Holding

The electricity board is strictly liable for the death; the act‑of‑a‑stranger exception does not apply.

Summary

The Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board (MPEB) was sued by the dependents of a workman who died after riding over a live electric wire that had fallen on a rain‑soaked road. The Board argued that the wire fell because a third party had illegally tapped the line, invoking the "act of a stranger" exception to strict liability under Rylands v. Fletcher. The Supreme Court held that the Board, as the statutory supplier of electricity, bears a strict liability for injuries caused by its hazardous activity, and that the exception does not apply because the Board should have anticipated and prevented such interference. Consequently, the Board was ordered to pay the assessed compensation of Rs. 4.34 lakhs. The appeal by the Board was dismissed.

Issues considered

The electricity board's liability under the doctrine of strict liability for death caused by a live wire on a public road.
Whether the "act of a stranger" exception to Rylands v. Fletcher applies to the Board's alleged loss of a wire due to illegal pilferage.
Whether the Board had a duty to anticipate and prevent third‑party interference with its electric lines.
Whether lack of knowledge of the alleged pilferage absolves the Board from compensation liability.

Subjects

strict liabilityRylands v Fletcherelectricity boardelectrocutionact of strangerpublic utilitycompensationtort

Judgment

A M.P. ELECTRICITY BOARD
v.
SHAIL KUMAR! AND ORS.

JANUARY 12, 2002

B [K.T. THOMAS AND S.N. PHUKAN, JJ.]

Torts:

Victim electrocuted by a live wire lying on road-Claim for
C Compensation by dependents of the victim-Electricity Board contending
that the wire fell down due to illegal tapping by a stranger and hence
liability is on the stranger-Rule of Strict Liability-Exception to the rule
being an 'Act of a stranger-Availability of-Held, the act of the stranger
should have been reasonably anticipated or its consequences should have
D been provented by the Electricity Board-Hence, the exception is not available
and therefore the Electricity Board is liable to pay compensation.

One J, a workman, while returning from his factory on a bicycle in the
night, came into contract with a live wire, which snapped and fell down on the
road due to rain. He was instantaneously electrocuted. Respondents-claimants,
E who are dependents of the victim, filed a suit for compensation before trial
court claiming Rs. 6.9. lakhs against appellant-Electricity Board. The
appellant contended that the wire fell down on the road due to the illegal
pilferage of electricity committed by respondent 3 from the main supply line
and hence respondent 3 is liable to pay damages to the claimants. The trial
court agreed with the contention of the appellant and assessed the
F compensation payable to the claimants at Rs. 4.34 lakhs. However, the
claimants were non-suited by the trial court on the ground that the claimants
failed to prove the onus of liability. The High Court allowed the appeal of the
claimants and directed the appellant to pay the compensation amount of Rs.
4.34 lakhs to the claimants. Hence this appeal.
G Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD : I. I. The responsibility to supply electric energy in the
particular locality was statutorily conferred on the appellant-Electricity Board.
If the energy so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being, who
H gets unknowingly trapped into it, the primary liability to compensate the
164
M.P. ELECTRICITY BOARD v. SHAIL KUMAR! 165
A
-
sufferer is that of the appellant. So long as the voltage of electricity
transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension, the
appellant have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of
• such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not remain live on the road
as users ofsuch road would be under peril. It is no defence on the part of the
appellant that somebody committed mischief by siphoning such energy to his B
private property and that the electrocution was from such diverted line. It is
the look out of the appellant to prevent such pilferage by installing necessary
devices. At any rate, if any live wire got snapped and fell on the public road
the electric current thereon should automatically have been disrupted.
Authorities manning such dangerous commodities have extra duty to chalk
out measures to prevent such mishaps. (167-G-H; 168-A-B] C
1.2. A person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky
exposure to human life is liable under the law of Torts to compensate for the
injury caused irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on his part in
causing the same. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent
in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known D
in law as 'strict liability'. In cases of strict liability, the defendant is held
liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by
taking precautions. One of the exceptions formulated to the rule of strict
liability in the case of Rylands v. Fletcher, is the 'Act of a stranger'. The said
exception is not available to the appellant as the act attributed to the third E
respondent should reasonably have been anticipated or at any rate its
consequences should have been prevented by the appellant. Merely because
the illegal act could be attributed to a stranger is not enough to absolve the
liability of the appellant regarding the live wire lying on the road.
[168-C; 169-D-E; 170-B]
F
Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) Law Reports 3 HL 330; North Western
Utilities ltd. v. london Guarantee & Accident Company ltd., (1936) Appeal
Cases 108 and Quebec Railway, Light Heat and Power Campany limited v.
Vandry & Ors., (1920) Law Reports Appeal Cases 662, relied on.

W.B. State Electricity Board v. Sachin Banerjee, (1999] 9 sec 21, G
distinguished.

MC. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) I SCC 395 (CB); Charan Lal Sahu
v. Union of India, (1990] I SCC 613 (CB); Gujarat State Road Transport
Corpn. v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, (1987) 3 SCC 234 and Kaushnuma Begum
v. New India Assurance Co. ltd., (2001 [ 2 SCC 9, referred to. H
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] l S.C.R.

A Cambridge Water Co. Ltd v. Eastern Countries Leather pie., [1994) 1
All England Law Reports (HL) 53, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 180 of 2002.

From the Judgment and Order dated 17.7.2001 of the Madhya Pradesh
B High Court in F.A. No. 416of1999.

Satish K. Agnihotri and Ms. Yogmaya Agnihotri for the Appellant.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

C THOMAS, J. Leave granted.

The supplier of electricity in a locality is striving to squirm out of the
liability to compensate the dependants of the sole victim of a snap
electrocution. The supplier, Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board (for short the
Board) pleads that the electrocution was due to the clandestine pilferage
D committed by a stranger unauthorisedly siphoning the electric energy from
the supply line and hence the wrong doer alone should be mulcted with the
burden of damages. In a suit filed by the dependents of the victim the trial
court agreed with the Board in regard to the aforesaid contention, but the
High Court disagreed and directed the Board to pay the amount of damages
assessed. The said judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh is now
E under challenge in this appeal. After hearing learned counsel for the Board
we do not find the necessity to seek the help of the respondents in deciding
this appeal and hence service of notice on the respondents is dispensed with.

One Jogendra Singh, a workman in a factory, aged 37, was riding on a "'
F bicycle on the night of23.8. I 997 while returning from his factory, without any
premonition of the impending disaster awaiting him en-route. The disaster
was lying on the road in the form of a live electric wire. There was rain and
hence the road was partially inundated with water. The cyclist did not notice
the live wire on the road and hence he rode the vehicle over the wire which
twitched and snatched him and he was instantaneously electrocuted. He fell
G down and dies within minutes.

When the action was brought by his widow and minor son, nobody
...
disputed the fact that Jogendra Singh died at the place and at the time
mentioned by the claimants. Nor has it been disputed that he was electrocuted
by the live wire lying on the road. The main contention advanced by the
H appellant Board is that one Hari Gaikwad (third respondent) had taken a wire
M.P. ELECTRICITY BOARD v. SHAIL KUMAR! [THOMAS, J.] 167
from the main supply line in order to siphon the energy for his own use and A
_, the said act of pilferage was down clandestinely without even the notice of
the Board; and that the line got unfastened from the hook and it fell on the
road over which the cycle ridden by the deceased slide resulting in the
instantaneous electrocution.

Third respondent disclaimed any liability, repudiated the allegation of B
pilferage of electric energy and disowned having taken the line from the main
supply wire which became the death trap of Jogendra Singh.

The compensation claim was in a sum of Rs. 6.9 lacs. The trial court
assessed the compensation amount to which the claimants are entitled as Rs. C
4.34 lacs. But the claimants were non-suited by the trial court solely on the
premise that the claimants "failed to prove who was liable for the above
compensation". A Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
allowed the appeal filed by the claimants and directed the Board to pay the
compensation amount of Rs. 4.34 lacs to the claimants. The Division Bench
reached the said conclusion on the following reasoning : D
'The MPEB has stated in paragraph No. 5 of the document Ex. P/6
that it has kept staff to see that no pilferage of electricity takes place
and it had no knowledge about this pilferage of electricity line by Hari
Gaikwad. Therefore. it becomes clear that the electricity supply line
was moving in that part of the area out of which the wire was hanging, E
may be or may not be put by Hari Gaikwad, put it was live electricity
wire and when the deceased came in contact with it he died of
electrocution. Therefore, the defences put up by the MPEB are
absolutely without any basis and do not reflect the real position at
the spot, rather attempt has been made to conceal the real position F
in order to avoid responsibility and liability for payment of
compensation."

It is an admitted fact that the responsibility to supply electric energy
in the particular locality was statutorily conferred on the Board. If the energy
so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being, who gets unknowingly G
trapped into it the primary liability to compensate the sufferer is that of the
supplier of the electric energy. So long as the voltage of electricity transmitted
through the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension the managers of its
supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of
such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not remain live on the road
as users of such road would be unde; peril. It is no defence on the part of H
r

168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] I S.C.R.

A the management of the Board that somebody committed mischief by siphoning
such energy to his private property and that the electrocution was from such '·
diverted line. It is the look out of the managers of the supply system to
prevent such pilferage by installing necessary devices. At any rate, if any live
wire got snapped and fell on the public road the electric current thereon
B should automatically have been disrupted. Authorities manning such
dangerous commodities have extra duty to chalk out measures to prevent
such mishaps.

Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person
undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life,
C is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other
person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the
managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability i.e. the foreseeable
risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such
person is known, in law, as "strict liability". It differs from the liability which
arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way i.e. the concept of
D negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by
ta:...ing reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be
done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based
on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases
of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he
E could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions.

The doctrine of strict liability has its origin in English Common Law
when it was propounded in the celebrated case of Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868)
Law Reports 3 HL 330. Blackburn J., the author of the said rule had observed
thus in the said decision :
F
'The rule of law is that the person who, for his own purpose, brings
on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief ...
if it escapes, must keep it at his peril; and if he does so he is prima
facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence
of its escape." ,..
G
There are seven exceptions formulated by means of case law to the
doctrine of strict liability. It is unnecessary to enumerate those exceptions
barring one which is this. "Act of stranger i.e. if the escape was caused by
the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule does not apply". (vide Page 535
H Winfield on Tort, 15th Edn.
M.P. ELECTRICITY BOARD v. SHAIL KUMARI [THOMAS, J.] 169
The rule of strict liability has been approved and followed in many A
• subsequent decisions in England. A recent decision in recognition of the said
doctrine is rendered by the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co. Ltd v.
Eastern Countries Leather pie., (1994) 1 All England Law Reports (HL) 53.
The said principle gained approval in India, and decisions of the High Courts
are a legion to that effect. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Charan Lal B
Sahu V. Union of India, [1990] I sec 613 and a Division Bench in Gujarat
State Road Transport Corpn. v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, [1987] 3 SCC 234
had followed with approval the principle in Rylands v. Fletcher. By referring
to the above two decisions a two Judge Bench of this Court has reiterated
the same principle in Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd,
(200112 sec 9. c
In MC. Mehta v. Union of India, [ 1987] I SCC 395 this Court has gone
even beyond the rule of strict liability by holding that "where an enterprise
is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and hann is ,
caused on any one on account of the accident in the operation of such
activity, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate those D
... who are affected by the accident; such liability is not subject te any of the
exceptions to the principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v.
Fletcher."

In the present case, the Board made an endeavour to rely on the
exception to the rule of strict liability (Rylands v. Fletcher) being "an act of E
stranger". The said exception is not available to the Board as the act attributed

. to the third respondent should reasonably have been anticipated or at any
rate its consequences should have been prevented by the appellant-Board.
In Northwestern Utilities, limited v. T_,ondon Guurantee and Accident
Company. limited. (1936) Appeal Cases 108, the Privy Council repelled the F
contention of the defendant based on the aforecited exception. In that case
a hotel belonging to the plaintiffs was destroyed in a fire caused by the
escape and ignition of natural gas. The gas had percolated into the hotel
basement from a fractured welded joint in an intermediate pressure main
situated below the street level and belonging to the defendants which was
'"' a public utility company. The fracture was caused during the construction G
involving underground work by a third party. The Privy Council held that the
risk involved in the operation undertaken by the defendant was so great that
a high degree care was expected of him since the defendant ought to have
appreciated the possibility of such a leakage.

The Privy Council has observed in Quebec Railway, light Heat and H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] I S.C.R.

A Power Company Limited v. Vandry and Ors., (1920) Law Reports Appeal
Cases 662 that the company supplying electricity is liable for the damage
without proof that they had been negligent. Even the defence that the cables
were disrupted on account of a violent wind and high tension current found
its way through the low tension cable into the premises of the respondents
B was held to be not a justifiable defence. Thus, merely because the illegal act
could be attributed to a stranger is not enough to absolve the liability of the
Board regarding the live wire lying on the road.

In W.B. State Electricity Board v. Sachin Banerjee, [ 1999) 9 SCC 21 the
Electricity Board adopted a defence that electric lines were illegally hooked
C for pilferage purposes. This Court said that the Board cannot be held to be
negligent on the said fact situation but the question of strict liability was not
taken up in that case.

In the light of the above discussion we do not think that the Board has
any reasonable prospect of succeeding in this appeal. Hence even without
D issuing notice to the respondents we dismiss this appeal.
B.S. Appeal dismissed.