Supreme Court of India
M.K. HARIHAR IYERversusAUTHORISED OFFICER LAND REFORMS, TIRUNELVELI
- Citation
- 1990 INSC 36
- Decided
- 14 February 1990
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- SABYASACHI MUKHERJI
Holding
Proceedings that began before the 1970 amendment continue as if the amendment had not been passed, except for the reduction of the ceiling area, so Section 21A cannot be invoked to protect the transactions.
Summary
M.K. Iyer, a landowner in Kanyakumari district, held more than 30 standard acres and filed a return under the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961. The Authorised Officer determined his family size and allowed him 30 acres plus stridhana for his wife and daughter, prompting Iyer to appeal. While the appeal was pending, the 1970 amendment (Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Reduction of Ceiling on Land) Act) reduced the ceiling to 15 acres and introduced Section 21A, which protects certain partitions and transfers made between 15 Feb 1970 and 2 Oct 1970. Iyer argued that the amendment should apply to his case and that the three transactions falling within the protected period should be saved from voiding under Section 22. The High Court held that Section 21A could be invoked even for proceedings commenced before the amendment, but the Supreme Court reversed, stating that actions taken before the amendment continue as if the amendment had not been passed, except for the reduction of ceiling area, which is expressly excluded. Consequently, Iyer could not rely on Section 21A, and the High Court’s remand was erroneous. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with costs.
Issues considered
- The amendment's Section 21A can be availed by persons whose proceedings commenced before the 1970 amendment.
- Whether Section 3(1) and (2) of the 1970 amendment render earlier actions subject to the reduced ceiling of 15 acres.
- The scope of Section 22 in declaring transfers void when Section 21A applies.
- Whether a son who attained majority before the notified date ceases to be part of the family for ceiling calculations.
- Whether lands converted into topes before 1 July 1959 are exempt from the Act.
Legislation cited
- Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961s. 10(2), s. 21A, s. 22, s. 23(vii), s. 3(2), s. 3(31), s. 5(2), s. 7(B)
- Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Reduction of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1970s. 2, s. 3(1), s. 3(2), s. 3(31)
Subjects
Land reformsCeiling on landAmendment retrospective effectSection 21ASection 22Family definitionStridhanaPartitionTopes exemption
Judgment
M.K. HARIHAR IYER
A
v.
AUTHORISED OFFICER LAND REFORMS, TIRUNELVELI
FEBRUARY 14, 1990
B [SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, CJ., T.K. THOMMEN AND
A.M. AHMADI, JJ.)
Tami/nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act
1961-Sections 3(2), 3(31), 5(2), JO(B), 21A, 22, 23(vii)-Whether
'affected person' can avail of Section 21A in respect of proceedings
commenced prior to the 1970 Amending Act.
c
The appellant land-owner held lands in excess of 30 s~tandard
acres as on 6.4.1960. He filed a return as required by the Tamil N!!du
Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 and an enquiry
was initiated by the Authorised Officer concerned under Section 9(2)(b)
D of the Act. Several objections raised by the appellant were rejected and
the Authorised Officer came to th~ conclusion that the family of the
appellant could be reckoned to be of five members between 6.4.1960
and 2.10.1962 and thus the appellant was entitled to 30 standard acres;
his wife and daughter however could hold IO and 7.71 standard acres
respectively as stridhana. The appellant was asked to elect which lands
E he wished to be included in his holding and state which lands should be
treated as surplus. Feeling aggrieved by the said determination, the
appellant preferred an appeal under Section 78(1) to the Land Tri-
bunal. The appellant contended (i) that the Authorised Officer had
wrongly included the lands of his minor sons, unmarried daughter and
wife gilled to them long before 1960; (ii) that subsequent to the filing of
F the appeal, the Act was amended as a consequence whereof his rights
and liabilities with regard to the fixation of ceiiing area were required to
be worked out on the basis of the revised date of commencement of the
Act i.e. 15.2.1970; notified date being 2.10.1970. It was also urged by
the appellant that the lands of his eldest son Laxminarayanan could not
be included in his holding. On those grounds amongst others relating to
G the effect of subsequent transactions the appellant prayed that the mat-
ter ought to be remanded to the Authorised Tribunal for a de nova
consideration. The appellant authority rejected all the contentions and
dismissed the appeal, whereupon the appellant preferred a revision
application before the High Court. Before the High Court his plea
regarding subsequent transactions was confined to the 'documents
H executed between 15th February 1970, the date of commencement of the
358
M.K. IYER v. LAND REFORMS 359
Act, and 2nd October 1970, the notified date; contentions regarding A
other transactions were not pressed. The High Court accepted this
contention and took the view that even in respect of proceedings which
commenced prior to the coming into force of the Amending Act, an
affected person can take advantage of the provisions contained in Sec-
tion 21A. The High Conrt held that while Section 2 of the Amending Act
reduced the ceiling area to half, benefit was conferred by Section 21A B·
and hence both the provisions had to be read together. On that reason-
ing the High Court opined that the three documents relating to subse-
quent transactions executed between the said date, could not be ignored
in fixing the ceiling area unless it was found that the documents were
executed to defeat the provisions of the Act, in which case the transac-
tions may be declared void under Section 22 of the Act. The High Court
accordingly directed-the Authorised Officer to make further inquiries C
regarding the three transactions in question and pass appropriate
orders. The High Court rejected the other contentions. The appellant
being aggrieved with the rejection of other points raised before the High
Court has preferred this appeal by special leave.
D
Dismissing the appeal, this Court,
HELD: The proceedings in this case had started and concluded
before the Authorised Officer long before the Amending Act saw the
light of the day. Under Section 3(1) of the Amending Act, any action
taken (including any order made, decision or direction given, pro- E
ceeding taken, etc.) under the provisions of Act before the date of
publication of the Amending Act, can be continued and enforced after
the said date in accordance with the provisions of the Act as if the
~. Amending Act had not been passed. This is however, subject to sub-
section (2) which carves out an exception to sub-section (I) insofar
\ \
as the reduction of the ceiling area fro111 30 standard acres to JS F
standard acres is concerned. [367E-G I
B.K. V. Radhamani Ammal v. Authorised Officer, Land
Reforms, Coimbatore, [1985] 2 SCC 46, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 695 G
of 1975.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.3.1974 of the Madras
High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 2598 of 1972.
G. Viswanatha Iyer and N. Sudhakar for the Appellant. H
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 1 S.C.R.
V. Krishnamurthy for the Respondent.
A
The Judgment of thf' Court was delivered by
AHMADI, J. This appeal by special leave is filed against the
judgment and order of the High Court of Madras whereby it remitted
B the matter to the Authorised Officer for disposal in accordance with '
law and in the light of the observations made therein. The facts giving I
rise to this appeal are as under: \..,
The appellant-land owner held lands in Kanyakumari District in
excess of 30 standard acres as on 6th April, 1960. He filed a return in
Form No. 2 as required by the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of
c Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 (Act 58 of 1961), hereinafter called 'the
Act'. An enquiry was initiated by the Authorised Officer, Land
Reforms, under Section 9(2)(b) of the Act. The appellant raised
several objections but they were overruled. The Authorised Officer
came to the conclusion that the family of the appellant could be ~
D reckoned to be of five members between 6th April, 1960 and 2nd
October, 1962 and accordingly the land owner was entitled to 30
standard acres while his wife and daughter could hold 10 and 7. 71
standard acres respectively as stridhana lands. The appellant was
directed to state which lands he wished to be included in his holding
and identify the lands which fell surplus, failing which the Authorised
E Officer said he would be constrained to select the surplus lands. The
appellant was given five days time to make the option.
- Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Authorised Officer, the
appellant preferred an appeal under Section 78( 1) to the Lands
Tribunal. The appellant complained that the Authorised Officer had
F wrongly added the lands of his minor sons, unmarried daughter and
wife gifted to them long before 1960 in his holdings for determining if I
his total holdings exceeded the ceiling limit fixed under Section 5(2) of
the Act. According to him the lands covered under the registered gift
deed ought to have been excluded from his holding under the Explana-
ti on to Section 3( 14) as a gift stood on par with a partition. As a limb of
0 the same argument the appellant contended that subsequent to the
filing of the appeal, the Act was drastically amended by Tamil Nadu
Land Reforms (Reduction of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1970 (Act 17 of
1970), hereinafter called 'the Amending Act', whereby under Section
3(2), 'the date of commencement of this Act' came to be fixed as 15th
February, 1970 and the 'notified date' came to be fixed as 2nd
J
H October, 1970 under Section 3(31) of the Act. Consequently, argued
M.K. IYER v. LAND REFORMS !AHMADI, J.] 361
. the appellant, his rights and liabilities with regard to the fixation of A
ceiling area were required to be worked out on the oasis of the state of
affairs existing on the revised date of commencement of the Act i.e.
15th February, 1970, fixed by virtue of the amendment in the Act. He
also relied on the fact that his eldest son who was a minor on 10th
April, 1968 had attained majority on 1st January, 1970 (in the High
~
B
Court judgment the date is 1st October, 1970) i.e. before the com-
mencement of the Act on 15th February, 1970, and also before the
notified date i.e. 2nd October, 1970, and hence his land could not be
included in his holding as was done by the Authorised Officer. It was
also pointed out that his son had created a trust in respect of a portion
of the land which would be exempt from the operation of the Act by
virtue of Section 73(2)(b) of the Act. It was, therefore, submitted that c
his eldest son Laxminarayanan was a necessary party and the proper
course would be to set aside the impugned order of the Authorised
. 0fficer and remand the matter for a de novo consideration after notice
to his son. The second submission made was that on 10th April, 1968
when the impugned order was made the appellant's wife was pregnant,
she had since delivered a d.aughter and had gifted to her 5.71 acres of
n
.
Vadaseri land on 1st 0ctober,
.
1970 and later an additional 5.06 acres
of the land from the same village, which developments had to be taken
into account as subsequent events touching the determination of the
~.. appellant's ceiling area. Thirdly, it \vas pointed out that the appellant
had transferred 2 acres 48 cents of$. No. 2221, 0.82 cents of S. No.
E
2208-A and 1 acre 66 cents of Vadaseri lands to a third party on 26th
April, 1970 for services rendered to him. Similarly a portion of S. No.
2224 admeasuring 0.31 cents was sold to yet another third party on
23rd April, 1969 for valuable consideration and it was necessary to
~·
give. effect to these transactions which were subsequent to the
impugned order. It was lastly contended by the appellant that his
F
property bearing S. Nos. 1387-A and 1363-A which was subject to
' mortgage had to be sold on 1st July, 1968, a development subsequent
to the impugned order which too had to be noticed in fixing the ceiling
area. These transactions, it was said, were protected by Section 21A of
the .Act. It was, therefore, submitted thai since an appeal was a
continuation of the original proceedings it was obligatory on the part
of the appellate authority to examine the impact of these subsequent G
developments and refix the ceiling are~. The appellant, however, con-
r
tended that as third parties would have to be heard before deciding the
issue, the proper course was to direct the Authorised Officer to con-
sider the matter afresh in its entirety. The appellate authority
negatived all the contentions and dismissed the appeal with costs. H
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] I S.C.R.
Thereupon, the appellant approached the High Court by way of
A
a revision application. Before the High Court the contention in regard
to the subsequent transactions was confined to the documents
executed between 15th February, 1970, the date of commencement of
the Act, and 2nd October, 1970, the notified date. That included the
two settlement deeds dated !st October, 1970 made in favour of the
B unmarried daughters and the sale deed· dated 26th April, 1970
executed in favour of a third party. The contention was not pressed in
respect of the transaction evidenced by the sale deed dated 23rd April,
1969 in favour of a third party. This contention found favour with the
High Court. The High Court took the view, relying on an earlier
Division Bench judgment in C.R.P.' No. 1197 of 1971 (Fakir Mohmad
v. The State of Tamil Nadu), that "even in respect of proceedings
c which commenced prior to the coming into force of the Amending
Act, an affected person can take advantage of the provisions contained
in Section 2 IA". It was held that while Section 2 of the Amending Act
reduced the ceiling area to half, benefit was conferred by Section 2 IA
and hence both the provisions had to be read together. It was, there-
D fore, held that the three documents could not be ignored in fixing the
ceiling area unless it is found that the documents were executed to
defeat the provisions of the Act, in which case the transactions may be
declared void under Section 22 of the Act. In this view of the matter,
the High Court directed the Authorised Officer to make further
inquiries regarding the said three transactions and pass appropriate
orders. The High Court, however, rejected the rest of the contentions
by which exclusion was sought, viz., (i) on the conjoint reading of
Section 10(8) and Section 3(14) insofar as it concerned Laxmmara-
yanan as a member of the appellant's family; (ii) in regard to lands
which were locked in litigation; (iii) in regard to lands in the possession
of mortgagees; and (iv) the lands which are covered under Section
73(vii) of the Act. In this view that the High Court took, the matter
was remitted to the Authorised Officer in regard to the aforesaid three
transactions.
The appellant, feeling aggrieved by the rejection of his other
contentions by the High Court, has preferred this appeal by special
G leave. The main grievance of the appellant is that the High Court fell
into an error in limiting the benefit of Section 2 JA to three transac-
tions only and by directing an enquiry under Section 22 overlooking
the fact that it was not subject to Section 22. He further contends that
the High Court was wrong in thinking that the contention in regard to
the sale deed dated 22nd April, 1969 was not pressed. In brief the
contention is that the High Court failed to appreciate the impact of the
M.K. IYER v. LAND REFORMS {AHMADI, J.l '363
amendments introduced by the Amending Act on the two settlements
A
of 1st October, 1970 and the sale deed of 26th April, 1970 and erred in
holding that the relief under Section 21A must be determined after an
enquiry under Section 22 of the Act. This was the main thrust of the
submissions made at the hearing of this appeal.
The Act (Act 58 of 1961) was notified on 2nd October, 1962 but B
the date of its commenceme'nt was fixed as 6th April, 1960. The pre-
) sent proceedings had commenced under the said Act. Th Act was
amended by Act 17 of 1970 whereby the ceiling area was reduced from
30 standard acres for a family not exceeding five member to 15
standard acres and the date of commencement of the Act was shifted
to 15th February, 1970 and the notified date to 2nd October, 1970.
There can be no doubt that after the passing of Act 17 of 1970 the family's C
holding had to be determined with reference to the notified date i.e.
2nd October, 1970. See: B.K. V. Radhamani Ammal v. Authorised
1 Officer, Land Reforms, Coimbatore, [1985] 2 SCC 46.
The Act was enacted to provide for the fixation of ceiling on D
agricultural land holdings and matters connected therewith. Section 5
fixes the ceiling area in the case of every family consisting of not more
than five members at 15 standard acres after the amendment made in
the provision by virtue of Section 2(2)(a) of the Amending Act. Sec-
tion 7 lays down that on and from the date of commencement of the
Act, no person shall, except as otherwise provided by the Act, be E
entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area. The family of the
appellant consisted of himself, his wife, two minor sons and an unmar-
ried daughter at the date of commencement of the Act and on the
notified date as they stood before the Amending Act. One son had
become a major w.e.f. 1st January, 1970. Jn the High Court judgment
the date is stated to be !st October, 1970. That will not make any F
difference so far as the submission is concerned.
We may first notice Sections 2 IA and 22 of the Act as amended
br the Amending Act. They read as under:
"21A. Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 22 G
or in any other provision of this Act and in any other law
for the time being in force, where, after the 15th day of
February, 1970 but before the 2nd day of October, 1970.
(a) any person has effected by means of a registered instru-
ment a partition of his holding or part thereof; or H
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 1 S.C.R.
(b) any parent or grand-parent has voluntarily transferred
A any land on account of natural love and affection to any
minor son, unmarried daughter, minor grand-son, or
unmarried grand-daughter in the male line; or
(c) any person has voluntarily transferred any land
B (i) to any educational institu\ion; or
(ji) hospital.
of a public nature solely for the purposes of such institution
or hospital;
c such partition or transfer shall be valid:
Provided that in the case of transfer to such educa-
tional institution or hospital, the land transferred absolu- t-
tely vests in the institution or hospital and the entire
D income from such land is appropriated for the institution or
hospital."
"22. Where, on or after the date of the commencement of
this Act, but before the notified date, any person has trans-
ferred any land held by him by sale, gift (other than gift
E made in contemplation of death), ex.change, surrender,
settlement or in any other manner whatsoever except by
bequest or has effected a partition of his holding or part
thereof, the auihorised officer within whose jurisdiction
such lane}, holding or the major part thereof is situated
may, after notice to·such person and other persons affected
F by such transfer or partition and after such enquiry as he
thinks fit to make, declare the transfer or partition to be
void if he finds that the transfer or the partition, as the case
may be, defeats any of the provisions of this Act."
Section 2 lA begins with a non·obstante clause and limits its applica-
G tion to partition or transfer mentioned in clauses (a\ to (c) effected
between.15th February, 1970 and 2nd October, 1970. The settlement
deeds, both dated lst October, 1970 and the sale deed dated 26th
April, 1970 fall within the two termini points fixed by Section 2 lA but
the sale deed dated 23rd April, 1969 is clearly outside the scope of
Section 2 lA and therefore it seems the learned counsel for the appel·
H lant in the High Court rightly did not press the claim in regard to the
M.K. IYER,v. LAND REFORMS [AHMADI, J.] 365
land covered under the said document. However, the learned counsel A
for the appellant before us pointed out that while the High Court
rightly came to the conclusion that the appellant was entitled to the
benefit of Section 2 lA insofar as the two settlement deeds of lst
October, 1970 and the sale deed of 26th April, 1970 are concerned, it
fell into an error in holding-"However, if those transfers are meant
to defeat any of the provisions of the Act, then the Authorised Officer B
may declare the said transfers to be void under Section 22 of the
Act"-thereby totally overlooking the opening words of Section 2 IA
which are intended to override Section 22. The further observations of
the High Court based on decision in Naganatha Ayyar v. Authorised
Officer, [197111 M.L.J. 274 make it clear that the High Court misread
the observations of Ramanujam, J. when it said:
c
"Ramanujam, J. pointed out that all transfers effected
between the date ,of commencement of the Act and the
notified date cannot be declared to be void as defeating the
provisions of the Act. It has been pointed out that only if
the transfers are really not transfers but sham and nominal D
transactions or bogus transactions, they would be defeating
the provisions of the Act and that only then they can be
declared to be void under Section 22 of the Act".
The above observations are somewhat confusing. A sham, nominal or
bogus document may not necessarily be one intended to defeat any E
provision of theAct. A partition or transfer evidenced by such a docu-
ment would be of no avail to seek the benefit of Section 2 lA regardless
of Section 22. Section 21A, which begins with the words-notwith-
standing anything contained in Section 22-clearly overrides Section
22 and therefore the transactions .referred to in Section 2 JA cannot be
the subject-matter of enquiry unci'¢r Section 22. Section 2 lA refers to F
only three types of transfers viz., (i). transfer of holding by a registered
partition deed; (ii) transfer of land to specified individuals on account
of natural love and affection; and (iii) transfer in favour of an educa-
tional institution or hospital of a public nature solely for the purposes
of such institution or hospital provided the transferred land vests abso-
lutely in the institution or hospital and the enllre income from such G
land is appropriated for the institution or hospital. Even though the
transactions referred to in Section 2 lA cannot be declar,ed void under
Se"ction 22 as defeating any of the provisions of the Act, the
Authorised Officer would be entitled debars Section 22 of the Act, to
find out if the instruments of transfer or partition though answering
the description of transactions under Section 2 lA, are in fact genuine H
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 1 S.C.R.
transactions and not sham, nominal or bogus ones. Similarly the
A
Authorised Officer would be entitled to determine if the instruments
of transfer even if genuine answer the description of documents refer-
red to in Section 2 lA, and if not, he would be justified in invoking
Section 22 of the Act. To put it differently when any party seeks the
benefit of Section 21A, he must show, if a doubt arises, that (i) the
B instrument on which he relies is a genuine one and not a sham,
nominal or bogus one and (ii) it answers the description of the docu-
ments referred to by Section 21A. If the document is not found to be
genuine, the Authorised Officer will not act on it, if it is genuine, the
Authorised Officer will determine if it is one referred to in Section
2 lA and if not he will resort to Section 22 of the Act. On this consi-
deration the sale deed <laid 26th April, 1970 in favour of a third party
c clearly falls outside the purview of Section 2 lA and the Authorised
Officer will be entitled to embark on an enquiry under Section 22 of
the Act, if the instrument is otherwise genuine. In regard to the two
settlements in favour of unmarried daughters also the Authorised
Officer will have to consider if the settlements answer the description
D of the documents referred to in Section 21A even if they are genuine.
If he answers both these points in the affirmative he need not test the
documents on the additional requirement of Section 22 but if he comes
to the conclusion that the documents do not fall within Section 21A, he
would be required to test their validity on the touchstone of Section 22
of the Act. We have thought it necessary to clearly define the scope of
E the enquiry before the Authorised Officer on remand to clear the
doubt, if any, arising from the observations of the High Court and to
avoid unnecessary complications.
The next contention urged by the learned counsel for the appel-
lant is based on the plain language of Section 10(2) read with the
F definition of 'family' in Section 3(14) of the Act. The appellant's son
Laxminarayanan is stated to have attained majority on 1st January,
1970, i.e. before the date of commencement of the Act on 15th
February, 1970 and the notified date of 2nd October, 1970. Even if the
date stated by the High Court is correct, he attained majority before
2nd October, 1970. On his attaining majority he ceased to be a
G member of the appellant's family. Under Section 10(2), the Authori-
sed Officer has to take into account only those members of the family
as are covered by the definition of Section 3(14) of the Act. Although
Laxminarayan was undoubtedly a member of the appellant's family on
the date on which the Authorised Officer first determined the ceiling
area, the submission of the appellant's counsel is that he having ceased
H to be a minor son, he cannot be included in the appellant's family when
M.K. IYER v. LAND REFORMS !AHMADI, J.l 367
the Authorised Officer reconsiders the ceiling area on remand. The A
High Court negatived this contention and in 011r opinion rightly. The
submission overlooks the provision contained in Section 3 of the
Amending Act by which the date of commencement of the Act and the
notified date were revised. Section 3 reads as under:
"Saving- B
) (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), any action
taken (including any order made, notification issued, deci-
sion or direction given, proceeding taken, liability or
penalty incurred and punishment awarded) under the pro-
visions of the Principal Act before the date of the publica- C
tion of this Act in the Fort St. George Gazette,. may be
continued or enforced after the said date in accordance
with the provisions of the Principal Act as if this Act had
not been passed.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall be deemed to entitle b
any person whether or not such person is a party to any
proceeding mentioned in sub-section (1), to hold after the
15th day of February 1970, land in excess of the ceiling area
under the Principal Act as modified by Section 2 and the
..-l. provisions of the Principal Act as modified by Section 2
shall, after the said date, apply to such person." E:
The proceedings in this case had started and concluded before the
Authorised Officer long before the Amending Act saw the light of the
day. Under Section 3(1) of the Amending Act, any action taking
(including any order made, decision or direction given, proceeding
taken, etc.) under the provisions of Act before the date of publication F
of the Amending Act, can be continued and enforced after the said
date in accordance with the provisions of the Act as if the Amending
Act had not been passed. This is, however, subject to sub-section (2)
which carves out an exception to sub-section ( 1) insofar as the reduc-
tion of the ceiling area from 30 standard acres to 15 standard acres is
concerned. The High Court was, therefore, right in rejecting this t;
contention.
Lastly, it was submitted that lands which were converted into
orchards of topes before 1st July, 1959 are exempt from the provisions
·of the Act by virtue of Section 73(vii) of the Act. The High Court has
rejected this contention on the following finding: H
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I1990] 1 S.C.R.
A "In the present case certain lands are claimed to be topes
and exemption is claimed regarding the same. But there is
nothing to show that the said lands had been converted into
!opes prior to first day of July, 1959.
Since the factual foundation is not laid we cannot entertain this
B contention.
These were the only c,ontentions urged before us. In view of the ?..,
above discussion we see no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same
with costs.
C Y.Lal Appeal dismissed.
r
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