Holding

Eviction under clause (k) of the proviso to Section 14(1) is valid, but the order under Section 14(11) directing misuser charges is unsustainable; possession must be delivered to the Union of India (paramount lessor).

Summary

The tenants (Mis. Bharat Sales Ltd. and Anr.) occupied a leasehold premises that were originally leased by the Union of India (through the Land & Development Officer) to the landlord. The tenants used the premises for unauthorized commercial purposes, violating conditions imposed on the landlord by the government, and the paramount lessor terminated the lease and re-entered. The landlord sought eviction under clause (k) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, and the Rent Controller also ordered the tenants to pay misuser charges under Section 14(11). The Supreme Court held that eviction under clause (k) was proper, but the order directing payment of misuser charges was unsustainable because the tenants were willing to vacate and not contest the eviction. Consequently, the Court set aside the misuser‑charge order, upheld the eviction, and directed the tenants to deliver vacant possession to the Union of India (the paramount lessor). The appeal was partly allowed and no costs were awarded.

Issues considered

The applicability of clause (k) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 for eviction of tenants misusing premises contrary to conditions imposed on the landlord.
Whether Section 14(11) can be invoked to compel tenants to pay misuser charges when they are ready to vacate and not contest the eviction.
The validity of the Rent Controller’s order determining and apportioning misuser charges.
To whom possession of the premises should be delivered after eviction – the landlord or the paramount lessor.
The locus standi of the landlord to claim misuser charges after the lease has been terminated by the paramount lessor.

Legislation cited

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. Section 14(11), s. Section 14(1) proviso (b), s. Section 14(1) proviso (c), s. Section 14(1) proviso (k)

Subjects

Delhi Rent Control Actevictionmisuse of premisesclause (k)Section 14(11)lease terminationlandlord-tenant disputepossessionparamount lessor

Judgment

MIS. BHARAT SALES LTD. AND ANR. A
v.
SMT. LAKSHMI DEVI AND ORS.

JULY 8, 2002

[D.P. MOHAPATRA, BRIJESH KUMAR AND D.M. B
DHARMADHIKARI, JJ.] .

Rent and Eviction:

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958-Clauses (b), (c) and (k) of provisio to C
Section 14(/) and Section 14(11):

Eviction Petition-On ground of sub-letting and misuse-Disn1issed by
Rent Controller-On appeal, Rent Tribunal held, ground of eviction under
clause (k} ofproviso to Section 14(1) available and directed the Rent Controller D
to deter1nine tnisuser charges-Misuser charges determined accordingly and
apportioned between parties-Misuser charges on tenants on bre_ach of
stipulation in the lease deed between paramount lessor and /essee/landlord-
Justification-Held. when tenants are willing to deliver vacant possession to
the lessee/landlord or paran1ount lessor, ii is not appropriate to direct tenants
to pay n1isuser charges-However, co1npensation, da111age or mesne p~ofit E
could be recovered from the tenants.

Breach of conditions of lease-Notice by lessor~Deter111ination of
lease-Eviction proceedings-Re-ent1y by para1nount lessor-· Validity of:_
Held, since lessor has not taken over possession of suit pre1nises due to
pendency of proceedings between lessee and tenants, he could re-enter the F
premises-After the Eviction order tenants should deliver possession of the
property directly to para111ount lessor.

Predecessor-in-interest of respondents had taken the suit property
on lease for non-commercial use from Governor General in Council in G
1938, who was succeeded by the Union of India acting through the Land
and Development Officer. The lessee let out the suit property to the
appellants/tenants for office purpose against the stipulation of the lease
and they further misused it as unauthorised shop. The land & Development
Officer issued a notice to lessee for certain breaches in the use of the

1135
H
'I
,)

1136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A leasehold premises. The lessee had failed to comply with the notice. i
Therefore, lessor had determined the lease. In the meantime, an Eviction
Petition was filed by the lessee against the appellant-tenants under clauses
(b), (c) and (k) of proviso tv Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act
alleging sub-letting and misuser of the suit premises, which was dismissed
by the Rent Controller. On appeal, Rent Control Tribunal affirmed the
B order of the Rent Controller in so far as dismissal of the petition under
clauses (b) and (c) of proviso to Section 14(1) but observed that grounds
of eviction were available under clause (k) of proviso to Section 14(1) and
further directed Rent Controller to issue notice to parties under Section.
>
14(11) of the Act and determine misuser charges. Accordingly, Rent
c Controller, after issuing notice to parties, determined misuser charges and
apportioned the same between the parties for payment. Tenants filed
appeal as well as Review Petition and the Tribunal dismissed them. Second
appeal was filed which was dismissed by the High Court. Hence this
appeal.

D It was contented for the appellants that they did not intend to contest
order of eviction passed under clause (k) of proviso to Section 14(1) of ~·
.._
the Act and would be ready to hand over the vacant possession of the suit
property to any party, as directed by the Court: that they could not be
made liable to pay misuser charges as they were willing to deljver
possession of the suit property to lessor or lessee; and that the lease being ~
E determined by the lessor, the lessee/landlord had no locus standi in the
proceeding under the Act.

On behalf of the respondents, it was contended that appellant-tenants
co.uld not be absolved of the liability to pay misuser charges since they
F misused the suit property.

Partly allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD : (Per Mahapatra, J. for himself and Brijesh Kumar, J.):
..
"-

1.1. Under clause (k) of proviso to Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent
G
Control Act an independent ground of eviction is laid down in case of
properties obtained on lease by the landlord from the Government or. the
Delhi Development Authority or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. It ,..,
is provided in that clause that if the tenant, notwithstanding the previous
notice, used or dealt with the premises in a manner contrary to any
H condition imposed on the landlord by the Government while giving him
BHARAT SALES LTD. v. LAKSHMI DEVI 1137
lease of the property the tenants shall be liable for eviction. From this A
provision it is clear that the tenant is given an opportunity to stop the
misuser or stop breach of condition of the lease and discontinue the
misuser by issuing a notice to him and despite such notice he having failed
to take the necessary steps for stoppage of misuser, a right is vested in
the landlord to seek order of his eviction given to the tenant to comply B
with the conditions imposed on the landlord by any of the authorities
referred to in clause (k) of sub-section (l) of Section 14 of the Act and
pay back the authority such amount by way of compensation as the

- Controller may direct before recovery of possession of the premises. From
the scheme of the statutory provisions, it is clear that the provisions are
intended for protection of the tenant agains1 eviction from the premises. C
But that is not to say that the owner of the property or landlord of the
tenant is precluded from realizing any compensation or damages for
misuser or unauthorized user of the suit property. The Rent Control
legislation, being intended for the benefit of tenant and to protect
legitimate interests of landlord does not contemplate of a proceeding which
in essence will be a substitute for a suit or other proceedings under law D
• for realisation of damages or mesne profits. fl 143-H; 1144-A-EI

Faquir Chandv. Smt. Harbans Kaur, AIR (1973) SC 921; Dr. K. Madan
v. Krishnawati (Smt.) and Anr., fl996f 6 SCC 707 and Munshi Rain and Anr.
• v. Union of India and Ors., 120001 7 SCC 22, referred to .
E
2. In the instant case, the appellants had used the suit property in a
manner contrary to the stipulations in the lease granted by the paramount
lessor in fa\'our of their landlord/lessee. The paramount lessor had given
notice to the lessee to stop the misuser; despite such notice the misuser
·• had continued. Therefore, the paramount lessor viz. the Union of India F
passed an order of termination of the lease and of re-entry; the possession
of the suit property continued with the tenants (appellants). In such
circumstances the landlords (respondents no. I to 11) were entitled to seek
eviction of the tenants under clause (k) of proviso to Section 14(1) of the
Act. The Controller was within the jurisdiction in passing the order of
eviction under clause (k) of proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act. Regarding G
the order purportedly passed under Section 14(11) of the Act it has to be
·kept in mind that the Land and Development Officer representing the
paramount lessor had not stated before the Controller its intention to
receive misuser charges or permit such misuser despite the order of
cancellation of the lease and re-entry of the property. 11147-E, F, GI H

-
1138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A 3.1. Appellants are not challenging the order of eviction passed .
against them and when tenants are ready and willing to deliver vacant
_possession to the landlord or to the paramount lessor as this Court may
direct. In such circumstances, the question of Controller directing the
tenant to pay misuser charges does not arise. To maintain such an order
will mean that even if the tenant has no intention to continue in possession
B of the premises and even if he is not contesting the eviction order, the
Controller, in exercise of his statutory power, will compel him to pay
misuser charges and continue in possession of the property. The
Legislature could not have intended to create such a situation while
enacting the provision in Section 14(11) of the Act. f 1147-G, H; 1148-A, Bl
c 3.2. Order terminating the lease granted by the Union of India in
favour of the landlord has been passed and re-entry upon the premises
has already been ordered; if possession of the premises has not been taken
over, it may be due to pendency of the proceedings. In the particular facts
and circumstances of the case, the tenant should deliver possession of the
D premises to the Union of India represented by Land & Development
Officer. f 1148-E, F)

3.3. Order passed by the Controller for eviction of the appellants
under clause (k) of proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act which was confirmed
E by the appellate authority and the High Court has to be maintained. The
•
order passed by the Controller under Section 14(11) of the Act determining
the misuser charges and apportioning the same between the parties which
was also confirmed by the appellate authority and the High Court is
unsustainable and has to be set aside. It is open to the respondents to
proceed for realisation of compensation, damages or mesne profits for misuser
F of the property by the tenants in accordance with law. f 1148-C, D, GI :>-·

Per Dharamadhikari, J. (concurring)

The possession of the suit premises cannot be directed to be handed
over to the landlord who has no right in presenti to obtain it even though
G order of eviction against the tenant is upheld. The possession of the leased
land with suit premises standing over it has, therefore, to be delivered to
the paramount lessor. 11149-F, Gf

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 3644 of
H 2002.

h
I

"
BHARAT SALES LTD. v. LAKSHMI DEVI [D.P. MOHAPATRA,J.] 1139

From the Judgment and Order dated 8.9.2000 of the Delhi High Court A
in SAO 363/85.

Rajeev Dhawan and Prakash Shrivastava for the Appellants.

K.N. Rawal, Additional Soliciter General, Jaspal Singh and Dr. A.M.
Singhvi, Shridhar Y. Chitale, Shreekant N. Terdal, L.K. Garg, Balraj Dewan B
and Amit Bhandari for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D.P. MOHAPATRA, J. Leave is granted.
c
This a~peal, filed by the tenants, is direc(ed against the judgment of the
High Court of Delhi dated 18th September, 2000 in S.A.0. No.363 of 1985
dismissing the appeal filed by the appellants herein with certain observations.
The operative portion of the judgment is quoted hereunder '°

"It was then urged that there is no rationale for the misuser charges D
demanded by the L&DO. This is really a matter between the L&DO
and its lessee. Moreover, the quantification and apportionment of
misuser charges are arithmetical matters of fact. I cannot go into all
this in a second appeal. Under the circumstances, there is no option
but to dismiss the appeal. The parties will pay the misuser charges in
.. accordance with the order dated 14th Augus~ 1984 passed by the E
learned Rent Controller. Respondent No. 12, that is, the Union of
India through the L&DO should quantify the subsequent misuser
charges within a period of two months from today. The appellants
should cease and desist from misusing the suit premises with effect
from !st January, 2001, failing which an order of eviction shall be p
deemed to have been passed against them.

The appeal is dismissed. There will, however, no order as to
costs."

The appellants are the tenants on the first floor and barsati (hereinafter G
referred as 'the suit property') of P-2, Connaught Circus, previously known
as 2/90, Connaught Circus, New Delhi. The suit property was taken on rent
from the predecessor in interest of respondents no. I to 11, namely Ram
Singh, so1netime in 1950. The predecessor in interest of respondents no. I to
' 11 had taken the suit property on lease from the Governor General in Council
in 1938. The Governor Gen,eral in Council is now succeeded by the Union H
1140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A of India acting through the Land and Development Officer (for short 'the
L&DO'). It was stipulated in the lease that the leasehold property was to be
used for cornmercial purpose. Despite the stipulation in the lease the lessee
i.e. the predecessor in interest of respondents no. I to 11 let out the suit
property to the appellants for office purpose. The L & DO issued a notice
B dated 25. 10. 1968 to Ram Singh enumerating certain breaches in use of the
leasehold premises, including misuse of first floor and barsati floors as office
and misuse of unauthorized shop measuring 21 'x7' as a tailoring shop. It was
specifically stated in the notice that despite the previous notice issued under
the L&DO's letter No.90('.2C.C.)/63~LI, dated 9.2.1965 to stop/remove the ~
misuser, the lessee had failed to comply with the notice. "Therefore, in
C consequence of the failure on the part of the lessee to remedy the aforesaid
breach the lessor had decided. to determine the lease. The relevant portion of
the letter dated 25th October, 1968 is extracted as under :

"Please take notice, therefore, that in consequence of your failure to
remedy the aforesaid breach the Lessor has been pleased to determine
D the Lease and re-enter upon the premises with effect from 16.9.68 on
& from which date, therefore all your rights and title in the leasehold
property in question have ceased.

The entire plot of land forming the subject matter of the relevant
Lease Deed and all the buildings standing thereupon including all
E structures, erections and fittings vest now in the President of India.
Shri Bharat Bhushan, an Assistant Engineer of the Land and
Development Office, has been directed to take possession of the
premises from you and he will call upon you for this purpose on I 31
I 1168 at 10.30 A.M, and I, hereby call upon you to hand over
peacefully the possession of the premises including land, buildings,
F
fittings, fixtures, etc. to him."

In the meantime, Ram Singh had filed a petition for eviction. of the petitioners
under clauses (b), (c) and (k) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred as 'the Act'), alleging sub-
G letting and misuser of suit property and breach of condition of the lease by
the tenant in favour of the landlord. The Rent Controller dismissed the eviction
petition vide order dated 18th August, 1981. The landlord filed an appeal,
RCA No. 717 of 1981 before the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi against the
order of the Rent Controller. By the order dated 30th August, 1982 the Rent
Control Tribunal affirmed the findings of the Rent Controller insofar as
H dismissal of the eviction petition filed under clauses (b) and (c) of proviso to
BHARAT SALES LTD. v. LAKSHMI DEVI [D.P. MOHAPATRA, .I.] 1141

Section 14( I) of the Act was concerned. It was stated by the Tribunal as A
regards clause (k) of proviso to Section I 4( I) of the Act that "in view of the
decision in the case of lilawati v. KB. Union Club 1981 Rajdhani Law
Report p.524, it is admitted that ground of eviction is available and notice
under Section 14 (I I) be directed to be issued." Accordingly, the Rent
Controller was directed to issue notice to the L & DO under Section 14(11)
of the Act to detern1inc the 1nisuser chargeS. The parties \Vere directed to B
appear before the Rent Coniroller. In compliance with the order of the Tribunal,
the Rent Controller by its order dated 14th August, 1984 apportioned the
misuser charges between the parties and directed the payment as apportioned
and determined. It was further directed that in case there is any violation of
the order by the tenants an order of eviction would be deemed to have been C
passed against them. Against the said order the appellants herein filed an
appeal no.957 of 1985 before the Rent Control Tribunal. They also filed,
though belatedly a petition for review of the order dated 30th August, I 982
on the ground that the counsel appearing for them (appellants) would not _
make a concession in law that the ground for eviction under clause (k) of
proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act had been made out. By the order dated D
19th August, 1985 the learned Tribunal dismissed the appeal as well as the
review petition filed by the appellants. Therefore, they filed the second appeal
' before the High Court of Delhi which was decided by the impugned judgment.
In the impugned judgment, as noted earlier, the High Court dismissed the
appeal. E
AJ the outset, Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel appearing for
the appellants, contended that the appellants do not intend to contest the
order of eviction passed by the statutory authorities under clause (k) of proviso
to Section 14( I) of the Act and that they are ready to handover vacant
possession of the suit property to any party as this Court may direct. Thereafter F
Dr. Dhawan challenged the order passed by the Rent Controller purportedly
under Section 14( 11) of the Act. He contended that since the tenant is ready
and willing to deliver possession of the suit property to the lessor or the
lessee as the Court may direct, it cannot be made liable for payment of any
amount towards the misuser charges. Dr. Dhawan further contended that ·
since the owner (Governor General in Council succeeded by the Union of
G
India) had decided to cancel the lease in favour of the lessee (predecessor in
interest of respondents no. I to 11) and to re-enter the property, the landlord
or the petitioners has no locus standi to claim apportionment of misuser
charges in tbe proceeding under the Act. Indeed, according to Dr. Dhawan,
the proceeding under the Act is not maintainable and should be dismissed as H
1142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A infructuous.

Shri Jaspal Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents
no. I to I I and respondent no.14 who had purchased the property during
pendency of the proceedings, strenuously urged that the appellants having
been responsible for misuser of the suit property cannot be absolvetl of liability
B to pay misuser charges under Section 14(11) of the Act. The learned counsel
further contended that the Tribunal rightly directed the Rent Controller to
proceed under Section 14(11) of the Act giving notice to the L & DO and
quantify the misuser charges and apportionment of the same between the
parties.
c In the context of the facts and circumstances discussed above, the
question that arises for determination is whether in this proceeding the
appellants could be made liable for payment of any amount towards the
misuser charges as determined under Section '14(11) of the Act? The further
question that arises in this connection is whether after determination of the
D lease of the suit property granted in favour of the predecessor in interest of
respondents no. I to I I and the decision of the lessor to re-enter the property
whether the proceeding under Section 14 of the Act should be proceeded
with and any order passed therein can be said to be valid and binding on the
parties?

E At the beginning it would be convenient to quote clauses (b), (c) and
(k) of proviso to Section 14(1) and Section 14(11) of the Act, which reads
..
as follows:

"14. Protection of tenant against eviction. - (I) Notwithstanding
anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no
F order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall
.J.
be made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against
a tenant:

Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him
in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession
G of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) that the tenant has, on or after the 9th day of June, 1952, sublet,
assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or
H any part of the premises without obtaining the c_onsent in writing
BHARAT SALES LTD. v. LAKSHMI DEVI [D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.] 1143

of the landlord; A
(c) that the tenant has used the premises for a purpose other than that
for which they were let-

(i) ifthe premises have been let on or after the 9th day of June,
1952, without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord; B
or

(ii) if the premises have been let before the said date without
obtaining his consent~
'
xxx ·xxx xxx
(k) that the tenant has, notwithstanding previous notice, used or dealt
c
with the premises in a manner contrary to any condition imposed on
the landlord by the Government or the Delhi Development Authority
or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi while giving him a lease of the
land on which the premises are situate;
D
xxx xxx xxx

• ( 11) No order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be
made on the ground specified in clause (k) of the proviso to sub-
section(!), ifthe tenant, within such time as may be specified in this
behalf by the Controller, complies with the condition imposed on the E
landlord by any of the authorities referred to in that clause or pays to
that authority such amount by way of compensation as the Controller
may direct."

•- Since the order of eviction of the tenant passed under clause (k) of proviso
to Section 14(1 )is not being challenged it is not necessary for us to enter into
the correctness or otherwise of the said order. Coming to the order of the
Rent Controller dated 14th August, 1984 passed under Section 14(11) of the
F

Act regarding the determination of misuser charges in the context of the facts
and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the answer to the
question depends on interpretation of clause (k) of proviso to Section 14(1) G
and Section 14(11) of the Act. From the statutory provisions quoted earlier
it is manifest that user of the premises by the tenant for a purpose other than
that for which it was let without obtaining the consent of the landlord, is
itself a ground for eviction under clause (c) of proviso to Section 14(1) of the
,. Act. Under clause (k) of proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act an independent
ground of eviction is laid down in case of properties obtained on lease by the H
_)

1144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A landlord from the Government or the Delhi Development Authority or the
Municipal Corporation of Delhi. It is provided in that clause that if the
tenant, notwithstanding the previous notice, used or dealt with the premises
in a manner contrary to any condition imposed on the landlord by the
Government while giving him lease of the property the tenants shall be liable
B for eviction. From this provision it is clear that the tenant is given an
opportunity to stop the misuser or stop breach of condition of the lease and
discontinue the misuser by issuing a notice to him and despite such notice he
having failed to take the necessary steps for stoppage of misuser, a right is
vested in the landlord to seek order of his eviction. Under sub-clause (11) of
Section 14 yet another opportunity is given to the tenant to comply with the
C conditions imposed on the landlord by any of the authorities referred to in
clause (k) of sub-section (I) of Section 14 of the .Act and pay back the
authority such amount by way of compensation as the Controller may direct
before recovery of possession of the premises. From the scheme of the statutory
provisions noted above, it is clear to us that the provisions are intended for
protection of the tenant against eviction from the premises. Then the question
D that arises is whether a tenant who is not interested in seeking such protection
and wants to vacate the premises could be compelled to pay misuser charges
in the proceedings under the Act? The answer to the question, in our considered ..
opinion, is in the negative. But that is not to say that the owner of the
property or landlord of the tenant is precluded from realizing any compensation
E or damages for misuser or unauthorized user of the suit property. The Rent
Control. legislation, being intended for the benefit of a tenant and to protect
legitimate interests of a landlord does not contemplate of a proceeding which
in essence will be a substitute for a suit or other proceedings under law for
realisation of damages or mesne profits. 0

F In the case of Faqir Ch:mdv. Smt. Harbans Kaur, AIR (1973) SC 921, this
Court construing the statutory provisions in Section 14(11) and clause (k) of
Section 14( 1) proviso of the Act, observed :

" .......... While the argument ·appears to be plausible we are of opinion
that there is no substance in this argument. If it is a case where the
G tenant has contrary to the terms of his tenancy used the building for
a commercial purpose the landlord could take action under clause (c).
He need not depend upon clause (k) at all. These two clauses are
intended to meet different situations. There was no need for an
additional provision in clause(k) to enable a landlord to get possession
where the tenant has used the building for a commercial purpose
H
BHARAT SALES LTD. v. LAKSHMI DEVI [D.P. MOHAPATRA. J.] 1145

contrary to the terms of the tenancy. An intention to put in an useless A
provision in a statute cannot be imputed to the Legislature. So111e
1neaning would have to be given to that provision. The only situation
in which it can take effect is where the lease is for a commercial
purpose agreed upon by both the landlord and the tenant but that is
contrary to the terms of the lease of land in favour of the landlord. B
That clause does not co1ne into operation where there is no provision
in the lease of the land in favour of the landlord, prohibiting its use
for a con11nercial purpose .
• ....... The policy of the legislature seems to be to put an end to
unauthorized use of the leased lands rather than merely to enable the C
authorities of get back possession of the leased lands. This conclusion
is further fortified .by a reference to sub-section (I I) of Section 14.
The lease is not forfeited merely because the building put upon the
leased land is put to an unauthorized use. The tenant is given an
opportunity to comply with the conditions imposed on the landlord
by any of the authorities referred to in Cl.(k) of the proviso to sub- D
section (I). As long as the condition imposed is complied with there
is no forfeiture. It even enables the controller to direct compensation
to be paid to the authority for a breach of the conditions. Of course,
the Controller cannot award the payment of compensation to the
authority except in the presence of the authority. The authority may E
not' be prepared to accept compensation but might insist upon cessation
of the unauthorized use. The sub-section does not also say who is to
pay the compensation, whether it is the landlord or the tenant.
Apparently in awarding compensation the Controller will have to
apportion the responsibility for the breach between the lessor and the
tenant." F
In the case of Dr. K. Madan v. Krishnawati (Smt.) and Anr., [1996] 6
SCC 707, this Court, construing Section 14(1)(k) and Section 14(11) of the
Act held as follows:

"Section 14(1) of the Act gives protection to the tenants from being G
evicted from the premises let out to them. Clauses (a) to (I) of the
proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act contain the grounds on which
recovery of possession of the premises can be ordered by the
Controller. Where the premises are used in a manner contrary to any
condition imposed on the landlord by the Government or the Delhi
Development Authority or Municipal Corporation of Delhi, then the H
)

1146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A landlord would be entitled to recovery of possession under Section
14(1)(k) of the Act. Sub-section (I 1) of Section 14, however gives an
option to the Control Ier to pass an order under sub-section ( 1 I) of
Section 14 of the Act whereby the tenant is directed to comply with
the conditions imposed on the landlord by the authorities referred to
in clause(k) namely to stop the misuser of the premises in question.
B Sub-section (I 1) of Section 14 also uses the words "pays to that
authority such amount by way of compensation as the Controller may
direct". Keeping in view the fact that clause (k) of the proviso to sub-
section ( 1) has been inserted in order that the unauthorized use of the ~
leased premises should come to an end, and also bearing in mind that
C the continued unauthorized use would give the principal lessor the
right of re-entry after cancellation of the deed, the afo~esaid words
occurring in sub-section (I I) of Section 14 cannot be regarded as
giving an option to the Controller to direct payment of compensation
and to permit the tenant to continue to use the premises in an
unauthorized manner. The principal lessor may, in a given case, be
D satisfied, in cases of breach of lease to get compensation only and
may waive its right of re-entry or cancellation of lease. In such a case
the Controller may, instead of ordering eviction under Section 14(l)(k)
of the Act, direct payment of compensation as demanded by the
authorities· mentioned in clause (k). Where, however, as in the present
E case compensation is demanded in respect of condoning/removal of
the earlier breach, but the authority insists that the misuser must
cease then the Controller has no authority to pass an order under
Section 14(11) or Section 14(l)(k) of the Act giving a licence or
liberty of continued misuser. In other words, sub-section (11) of
Section 14 enables the Controller to give another opportunity to the
F tenant to avoid an order of eviction. Where the authority concerned
requires stoppage of misuser then an order to that effect has to be
passed, but where the authority merely demands compensation for
misuser and does not require the stoppage of misuser then only in
such a case would the Controller be justified in passing an order for
G payment of compensation alone.

The observations of this Court in Punjab National Bank case
( 1986) 4 sec 660, to the effect that as long as the penalty continued
to be paid, deviation to user could be permitted, do not appear to be
in consonance with the decision of the larger Bench in Faqir Chand
H case. Continued wrongful user cannot be permitted by levying penalty
BHARAT SALES LTD. v. LAKSHMI DEVI [D.P. MOHAPATRA. J.) 1147

but if the authorities do not require the stoppage of misuser, but A
merely ask for payment of penalty or compensation, then in such a
case, an order of eviction or for stoppage of premises need not be
passed and it will be sufficient if compensation is required to be
paid."

The principles laid down therein were reiterated in the case of Munshi B
Ram and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., [2000] 7 SCC 22. In paragraph 9
of the judgment it was observed, inter alia, that : "the first opportunity to the
• tenant is given when the notice is served on him by the landlord and second
opportunity is given when a conditional order under Section 14(11) of the
.._:\ct is passed directing the tenant to pay the amount by way of compensation C
for regularization of user up to the date of stopping the misuser and further
directing stoppage of unauthorized user". The Court has further observed :
"The continued unauthorized user would give the paramount lessor the right
to re-enter after the cancellation of the lease deed". Then the Court took note
of the fact that the Delhi Development Authority insisting on stoppage of
misuser which was contrary to the terms of the lease. This Court also held D
that : "DDA cannot be directed to permit continued misuser contrary to the
terms of the lease on the ground that zonal development plan of the area has
not been framed."

In the case in hand, the clear factual position that emerges is that the
appellants had used the suit property in a manner contrary to the stipulations E
in the lease granted by the paramount lessor in favour of their landlord. The
paramount lessor had given notice to the lessee (landlord) to stop the misuser;
despite such notice the misuser had continued. Therefore, the paramount
lessor passed the order of termination of the lease and of re-entry; the
J. possession of the suit property continued with the tenants (appellants). In p
such circumstances the landlords (respondents no. I to 11) were entitled .to
seek eviction of the tenants under clause (k) of proviso to Section 14(1) of
the Act. The Controller was within his jurisdiction in passing the order of
eviction under clause (k) of proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act. Regarding
the order purportedly passed under Section 14(11) of the Act it has to be kept
in mind that the L & DO representing the paramount lessor had not stated G
before the Controller its intention to receive misuser charges or permit such
misuser despite the order of cancellation of the lease and reentry of the
property. As noted earlier, Dr. Dhawan, learned senior counsel appearing for
the appellants has, at the very outset, conceded that the appellants are not
challenging the order of eviction passed against them and they are ready and H
1148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) 3 S.C.R.

A willing to deliver vacant possession to the landlord or the paramount lessor -l
as this Court may direct. In such circumstances the question of Controller
directing the tenant to pay misuser charges does not arise. To maintain such
an order will mean that even if the tenant has no intention to continue in
possession of the premises and even if he is not contesting the eviction order
B the controller in exercise of his statutory power will compel him to pay
misuser charge and continue in possession of the property. The Legislature
could not have intended to create such a situation while enacting the provision
in Section I 4(1 I) of the Act. At the cost of repetition we would like to state
here that we do not intend to hold that in such a situation the landlord or the
paramount lessor cannot realize compensation, damages .or mesne profits for
C wrongful user of the property from the tenant or erstwhile tenant. However,
this purpose cannot be achieved by an order of the Controller under Section
I 4(1 I) of the Act in the situation as discussed earlier. Therefore, the position
that emerges is that the order passed by the Controller for eviction of the
appellants under clause (k) of proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act which was
confirmed by the appellate authority and the High Court has to be maintained.
D The order passed by the Controller under Section 14(11) of the Act determining
the misuser charges and apportioning the same between the parties which ,
was also confirmed by the appellate authority and the High Court is
unsustainable and has to be set aside. Then the question arises to whom the
tenants should be directed to deliver possession of the premises? Ordinarily,
E in a case where the order of eviction passed by the Controller is confinned
then the landlord is entitled to recover possession of the premises from the
tenant. But in the present case, as noted earlier, the order terminating the
lease granted by the Union of India in favour of the landlord has been passed
and re-entry upon the premises has already been ordered; if possession of the
premises has not yet been taken over, it may be due to pendency of the
F proceedings. In the particular facts and circumstances of the case we are of
the view that the tenant should deliver possession of the premises to the
Union of India represented by L&DO.

The appeal is allowed in part and the order passed by the Controller
G under Section 14(1 I) of the Act which was con finned by the appellate authority
and the High Court is set aside leaving it open to the respondents to proceed
for realisation of compensation, damages or mesne profits for misuser of the
property by the tenants in accordance with law. The appellants are directed
to deliver vacant possession of the suit property to the Union of India 'r
represented by the L & DO within one month. There will be no order for
H costs.
BHARAT SALES LTD. v. LAKSHMI DEVI [DHARMADHIKARI, J.] 1149

DHARMADHIKARI, J. I am in respectful agreement with the A
reasoning and conclusions contained in the judgment of learned Brother
Mahapatra J. l, however, find it necessary to consider an important submission
made on behalf of the landlord and the subsequent purchasers from him of
the suit premises. On their behalf learned counsel very emphatically contended
that in the case between landlord and tenant, after an order of eviction is B
passed, the possession of the suit premises must be handed over to the landlord
and cannot be directed to be handed over to a third party .
•
Learned Brother Mahapatra J. has recorded relevant facts and taken
note of the subsequent events which took place during this long course of
litigation. It has been found that the landlord and the tenant both committed C
breaches of the terms of the lease of land granted by paramount lessor and
despite notice them to the said breaches were not remedied. Consequently an
order determining the lease and re-entry into possession of the leased land
has already been passed by the paramount lessor although as the said order
has not been enforced the tenant continues in actual possession of the leased
land in the suit premises. D
' In the course of hearing of this appeal the tenant has expressed his
inability to pay the misuser charges as have been determined by the Rent
Controller and after apportionment by him held to be payable by the tenant.
The tenant, therefore, instead of paying the misuser charges has expressed his
willingness to suffer the order of eviction and hand over possession of the E
suit premises to such party which is held to be entitled to it by this Court.

On determination of the lease and the order of re-entry the right of
landlord to retain possession has been lost and the paramount lessor has
acquired right to obtain possession of the leased land. F
As a result of the above mentioned subsequent events of which due
notice has been taken by this Court, the possession of the suit premises
cannot be directed to be handed over to the landlord who has no right in
presenti to obtain it even though this Court has upheld the order of eviction
against the tenant. The possession of the leased land with suit premises standing G
over it has, therefore, to be delivered to the paramount lessor.

The rights and liabil; es inter-se between landlord and tenant and/or
between landlord and subsequent transferee from him are not subject-matters
of these proceedings. They are at liberty to work out their rights if any by
independent action in appropriate Court of foru1n. H
) I
I
l 150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) 3 S.C.R.

A The argument advanced on behalf of landlord and the subsequent °"'
purchaser that the paramount lessor is a third party to the proceedings under
the Act cannot be accepted. The ground of eviction contained in clause (K)
of Section 14 read with sub-section (11) of the Act makes the paramount
lessor a party to the proceedings and this Court, therefore, is fully justified
B in directing delivery of possession to the paramount lessor instead ofrestoring
it to the landlord.

For the aforesaid reasons I fully agree with the conclusion reached· by
learned.Brother Mohapatra J. that the tenant as the appellant having expressed
his desire to deliver the vacant possession of the suit property, the same
C should be directed to be delivered to the paramount lessor represented by L
&DO within two weeks from the date of this order.

S.K.S. Appeal partly allowed.