Holding

A review of a Collector’s order under s.51 must be exercised within a reasonable time; the three‑year delay invalidated the review, and the lease deed remains valid as no grounds under s.182 were established.

Summary

The respondents applied to the District Industries Centre for a parcel of Nazul land (Survey No. 462) to set up an industrial unit. The Collector transferred the land to the Industries Centre on 27 July 1991 and later, after the Madhya Pradesh Housing Board objected, ordered a status‑quo restraining construction. While the writ petitions were pending, the Board of Revenue permitted the Collector to review his own order under Section 51 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, but the review was sought after more than three years. The High Court held that the review was invalid and that the lease deed executed on 30 July 1991 remained valid. The Supreme Court affirmed this view, ruling that Nazul government land can be lawfully leased, that a review under Section 51 must be exercised within a reasonable time and the three‑year delay rendered the review void, and that the lease deed can be set aside only on grounds specified in Section 182, which were absent. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

The legality of transferring and leasing Nazul government land for industrial purposes despite a claim that it was reserved for grazing under s.237 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code.
Whether the Collector could validly review his own order under s.51 of the Code after a lapse of three years.
Whether the lease deed created on 30 July 1991 could be cancelled by the subsequent review of the original transfer.
Whether sections 181 and 182 of the Code provide any basis to set aside the lease.

Legislation cited

Government Grants Act, 1895
Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959s. 181(1), s. 182(1), s. 182(2), s. 234, s. 235, s. 236, s. 237, s. 51

Subjects

Nazul landgovernment leaseSection 51 reviewreasonable timeMadhya Pradesh Land Revenue Codegrazing landindustrial leasecancellation of lease

Judgment

[2008] 14 S.C.R. 1155

'f
M.P. HOUSING BOARD A
v.
SHIV SHANKAR MANDIL & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 3840-3841 of 2001)
OCTOBER 24, 2008
B
[LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA AND V.S. SIRPURKAR,
JJ.]

Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code - s.51- Govern-
ment land transferred to respondent for establishing indus- c
trial unit as per order of Collector- Valid lease deed executed
- Cancellation of, on the ground that land was reserved for
grazing - Correctness of - Held: Not correct - Permission
granted by Housing Board to the Collector to review its order
of transfer after a period of 3 years was not correct since re-
D
view power has to be exercised within reasonable time - Re-
view.
The private respondent filed application before Dis-
trict Industries Centre for a piece of land to establish in-
dustrial unit. The said proposal was forwarded to the E
Tehsildar with request to transfer Survey No.462 recorded
as Nazul land. The Tehsildar invited objections. Since no
objections were received, after consulting the concerned
authorities, Tehsildar proposed transfer to the Collector.
The Collector ordered on 27. 7 .1991, transfer of the F
said land to the District Industries Centre. However Hous-
ing Board objected to the allotment of Survey No.462 on
' the ground that said survey number was in the middle of
residential plan of the Board and prayed for cancellation
"""' of the allotment of the land and for stopping the work G
1 commenced by private respondent. The Collector, by his
order dt. 27 .8.1991 directed the respondents to maintain
status quo and further ordered the respondents not to
construct on the allotted land.
1155 H
1156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 14 S.C.R.

A The respondents filed the first Writ ~Petition. During ..
the pendency of the writ petition, on 11.5.1994, the Board
of Revenue passed an order at the instance of Collector, ·
permitting the Collector to review its order dated
27.7.1991. Respondents challenged this order by filing
B another writ petition. The Collector decided to review the
order dated 27.7.1991 in view of the observation of the
Board regarding the transfer. The Single Judge gf High
Court (lllowed both the writ petitions and held that the
order passed by the Collector, restraining respondents
C to construct on the leased plot was wholly incorrect. The
Single Judge also held that the Collector having already
granted permission on 27.7.1991 could not have decided
to review that order, that too after 3 years. Two LPAs filed
thereagainst were dismissed by Division Bench of High
Court.
0
In the instant appeals, it 'was contended for the ap-
pellant-Housing Board that it was a reserved land for the
grazing and-therefore there was clear bar under s.237 of
the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code from transfer-
E ring the land for the industrial purppses. ·
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The -land could have 'been leased out as
it was, undoubtedly, a Nazul land owned by the Govern-
F ment. The respondent had obtained possession, paid
premium, spent money for obtaining the Registered Sale
, Deed and also ,mad~ the initial expenditure for preparing
the land for raising structure.s and yet the Government
authorities had remained dormant for a good long period
G for more than 3 years for deciding to exercise their power
of review. Merely by changing the nomenclature of the
category of the land which was admittedly sought to be r
done by the Collector, later on, the said leasehold rights
of the respondents could not be set at naught. For that, it
would be necessary to cancel the Lease Deed or to nul-
H
M.P. HOUSING BOARD v. SHIV SHANKAR 1157
MANDIL & ORS.
/
_,
.. lify the same through the modality provided by ss.181 (1) A
and 182 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959
and not by the indirect method of changing the category
of the land. [Paras 8, 11] (1163-B, C; 1164-G, H; 1165-A)
1.2. It was not specifically· proved that the land in
question was carrying any Nistar rights. On the other . B
hand, this was specifically admitted to be a "Nazul land".
That apart, there was no bar in diverting the unoccupied
land. It was shown that this land was specifically set apart
for pasture. Barring one revenue entry, the State Govern-
ment has not produced any evidence at any point to sug- c
gest that this particular piece of land was set apart for
pasture or for fodder reserve. Under the cirCUl'J!Stances,
there is no reason to hold that ss.235-237 were applicable.
[Para 12] (1167-C, D)
.... 1.3. Even if it is held that the said land was a grazing p
land and was treated as such before its diversion by Col-
lector for commercial purpose, merely by cancelling the
said diversion, the subsequent validly created Lease
Deed cannot be set at naught. Both the Single Judge, as
- well as the Division Bench are correct in holding that E
the subsequent Lease Deed would hold good. [Para 13]
(1167-E, F)
2. The Collector wanted to review his own order un-
der s.51 of the Code and for that purpose, needed the
sanction of the Board of Revenue under sub-Section 1(1) F
of s.51 of the Code. It will be clear from the language that
it is a review power and such review power would have
to be exercised within a reasonable time. It took more than
three years for the State Government to move the Board
r of Revenue for reviewing the orders. The three years of G
1 time, without any explanation, could not be viewed as a
reasonable time in view of the fact that the petitioner had
obtained possession, paid premium, spent money for ob-
taining the Registered Sale Deed and have also made the
initial expenditure for preparing the land for raising struc- H
1158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A tures. The said Government could not have allowed the
,.. ...
.•
petitioner to do all these things and then chosen to re-
view its own order. That apart, even if the earlier order
dated 27.7.1991 was reviewed, it could not set at naught
the Lease Deed which was validly created. It could have
B cancelled the lease only for the reasons stated in s.182(2)
of the Code, which reasons were obviously absent in
the instant case. [Paras 14, 15] (1167-G; 1168-D, F, G, H; ~
1169-A, B)
State of Gujarat v. Raghav AIR (1969) SC 1297 - relied
c on.
CASE LAW REFERENCE
AIR (1969) SC 1297 relied on Para 14
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
D ·3840-3841 of 2001

From the final Judgment and Order dated 8.7.1999 of the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior in LPA No.
315 & 296 of 1996
E WITH
C.A. Nos. 3842-3843 of 2001
B.S. Banthia and Vikas Upadhyay for the Appellant.
R.P. Gupta, M.P. Singh, C.D. Singh, Vibha Datta Makhija
F t-
and S.S. Khanduja for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. 1. This Judgment will dispose of
Civil Appeal Nos. 3840-3841 of 2001 and 3842-3843 of 2001.
G All the appeals relate to a common judgment passed by Divi-
sion Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at ~ ""
Gwalior, by which the Division Bench disposed of two Letters
Patent Appeals, being Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 315 of 1996
and 296of1996. The first two appeals are filed by the Madhya
H Pradesh Housing Board (hereinafter referred to as "the Board"),
M.P. HOUSING BOARD v. SHIV SHANKAR 1159
MANDIL & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

, whereas, the other two appeals are filed by State of Madhya A
Pradesh and one of its officers. Controversy relates to a plot of
land in Morena, Madhya Pradesh, measuring 11 biswa in Sur-
vey Plot No. 462. The private respondent, namely, Shiv Shankar
Mandil submitted an application on 29.12.1990 to the General
Manager, District Industries Centre, Morena, contending therein B
that he had his small scale industry manufacturing steel furni-
ture and he needed some land to establish the unit. The Gen-
1 eral Manager, District Industries Centre, Morena submitted an
application by Letter No. ,138 dt. 8.1.1991 requesting to trans-
fer Survey No. 462 measuring 11 biswa which was recorded c
as "Charnoi Extra Nazul" in favour of the respondents for estab-
lishing an industry. This proposal was sent to Tehsildar, Morena,
who invited objections from various authorities. No objections
were, however, received by him. He, thereafter, obtained the
consent of the Municipal Officer, Morena. He also consulted
D
Town and Country Planning, Health and Police Departments
and proposed the transfer to the Collector. The Collector on
consideration of all the facts, ordered on 27. 7 .1991, a transfer
of the said land to the General Manager, District Industries Cen-
tre, Morena under Clause 4-3, para 36 of the Revenue book
circulars. It is on the basis of this, that the District Industries E
Centre, Morena by his order dt. 29.07.1991 agreed to allot the
said land on three conditions:-
(i) Obtaining the appropriate approval of the lay out plan
(ii) Obtaining building permission from the concerned F
Department
(iii) Submission of a map of the lay out plan.
In pursuance thereof, a Lease Deed was created for 99
years on 30.7.1991. G
,, , 2. However, Assistant Engineer, Madhya Pradesh Haus-
ing Board, Sub-Division Morena approached the Collector by
Letter dt. 23.8.1991 and pointed out that the allotment of Sur-
vey No. 462 made by Industries Department to the respondents
H
1160 · SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A was objectionable. It was pointed out that said Survey Number
was in the middle of a residential plan of the Board, It was then
pointed out that a letter was already written by Commissioner
')--·
-
of the Board for transferring Survey Nos. 458, 462, 482 and
485, which were Government lands in favour of the Board. The
B proposal for transfer of Survey No. 462 was, however, aiready
over. Further, the Board had started acquisition proceedings .
by paying the diversion charges. It was further pointed out that )

the Board had also ~ought for paper possession in respect of 1'
the aforementioned four Survey Numbers and intended fo ex-
c ecute a residential plan, wherein, 1000 residential plots had
been proposed for solving the residential problem in Morena
Town. It was expressed further that if M/s S.S. Industries of the
. respondents was permitted to establish· an industry, then the
plan of the Board would be upset and the expenditure invested
in the development plan would be wasted. It was, therefore,
D
prayed that .the allotment of the land of Survey No. 462 should
be cancelle~ and the work commenced by M/s. S.S. Industries . )<.
should be stoppe~:. The Collector, by his order dt. 27 .8.1991
directed the respondents to maintain status quo and further or-
dered the respondents not to construct on the allotted land. The
E respondents, th_erefore, filed the first Writ Petition, being Writ
Petition No. 1513 of 1991.
3. During the pendency of this Writ Petition, the Board of
Revenue of Madhya Pradesh passed an ord_er at the instance
F of Collector, Mor~na, permitting the Collector to review his own
order dt. 27.7.1991. This order by the Board of Revenue was
passed on 11.5.1994. It was challenged by the respondents
herein by filing another Writ Petition, being Writ Petition No.
1289 of 1994. The Collector had decided to review the order
dt. 27. 7 .1991 in view of the observations by the Board regard-
G
ingthe transfer of Survey No. 462.
4. Both these Writ Petitions came to be decided by the r- .,
Learned Single Judge of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,
Bench at Gwalior, who allowed both the Writ Petitions. The
H Learned Single Judge, firstly, held that the order passed by the

.
i
M.P. HOUSING BOARD v. SHIV SHANKAR 1161
MANDIL & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

, Collector, restraining respondents to construct in the leased plot A
was wholly incorrect. The Learned Single Judge also held that
the Collector having already granted permission on 27.7.1991
could not have decided to review that order so as to put the
clock back and the Board of Revenue had erred in granting
such permission under Section 51 of the Madhya Prade$h Land B
Revenue Code, 1959 (hereinafter called "the Code" for short),
which permission was the condition precedent for reviewing
·f the order passed by the Collector. Two Letters Patent Appeals
came to be filed against this common order, which have been
dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior, necessitating the present two ap-
c
peals which have been separately filed by the State of Madhya
Pradesh, as also by the Board.
5. Shri R.P. Gupta, Learned Senior Counsel and Shri B.S.
Banthia, Learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the appel- D
lant,
°".
painstakingly,
.
took us through various documents, as well
as the provisions of the Code. The basic contention of the
Learned Counsel was that this land was a reserved land and
there was an entry in the Revenue records, describing the land
as "Charnoi Extra Nazul", from which it was clear that it was a E
reserved land for the grazing and, therefore, there was a clear
bar under Section 237 of the Code from· transferring this land
for the industrial purposes. The initial order of the Collector dt.
27.7.1991, transferring this land to the Industrial Department
itself was without jur~sdiction. Taking argument further, both the
F
counsel urged that as a result, the Industrial Department could
not have created a lease in favour of the respondents and, there-
fore, the Lease was null and void and ineffective. Both the
Learned Counsel urged that the decision of the Board of Rev-
enue, allowing the Collector to review his order dt. 27. 7 .1991
G
was a correct decision and should not have been interfered
'!' with by the Learned Single Judge, as well as the Division Bench.
i
The arguments went further and suggested that, in fact, the first,
as well as the second Writ Petition were premature as the Col-
lector had not so far reviewed his order. The Counsel also urged
H
1162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A that if an industry is allowed to be set up in the midst of the
residential area, it would not only be improper, but would affect
the ecology and the citizens living in the neighbouring area would
suffer on that count.
6. As against this, the Learned Counsel for the respon-
B dents Shri S.S. Khanduja supported both the orders and pointed
out that, firstly, the State Government as well as the Board could
not have assailed the Lease Deed, which was a valid Lease
Deed for valuable consideration, that too in a Writ Petition filed
by the respondents. He pointed out that there is no Civil Suit
C filed for cancellation of Lease Deed which was the only way to
wipe out this Deed. According to the Leafned Counsel, there-
fore, the State Government, as well as the Board were trying to
get this Lease Deed cancelled in an indirect manner by attack-
ing the transfer of this land in favour of the Industrial Depart-
D ment. The Learned Counsel further urged that there was no
question of application under Section 237 of the Code and the
Board of Revenue could not have used its discretion to allow
the Collector to review the matter after a period of three years
and the Learned Single Judge was absolutely right in holding
E that the delay on the part of the State Government and/or the
Collector to move for review, was fatal. The Learned Counsel
also suggested that there is no question of any ecological im-
balance, as already there are industries in the neighbourhood
of the said plot. It is on the basis of these rival cqntentions that
F we have to consider the correctness of the impugned judgments.
We may go into some undisputed facts.
7. It was not disputed before the High Court that though
there was a request by Housing Commissioner, Bhopal dt.
26.12.1978 in respect of Survey Plot Nos. 458, 462, 482 and
G 485, which were Government lands, no action was taken for
acquiring the land in dispute, which is a part of the Survey No.
462. Very strangely, it was pleaded before the High Court that it
was by "inadvertence" that the land was not acquired.
8. The execution of the Sale Deed and the validity thereof
H
M.P. HOUSING BOARD v. SHIV SHANKAR 1163
MANDIL & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

is not disputed. The contention is that the land could not have A
been transferred, there being Nistar rights of grazing on the land.
The Learned Counsel for the appellant when confronted with
the specific question as to whether the Government could have
leased out the land independently without transferring it to the
Industrial Department, did not dispute such power Therefore, it B
is clear that the land even otherwise (without being transferred I
to the Industrial Department) could have been leased out as it '
was, undoubtedly, a Nazul land owned by the Government. The
original petitioner (respondent herein) had obtained posses-
sion, paid premium, spent money for obtaining the Registered C
Sale Deed and also made the initial expenditure for preparing
the land for raising structures and yet the Government authori-
ties had remained dormant for a good long period for more
than 3 years for deciding to exercise their power of review.
9. At this juncture, it will be useful to consider findings given D
!

by the Learned Single Judge, who allowed both the petitions.
The Learn~d Single Judge appears to have come to the con-
clusion that this was a valid Lease Deed for valuable consider-
ation and the same could not be set at naught or nullified by
exercise of power of review by the succeeding Collector under E
Section 51 of the Code as the only grounds on which the Lease
could be set aside were provided specifically by Section 182
of the Code, which provisions could not be controlled by Sec-
tion 51 of the Code. The Learned Single Judge also found that
there was no breach of any of the provisions of Section 182 of F
the Code, so as to nullify the Lease. The Learned Single Judge
also held that the authorities could not move for a permission to
review the order dt. 27.7.1991 after a lapse of three years and
the exercise was not in the reasonable time.
10. The Division Bench, firstly, considered the question G
raised before it regarding the validity of the Letters Patent Ap-
peals and held them tenable. The question of tenability has not
been argued before us. We will, therefore, not go into that ques-
tion. As regards the merits, the Division Bench in para 55 of its
Judgment, noted that there was a clear admission in the counter H
1164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A affidavit filed by the respondent No. 3 therein that the land in
dispute was surrounded by the land acquired by the Board and
was the Nazul land. The Division Bench, therefore, expressed
that when this Nazul land was transferred to the Industrial De-
partment and thereafter, leased out to the respondents herein,
B it had ceased to be a land as envisaged under the Zamindari
Abolition Act and was a non agricultural land. The Division Bench
then went on to consider the provisions of Section 234 of the
Code, which stipulate preparation of Nistar Patrak embodying
scheme of management of all unoccupied lands in the village
C and all matters incidental thereto ~nd more particularly, the
matters specified in Section 235 of the Code. The Division
Bench went on to note the Revenue book circular issued by the
State Government, issuing the directions in various matters in
regard to the management of the land vested in the State Gov-
D ernment. It made a reference to "Rajasva Pustak Paripatra,
Khand 4, Kramank 1" and noted that the terms 'Nazul' and
'Milkiyat Sarkar' referred in that book suggested that the lands
.in possession of the State Government or the Central .Govern-
ment were to be classified in the two categories, i.e., 'Nazul'
and Milkiyat Sarkar.' It also noted the admission that this land
E was a Government ~and and had obviously become a part of
the urban land, since it was not to be used for agricultural pur-
poses.
11. It was, therefore, obvious that the land was, undoubt-
F edly, a property of the Government under Section 57(1) of the
Code and the Collector had granted the-permission.for diver-
sion of this land for setting up the industry. We have carefully
examined the provisions of Section 181 (1) and 182 of the Code,
which pertain to the lease and we are of the considered opin-
G ion that merely by changing the nomenclature of the category of
the land which was admittedly sought to be done by the Collec-
tor, later on, the said lease hold rights of the respondents could
not be set at naught. For that, it would be necessary to cancel
the Lease Deed or to nullify the same through the modality pro-
H vided .by Section 181(1) and 182 of the Code and not by the
M.P. HOUSING BOARD v. SHIV SHANKAR 1165
MANDIL & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.. ]

.... indirect method of changing the category of the land. Section A
181 (1) and 182 of the Code reads as under:-
"181. Government Lessees: (1) Every person who holds
land from the State Government or to whom a right to
occupy land is granted by the State Government or by
Collector and who is not entitled to hold as a Bhumiswami B
shall be called a Government lessee in respect of such
)I
land.
182. Rights and liabilities of a Government lessee: (1) A
• Government lessee shall, subject to any express
provisions in this Code, hold his land in accordance with
c
th~ terms and conditions of the grant, which shall be
deemed to be a grant within the meaning of the
Government Grants Act, 1895 (XV of 1895).
(2) A Government lessee may be ejected from his land by D
order of a Revenue Officer on one or more of the following
grounds, namely:-
(i) that he has failed to pay the rent for a periof of three
months from the date on which it became due; or
...... E
(ii) that he has used such land for purposes other than .
for which it was granted; or
(iii) that the term of his lease has expired; or
(iv) that he has contravened any of the terms and F
conditions of the grant.
1
Provided that no order for ejectme!J.t of a Government
lessee under-this sub-Section shall be passed without
giving him an opportunity of being heard in his defence."
~
Section 234 of the Code contemplates preparation of
Nistar Patrak, which is prepared for embodying a scheme of
llf' i
management of all unoccupied land in a village. Section 235 of
the Code provides for the matters to be provided for in Nistar
"
( Patrak and sub-Section (a) whereof is as under:-
H
1166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A "235. Matters to be provided for in Nistar Patrak:- The t-
·matters which shall be provided for in the Nistar Patrak
shall be as follows, namely:-
(a) terms and conditions on which grazing of the cattle
in the village will be permitted.
B
(b) Not relevant
(c) Not relevant ~-

(d) any other matter required to be recorded in the Nistar
c Patrak by or under this Code."
Section 236 mandates as under:-
"236. Provision in Nistar Patrak for certain matters: In
preparing the Nistar Patrak as. provided in Section
235, the Collector shall, as far as possible, make
D
provision for-
(a) free grazing of the cattle used for agriculture.
(b) removal free of charge by the residents of the village
for their bona fide domestic consumption of-
E
(i) forest produce;
(ii) minor minerals;
(c) Not relevant."
F Section 237 mandates that Collector may set apart unoc-
cupied land for the purposes given in that Section, which in-
, elude as many as about 10 purposes. Sub-Section 1(b) nien-
tions for pasture, grass bir or fodder reserve. Sub-Section (2)
spells out a specific bar in the following words"-
G
"(2) Lands set apart specifically for any. purpose
mentioned in sub-Section (1 ), shall not otherwise be ,._ 1
diverted without the sanction of the Collector.
(3) Subject to the rules made under this Code, the
H Collector may divert such unoccupied land, which is
M.P. HOUSING BOARD v. SHIV SHANKAR 1167
MANDIL & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
* set apart for the purposes mentioned in clause (b) of A
sub-Section (1) subject to secure minimum two
percent of the agriculture land of that village for the
said purposes in to abadi or for agricultural
purposes."
12. Relying heavily on Section 237(2), the contention raised B
before us, as well as before the High Court was that this being
a Nistar land, could not have been diverted by the Collector.
We do not see any such bar. In the first place, it is not specifi-
cally proved that this was a land carrying any Nistar rights. On
the other hand, this was specifically admitted to be a "Nazul c
land". That apart, we do not see any bar in diverting the unoccu-
pied land. It is shown that this land was specifically set apart for
pasture. Barring one revenue entry, the State Government has
not produced any evidence either before the Learned Single
Judge or before the Division Bench of the High Court or even D
before us to suggest that this particular piece of land was set
apart for pasture or for fodder reserve. Under the circumstances,
we do not see any reason to hold that Sections 235-237 were
applicable herein.
13. Even if it is held that the said land was a grazing land E
and was treated as. such before its being diverted by Collector
for commercial purpose, merely by cancelling the ·said diver-
sion, the subsequent validly created Lease Deed cannot be
set at naught. Both the Learned Single Judge, as well as the
i F
Division Bench are correct in holding that the subsequent Lease
Deed would hold good.
14. The subsequent stance for reviewing the diversion or-
der is slightly intriguing. The Collector wanted to review his own
order under Section 51 of the Code and for that purpose,
G
., needed the sanction of the Board of Revenue under sub-Sec-
tion 1(1) of Section 51 of the Code. Section 51 runs as under:-

"51. Review of orders:- (1) The Board and every Revenue
Officer may, either on its/his own motion or on the
application of any party interested, review any order H
1168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A passed by itself/himself or by any of its/his
predecessors in office and pass such order in
reference thereto as iUhe thinks fit:
provided that-

B (i) . if the Commissioner, Settlement Commissioner,
Collector of Settlement Officer thinks it
·I(
necessary to review any order which he has not
himself passed, he shall first obtain the sanction
of the Board, and if an Officer subordinate to a
c Collector or Settlement Officer proposes to
review any order, whether passed by himself or
by any predecessor, he shall first obtain the
sanction in writing of the authority to whom he
is immediately subordinates."
D It will be clear from the language that it is a review power
and such review power would have to be exercised within a
reasonable time. We agree with the Learned Single Judge that
in this case, it took more than three years for the State Govern-
ment to move the Board of Revenue for reviewing the orders.
E The Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of appellants tried
to suggest that at that time, there was status quo order pend-
ing, passed by the High Court on the first Writ petition filed by
the respondents herein. We have examined the record care-
fully and we find nothing in the record suggesting that the State
F Government could not have exercised the power under Section
51 of the Code. In AIR 1969 SC 1297 State of Gujarat Vs ..
Raghav, this Court held that the review power should be used
in reasonable time. We accept the finding of the Learned Single
Judge as confirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court
G that the power of review has to be exercised within a reason-
able time and that in this case, three years of time, without any
explanation, could not be viewed as a reasonable time in view
of the fact that the petitioner had obtained possession, paid
premium, spent money for obtaining the Registered Sale Deed
and have also made the initial expenditure for preparing the
H
M.P. HOUSING BOARD v. SHIV SHANKAR 1169
MANDIL & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

land for raising structures. The said Government could not have A
allowed the petitioner to do all these things and then chosen to
review its own powers.
15. That apart, even if the earlier order dt. 27.7.1991 was
reviewed, it could not set at naught the Lease Deed which was
validly created. It could have cancelled the lease only for the B
reasons stated in Section 182(2) of the Code, which reasons
were obviously absent in the case. In that view, we are of the
clear opinion that the impugned judgments of the Division Bench
of the High Court confirming the judgment of the Learned Single
Judge of that Court are correct judgments and need no interfer- 'C
ence. We, therefore, dismiss these appeals, but without any
orders as to the costs.
D.G. Appeals dismissed.

-