2016 before the City Civil Court, preferred by the appellants
E     seeking a declaration that they are lessees, they have not made respondent
      no. 3 (SRA) a party to the suit, although the injunction sought is intended
      against the SRA. Moreover, any declaration made therein may bind
      respondent no. 2 (MCGM), but not the SRA. The counsel rested his
      argument by stating that the prolongation of this dispute is contrary to
F     public interest.
             16. Learned Counsel Mr. A.N. Nadkarni, Additional Solicitor
      General appearing on behalf of respondent no. 2 concurred with the
      submissions made by Mr. Naphade, wherein he averred that the appellants
      do not have any locus as they have no interest in the said property. Mr.
G     Nadkarni further submitted that the appellants do not have any right in
      the suit property, be it factual or legal. In order to substantiate his claim,
      the counsel relied upon Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act,
      1882, which mandates that a lease of immovable property for a period
      exceeding one year should be registered. He also relied on Sections 70
      and 71 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (hereafter
H
      LULLU VAS (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH LRS v.                                 463
       STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [N. V. RAMANA, J.]

Municipal Act), which prescribe the mode of executing contracts and             A
indicate that any contract made in contravention to the same shall not be
binding on the corporation. However, the appellants have not complied
with any of the aforesaid provisions. Moreover, the physical possession
was never vested on the appellants as the land was encroached upon by
the slum dwellers. Hence, the entire purpose of the lease stood completely
                                                                                B
frustrated. Further, the Slum Act being a special statute enacted for
redevelopment of the slum areas takes precedence over the Municipal
Corporation Act. The counsel submitted that once the SRA comes into
the picture, the MCGM vanishes as the entire management will be taken
up by the SRA. In the absence of any established interest over the suit
property, the appellants may be entitled for the grant of certain damages       C
only. In the present case, public interest takes dominance over the half-
baked rights of the appellants.
        17. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Shyam Divan, appearing on behalf
of respondent no. 4 submitted that respondent no. 4 (society) has a
membership of 106 slum dwellers. It is the statutory right of the               D
respondent no. 4 (society), acting in furtherance of the interest of the
slum dwellers to be rehabilitated in situ, to selecting the developer through
which they will implement the scheme. The respondent no. 4- Society
has the overwhelming support of more than 70% of the slum dwellers
for the implementation of the SRA Scheme. On the contrary, the appellants
have not applied for any rehabilitation scheme nor is there anything on         E
record to show that they are supported by 70% of the hutment dwellers
so as to redevelop the said land. There is already a pending civil suit
being LC Suit No. 456 of 2016, wherein the appellants sought for the
specific performance of the lease agreement based on the application of
allotment dated 04.06.1945, which is hopelessly time barred as the same         F
was preferred after 71 years. Lastly, the appellants have not accrued
any rights in their favour as there is no registered document. The court
should decide the matter on the balanceof convenience as granting the
relief to the appellants will be tantamount to defeating the object of the
Slum Act which provides the slum dweller the right to seek for in situ
rehabilitation. Any relief in favour of the appellants will cause hardship      G
to the slum dwellers whose accommodation have been demolished for
redevelopment.
       18. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Kapil Sibal, appearing on behalf
of the developers submitted that respondent no. 5 (developer) has the
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464            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 4 S.C.R.


A     consent of 70% of the slum-dwellers, which is a mandatory requirement
      under the Development Control Regulations. On the contrary, neither
      does the Power of Attorney provide for the development of the slum nor
      have the appellants submitted a proposal for the redevelopment scheme.
      Further, pursuant to its contractual obligations, respondent no. 5 has
      incurred a huge expenditure on the shifting of the slum dwellers and
B
      demolition of the existing structures, as they have provided alternate
      accommodation on rental basis by paying an amount of Rs. 8,000/-
      monthly. Lastly, the learned Senior Counsel has contended that no
      measures can be enforced against them, as they have not been arrayed
      as a party in the civil suit.
C            19. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Basava Prabhu Patil, counsel on
      behalf of 83 hutment dwellers being intervenors herein, submitted that
      I.A No. 167398/2018 and I.A No. 173077 of 2018 have been filed by 82
      slum dwellers who have executed individual affidavits in support of the
      implementation of the SRA Scheme being implemented by respondent
D     nos. 3 to 5. In total, respondent no. 4 society comprises of 106 hutments.
      The intervenors state that 97.16%, i.e., 103 dwellers out of 106 dwellers
      support the implementation of the SRA Scheme.
              20. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Niraj Kishan Kaul- appearing on
      behalf of 26 hutment dwellers being intervenors herein, while supporting
E     the appellants, submitted that 26 individual applications have been filed
      by these slum dwellers, who are challenging the fundamental basis of
      the claim, i.e., 70% of the dwellers supporting the respondent nos. 3 to
      5. The main contention of the learned Senior Counsel was that the
      consent of 70% should be proved from the time of the initiation itself,
      that is from the date of the implementation of the scheme. But the same
F     has not been complied with. In this regard, there is a lack of proper
      scrutiny.
             21. Per contra, the counsels on behalf of the respondents stated
      that the slum dwellers have no right to be impleaded in this SLP as a
      party. They did not raise any grievance during the pendency of the Writ
G     Petition before the High Court. Further, there exists a specific mechanism
      for the redressal of grievances under Section 35 of the Slum Act, but the
      same has not been resorted to. Lastly, it was brought to our notice that
      of the 26 slum dwellers, constituting the second set of intervenors, 18
      have withdrawn their support and are now favouring the SRA for the
H     implementation of the scheme.
      LULLU VAS (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH LRS v.                                465
       STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [N. V. RAMANA, J.]

       22. Even though the parties have argued at length and produced          A
multiple documents regarding the lease-holding rights in dispute, at the
outset, we would like to clarify that at this stage of litigation we are not
inclined to attempt to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit or to
decide questions of law on merits which call for elaborate arguments or
detailed scrutiny, as these issues are the subject matter of the trial. The
                                                                               B
aforesaid contentions raised by the parties are to be resolved during the
trial.
      23. Heard the learned counsels for the parties.
       24. Considering the pending civil suit before the trial court, the
limited question before us is whether the impugned order passed by the         C
High Court, allowing the respondents to proceed with the redevelopment
of the land, can be sustained in the eyes of law.
       25. The adjudication of the dispute before us has to be based on
principles of equity. The party seeking the remedy has to make out a
prima facie case on merits, and has to satisfy the court that there is         D
some basis to its claim regarding the existence of his right. Further, the
court must balance the comparative hardship or mischief which is likely
to occur from withholding the relief, against that which would likely arise
from granting it. It has to be further established that non-interference by
the court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief
and that there is no other remedy available to the party except to grant       E
the relief sought.
       26. In the present case the genesis of the appellants’ right is a
lease which was allegedly entered into between the appellants’
predecessor in interest and MCGM, which allegedly accepted the
application and the premium amount on 17.11.1965. Respondent no. 2             F
has vehemently denied the existence of any lease on the ground that
mere filing of an “application” and an endorsement made thereunder of
its acceptance does not result in a “concluded contract” which creates
any right. Further, counsel for respondent no. 2 averred that the original
application can only be treated as an “offer to enter into a lease” and the    G
amount paid i.e., Rs.8,232, was only in the nature of earnest money.
Respondent no. 2 further contended that in any event, the offer which
allegedly came to be accepted on 05.11.1965 was not in the required
form as prescribed under the Municipal Act. Respondent no. 2 has also
vehemently argued that Section 70 of the Municipal Act was not complied
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466             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 4 S.C.R.


A     with as the said document has neither been duly sealed nor does it have
      the signature of the competent authority. Therefore, respondent no. 2
      submitted that as per the provisions of Section 71 of the Municipal Act
      the said lease is not binding upon the corporation.
              27. It may be noted that the very basis of the appellants’ right,
B     i.e., the lease deed, is itself disputed as there exists no registered
      document to that effect. It is pertinent to note herein that the appellants
      have taken the plea that by paying consideration towards the leasehold
      rights they now have a vested interest over the suit property. Hence,
      without any alleged violation of the conditions of the lease, the appellants
      claim that the revocation of their rights by the respondent no. 2 is malafide.
C     In order to substantiate their claim, the appellants have averred that the
      name of the appellants appears in the records of the Estate Department
      as the lessees. Furthermore, our attention has been drawn to the fact
      that the first order of the HPC, dated 20.06.2009, declares the appellants
      to be lessees for 999 years. As the aforementioned order has not been
D     challenged by the respondents, it has now attained finality. However,
      bearing in mind that this very issue is the subject matter of the pending
      civil suit, we refrain from making any observations regarding the same.
              28. While taking into consideration the rights of the appellants, we
      must also not lose sight of the fact that the Slum Act is a beneficial
E     legislation meant to ameliorate the poor condition of slum dwellers. (See
      Balasaheb Arjun Torbole v. Administrator and Divisional
      Commissioner., (2015) 6 SCC 534). The legislative purpose behind
      this enactment is to provide statutory protection to the rights of slum
      dwellers in furtherance of their fundamental right to shelter and other
      basic amenities, enabling them to lead a dignified life as reflected in the
F     Constitution. As such, where the rights of the appellants need to be
      analysed in light of the Slum Act, it is necessary to balance the interests
      of the appellants with that of the slum dwellers. In the present case, the
      slum dwellers, who are the primary beneficiaries of the redevelopment
      scheme, are not only at risk of losing their shelter, but also their means of
G     livelihood.
              29. The averments made by the respondents reveal that pursuant
      to the implementation of the Slum Act, more than 70% of the slum dwellers
      formed respondent no. 4 (the housing society) and sought rehabilitation
      on the site in furtherance of their statutory rights. Further, respondent
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      LULLU VAS (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH LRS v.                                   467
       STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [N. V. RAMANA, J.]

no. 5 has averred that demolition of the existing structures has already          A
been initiated and the shifting of the slum dwellers is ongoing. The
respondent no. 5 has brought to our notice that alternate accommodation
for the slum dwellers has been arranged on a rental basis. But, owing to
the ongoing litigation over the suit property, redevelopment has been
pending for more than eight years. It is to be noted that ultimately it is
                                                                                  B
the slum dwellers who are suffering. There is nothing on record to show
that they have the support of 70% of the slum dwellers as mandated by
the statute. Moreover, the appellants can be adequately compensated in
the event of their success in the trial and, as such, have failed to prove
any irreparable injury which cannot be remedied. In a situation such as
this, where rights of the parties have not yet crystalized, and no irreparable    C
injury can accrue to the plaintiff pending trial, the entire case then revolves
around the principles of comparative convenience.
       30. The balance of convenience in the present case tilts in favour
of the respondents, as the completion of the scheme is in greater public
interest. However, it is noteworthy to observe that the appellants have           D
vehemently contended that they have paid consideration in exchange of
the lease-hold right which is the subject matter of the trial. In order to
substantiate their claim, the appellants have produced multiple documents
on records, the genuineness of which is seriously doubted by the
respondent authorities.
                                                                                  E
       31. The main grievance of the appellant’s counsel is that in case
they succeed in the trial, they may not be placed in a position to enjoy the
benefits arising out of the suit property. The counsel contended that their
interest can be protected only if respondent no. 5 (developer) is injuncted
from disposing of 50% of the free saleable area.
                                                                                  F
        32. It is to be noted that no material was produced before us so as
to ascertain the quantum of damages that may have accrued to the
appellants. Further, we cannot prohibit respondent no. 5 from disposing
of the free saleable area, as it is only performing its contractual obligations
and cannot be penalized for any irregularity committed by the respondent
authorities. A specific averment has been made by respondent no. 2                G
that, in the event the appellants succeed before the trial court, they shall
be entitled to adequate damages.
       33. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the
case, we grant the appellants the liberty to make such a prayer, supported
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468            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 4 S.C.R.


A     by relevant materials, before the trial court in the pending suit being LC
      Suit No. 456 of 2016. Further, the appellants are granted the liberty to
      implead necessary parties before the trial court. The trial court is at
      liberty to consider such relief in accordance with law.
            34. In view of the pending civil suit, any observation made by the
B     High Court which affects the merit of the matter is hereby set aside.
      Any observations made herein shall not act in prejudice against the
      appellants during the trial on merits.
             35. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms. In light of
      this Judgment, it is not necessary to pass any orders in the Contempt
C     Petition no. 123 of 2019 preferred by the appellants, which hereby stands
      disposed of. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.


      Divya Pandey                                              Appeal disposed of.


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