M/S. BHAGWATI VANASPATI TRADERSversusSENIOR SUPERINTENDENT OF POST OFFICES, MEERUT

                        [2014] 10 S.C.R. 762


A            MIS. BHAGWATI VANASPATI TRADERS
                                  v.
        SENIOR SUPERINTENDENT OF POST OFFICES,
                           MEERUT
               (Civil Appeal No. 4854 of 2009)
B                      OCTOBER 10, 2014.

     [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR AND C. NAGAPPAN, JJ.]

        Consumer Protection Act, 1986: Compensation -
C Purchase of National Saving Certificate (NSC) by a
  proprietorship concern - On maturity, matured amount not
  paid by respondent authorities on the ground that an NSC
  could only be issued in the name of an individual, and that,
  the NSC taken in the name of proprietorship concern was not
D valid - Held: The irregularity committed while issuing NSC
  in the name of proprietor concern could have been easily
  corrected by authorities by substituting the name of the
  proprietor - Rigidity adopted by authorities was wrong - The
  authorities issued a certificate which they could not have
E issued and, therefore, they cannot be allowed to enrich
  themselves by retaining the deposit made - Authorities ought
  to have devised means to regularize the irregularity -District
  Forum was right in directing the authorities to pay the maturity
  amount with 12% interest and Rs.5,0001- as compensation,
F and also cost of Rs.2,0001-, to the proprietorship concern which
  was wrongly set aside by State and National Commission.

       Estoppel: Applicability of - Held: Where two people with
  the same source of information assert the same truth or agree
  to assert the same falsehood at the same time, neither ce::
G be estopped against the other.

        Allowing the appeal, the Court

        HELD: 1. The principle of estoppal is not applicable
H                                762
BHAGWATI VANASPATI TRADERS v. SR. SUPERINTENDENT 763
           OF POST OFFICES, MEERUT
in the facts and circumstances of this case. It was the          A
appellant's individual decision to purchase the NSC. It
was not shown that a fraudulent representation or a false
statement was negligently made to the appellant. The rule
of estoppel, in the present case, could have only been
premised on some conduct of the respondent, which had            B
willfully induced the appellant to invest in the NSC. No
such willful conduct was brought to notice. [Para 7]
[773-B, C]

    Post Master, Dargamitta HPO, Nel/or v. Raja                  C
Prameeelamma (1998) 9 SCC 706; Arulmighu
Dhandayadhapaniswamy Thirukoil, Palani, Tamil Nadu v.
Director General of Post Offices, Department of Posts & Ors.
(2011) 13 sec 220 - referred to.
    2. The NSC was purchased in the name of the                  D
appellant which is a sole proprietorship concern and as
such, the irregularity committed while issuing the NSC in
the name of the appellant could have easily been
corrected by substituting the name of the appellant with
that of the sole proprietor. For, in a sole proprietorship       E
concern an individual uses a fictional trade name, in place
of his own name. The rigidity adopted by the authorities
is clearly ununderstandable. The postal authorities
having permitted the appellant to purchase the NSC in the
year 1995 could not have legitimately raised a challenge         F
of irregularity after the maturity thereof in the year 2001,
specially when the irregularity was curable. [para 9] [755-
D·F]

    Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. (2001)
2 SCC 41: 2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 228; Ashok Transport               G
Agency v. Awadhesh Kumar & Anr. (1998) 5 SCC 567 - relied
on.

    Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. Twitchings (1977) AC
890 - referred to.                                               H
    764      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A                         Case Law Reference:
          (1998) 9 sec 10s             referred to .    Para 4
          (2011) 13 sec 220            referred to      Para 4
          2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 228 relied on             Para 6
B
          (1977) AC 890                referred to      Para 7
          (1998) 5 sec 567             relied on        Para 8
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
C 4854 of 2009.

        From the Judgment and Order dated 04.09.2008 in RP
    No. 1456 of 2008 of the National Consumer Disputes
    Reddressal Commission, New Delhi.
D
          Prabhash Kr. Yadav (For V.K. Monga) for the Appellant.

         R. Balasubramanian, R.K. Rathore, Rekha Pandey (For
    D.S. Mahra), Kamal Mohan Gupta for the Respondent.

E         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J. 1. M/s. Bhagwati
    Vanaspati Traders, the appellant before us, is a proprietorship
    concern. Mr. B.K. Garg is its sole proprietor. On 28.4.1995, M/
F   s. Bhagwati Vanaspati Traders purchased one, six years'
    National Savings Certificate (hereinafter referred to as, NSC)
    bearing numbr 1NS/06DD 381'742, by investing a sum of
    Rs.5,000/-. The above NSC was to mature on 28.4.2001. The
    maturity amount payable on 28.4.2001 was Rs.10,075/-.
G        2. Since M/s. Bhagwati Vanaspati Traders was not paid
    the amount due on maturity, B.K. Garg made repeated visits
    to the office from where the NSC was purchased. He was
    informed, that an NSC could only be issued in the name of an
    individual, and that, the NSC taken in the name of M/s.
H
BHAGWATI VANASPATI TRADERS v. SR. SUPERINTENDENT 765
OF POST OFFICES, MEERUT [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
                                                                    A
Bhagwati Vanaspati Traders, was not valid. He was also
informed, that the matter had been referred for advice to the
Post Master General, Bareilly, and that, the question of payment
of the maturity amount would be considered only after the
receipt of inputs from Bareilly. Having waited for a substantial
                                                                    B
length of time, and realizing that no further action had been
taken at the hands of the respondent, B.K. Garg visited the
office of the Post Master General, Bareilly. At Bareilly he was
informed, that the matter had been referred to the Director
General (Post), Department of Posts, New Delhi, and that, he
would have to await the decision of the Director General (Post).    C
Having waited long enough, without any fruitful result, Mis.
Bhagwati Vanaspati Traders preferred Complaint Case no. 513
of 2004 before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal
Forum, Meerut (hereinafter referred to as, the District Forum).
The District Forum, by its order dated 1.2.2007 accepted the        D
claim of M/s. Bhagwati Vanaspati Traders, and accordingly,
directed the respondent to pay the maturity amount of
Rs.10,075/- with 12% interest, from the date of maturity till the
date of payment. The respondent was additionally directed to
pay, a sum of Rs.5,000/- as compensation, and also cost of          E
 Rs.2,000/-, to the appellant proprietorship concern.

     3. Dissatisfied with the order dated 1.2.2007, passed by
the District Forum in favour of the appellant, the respondent
Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Meerut, preferred F
Appeal no. 460 of 2007 before the State Consumer Disputes .
Redressal Commission, Lucknow. The aforestated appeal was
allowed by the State Commission vide its order dated
21.1.2008. The appellant concern then preferred Revision
Petition no. 1456 of 2008 before the National Consumer G
Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi. The National
Commission dismissed the revision petition, vide the impugned
order dated 4.9.2008. The special leave to appeal preferred
by the appellant, against the impugned order dated 4.9.2008,
was granted by this Court on 27.7.2009.                       H
    766       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A        4. A perusal of the orders passed by the State
    Commission, as also, the National Commission reveals, that
    the same were premised on the fact, that the NSC purchased
    by M/s. Bhagwati Vanaspati Traders, had an irregularity,
    inasmuch as, an NSC could only be purchased by an individual,
B   and the same could not be issued in the name of a concern,
    firm, institution, banking institution or company etc. On account
    of the aforesaid irregularity, the respondent placed reliance on
    rule 17 of the Post Office Savings Bank General Rules, 1981.
    The above rule is being extracted hereunder:-
c         "17. Account opened in contravention of rules:- Subject to
          the provision of rule 16, where an account is found to have
          been opened in contravention of any relevant rule for the
          time being in force and applicable to the account kept in
          the Post Office Savings Bank, the relevant Head Savings
D
          Bank may, at any time, cause the account to be closed and
          the deposits made in the account refunded to the depositor
          without interest."

         In addition to the above, the respondent had placed
E   reliance on a decision rendered by this Court in Post Master,
    Dargamitta HPO, Nellor v. Raja Prameee/amma, (1998) 9
    SCC 706, wherein this Court had held as under:-

          "But as this contract was contrary to the terms notified by
F         the Government of India and this was due to inadvertence
          of the staff. In my opinion it does not become a contract
          binding the Government of India being unlawful and void.
          As :;uch this is not a case of deficiency in service either
          in terms of the law or in terms of the contract as defined
          in Section 2(1)(g) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986."
G
                                                 (emphasis is ours)

      During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the
  respondent, in addition to the judgment extracted hereinabove,
H placed reliance on a recent decision rendered by this Court in
BHAGWATI VANASPATI TRADERS v. SR. SUPERINTENDENT 767
OF POST OFFICES, MEERUT [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

Arulmighu Dhandayadhapaniswamy Thirukoi/, Palani, Tamil            A
Nadu v. Director General of Post Offices, Department of
Posts & Ors., (2011) 13 sec 220, and drew our attention to
the following conclusions recorded therein;-

    "18. This Court in Raja Prameeelamma case, (1998) 9            8
    SCC 706, held that even though the certificates contained
    the terms of contract between the Government of India and
    the holders of the National Savings Certificate, the terms
    in the contract were contrary to the Notification and
    therefore the terms of contract being unlawful and void        C
    were not binding on the Government of India and as such
    the Government refusing to pay interest at the rate
    mentioned in the Certificate is not a case of deficiency in
    service either in terms of law or in terms of contract as
    defined under Section 2(1)(g) of the Consumer Protection
    Act, 1986. The above said decision is squarely applicable      D
    to the case on hand.

    19. It is true that when the Appellant deposited a huge
    amount with the third Respondent from 5.5.1995 to
    16.8.1995 under the Scheme for a period of five years. it      E
    was but proper on the part of the Post Master to have taken
    a note of the correct Scheme applicable to the deposit. It
    was also possible for the Postmaster to have ascertained
    from the records. could have applied the correct Scheme
    and if the Appellant. being an institution. was not eligible   F
    to avail the Scheme and advised them properly. Though
   ·Mr. S. Aravindh, learned Counsel for the Appellant
    requested this Court to direct the third Respondent to pay
    some reasonable amount for his lapse. inasmuch as such
    direction would go contrary to the Rules and payment of        G
    interest is prohibited for such Scheme in terms of Rule 17,
    we are not inclined to accept the same."

                                            (emphasis is ours)
                                                                   H
    768      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A       Based bn the decision of this Court relied upon by the
  State Commission, as also, the National Commission in the
  impugned orders dated 21.1.2008 and 4.9.2008 respectively,
  as also, the latest judgment rendered by this Court in Arulmighu
  Dhandayadhapaniswamy Thirukoil case (supra), it was the
B emphatic contention of the learned counsel for the respondent.
  that there was no question of release of the maturity amount to
  the appellant.

       5. It was also the contention of the learned counsel for the
c respondent, that the mistake at the hands of the postal
  authorities was innocent. After the appellant's claim was
  examined, a preliminary enquiry disclosed, that the NSC was
  issued to M/s. Bhagwati Vanaspati Traders by Ved Bahadur
  Singh (an employee of the postal department). A departmental
0 proceeding   was held against the above employee, and he was
  duly punished. Accordingly it was sought to be asserted, that it
  was not as if, the postal authorities were intentionally depriving
  the appellant of the benefits of the NSC purchased by him on
  28.4.1995. The deprivation of the appellant, according to
E learned counsel, was based on a pure determination of the
  legal rights of the appellant.

          6. The first contention advanced at the hands of the
    learned counsel for the appellant was based on the decision
    rendered by this Court in Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union
F   of India & Ors., (2001) 2 SCC 41, wherefrom learned counsel
    invited our attention to the following observations:-

          "20. Estoppel by conduct in modern times stands
          elucidated with the decisions of the English Courts in
G         Pickard v. Sears, 1837 6 Ad. & El. 469, and its gradual
          elaboration until placement of its true principles by the
          Privy Council in the case of Saraf Chunder Dey v. Gopal
          Chunder Laha, (1891-92) 19 IA 203, whereas earlier Lord
          Esher in the- case of Seton Laing Co. v. Lafone, 1887 19
H
BHAGWATI VANASPATI TRADERS v. SR. SUPERINTENDENT 769
OF POST OFFICES, MEERUT [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
   Q.B.D. 68, evolved three basic elements of the doctrine of       A
   Estoppel to wit:

          "Firstly, where a man makes a fraudulent
          misrepresentation and another man acts upon it to
          its true detriment: Secondly, another may be where
                                                                    B
          a man makes a false statement negligently though
          without fraud and another person acts upon it: And
          thirdly, there may be circumstances under which,
          where a misrepresentation is made without fraud
          and without negligence, there may be an Estoppel."        C

   Lord Shand. however. was pleased to add one further
   element to the effect that there may be statements made.
   which have induced other party to do that from which
   otherwise he would have abstained and which cannot
   properly be characterized as misrepresentation. In this          D
   context, reference may be made to the decisions of the
   High Court of Australia in the case of Craine v. Colonial
   Mutual Fire Insurance Co. Ltd., 1920 28 C.L.R. 305.
   Dixon, J. in his judgment in Grundt v. The Great Boulder
   Pty. Gold Mines Pty. Ltd., 1938 59 C.L.R. 641, stated that:      E

          "In measuring the detriment, or demonstrating its
          existence, one does not compare the position of the
          representee, before and after acting upon the
          representation, upon the assumption that the
          representation is to be regarded as true, the             F
          question of estoppel does not arise. It is only when
          the representer wished to disavow the assumption
          contained in his representation that an estoppel
          arises. and the question of Q.!=!triment is considered.
          accordingly. in the light of the position which the       G
          representee would be in if the representer were
          allowed to disavow the truth of the representation."

    (In this context see Spencer Bower and Turner: Estoppel
    by Representation, 3rd Ed.). Lord Denning also in the case      H
    770       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A         of Central Newbury Car Auctions Ltd. v. Unity Finance
          Ltd., 1956 (3) All ER 905, appears to have subscribed to
          the view of Lord Dixon, J. pertaining to the test of
          'detriment' to the effect as to whether it appears unjust or
          unequitable that the representator should now be allowed
B         to resile from his representation. having regard to what the
          representee has done or refrained from doing in reliance
          on the representation. in short. the party asserting the
          estoppel must have been induced to act to his detriment.
          So long as the assumption is adhered to, the party who
c         altered the situation upon the faith of it cannot complain.
          His complaint is that when afterwards the other party
          makes a different state of affairs, the basis of an assertion
          of right against him then, if it is allowed, his own original
          change of position will operate as a detriment, (vide
          Grundts: High Court of Australia (supra)).
D
         21. Phipson on Evidence (Fourteenth Edn.) has the
    following to state as regards estoppels by conduct.

                 "Estoppels by conduct, or, as they are still
E                sometimes called, estoppels by matter in pais,
                 were anciently acts of notoriety not less solemn and
                 formal than the execution of a deed, such as livery
                 of seisin, entry, acceptance of an estate and the
                 like, and whether a party had or had not concurred
F                in an act of this sort was deemed a matter which
                 there could be no difficulty in ascertaining, and then
                 the legal consequences followed (Lyon v.
                 Reed, (1844) 13 M & W 285 (at p. 309). The
                 doctrine has, however, in modern times, been
                 extended so as to embrace practically any act or
G
                 statement by a party which it would be
                 unconscionable to permit him to deny. The rule has
                 been authoritatively stated as follows: 'Where one
                 by his words or conduct willfully causes another to
                 believe the existence of a certain state of things and
H
BHAGWATI VANASPATI TRADERS v. SR. SUPERINTENDENT 771
OF POST OFFICES, MEERUT [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
         induces him to act on that belief so as to alter this     A
         own previous position. the former is concluded from
         averring against the latter a different state of things
         as existing at the same time.' (Pickard v. Sears
         (supra)). And whatever a man's real intention may
         be, he is deemed to act willfully 'if he so conducts      B
         himself that a reasonable man would take the
         representation to be true and believe that it was
         meant that he should act upon it.' (Freeman v.
         Cooke, 1848 (2) Exch. 654: at p. 663).

         Where the conduct is negligent or consists wholly
                                                                   c
         of omission, there must be a duty to the person
         misled (Mercantile Bank v. Central Bank, 1938 AC
         287 at p. 304, and National Westminster Bank v.
         Barclays Bank International, 1975 Q.B. 654). This
                                                                   0
         principle sits oddly with the rest of the law of
         estoppel, but it appears to have been reaffirmed,
         at least by implication, by the House of Lords
         comparatively re'cently (Moorgate Mercantile Co.
         Ltd. v. Twitchings, (1977) AC 890). The
         explanation is no doubt that this aspect of estoppel      E
         is properly to be considered a part of the law
         relating to negligent representations, rather than
         estoppel properly so-called. If two people with the
         same source of information assert the same truth
         or agree to assert the same falsehood at the same         F
         time. neither can be estopped as against the other
         from asserting differently at another time (Square
         v. Square, 1935 P. 120)."

   22. A bare perusal of the same would go to show that the        G
   issue of an estoppel by conduct can only be said to be
   available in the event of there being a precise and
   unambiguous representation and on that score a further
   question arises as to whether there was any unequivocal
   assurance prompting the assured to alter his position or        H
    772       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014) 10 S.C.R.-


A         status. The contextual facts however, depict otherwise.
          Annexure 2 to the application form for benefit of price
          protection contains an undertaking to the following effect:-

                 "We hereby undertake to refund to EEPC Rs ... the
                 amount paid to us in full or part thereof against our
8
                 application for price protection. In terms of our
                 application dated against exports made during ... In
                 case any particular declaration/certificate furnished
                 by us against our above referred to claims are
                 found to be incorrect or any excess payment is
c                determine to have been made due to oversight/
                 wrong calculation etc. at any time. We also
                 undertake to refund the amount within 10 days of
                 receipt of the notice asking for the refund, failing
                 which the amount erroneously paid or paid in
D                excess shall be recovered from or adjusted against
                 any other claim for export benefits by EEPC or by
                 the licensing authorities of CCI & C."

          and it is on this score it may be noted that in the event of
E         there being a specific undertaking to refund for any
          amount erroneously paid or paid in excess (emphasis
          supplied), question of there being any estoppel in our view
          would not arise. In this context correspondence exchanged
          between the parties are rather significant. In particular letter
F         dated 30 .11.1990 from the Assistant Development
          Commissioner for Iron & Steel and the reply thereto dated
          8.3.1991 which unmistakably record the factum of non-
          payment of JPC price."

                                                    (emphasis is ours)
G
       Based on the aforesaid observations it was the emphatic
  contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, that the rule
  of estoppel would come to the aid of the appellant, inasmuch
  as, the appellant having been consciously permitted to
H purchase the NSC, could not be denied the benefit of the
BHAGWATI VANASPATI TRADERS v. SR. SUPERINTENDENT 773
OF POST OFFICES, MEERUT [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

maturity amount by asserting, that there was some irregularity         A
in the purchase of the NSC.
     7. It is not possible for us to accept the applicability of the
principle of estoppel in the facts and circumstances of this case.
No representation is ever shown to have been made to the
appellant. It was the appellant's individual decision to purchase      B
the NSC. It is not shown, that a fraudulent representation was
made to the appellant. It is also not shown, that a false
statement was negligently made to the appellant. The rule of
estoppel, in the present case, could have only been premised
on some conduct of the respondent, which had willfully induced         C
the appellant to invest in the NSC. Unfortunately, for the
appellant, no such willful conduct has been brought to our notice.
Having given our thoughtful consideration to the instant aspect
of the matter, we feel that this case would be governed by the
proposition evolved in Moorgate. Mercantile Co. Ltd. v.                D
Twitchings, (1977) AC 890, namely, where two people with the
same source of information assert the same truth or agree to
assert the same falsehood at the same time, neither can be
estopped against the other. Therefore, whilst it cannot be
disputed, that the authorities issuing the NSC were required to        E
ensure, that the same was issued to only such persons who
were eligible in law to purchase the same, yet in terms of the
mandate of rule 17 extracted hereinabove, the vires whereof
is not subject matter of challenge, it is not possible for us to
accept, that the rule of estoppel could be relied upon at the          F
behest of the appellant, for any fruitful benefit.
     8. To overcome the mandate of rule 17 extracted
hereinabove, as also, the decision rendered by this Court in
Raja Prameeelamma case (supra), and the proposition of law
declared in Arulmighu Dhandayadhapaniswamy Thirukoil case              G
(supra), learned counsel for the appellant placed emphatic
reliance on the decision of this Court in Ashok Transport
Agency v. Awadhesh Kumar & another., (1998) 5 SCC 567.
He invited our attention to the following observations recorded
therein:-                                                              H
    774       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2014] 10 S.C.R.


A         "6. A partnership firm differs from a proprietary concern
          owned by an individual. A partnership is governed by the
          provisions of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. Though a
          partnership is not a juristic person but Order XXX Rule 1
          CPC enables the partners of a partnership firm to sue or
B         to be sued in the name of the firm. A proprietary concern
          is only the business name in which the proprietor of the
          business carries on the business. A suit by or against a
          proprietary concern is by or against the proprietor of the
          business. In the event of the death of the proprietor of a
c         proprietary concern, it is the legal representatives of the
          proprietor who alone can sue or be sued in respect of the
          dealings of the proprietary business. The provisions of
          Rule 10 of Order XXX which make applicable the
          provisions of Order XXX to a proprietart concern, enable
          the proprietor of a proprietary business to be sued in the
D
          business names of his proprietary concern. The real party
          who is being sued is the proprietor of the said business.
          The said provision does not have the effect of converting
          the proprietary business into a partnership firm. The
          provisions of Rule 4 of Order XXX have no application to
E         such a suit as by virtue of Order XXX Rule 10 the other
          provisions of Order XXX are applicable to a suit against
          the proprietor of proprietary business "insofar as the nature
          of such case permits". This means that only those
          provisions of Order XXX can be made applicable to
F         proprietary concern which can be so made applicable
          keeping in view the nature of the case."

                                                  (emphasis is ours)

G Based on the observations recorded in the aforesaid judgment,
  the second contention advanced by the learned counsel for the
  appellant was, that in sum and substance, a sole proprietorship
  concern allows the fictional use of a trade name on behalf of
  an individual. It was contended, that truthfully only one individual
  is the owner of a sole proprietorship concern. As such,
H
BHAGWATI VANASPATI TRADERS v. SR. SUPERINTENDENT 775
OF POST OFFICES,.MEERUT [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

according to learned counsel, the name of the sole                    A
proprietorship concern, can again be substituted with the name
of the sole proprietor. If that is allowed, the NSC purchased by
the appellant would strictly conform to the mandate of law.
According to learned counsel, it makes no difference whether
the individual's name, or the proprietorship's name is recorded       B
while purchasing an NSC. It was pointed out, that if the
respondent was not agreeable in accepting the trade name, the
respondent ought to have corrected the NSC by substituting the
name of Mis. Bhagwati Vanaspati Traders with that of its sole
proprietor, namely, B.K. Garg.                                        c
     9. We find merit in the second contention advanced at the
hands of the learned counsel for the appellant. It is indeed true,
that the NSC was purchased in the name of M/s. Bhagwati
Vanaspati Traders. It is also equally true, that M/s. Bhagwati
                                                                      0
Vanaspati Traders is a sole proprietorship concern of B.K.
Garg, and as such, the irregularity committed while issuing the
NSC in the name of M/s. Bhagwati Vanaspati Traders, could
have easily been corrected by substituting the name of M/s.
Bhagwati Vanaspati Traders with that of B.K. Garg. For, in a
sole proprietorship concern an individual uses a fictional trade      E
name, in place of his own name. The rigidity adopted by the
authorities is clearly ununderstandable. The postal authorities
having permitted M/s. Bhagwati Vanaspati Traders to purchase
the NSC in the year 1995, could not have legitimately raised a
challenge of irregularity after the maturity thereof in the year      F
2001, specially when the irregularity was curable. Legally, rule
17 of the Post Office Savings Bank General Rules, 1981, would
apply only when an applicant is irreregularly allowed something
more, than what is contemplated under a scheme. As for
instance, if the scheme contemplates an interest of Y% and the        G
certificate issued records the interest of Y+2% as payable on
maturity, the certificate holder cannot be deprived of the interest
as a whole, on account of the above irregularity. He can only
be deprived of 2%, i.e., the excess amount, beyond the
permissible interest, contemplated under the scheme. A                H
    776      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A certificate holder, would have an absolute right, in the above
  illustration, to claim interest at Yo/o, i.e., in consonance with the
  scheme, despite rule 17. Ordinarily, when the authorities have
  issued a certificate which they could not have issued, they
  cannot be allowed to enrich themselves, by retaining the
B deposit made. This may well be possible if the transaction is
  a sham or wholly illegal. Not so, if the irregularity is curable. In
  such circumstances, the postal authorities should devise means
  to regularize the irregularity, if possible.

c        10. It is not possible for us to deny relief to the appellant,
    based on the judgments rendered by this Court in Raja
    Prameeelamma            case     (supra)      and      Arulmighu
    Dhandayadhapaniswamy Thirukoil case (supra), in view of the
    fact that, the matter was never examined in the perspective
    determined by us hereinabove. In neither of the two judgments,
0
    the amendment of the NSC was sought. The instant proposition
    of law, was also not projected on behalf of the certificate
    holders, in the manner expressed above.

        11. There was seriously no difficulty at all in the facts and
E circumstances of the present case, to regularize the defect
  pointed out, because Mis. Bhagwati Vanaspati Traders, is
  admittedly the sole proprietorship concern of B.K. Garg. The
  postal authorities should have solicited the change of the name
  in the NSC, through a representation by B.K. Garg himself. On
F receipt of such a representation, the alleged irregularity would
  have been cured, and the beneficiary of the deposit, would have
  legitimately reaped the fruits thereof. Rather than adopting the
  above simple course, the postal authorities chose to strictly and
  rigidly interpret the terms of the scheme. This resulted in the
G denial of the legitimate claims of the sole proprietor of the
  appellant concern, i.e., B.K. Garg, of the investment made by
  him. In the above view of the matter, we consider it just and
  appropriate, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of
  the Constitution of India, to direct the Senior Superintendent of
H Post Offices, Meerut, to correct the NSC issued in the name
BHAGWATI VANASPATI TRADERS v. SR. SUPERINTENDENT 777
OF POST OFFICES, MEERUT [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

of M/s. Bhagwati Vanaspati Traders, by substituting the             A
appellant's name, with that of B.K. Garg.

     12. The irregularity having been cured, we hope that B.K.
Garg will now be released all the payments due to him, in terms
of the order passed by the District Forum. The respondent is        8
accordingly Jirected to pay to B.K. Garg, the maturity amount
of Rs.10,075/- with 12% interest, from the date of maturity, till
the date of payment. He would be entitled to Rs.5,000/- towards
compensation, as was awarded to him by the District Forum.
In addition, we consider it just and appropriate to award him       C
litigation costs of Rs.10,000/-. The entire amount
aforementioned, should be released to B.K. Garg, the sole
proprietor of M/s. Bhagwati Vanaspati Traders, within one
month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this
judgment.
                                                                    D
     13. The instant appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

Devika Gujral                                     Appeal allowed.