Holding

Members of the Central Administrative Tribunal are not to be treated as equal to High Court judges or the Vice‑Chairman for purposes of pay and superannuation, and the statutory scheme does not violate Article 14.

Summary

M.B. Majumdar, a Judicial Member of the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), filed a writ petition under Article 32 alleging that the CAT members were discriminated against in pay and superannuation age compared to the Vice‑Chairman and High Court judges, invoking the principle of "equal pay for equal work" and Article 14. The Union of India contended that the CAT’s statutory scheme distinguishes the roles, with the Vice‑Chairman performing additional administrative functions, and that the Act expressly provides different service conditions. The Supreme Court examined the scheme of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and the Rules framed thereunder, noting that the Act and the Constitution (Articles 323‑A and 323‑B) envisage tribunals as distinct from High Courts and prescribe separate pay and retirement ages for Chairman, Vice‑Chairman and Members. It held that the members cannot be equated with High Court judges or the Vice‑Chairman for all purposes, and that no violation of Article 14 exists. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

The applicability of the principle of "equal pay for equal work" to members of the Central Administrative Tribunal vis‑à‑vis the Vice‑Chairman and High Court judges.
Whether the distinction in pay and superannuation age between CAT members and the Vice‑Chairman violates Article 14 of the Constitution.
Whether the scheme of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and its Rules precludes treating CAT members as a single class for service conditions.
The proper interpretation of Articles 323‑A and 323‑B concerning the status of administrative tribunals relative to High Courts.

Legislation cited

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985s. 10, s. 17, s. 35, s. 36, s. 4, s. 6, s. 7, s. 8

Subjects

Administrative TribunalEqual PayArticle 14Article 323-ACentral Administrative TribunalPay and allowancesSuperannuation ageJudicial equalityConstitutional lawService conditions

Judgment

M.B. MAJUMDAR
v.
UNION OF INDIA

AUGUST 22, 1990

B [J.S. VERMA, M.M. PUNCHHI AND K. JAYACHANDRA
REDDY, JJ.]

Administrative Tribunals Act 1985/Central Administrative Tri-
bunal (Salaries and Allowances and Conditions of Service of Chair-- --;
man, Vice-Chairman and Members) Rules 1985.
c Sections 4, 7, 14, 17, 35/Rule 3-Central Administrative Tri-
bunals-Members-Not equated with High Court Judges/Vice Chair-
man of Tribunal for purposes of pay and superannuation whether valid
-
and legal.

D The petitioner is a Judicial Member of the Central Administrative
Tribunal. In this writ petition he claims equality of the Members of the
Administrative Tribunal with the Judges of the High Court, or even the
Vice-Chairman of the Tribunal, in the matter of pay, and age of
superannuation.

£ The Central Administrative Tribunal (Salaries and Allowances
and Conditions of Service of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members)";
Rules, 1985 were framed in exercise of the powers conferred by section
35(2)(c) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Rule 3 of the Rules
specifies Rs.8,000 p.m. as the pay of the Vice-Chairman and the pay
scale of Rs. 7300-100-7600 p.m. for a Member. Rule 8 prescribes the age
F of superannuation for the Chairman and Vice Chairman at 65, and for
any other Member 62 years.

It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that an arbitrary )
distinction had been made in the conditions of service, particularly in
regard to pay and age of superannuation, between the Vice-Chairman
G and the Members; that the judicial functions discharged by the Vice-
Chairman and the Members of the Central Administrative Tribunal
were the same and, therefore, the principle of "equal pay for equal
work" applied, and on that basis Article 14 had been violated; and that
the Administrative Tribunal being a substitute for the High Court for
adjudicating disputes relating to service matters, the Members of the Y
H Tribunal should be equated with the High Court Judges for all purposes

946

i
M.B. MAJUMDAR v. U.O.I. 947

including their pay and age of superannuation.
A
)-
S. P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, [1987] l SCC 124, relied
upon.

On behalf of the respondent it was contended that all the functions
of the Vice-Chairman and the Members were not the same in as much B
as the Vice-Chairman, in addition to filling the casual vacancy in the
office of the Chairman, also discharged certain administrative functions
~ - -entrusted to him by the Chairman.

Dismissing the writ petition, this Court,

- HELD: (1) It is the law enacted by Parliament constituting the
Administrative Tribunal which has to be imt seen for the purpose of
c
ascertaining the real nature and status of the Tribunal and the persons
constituting it. l953E]

(2) It is not possible for the Administrative Tribunalto shed off or D
abandon its heritage and substitute its genes with those of its choice of a
different heritage. [956G]

(3) There is no ambiguity in the provisions of the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985, and the exact status and service conditions of the
/ Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members of the Administrative Tribunal E
together with the qualifications for appointment to these offices have
been clearly spelt out in the Act. [953F I

(4) From the scheme of the Act aitd the rules framed thereunder
it is quite clear that their enactment is in the manner laid down in
Article 323-A of the Constitution. From the scheme it is evident that the F
{ Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members are not treated as one class
'-.. for this purpose by the very enactment which provides for the establish-
ment of the Tribunals. Such elaborate provisions were unnecessary if
the Tribunal was to be equated with the High Courts and its members
with High Court Judges. [9530; 954C]
G
(5) Article 323-A and 323-B themselves require the law constitut-
ing these Tribunals to provide for the pay and other conditions of
service of its Members and, therefore, the same would be governed in
"( the case of each Tribunal by the provisions of the statute giving birth to
the Tribunal. These statutes being different, the provisions therein in
this behalf can also be different, which has been left to the legislative H
wisdom to decide. [955G-H]
948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 3 S.C.R.

(6) Equation of the Tribunal with the High Court was only as the
A forum for adjudication of disputes relating to service matters an<!~
not for all purposes such as the one arising for decision in the present
case. [956C]

S. P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, [1987] I SCC 124,
B distinguished & explained.

(7) The foundation of initial equality on which the argument of
discrimination is based, is non·existent. The parent statute itself shows - •
that they were not born equals. [956E]

c 1987.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition {Civil) No. 960 of
-
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution oflndia).

G.L. Sanghi, B.A. Masodkar, Sunil Dogra and P.H. Parekh for
D the Petitioner.

V.C. Mahajan, K. Swami and Ms. A. Subhashini for the
Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E
VERMA, J. This writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitu-
tion by a Judicial Member of the Central Administrative Tribunal
purports to be a sequal of this Court's decision in S.P. Sampath Kumar
v. Union of India, and Ors., [ 19S7] l sec 124. The petitioner contends that
the decision in Sampath Kumar's case {supra) equates the Central
F Administrative Tribunal with the High Court and therefore, -its
Chairman has to be equated with the Chief Justice of a High Court and )
the Vice-Chairman and Members must be equated with the sitting ·
Judges of the High Court in all respects. It is contended that while the
Vice-Chairman have been equated with sitting Judges of the High
Court, the Members have not been so equated in their pay and other
G conditions of service. It is further contended that a distinction has been
made in the conditions of service, particularly the pay and age of
superannuation between the Vice-Chairmen and the Members, which
is arbitrary and therefore, the Members also should be given the same 'y
pay as the Vice-Chairmen and their age of superannuation should also
be the same i.e. 65 years as that of the Vice-Chairmen. It is urged that
H the judicial functions discharged by the Vice-Chairmen and the
M.B. MAJUMDAR v. U.0.1. {VERMA, J.) 949

. Members of the Central Administrative Tribunal are the same and.
A
/:..therefore, the principle of "equal pay for equal work" applies. Viola"
tion of Article 14 of the Constitution is alleged on this basis.

Part XIV-A containing Articles 323-A and 323-!3were inserted
in the Constitution of India by the Constitution (Forty-second Amend-
ment) Act, 1976 enabling the setting up of Administrative Tribunals B
and Tribunals for other matters by legislative enactments.
~~----
The Central Administrative Tribunal has been constituted under
Section 4 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter refer-
• red to as 'the Act') with a Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and Members-
~ judicial and administrative. The qualifications for appointment of
Chairman, Vice-Chairmen or other Members are prescribed by c
Section 6 of the Act. Section 7 provides that the Vice-Chairman or, as
.,,,. the case may be snch one of the Vice-Chairman as the appropriate
Government may, by notification, authorise in this behalf, shall act as
the Chairman in the event of any vacancy in the office of the Chairman
for any reason whatsoever, or when the Chairman is unable to dis- D
charge his functions for any reason. Section 8 prescribes the term of
office of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman or other Members as five years
from the date on which he enters upon his office with eligibility for
re-appointment for another term of five years provided that no
-/ Chairman or Vice-Chairman shall hold the office after he has attained
the age of 65 years and any other Member, the age of 62 years. Section E
10 of the Act provides for the salaries and allowances and other terms
and conditions of service of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and other
-·,, Members to be such as may be prescnbed by the Central Government.
Section 17 confers on tlie_:r!lbllnal th.e_ samejurisdicilon, JlOwers ,and
authority in respect of contempt of itself as a High Court has under the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. But for this specific provision, the F
~ Tribunal would not have the power of the High Court in this behalf.
Section 18 provides for distribution of business amongst the Benches
of the Tribunal. Section 28 excludes the jursidiction of courts except
the Supreme Court or any Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court or other
authority, constituted unde.r the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any
other corresponding law for the time being in force in relation to G
matters over which the Tribunal has be.en conferred jursidiction.
Section 35 contains the rule-making power of the Central Government
"( while Section 36 gives power to the appropriate Government to make
rules to carry out the provisions of the Act and particularly, for the
matters specified therein·.
-
the- specified purposes
-
for
- -
which
..
the Cent-
- - -
ral Government can make rules specified in Section 35(2)(c) include H
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 3 S.C.R.

A the salaries and allowances payable to, and tbe other terms and condi-
tions of the Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and other Members. The rule~
framed under the Act are to be laid before the Parliament. It is not
necessary to give further details of the Administrative Tribunals Act,
1985, the provisions of which were considered at length in Sampath
B Kumar's case (supra) and now stand amended in accordance with the
observations of this Court in that decision.

The Central Administrative Tribunal (Salaries and Allowances
and Conditions of Service of Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and Members)
Rules, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as 'the rules') were framed in
exercise of the powers conferred by Section 35(2)(c) of the Adminis-
c trative Tribunals Act, 1985. Rule 3 therein, as it now exists, specifies
Rs.9,000 p.m. as the pay of the Chairman; Rs.8,000 p.m. as the pay of
the Vice-Chairman; and the pay scale of Rs.7300-100-7600 per
-
mensem for a Member. As earlier indicated, the age of superannua-
tion prescribed in Section 8 of the Act for the Chairman and Vice-
D Chairman is 65 years and ·for any other Member, 62 years. The
petitioner's grievance is that the pay of any other Member of the
Tribunal and his age of superannuation should be Rs. 8,000 p.m. and
65 years respectively as in the case of Vice-Chairmen, since the
Members and Vice-Chairmen discharge identical judicial functions.
The question is: Whether the principle of "equal pay for equal work",
relied on by the petitioner, is applicable to this situation or there is any
E
hostile discrimination against the Members of the Central Administra- ~
tive Tribunal, as alleged by the petitioner. If the petitioner's conten-
tion be correct, then would arise the question of relief which can be
granted. The prayer made in this petition is to direct an amendment in
the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and the rules framed thereun-
der, to prescribe the same pay and age of superannuation for the
-
F
Members as in the case of the Vice-Chairman.

The argument of Shri B .A. Masodkar and Shri G .L. Sanghi in
)
support of the petition is that the Members and the Vice-Chairman of .
the Central Administrative Tribunal belong to the same class since
they discharge identical judicial functions and there is no rational
G
nexus of tbe classification made between them with the object sought
to be achieved. It is urged that the Tribunal is one entity comprising of
the Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and Members which has been substi-
tuted for the High Court in respect of the jurisdiction conferred on the
Tribunal and therefore, there is no justification for discriminating bet-
H ween them in the matter of pay and other conditions of service.
M.B. MAJUMDAR v. U.0.1. !VERMA, J.] 951

In the counter-affidavit of the respondent, it has been stated that
A
~l the functions of the Vice-Chairman and the Members are not the
same inasmuch as the Vice-Chairman, in addition to filling the casual
vacancy in the office of the Chairman, also discharges certain
administrative functions entrusted to him by the Chairman while no
such administrative function is discharged by any Member. It is stated
that the office of the Vice-Cb,airman and any other Member cannot, B
therefore, be treated as the same or in one class. Shri V.C. Mahajan,
learned counsel for the respondent contended that Sampath Kumar's
~ -· case (supra) does not lend any support to the petitioner's contention
and in this context the observations made therein actually negative the
petitioner's stand. It was also urged that tlie relief claimed for a direc-
. tion to amend the aforesaid Act and the rules framed thereunder can-
not be granted, which alone is the relief claimed in the writ petition.
c
It was rightly not disputed by learned counsel for the petitioner
,.i that the reIief specifically claimed in the petition of a direction to
amend the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and the rules framed
thereunder to equate the Members of the Tribunal with the Vice- D
Chairman in the matter of pay and age of superannuation cannot be
granted. For this reason, it was urged on behalf of the petitioner that
the relief may be suitably moulded to grant the same benefit for the
Members of the Tribunal if the allegation of hostile discrimination is
accepted. It is not necessary for us to deal further with this aspect since
7 we have no doubt that the plea of violation of Article 14 of the Con- E
stitution, raised by the petitioner, is untenable and must fail.

- The sheet-anchor of petitioner's case is the decision of this Court
in Sampath Kumar's case (supra). We will presently show that the
\'' decision in Sampath Kumar's case (supra) does not support the
petitioner's claim in this petition. It is significant to note that the age of F
superannuation of High Court Judges is 62 years while that of the
( . Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Tribunal is 65 years and of any
· other Member is 62 years. No attempt has been made on behalf of the
petitioner to justify the fixation of age of superannuation of the
Chairman and the Vice-Chairman as 65 years if they are to be equated
with the Chief Justice and sitting Judges of the High Court who retire G
at the age of 62 years only. In respect of the age of superannuation, the
Members of the Tribunal are at par with the Chief Justice and the
Judges of the High Court. Obviously, it is for this reason that an
't""(°
Jj attempt was made to claim the equality with the Vice-Chairman of the
, Tribunal who gets Rs.8,000 p.m. as pay like a High Court Judge but
retires at the higher age of 65 years. This disparity itself indicates that H
952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 3 S.C.R.

the Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and Members of the Tribunal are not
A
equated with the Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court for all I
purposes which, in substance, is the foundation of the petition. -""\

The contention of Shri D .A. Masodkar, learned connsel for the
petitioner, is that the Administrative Tribunal being a substitute for
B the High Court for adjudicating disputes relating to service matters the
Members of the Tribunal should be equated with the High Court
Judges for all purposes including their pay and age of superannuation.
He contends that the lower pay and age of superannuation of the
Members of the Tribunal is discriminatory and violates Article 14 of
the Constitution. His argument is that the Members should be equated
C in this beahlf with the Vice-Chairman whose pay is equal to that of a
puisne Judge of the High Court. However, no attempt was made to
justify on this reasoning the higher age of superannuation of the Vice-
Chairman being 65 years against 62 years of a High Court Judge. Shri
G.L. Sanghi supported the petition and contended that the Tribunal
being one body, the persons constituting it cannot be bifurcated into
D separate categories and the pay and age of superannuation of all of
them should be the same. He adds that the Members and the Vice-
Chairman should have the same pay and age of superannuation while
the slightly higher pay of the Chairman was justified as in the case of
the Chief Justce vis-a-vis the puisne Judges of the High Courts.

E In substance, the contention of Shri Masodkar is for equating the '<:
Members of the Tribunal with puisne Judges of the High Courts in the
matter of pay on the assumption that the Tribunal is equated with the
High Court and with the Vice-Chairman of the Tribunal in the matter
of age of superannuation on the basis of equal work. The contention of
Shri G.L. Sanghi is slightly different. He argues that the Tribunal
F being one entity there is no reason to treat its Members differently
when all of them perform the same judicial function, the only diffe-
rence being that the Chairman has additional administrative functions '
to discharge.

Part XN-A of the Constitution of India containing Articles
G 323-A and 323-B provides for the constitution of administrative and
other tribunals for the purpose of adjudication or trial by these tri-
bunals of disputes relating to matters specified therein. Artcle 323-A
deals with administrative tribunals to be constituted for adjudication
of disputes with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of
persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the
H affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other specified
M.B., MAJUMDAR v. U.0.1. [VERMA, J.J 953

authority. The law enacted by the Parliament for this purpose may
A
provide for all matters relating to the constitution and functions of the
}\.dministrative Tribunals as well as for exclusion of jurisdiction of all
courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India, with
respect to the matters required to be adjudicated by the Administra-
tive Tribunal. It is for this purpose that the Administrative Tribunals
Act, 1985 has been enacted and Section 28 therein excludes the juris-
diction of all courts except the Supreme Court or any Industrial Tri-
bunal, Labour Court or other authority constituted under the Indust-·
-.... ri\)) Disputes Act, 1947 or any other corresponding law for the time
~ being in force in relation to matters which the Administrative Tribunal
' is empowered to adjudicate. The Act also provides for transfer of all
pending cases as provided in Section 29 of the Act.
... c
In the first place, the assumption in the argument on behalf of
the petitioner that the Tribunal is equated with the High Court is
yfallacious. It is not only the service matters required earlier to the
adjudicated by the High Court but also those by the subordinate courts
which are now to be adjudicated by the Administrative Tribunals. That D
apart, Article 323-A itself clearly contemplates that the Administra-
tive Tribunals constituted thereunder are distinct from the High
Courts and it is the law enacted by the Parliament providing for
establishment of an Administrative Tribunal which is to provide for all
matters relating to the jursidiction, powers, procedure and all supple-
.91ental, incidental and consequential matters relating to the Adminis- E
trative Tribunal. It is, therefore, the law enacted by the Parliament
constituting the Administrative Tribunal which has to be first seen for
the purpose of ascertaining the real nature and status of the Tribunal
and the persons constituting it. There is no ambiguity in.the provisions
_~.of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and the exact status and
· service conditions of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members of F
the Administrative Tribunal together with the qualifications for
flppointment to these offices have been clearly spelt out in the Act.
this Act provides expressly for the term of office of the Chairman,
Vice-Chairman and Members in Section 8 and for the salaries and
allowances and other terms and conditions of service by Section 10
read with Section 35(2)(c) and the rules framed thereunder. The Cent- G
rat Administrative Tribunal (Salaries and allowances and Conditions
of Service of Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and Members) Rules, 1985
have been framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Section
~5(2)(c) to provide for the salaries and allowances etc. The scheme of
the Act and the rules framed thereunder is quite clear and their enact-
ment is in the manner laid down in Article 324-A of the Constitution. H
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] 3 S.C.R.

A The term of office and the age of superannuation, pay and allowances
and other service. conditions of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and I
Members are specifically provided in this manner and from the scheme-\
it is evident that the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members are not
treated as one class for this purpose by the very enactment which
provides for the establishment of the Tribunals. Such elaborate provi-
B sions were unnecessary if the Tribunal was equated with the High
Courts and its Members with High Court Judges. Similarly, a higher
age of superannuation could not have been prescnbed for the
Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Tribunal. Article 323-A of the __ . . -
Constitution itself envisages different provisions in this behalf and not
the same as that of the High Courts which is the assumption made in
c the petitioner's contention. In fact, the provisions of the Act indicate
that there is no intention of equating the Chairman, Vice-Chairman
and Members of the Tribunal with the Chief Justice and Judges of the
High Courts for purposes other than those expressly provided in
-
respect of jurisdiction, power etc. Section 17 of the Act is a significant ~
indication. By Section 17, the Tribunal has been given the power to
D punish for contempt of itself and it is provided that for this purpose the
Tribunal shall have, and exercise, the same jurisdiction, powers and
authority as the High Court and the references in the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971, to a High Court shall be construed as including a
reference to such Tribunal. It is obvious that the need for enacting
such a provision arose only because in the absence of such a provision
E conferring on the Tribunal the jurisdiction and power of a High Court''\" '
for the purpose of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971,
the Tribunal would not have the same jurisdiction or power while
adjudicating those very matters which earlier were to be adjudicated
by the High Court. Similarly, Section 30 of the Act provides that all
proceedings before a Tribunal shall be deemed to be judicial proceed- ,,-, ·-
F ings within the meaning of Sections 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860. This provision also is unnecessary if the petitioner is
right in contending that the Tribunal is equated with the High Court)
for all purposes and must be treated as a deemed High Court with alt
the logical consequences.

G It is, therefore, not possible for the Administrative Tribunal to
shed off or abandon its heritage and substitute its genes with those of
its choice of a different heritage. In our opinion, this alone is sufficient
to indicate that the petitioner's assumption is fallacious and his
attempt to be treated as a deemed High Court Judge cannot be 'v
accepted. Apart from the obvious fallacy already indicated, the
H petitioner's claim, if accepted, wouJd resuJt in appointment of some
M.B. MAJUMDAR v. U.0.1. [VERMA, J.] 955

deemed High Court Judges contrary to the express provision made in
A
the Constitution for appointment of High Court Judges.

During the course of hearing, it was pointed out that mere sub-
stitution of a different forum for adjudication of a dispute does not
result in conferring on the new forum the status of the substituted
forum for purposes other than the jurisdiction and power to adjudicate B
that dispute unless their status be otherwise equal. To illustrate,
Section 115 CPC by amendment in some states empowers the District
Courts instead of the High Court to decide revisions thereunder, but
-· that does not equate the District Court with the High Court. No
attempt was made on behalf of the petitoner to answer this.

The slightly modified argument of Shri G .L. Sanghi for achieving c
the same purpose also does not bear close scrutiny, The Administra-
tive Tribunals Act, 1985, itself makes a distinction between the
y- Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members. The age of superannuation
of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman is 65 years while that of the
Membes is 62 years. Similarly, there is difference in their salaries. D
They are not treated to be in one class for this purpose by the Act
itself. It cannot, therefore, be said that all of them constitute one class
since the Tribunal is one. The case of the Chairman was distinguished
by learned counsel on the basis that his position was akin to that of the
Chief Justice of the High Court. However, the age of superannuation
....,. of the Chief Justice and the puisne Judges of the High Court is the E
same which pattern is not maintained in the Act. A provision is made
in the Act for discharge of certain administrative functions cif the
Chairman by the Vice-Chairman and not by the Members and simi-
larly, there is provision only for the Vice-Chairman to fill a casual
vacancy. The foundation of initial equality on which the argument of
discrimination is based, is non-existent. The parent statute itself shows F
that they were not born equals.

There is also no merit in the casual argument that there is a
proposal for higher pay and age of superannuation for Members of
Tribunals for other matters constituted in accordance with Article
323-B of the Constitution. The basic fact to be rememberd is that G
Articles 323-A and 323-B themselves require the law constituting these
Tribunals to provide for the pay and other conditions-of service of its
Members and, therefore, the same would be governed in the case of
--... each Tribunal by the provisions of the statute giving birth to the
Tribunal. These statutes being different, the provisions therein in this
behalf can also be different which has been left to the legislative H
. wisdom to decide.
956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I1990) 3 S.C.R.

A Considerable emphasis was laid on behalf of the petitioner on
S. P. Sampath Kumar's case (supra) to contend that the Tribunals con-
stituted under Article 323-A have been equated with the High Courts. -\
It is sufficient to say that in Sampath Kumar (supra), the question
before us in the present petition did not arise for consideration and the
observation therin cannot be torn out of context. On the contrary,
B certain observations in para 22 of that judgment indicate that the retir-
ing age of 62 years or 65 years, for the Members, Chairman and Vice-
Chairman was treated to be in accord with the pattern of the·enact-
ment on the basis that the Members and Chairman or Vice-Chairman
were in different categories. Equation of the Tribunal with the High
•.
Court therein was only as the forum for adjudication of disputes relat-
c ing to service matters and not for all purposes such as the one arising
for decision in the present case. We are unable to accept that the
decision of this Court in S.P. Sampath Kumar (supra) supports the
contention before us in this petition.

As a result of the aforesaid disi:ussion, we have no hesitation in
D holding that the equality claimed by the Members of the Administra-
tive Tribunal with the Judges of the High Courts or even the Vice-
Chairman of the Tribunal in the matter of pay and age of superannua-
tion does not exist being contrary to the pattern and scheme of the
parent statute establishing the Tribunal and, therefore, the very foun-
dation for the argument of discrimination being non-existent, the peti-
E tion must fail.

Consequently, the petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of
the case, the parties will bear their own costs.

R.S.8. Petition dismissed . . ~.

)