Holding

A two‑tier arbitration system agreed upon by the parties is valid under Indian law and does not offend public policy.

Summary

Centrotrade Minerals & Metal Inc. and Hindustan Copper Ltd. entered into a contract containing Clause 14, which provided for a two‑tier arbitration: first before the Indian Council of Arbitration and, if dissatisfied, a second "appeal" arbitration in London under ICC rules. A dispute arose; the Indian arbitrator gave a nil award and Centrotrade invoked the second tier, obtaining an award in London. Centrotrade sought enforcement of the London award under Section 48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Supreme Court examined whether such a two‑tier arbitration scheme is permissible under Indian law and whether it violates public policy. Relying on the parties' clear contractual intent, prior Indian case law, and the principle of party autonomy, the Court held that a two‑tier arbitration system is valid and does not contravene public policy. Consequently, the Court affirmed the validity of the arbitration clause, paving the way for the enforcement issue to be considered separately.

Issues considered

Whether a two‑tier arbitration procedure, as stipulated in Clause 14 of the contract, is permissible under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Indian law.
Assuming the two‑tier procedure is permissible, whether the award rendered by the appellate arbitration in London can be enforced in India under Section 48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Legislation cited

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s. 34, s. 35, s. 36, s. 48

Subjects

ArbitrationTwo‑tier arbitrationArbitration clausePublic policyParty autonomyEnforcement of foreign awardSection 48Section 34Section 35International arbitrationICC arbitrationIndian Council of Arbitration

Judgment

[2016] 9 S.C.R. 83

M/S CENTROTRADE MINERALS & METAL INC. A
v.
HINDUSTAN COPPER LTD.
(Civil Appeal No. 2562 of2006)
DECEMBER 15, 2016 B

(MADAN B. LOKUR, R. K. AGRAWAL AND
DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.)
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - s. 48 - Dispute
resolution by two-tier arbitration system - Validity of - Parties c
entered into a contract containing arbitration clause - Subsequently
dispute between the parties - Appellant company invoked
arbitration clause - Appointment of arbitrator by Indian Council
of Arbitration, who gave NIL award - Thereafter, invocation of
second part of the arbitration clause by the appellant company -
Award passed by arbitrator in London in accordance with the Rules D
of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce - Application u!s. 48 by the appellant company seeking
enforcement of the said award - Validity of two tier arbitration -
Held: Resolving of disputes by two tier arbitration system was valid
under the Indian law and not contrary to the public policy -
E
Arbitration clause in the agreement between the parties does not
violate the fundamental or public policy of India by the parties
agreeing to a second instance arbitration - Parties to an arbitration
agreement have the autonomy to decide not only on the procedural
law to be followed but also the substantive law.
F
Adjourning the matters, the Court
HELD: 1.1 It is necessary to appreciate the parties'
intention when they agreed upon the arbitration clause in the
contract. A plain reading of the arbitration clause suggests that
the contracting parties intended: firstly, a settlement of their
disputes or differences by arbitration in India through an G
arbitration panel of the Indian Council of Arbitration and in
accordance with the Rules of Arbitration of the Indian Council of
Arbitration, and secondly, if either of the contracting parties was
in disagreement with the 'arbitration result' in India, then the
aggrieved party would have a right to appeal to a second H
83
84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 9 S.C.R.

A ai·bitration in London in accordance with the Rules of Conciliation
and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce. The
result of the appellate arbitration would be binding on both the
parties, subject to a legal challenge in accordance with law. The
text of the arbitration clause is quite clear and explicit and does
not admit of any doubt on its interpretation. The contracting
B
parties intended Clause 14 of the contract to provide for two
opportunities at resolving their disputes or differences. The first
occasion would be a settlement by arbitration in lndia-'arbitration
result' and the second occasion would be by arbitration in London,
being in the nature of an appeal against the 'arbitration result' in
c India. [Para 6] (92-D-G]
1.2 While Clause 14 of the contract may have used the
expression 'arbitration result' and not the expression 'arbitration
award' clearly the parties' intention was that the 'arbitration result'
would be an award or at least in the nature of an award rendered
D by the arbitration panel of the Indian Council of Arbitration. The
proceedings before the arbitration panel were intended to be
structured and held in accordance with the Rules of Arbitration
of the Indian Council of Arbitration. The result of such
proceedings would inevitably be an arbitration award, regardless
of the nomenclature used by the parties. It is difficult to interpret
E the words 'arbitration result' other than meaning an arbitration
award. [Para 7) (93-A-B]
Comparative International Commercial Arbitration,
Julian D. M. Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis, et al., (Kluwer Law
International 2003) pp. 627-662; International
F Arbitration, Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, et al.,
Redfern and Hunter 6th edn (© Kluwer Law
International; Oxford University Press 2015) pp. 501-
568; International Commercial Arbitration, Emmanuel
Gaillard and John Savage (eds), Fouchard Gaillard
G Goldman (Kluwer Law International 1999) pp. 735 -
780 - referred to.
1.3 The arbitration result in the instant case has all the
elements and ingredients of an arbitration award. The 'arbitration
result' in the first part of Clause 14 of the contract must mean an
H arbitration award given by the arbitral panel of the Indian Council
M/S CENTROTRADE MINERALS & METAL INC. v. 85
HINDUSTAN COPPER LTD.

of Arbitration. The plain language of Clause 14 specifically A
provides for a second arbitration, in the form of an 'appeal' against
the award of the arbitratioJl panel of the Indian Council of
Arbitration. Respondents submitted that the right to file an appeal
can only be created by a statute and not by an agreement between
the parties. This may be so in respect of litigation initiated in
B
courts under a statute or for the enforcement of common law
rights, but that does not prevent parties from entering into an
agreement providing for non-statutory appeals so that their
disputes and differences could preferably be settled without resort
to court processes. [Paras 12, 14] [94-G; 95-A, C-El
2.1 Historically in India prior to the enactment of the A&C c
Act, two-tier arbitration was permissible. The significance of this
is that Parliament must be assumed to have known the view of
the UNCITRAL Working Group (of which India was a State
member) and must be assumed to have known the decisions of
various domestic courts and yet chose not to specifically prohibit D
the two-tier arbitration system. If that be so, this Court is entitled
to proceed on the basis that even after the passage of the A&C
Act, there can perhaps be no objection to the existence of a
two-tier arbitration system. But this Court does not propose to
base the decision on this assumption. It is, however, noted that
there are several decisions rendered by the Bombay High Court E
that have accepted the two-tier arbitration system. There are
several decisions of the Delhi High Court holding that since the
A&C Act does not proscribe a two-tier arbitration procedure,
such a system is acceptable. [Paras 19, 20] [97-B-C, D-FJ
Dedhia Investments Pvt. Ltd. v. JRD Securities Pvt. Ltd. F
[2002) 104 (4) Born L.R. 932; Amin Merchant v. Bipin
M. Gandhi 2005 (Suptll.) Arb. LR 337; Dhansukh K.
Sethia v. Rajendra Capital Services Ltd. 2008 (1) Arb.
L~l. 368 (~ombay); Dowell LeasinK & Finance Ltd. v.
Radheshyam B. Khandelwal 2008 (1) Born C.R. 768; G
ANS Pvt. Ltd. v..Jayesh R. Ajmera 2014 SCC Online
Ilom 1825; Ankit Bimal Deorah v. Microsec Capital
Ltd. 2015 SCC Online Born 4538; Steel Authority of
India Ltd. v. Engineers Project Ltd. 2014 SCC Online
Del 2314; U.P. Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd. v.
Union of India MANU/DE/3452/2015; Rakesh Kumar H
86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 9 S.C.R.

A Garg v. DSE Financial Service Ltd. MANU/DE/3339/
2015; Fuerst Day Lawson Limited v. Jindal Exports Ltd.
2011 (11) SCR 1 : (2011) 8 SCC 333; IT/ Ltd. v. Siemens
Public Communications Network Ltd. 2002 (3)
SCR 1122 : (2002) 5 SCC 510; Garikapati Veeraya v.
N. Subbiah Chaudhry 1957 SCR 488 - referred to.
B
Report of the Working Group on International Contract
Practices on the Work of its Third Session New York,
16-26 February, 1982, A.CN.9/216 (23rd March
1982); Handbook of Arbitration Practice, Sweet and
Maxwell pp.276, 290 - referred to.
c
2.2 On a combined reading of sub-section (1) of Section 34
of the A&C Act and Section 35 thereof, an arbitral award would
be final and binding on the parties unless it is set aside by a
competent court on an application made by a party to the arbitral
award. This does not exclude the auto!lomy of the parties to an
D arbitral award to mutually agree to a procedure whereby the
arbitral award might be reconsidered by another arbitrator or
panel of arbitrators by way of an appeal and the result of that
appeal is accepted by the parties to be final and binding subject
to a challenge provided for by the A&C Act. This is precisely
E what the parties have in fact agreed upon and there is no difficulty
in honouring their mutual decision and accepting the validity of
their agreeriient. (Para 27] (101-C-D]
2.3 The fact that recourse to a court is available to a party
for challenging an award does not ipso facto prohibit the parties
F from mutually agreeing to a second look at an award with the
i.ntention of an early settlement of disputes and differences. The
intention o( Section 34 of the A&C Act and of the international
arbitration community is to avoid subjecting a party to an
arbitration agreement to challenges to an award in multiple
forums, say by way of proceedings in a civil court as well under
G the arbitration statute. The intention is not to throttle the
autonomy of the parties or preclude them from adopting any other
acceptable method of redressal such as an appellate arbitration.
fP~ra 281 [101-E-FJ

2.4 The "final and binding" clause in Section 35 of the A&C
H Act does not mean final for all intents and purposes. The award
M/S CENTROTRADE MINERALS & METAL INC. v. 87
HINDUSTAN COPPER LTD.

is binding in a limited context. Unless this interpretation is A
accepted, a second instance arbitration would be per se invalid in
India. This would be going against the decisions rendered by
various courts which have accepted the validity of a two-tier
arbitration procedure under institutional rules and have not taken
the view that a two-tier arbitration procedure is per se invalid.
B
There is no error in the implicit acceptance of the general principle
of two-tier arbitrations. [Paras 34, 35) [105-F-G; 106-B]
Satish Kumar and Ors v. Surinder Kumar [1969) 2 SCR
244; Uttam Singh Dugal & Co. v. The Union of India
CA No 162 of 1962 decided on 11.10.1962
[Unreported decision]; Shri Lal Mahal Ltd. v. Progetto c
Grano Spa (2014) 2 SCC 433; Subhash Aggarwal
Agencies v. Bhilwara Synthetics Ltd. 1994 (6) Suppl.
SCR 530 : (1995) 1 SCC 371 - referred to.
Analytical Commentary On Draft Text of A Model Law
011 International Commercial Arbitration-Report of the
D
Secretary-Genera/ Eighteenth Session, Vienna, 3-21
June 1985, A/CN.9/264 (25.03.1985); Explanatory
Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the 1985 Model
Law on International Commercia/Arbitration.- referred
to. E
3. Party autonomy is virtually the backbone of arbitrations.
The parties to an arbitration agreement have the autonomy to
decide not only on the procedural Jaw to be followed but also the
substantive law. The choice of jurisdiction is left to the contracting
parties. In the instant case, the parties have agreed on a two tier F
arbitration system through Clause 14 of the agreement and Clause
16 of the agreement provides for the construction of the contract
as a contract made in accordance with the laws of India. There is
nothing wrong in either of the two clauses mutually agreed upon
by the parties. [Paras 36, 40) [106-C; 108-E-F)
G
Bharat Aluminium Company v. Kaiser Aluminium
Technical Services Inc. 2016 (1) SCR 364: (2016) 4
SCC 126; Union of Inr:Jia v. Uttar Pradesh State Bridge
Corporation Ltd. (2015) 2 SCC 52 - referred to.
Law and Practice of International Commercial
H
88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 9 S.C.R.

A Arbitration, Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Par/asides, et
al., Redfern and Hunter (Sixth Edition),(© Kluwer Law
International; Oxford University Press 2015) pp. 353-
414; Comparative International Commercial Arbitration,
Julian D. M Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis, et al., (Kluwer
Law International 2003) pp. 411-437 - referred to.
B
4.1 Even assuming the broad delineation of the fundamental
policy of India as stated in Associate Builders case there is nothin2
fundamentally objectionable in the parties preferring and
accepting the two-tier arbitration system. The parties to the
contract have not by-passed any mandatory provision of the A&C
C Act and were aware, or at least ought to have been aware that
they could have agreed upon the finality of an award given by the
arbitration panel of the Indian Council ofArbitration in accordance
with the Rules of Arbitration of the Indian Council of Arbitration.
· Yet they volnntarily and deliberately chose to agree upon a second
o or appellate arbitration in London, UK in accordance with the
Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber
of Commerce. There is nothing in the A&C Act that prohibits
the contracting parties from agreeing upon a second instance or
appellate arbitration-either explicitly or implicitly. No such
prohibition or mandate can be read into the A&C Act except by
E an unreasonable and awkward misconstruction and by straining
its language to a vanishing point. The concern is not with the
reason why the parties agreed to a second instance arbitration-
the fact is that they did and are bound by the agreement entered
into by them. HCL cannot wriggle out of a solemn commitment
F made by it voluntarily, deliberately and with eyes wide open. (Para
441 1109-E-G; 110-A-BJ
Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority
(2015) 3 sec 49 - referred to.
Amicable Society v. Bolland (Fauntleroy :Y Case) ( 1830)
G 4 Bligh. (N.S.) 194; 2 Dow & CI. 1- referred to.
The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in
Enf{land, London, Butterworths, Mustill and Boyd 1982
pp. 245-246 - referred to.
4.2 The arbitration clause in the agreement between the
H parties docs not violate the fundamental or public policy of India
MIS CENTROTRADE MINERALS & METAL INC. v. 89
HINDUSTAN COPPER LTD.

by the parties agreeing to a second instance arbitration. It follows A
that the award which is required to be challenged by HCL is the
award rendered by the arbitrator in London. [Para 45] (110-C]
Centrotrade Minerals & Metals Inc. v. Hindustan
Copper Ltd. 2006 (2) Suppl. SCR 146 : (2006) 11 SCC
245 - referred to. B
Case Law Reference
2006 (2) Suppl. SCR 146 referred to Para 1
(2002] 104 (4) Born L.R. 932 referred to Para 21
2005 (Suppl.) Arb. LR 337 referred to Para 21 c
2008 (1) Arb. LR 368 (Bombay) referred to Para 21
2008 (1) Born C.R. 768 referred to Para 21
2011 (11) SCR 1 referred to Para 21
2002 (3 ) SCR 1122 referred to · Para22 D

1957 SCR 488 referred to Para23
(1969) 2 SCR 244 referred to Para30
(2014) 2 sec 433 referred to Para35
E
1994 (6) Suppl. SCR 530 referred to Para36
2016 (1) SCR 364 referred to Para36
(2015) 2 sec 52 referred to · Para37
(2015) 3 sec 49 referred to Para 43
F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2562
of2006.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.07 .2004 of the High Court
at Calcutta in A.P.0.T. No. 182 of2004
WITH G
C. A. No. 2564 of2006.
Goura.b Banerji, Sr. Adv., Prateek Jalan, R. N. Karanjawala,
Ms. Ruby Singh Ahuja, Vishal Gehrana, Utsav Trivedi, Sahil Tagotra,
Harsh Trivedi, Ms.Videhi Misra,AnkitYadav, Mrs. Manik Karanjawala
H
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 9 S.C.R.

A (For Mis. Karanjawala & Co.), S. S. Jauhar, Advs. for the Appellant.
Harin P. Raval, Sr. Adv., Ms. Nandini Sen, Nipun Saxena, Anando
Mukherjee, Deba Prasad Mukherjee, Ms. Divya Anand, Advs. for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B 7
MADAN B. LOKUR, J. I. These appeals have been referred
to a Bench of three judges in view of a difference of opinion between
two learned judges of this Court. The controversy is best understood by
referring to the proceedings recorded on 91h May, 2006:

c Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.B. Sinha pronounced His Lordship's
judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr.
Justice Tarun Chatterjee.
Leave granted.
For the reasons mentioned in the signed judgment, Civil Appeal
D arising out of SLP (C) No.1861112004 filed by Mis Centrotrade
Minerals and Metal Inc., is dismissed and Civil Appeal arising out
of SLP (C) No.21340 of 2005 (actually 2004) preferred by
Hindustan Copper Ltd. is allowed. In the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case, the parties shall pay and bear their
own costs.
E
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarun Chatterjee pronounced His Lordship's
judgment disposing of the appeals in terms of the signed judgment.
In view of difference of opinion, the matter is referred to a larger
Bench for consideration. The Registry of this Court shall place
F the matter before the Hon 'ble the ChiefJustice for constitution of
a larger Bench.
The decisions rendered by Justice Sinha and Justice Chatterjee
are reported as Centrotr<1de Miner<1/s & Met<1/s Inc. v. Hindust<1n
Copper Ltd. 1
.G 2. Since the facts of the case have been detailed by both the
learned judges in their separate judgments, it is not necessary for us to
detail them for the third time. What is necessary to state, however, is
that the parties had entered into a contract and some disputes and
differences arose between them. The contract contained an arbitration
H • (2006) 11 sec 245
M/S CENTROTRADE MINERALS & METAL INC. v. 91
HINDUSTAN COPPER LTD. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

clause and Centrotrade invoked it. Pursuant thereto the Indian Council A
of Arbitration appointed an arbitrator. The arbitrator gave a NIL award
and then Centrot~ade invoked the second part of the arbitration clause
and the arbitrator in London gave an award on 291h September, 200 I in
accordance with the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce. The award rendered by the
B
arbitrator in London was sought to be enforced by Centrotrade by moving
an application under section 48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996.
3. The arbitration clause in the contract between the parties is
Clause 14 and this reads as follows:
c
"14. Arbitration -All disputes or differences whatsoever arising
between the parties out of, or relating to, the construction, meaning·
and operation or effect of the contract or the breach thereof shall
be settled by arbitration in India through the arbitration panel of
the Indian Council ofArbitration in accordance with the Rules of
Arbitration of the Indian Council of Arbitration. D

1feither party is in disagreement with the arbitration result in India,
either party will have the right to appeal to a second arbitration in
London, UK in accordance with the Rules of Conciliation and
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce in effect
on the date hereofand the result of this second arbitration will be E
binding on both the parties. Judgment upon the award may be
entered in any comt in jurisdiction."
4. Clause 16 of the contract is also important and this reads as
follows:
F
"16. Construction - The contract is to be constructed and to
take effect as a contract made in accordance with the laws of
India."
5. The issues that have arisen for our consideration, as a result of
the difference ofopinion between the learned judges, are as under:
G
(I) Whether a settlement of disputes or differences through a two-
tier arbitration procedure as provided for in Clause 14 of the
contract between the parties is permissible under the laws of
India?
(2) Assuming a two-tier arbitration procedure is permissible under H,;•.-
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 9 S.C.R.

A the laws oflndia, whether the award rendered in the appellate
arbitration being a 'foreign award' is liable to be enforced under
the provisions of Section 48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 at the instance of Centrotrade? If so, what is the
relief that Centrotrade is entitled to?
B For the present, we propose to address only the first question and
depending upon the answer, the appeals would be set down for hearing
on the remaining issue. We have adopted this somewhat unusual course
since the roster of business allowed us to hear the appeals only
sporadically and therefore the proceedings before us dragged on for ·
about three months.
c
Appreciating Clause 14 of the contract
6. At the outset, it is necessary to appreciate the parties' intention
when they agreed upon the arbitration clause in the contract. A plain
reading of the arbitration clause suggests that the contracting parties
D intended: (a) Firstly, a settlement of their disputes or differences by
arbitration in India through an arbitration panel of the Indian Council of
Arbitration and in accordance with the Rules of Arbitration of the Indian
Council ofArbitration, and (b) Secondly, if either of the contracting parties
was in disagreement with the 'arbitration result' in India, then the aggrieved
party would have a right to appeal to a second arbitration in London in
E accordance with the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce. The result of the appellate
arbitration would be binding on both the parties, subject to a legal challenge
in accordance with law. The text of the arbitration clause is quite clear
and explicit and does not admit of any doubt on its interpretation. The
F contracting parties intended Clause 14 of the contract to provide for two
opportunities at resolving their disputes or differences. The first occasion
would be a settlement by arbitration in India(the 'arbitration result') and
the second occasion would be by arbitration in London, with the second
occasion being in the nature of an appeal against the 'arbitration result'
in India.
G
7. It was the contention of learned counsel for Centrotrade that
the 'arbitration result' in India was not an award as conventionally
understood with reference to arbitration, but merely a 'resu It' of arbitration
given by an arbitration panel of the Indian Council of Arbitration and
nothing more. We are not at all inclined to accept this interpretation.
H
M/S CENTROTRADE MINERALS & METAL INC. v. 93
HINDUSTAN COPPER LTD. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

While Clause 14 of the contract may have used the expression 'arbitration A
result' and not the expression 'arbitration award' clearly the parties'
intention was that the 'arbitration result' would be an award or at least in
the nature of an award rendered by the arbitration panel of the Indian
Council ofArbitration. The proceedings before the arbitration panel were
intended to be structured and held in accordance with the Rules of
B
Arbitration of the Indian Council of Arbitration. The result of such
proceedings would inevitably be an arbitration award, regardless of the
nomenclature used by the parties. It is difficult to interpret the words
'arbitration result' other than meaning an arbitration award.
8. We say this also because ifthe submission of learned counsel
for Centrotrade were to be accepted, it would mean that if both the
c
contracting parties were satisfied with the 'arbitration result' (ornegatively
put, if neither party was dissatisfied with the 'arbitration result') there
would be no method of enforcing that 'arbitration result' should such
enforcement become necessary. This would create a vacuum post the
'arbitration result'. It is to avoid such a vacuum that 'arbitration result' D
must be understood to mean an award of the arbitration panel of the
Indian Council of Arbitration and an award that could be enforced in
accordance with the laws oflndia, that is, the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, I 996 (for short 'the A&C Act').
9. The general principle that we have accepted is supported by E
~o pas~ages in Comparative I11ter11<1tional Commercial Arbitration.1
In paragraph 24-3 thereof reference is made to Article 31 (I) of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (or UNCITRAL)
Rules to suggest that while all awards are decisions of the arbitral tribunal,
all decisions of the arbitral tribunal are not awards. Similarly, while a
decision is generic, an award is a more specific decision that affects the F
rights of the parties, has important consequences and can be enforced.
The distinction between an award and a decision ofan arbitral tribunal is
summarized in Paragraph 24-13. It is observed that an award:
(i) concludes the dispute as to the specific issue determined in
the award so that it has res judicata effect between the G
parties; if it is a final award, it terminates the tribunal's
jurisdiction;
(ii) disposes of parties' respective claims;
' Chapter 24 Arbitration Award in Julian D. M. Lew. Loukas A. Mistelis. et al..
Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, (© Kluwer Law International;
Kluwer Law International 2003) pp. 627 - 662 H
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 9 S.C.R.

A (iii) may be confirmed by recognition and enforcement;
(iv) may be challenged in the courts of the place of arbitration.
10. In brtenwtiom1/ Arbitr<1tion3 a similar distinction is drawn
between an award and decisions such as procedural orders and directions.
It is observed that an award has finality attached to a decision on a
B substantive issue. Paragraph 9.08 in this context reads as follows:
"9 .08 The term 'award' should generally be reserved for decisions
that finally determine the substantive issues with which they deal.
This involves distinguishing between awards, which are concerned
with substantive issues, and procedural orders and directions, which
c are concerned with the conduct of the arbitration. Procedural orders
and directions help to move the arbitration forward; they deal
with such matters as the exchange of written evidence, the
production of documents, and the arrangements for the conduct
of the hearing. They do not have the status of awards and they
may perhaps be called into question after the final award has
D been made (for example as evidence of 'bias', or 'lack of due
process')."
11. In Intenrntion(I/ Commercial Arbifr(ltion~ the general
characteristics of an award are stated. In Paragraph 1353 it is stated as
follows:
E "I 353. -An arbitral award can be defined as a final decision by
the arbitrators on all or part of the dispute submitted to them,
whether it concerns the merits of the dispute, jurisdiction, or a
procedural issue leading them to end the proceedings."
This is subsequently elucidated through four aspects of an award, namely:
F (i) An award is made by the arbitrators; (ii) An award resolves a dispute;
(iii) An award is a binding decision; and (iv)An award may be partial.
12. The arbitration result in the present case has all the elements
and ingredients of an arbitration award. Taking also into consideration
the view expressed by the above authors, we have no hesitation in
G concluding that the 'arbitration result' in the first part of Clause 14 of the
3 Chapter 9. Award in Nigel Blackaby. Constantine Partasides, et al., Redfern and
Hunter on International Arbitration (Sixth Edition), 6th edition (© Kluwer Law
International; Oxford University Press 2015) pp. 501 - 568
•Part 4 : Chapter IV - The Arbitral Award in Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage
(eds), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration,(© Kluwer
H Law International: Kluwer Law International 1999) pp. 735 - 780
M/S CENTROTRADE MINERALS & METAL INC. v. 95
HINDUSTAN COPPER LTD. [MADAN 8. LOKUR, J.]

contract must mean an arbitration award given by the arbitral panel of A
the Indian Council ofArbitration. To this extent we disagree with learned
counsel for Centrotrade but agree with learned counsel for Hindustan
Copper Limited (hereafter referred to as 'HCL').
13. The alternative submission oflearned counsel for Centrotrade
is that in any event on being dissatisfied with the arbitration result, the B
second part of Clause 14 of the agreement entitles the aggrieved part}'
to appeal to a second arbitration in London in accordance with the Rules
of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce. However, according to learned counsel for HCL the second
part of Clause 14 of the contract is contrary to the laws oflndia.
c
14. In our opinion the plain language of Clause 14 specifically
provides for a second arbitration, in the form of an 'appeal' against the
award of the arbitration panel of the Indian Council of Arbitration. We
do not think it necessary to labour on this issue, given the express words
used in Clause 14. For the record, we may note that learned counsel for
HCL spent considerable time on explaining that the right to file an appeal D
can only be created by a statute and not by an agreement between the
parties. This may be so in respect of litigation initiated in courts under a
statute or for the enforcement of common law rights, but that does not
prevent parties from entering into an agreement providing for non-
statutory appeals so that their disputes and differences could preferably E
be settled without resort to court processes.
15. However, what does require serious consideration is the
submission ofleamed counsel for HCL that the provision for an appellate
arbitration in Clause 14 is prohibited by the laws oflndia on three counts:
the provisions of the A&C Act do not sanction an appellate arbitration; F
there is an implied prohibition to an appellate arbitration in the A&C Act;
and an appellate arbitration is even otherwise contrary to public policy.
Appellate arbitration and the A&C Act
16. Before actually discussing the validity of an appellate arbitration
in the context oftheA&C Act, itmightbe mentioned that it is doubtful if G
HCL can even contend that an appellate arbitration is contrary to the
laws oflndia. If this contention is accepted, then it could be argued that
HCL entered into a contract with Centrotrade fully conscious and aware
that one of the provisions of the contract was contrary to the laws of
India. This could amount to HCL playing a fraud on Centrotrade and
H
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 9 S.C.R.

A could have serious long-term implications and ramifications for
. international commercial contracts with an Indian party.
17. But be that as it may, it might be fruitful as a starting point to
consider the view expressed in the Report of the Working Group on
International Contract Practices on the Work of its Third
B Session.; Incidentally, India was one of the State members of that
UNCITRAL Working Group. With reference to an appeal [before another
arbitral tribunal (of second instance)] against an arbitral award, Question
6-1 was posed and answered as follows:
"Question 6-1: Should the model law recognize any agreement by
c the parties that the arbitration award may be appealed before
another arbitral tribunal (of second instance)?
I 06. There was wide support for the view that parties were
free to agree that the award may be appealed before another
arbitral tribunal (of second instance), and that the model
D law should not exclude such practice although it was not
used in all countries. However, the Working Group was agreed
that there was no need to include in the model law a provision
recognizing such practice. It was noted, however, that this
conclusion might have to be reconsidered in the light of the ultimate
contents of the model law, and in particular its chapter on means
E of recourse against an award." [Emphasis supplie_d by us].
This view also throws open the issue of party autonomy, which we will
advert to a little later. But for the present, we may also refer to the
Handbook ofArbitration Practice6 in which a reference is made to a
two-tier system of arbitration particularly in commodity trade in the
F following words:
" ..... Fundamental and ancient feature of commodity trade
arbitration is the two tier system whereby the first arbitration is
held speedily and relatively informally and results in the issuance
of an award, which, subject to time limits, can be appealed by a
G dissatisfied party to a board of appeal of the relevant association. ·
This gives a party two bites at the cherry and the arbitral process
is not deemed to be concluded until the board ofappeal has issued
'New York, 16-26 February, 1982, A.CN.9/216 (23rd March 1982)
6
Published by Sweet and Maxwell in conjunction with The Chartered Institute of
H Arbitrators, (para 3-35) at p.276 and para 3-106 at p.290.
MIS CENTROTRADE MINERALS & METAL INC. v. 97
HINDUSTAN COPPER LTD. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

its final award ...... .Jn two tier systems, the awards of the tribunal, A
sole arbitrator or umpire are usually called awards of arbitration;
to distinguish them from appeal awards issued by boards of appeal."
18. Our attention has also been drawn to several jurisdictions in
which the statutory acceptance of a two-tier system of arbitration. is
prevalent, but it is not necessary to discuss this since the contention of B
learn\:d counsel for HCL is that the law in India through the A&C Act is ·
quite different.
19. Learned counsel for the parties agree that historically in India
prior to the enactment of the A&C Act, two-tier arbitration was
permissible. Justice Sinha adverted to the existence of a two-tier c
arbitration system in India prior to the A&C Act and referred to several
decisions in this regard but did not pronounce on its validity or otherwise.'
However, Justice Chatterjee.was of the opinion that prior to the A&C
Act a two-tier arbitration system was valid and permissible in India. 8
20. The significance of this is that Parliament must be assumed to D
have known the view of the UNClTRAL Working Group (of which
India was a State member) and must be assumed to have known the
decisions of various domestic courts and yet chose not to specifically
prohibit the two-tier arbitration system. If that be so, we are entitled to
proceed on the basis that even after the passage of the A&C Act, there
can perhaps be no objection to the existence of a two-tier arbitration E
system. But we do not propose to base our decision on this assumption.
We may, however, note that it has been brought to our notice that there
are several decisions rendered by the Bombay High Court9 that have
accepted the two-tier arbitration system. There are several decisions of
the Delhi High Court that have taken the view that since the A&C Act F
does not proscribe a two-tier arbitration procedure, such a system is
acceptabte. ' 0 ·

7
Paragraphs 27, 65 and 119 of the Report
• Paragraph 136 of the Report
9
Dedhia Investments Pvt. Ltd._v. JRD Securities Pvt. Ltd., (2002] 104 (4) Born L.R.
932, Amin Merchant v. Bipin M. Gandhi, 2005 (Suppl.) Arb. LR 337, Dhansukh · G
K. Sethia v. Rajendra Capital Services Ltd., 2008 (I) Arb. LR 368 (Bombay),
Dowell Leasing & Finance Ltd. v. Radheshyam B. Khandelwal. 2008 (I) Born C.R.
768, ANS Pvt. Ltd. v. Jayesh R. Ajmera, 2014 SCC Online Born 1825 and Ankit
Bimal Deorah v. Microsec Capital Ltd., 2015 SCC Online Born 4538
10
Steel Authority oflndia Ltd. v. Engineers Project Ltd., 2014 SCC Online Del 2314,
U.P. Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd. v. Union oflndia MANU/DE/3452/2015
and Rakesh Kumar Garg v. DSE Financial Service Ltd., MANU/DE/3339/2015 H
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2016] 9 S.C.R.

A 21. Learned counsel for HCL relied upon the following passage
from Fuerst Day Lawson Limited v. Jindal Exports Ltd. 11 to contend
that since the A&C Act did not permit two-tier arbitrations such an
arbitration system was not permissible:
"89. lt is, thus, to be seen that Arbitration Act, 1940, from its
8 inception and right through to 2004 (in P.S. Sathappan 11 ) was
held to be a self-contained code. Now, if the Arbitration Act, 1940
was held to be a self-contained code, on matters pertaining to
arbitration, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which
consolidates, amends and designs the law relating to arbitration to
bring it, as much as possible, in harmony with the UNCITRAL
c Model must be held only to be more so. Once it is held that the
Arbitration Act is a self-contained code and exhaustive, then it
must also be held, using the lucid expression ofTulzapurkar, J.,
that it carries with it "a negative import that only such acts as are
mentioned in the Act are permissible to be done and acts or things
D not mentioned therein are not permissible to be done". In other
words, a letters patent appeal would be excluded by the application
of one of the general principles that where the special Act sets
out a self-contained code the applicability of the general law
procedure would be impliedly excluded."
22. On the other hand, in /Tl Ltd. v. Siemens Public
E
Commu11icatio11s Network Ltd.'3 the question before this court was
whether the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code were applicable to
the A&C Act or not. In response, this Court observed 14 that since there
was no express provision excluding the provisions of the Code in the
A&C Act, it cannot be held by inference that the provisions of the Code
F were inapplicable.
23. In any event, we are afraid the passage referred to by the
learned counsel from Fuerst Day Lawson has been misunderstood and
is even otherwise inapposite since we are not concerned with a statutory
appeal but a non-statutory process agreed upon by parties that has nothing
G to do with court procedures. We are also unable to fully subscribe to the
broad observation that acts mentioned in a statute are permissible but
acts not mentioned therein are impermissible. It could very well be the
11
(2011) s sec 333
12 P.S. Sathappan v. Andhra Bank Ltd., (2004) 11 SCC 672
" (2002) s sec s10
H " Per Justice Santosh Hegde with Justice D.M. Dharmadhikari concurring
M/S CENTROTRADE MINERALS & METAL INC. v. 99
HINDUSTAN COPPER LTD. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

converse. In any event, the observations of this Court were in the context A
of a statutory appeal not provided (or provided). In that context, it was
observed that if an appeal is not provided for by a statute, then the filing
of an appeal is not permissible. This was made clear many years ago by
the Constitution Bench in Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbia/1
Clwudllry 15 when it was concluded that:
B
"From the decisions cited above the following principles clearly
emerge:
(i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second
appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected
by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding.
(ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure
c
but is a substantive right.
(iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all
rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto
till the rest of the career of the suit.
(iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter D
the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from
the date the /is commences and although it may be actually
exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is
to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution
of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the E
date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal.
(v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a
subsequent enactment, ifit so provides expressly or by necessary
intendment and not otherwise." [Emphasis supplied by us].
We are not concerned with an appeal not provided for by the A&C Act,
F
but an appeal procedure mutually agreed -upon by the parties to the
contract. This is an area of party autonomy, which we will consider a
little later, but for the present the next issue is whether the A&C Act
prohibits a two-tier arbitration system by necessary implication.
24. Reference was first made by learned counsel for HCL to
the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 34 and then to Sections 35 G
and 36 of the A&C Act. These read as follows:
"34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.-( I)
Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only
by an api:- ::cation for setting aside such award in accordance with
" 1957 SCR 488 H
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 9 S.C.R.

A · sub-section (2) and sub-section (3 ).
35. Finality of arbitral awards.-Subject to this Part an arbitral
award shall be final and binding on the parties and persons claiming
under them respectively.
36. Enforcement. ( 1) Where the time for making an application
B to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired, then,
subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), such award shall be
enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in the same manner as if it were a
decree of the court.
(2) Where an application to set aside the arbitral award has been
c filed in the Court under Section 34, the filing of such an application
shall not by itself render that award unenforceable, unless the
Court grants an order of stay of the operation of the said arbitral
award in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3 ), on a
separate application made for that purpose.
D (3) Upon filing ofan application under sub-section (2) for stay of
the operation of the arbitral award, the Court may, subject to such
conditions as it may deem fit, grant stay of the operation of such
award for reasons to be recorded in writing:
Provided that xxx xxx xxx"
E 25. We are unable to appreciate how these provisions come to the
aid of learned counsel for HCL. Sub-section ( 1) of Section 34 of the
A&C Act entitles a party to an arbitration to approach a court "only by
an application" for setting aside an award. This is sought to be read by
learned counsel in a different way to suggest that an award can be set
aside only by a court, thereby excluding a two-tier arbitration procedure.
F If the contention of learned counsel were to be accepted, we would
perforce have to read the sub-section quite differently by repositioning
the word "only" and the sub-section to read: "Recourse only to a Court
against an arbitral award may be made by an application for setting
aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section
G (3)." Or "Recourse against an arbitral award may be made only to a
Court by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with
sub-section (2) and sub-section (3)." We are afraid we cannot read or
redraft the statute in the manner suggested by learned counsel.
26. Learned counsel would like us to read sub-section (I) of Section
H 34 of the A&C Act in conj unction with Section 35 thereof and thereby
MIS CENTROTRADE MINERALS & METAL INC. v. 101
HINDUSTAN COPPER LTD. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

conclude that an arbitral award would be final and binding unless it is A
challenged and set aside by a court and that the setting aside can be only
by a court and none else. The acceptance of this submission would be
possible only if we were to first accept the interpretation given by learned
counsel to sub-section (I) of Section 34 of the A&C Act. However,
since we do not agree with learned counsel on the interpretation of sub-
B
section (1) of Section 34 of the A&C Act, acceptance of the contention
of leanied counsel does not arise.
27. In our opinion, on a combined reading of sub-section ( 1) of
Section 34 of the A&C Act and Section 35 thereof, an arbitral award
would be final and binding on the parties unless it is set aside by a
competent court on an application made by a party to the arbitral award. c
This does not exclude the autonomy of the parties to an arbitral award to
mutually agree to a procedure whereby the arbitral award might be
reconsidered by another arbitrator or panel of arbitrators by way of an
appeal and the result of that appeal is accepted by the parties to be final
and binding subject to a challenge provided for by the A&C Act. This is D
precisely what the parties have in fact agreed upon and we see no
difficulty in honouring their mutual decision and accepting the validity of
their agreement.
28. The fact that recourse to a court is available to a party for
challenging an award does not ipso facto prohibit the parties from
mutually agreeing to a second look at an award with the intention of an E
early settlement of disputes and differences. The intention of Section 34
of the A&C Act and of the international arbitration community is to
avoid subjecting a party to an arbitration agreement to challenges to an
award in multiple forums, say by way of proceedings in a civil court as
well under the arbitration statute. The intention is not to throttle the F
autonomy of the parties or preclude them from adopting any other
acceptable method ofredressal such as an appellate arbitration. In this
context, the view expressed in the Analytical Commentary On Draft
Text of A Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration -
Report of the Secrctary-Gcneral 16 is quite relevant. This commentary
deals, inter a/ia, with Article 34( 1) of the Model Law on International G
Commercial Arbitration 17 and it is stated as follows:
"' Eighteenth Session, Vienna 3-21 June 1985, A/CN.9/264 (25th March 1985)
17
Article 34. Application for setting aside as exclusive recourse against arbitral award
(i) Recourse to a court against an arbitral award made [in the territory of this State]
[under this Law] may be made only by an application for setting aside in accordance
with paragraphs (2) and (3) of this article. H
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 9 S.C.R.

A "!. Existing national laws provide a variety of actions or
remedies available to a party for attacking the award. Often
equating arbitral awards with local court decisions, they set varied
and sometimes extremely long periods of time and set forth varied
and sometimes long lists of grounds on which the award may be
attacked. Article 34 is designed to ameliorate this situation by
B
providing only one means of recourse available during a fairly
short period of time and for a rather limited number ofreasons.
2. The application for setting aside constitutes the exclusive
recourse to a court against the award in the sense that it is the
only means for actively attacking the award, i.e. initiating
c proceedings for judicial review..... Finally, article 34(1) would not
exclude recourse to a second arbitral tribunal, where such
appeal within the arbitration system is envisaged (as, e.g.,
in certain commodity trades)." 18 [Emphasis supplied by us].
29. Similarly, the Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL
D Secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration as amended in 2006 19 also affirms this position in the
following words:
44. The disparity found in national laws as regards the types
of recourse against an arbitral award available to the parties
E presents a major difficulty in harmonising international
arbitration legislation. Some outdated laws on arbitration, by
establishing parallel regimes for recourse against arbitral awards
or against court decisions, provide various types of recourse,
various (and often long) time-periods for exercising the recourse,
F and extensive lists of grounds on which recourse may be based.
That situation (of considerable concern to those involved in
international commercial arbitration) is greatly improved by the
Model Law, which provides uniform grounds upon which (and
clear time periods within which) recourse against an arbitral award
may be made.
G
a. Application for setting aside as exclusive recourse
" NCN.91264. 25 March 1985
https ://documents-dds-ny. u n.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V 85/26 710 I /PDF I
V852670 I.pdf'?OpenElement
19
http://www. uncitral .org/pd f/engli sh/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/MLARB-
H explanator)'.Note20-9-07.pdf
MIS CENTROTRADE MINERALS & METAL INC. v. 103
HINDUSTAN COPPER LTD. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

45. The first measure of improvement is to allow only one A
type of recourse, to the exclusion of any other recourse
regulated in any procedural law of the State in question.
Article 34 (1) provides that the sole recourse against an arbitral
award is by application for setting aside, which must be made
within three months of receipt of the award (article 34 (3)). In
B
regulating "recourse" (i.e., the means through which a party may
actively "attack" the award), article 34 does not preclude a party
from seeking court control by way of defence in enforcement
proceedings (articles 35 and 36). Article 34 is limited to action
before a court (i.e., an organ of the judicial system of a State).
However; a party is not precluded from appealing to an c
arbitral tribunal of second instance if the parties have agreed
on such a possibility (as is common in certain commodity
trades)." [Emphasis supplied by us].
30. Learned counsel for HCL contended that since an award of
the first instance is final and binding on the parties under Section 35 of D
the A&C Act there cannot be an 'appeal' provision in the agreement
between the contracting parties. The "final and binding" nature ofan
arbitral award (postulated by Section 35 of the A&C Act) has come up
for consideration in this Court. This Court has taken the view that an
award is not a waste paper only because it has not been enforced. The
existence of an award has some legal consequences as well. In Satislt ., E
Kumar and Ors v. Surinder Kumar 0 paragraph 7 of the Schedule I of
the Arbitration Act, 1940~ 1 was considered. This is almost in pari materia
with Section 35 of the A&C Act. The question before this Court was:
Whether an award given under the Arbitration Act, 1940 on a private
reference requires registration under Section I 7(1)(b) of the Indian F
Registration Act, if the award effects partition of immovable property
exceeding the value ofRs.100/-?
31. In that case, this Court relied upon the following passage from
Uttam Singlt Dugal & Co. v. Tiie Union of India~~ which held that
once an award is made on a subject-matter, no action can be started on G
the original claim which had been the subject matter of reference. This
Court was not concerned with any agreement between parties to subject
20
[ 1969] 2 SCR 244
21 Paragraph 7, Schedule I: 'The award shall be final and binding on the parties and
persons claiming under them respectively"
22 Civil Appeal No 162of1962 decided on I Ith October, 1962 [Unreported decision]
H
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 9 S.C.R.

A the correctness of the award to further scrutiny through an 'appeal'
procedure. It was held:
"The true legal position in regard to the effect of an award is not
in dispute. It is well settled that as a 2eneral rule, all claims
which are the subject-matter of a reference to arbitration merge
B in the award which is pronounced in the proceedings before the
arbitrator and that after an award has been pronounced, the rights
and liabilities of the parties in respect of the said claims can be
determined only on the basis of the said award. After an award
is pronounced, no action can be started on the original claim
which had been the subject-matter of the reference. As has
c been observed by Mookerjee, J. in the case of Bhajahari Saha
Banikya v. Behary Lal Basak!-3 "the award is, in fact, a final
adjudication of a Court of the parties' own choice, and until
impeached upon sufficient grounds in an appropriate proceeding,
an award, which is on the fact of it regular, is conclusive upon the
D merits of the controversy submitted, unless possibly the parties
have intended that the award shall not be final and conclusive ...
in reality, an award <possesses all the elements of vitality,
even though it has not been formally enforced, and it may
be relied upon in a litigation between the parties relating
to the same subject-matter." This conclusion, according to the
E learned Judge, is based upon the elementary principle that, as
between the parties and their privies, an award is entitled to that
respect which is due to the judgment of a court of last resort.
Therefore, ifthe award which has been pronounced between the
parties has, in fact, or can, in law, be deemed to have dealt with
F the present dispute, the second reference would be incompetent.
This position also has not been and cannot be seriously disputed."
[Emphasis supplied by us].
32. This Court held that the above decision stated the correct
position in law and was binding. This Court further adverted to paragraph
7 of Schedule I to the Arbitration Act, 1940 to state:
a
" .... We may mention that no comment was made in these cases
on the provisions of para 7 of Schedule I to the Act. This para
provides:
"7. The award shall be final and binding on the parties and
----
H "33 Cal. 881
M/S CENTROTRADE MINERALS & METAL INC. v. 105
HINDUSTAN COPPER LTD. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

persons claiming under them respectively." A
If the award is final and binding on the parties it can hardly be
said that it is a waste paper unless it is made a rule of the Court."
33. In a separate opinion Justice Hedge held as follows:
" ...... Arbitration proceedings, broadly speaking may be divided
into two stages. The first stage commences with arbitration B
agreement and ends with the making of the award. And the
second stage relates to the enforcement of the award. Paragraph
7 of the First Schedule to the Arbitration Act Jays down that "the
award shall be final and binding on the parties and persons
claiming under them respectively''. Therefore it is not possible c
to agree with the Full Bench decisions of the Patna High
Court and that of the Punjab and Haryana High Court that
an award which is not made a decree of the Court has no
existence in law. The learned Judges who decided those cases
appear to have proceeded on the basis that an award which
cannot be enforced is not a valid award and the same does not D
create any rights in the property which is the subject matter of
the award. This in my opinion is not a correct approach. The
award does create rights in that property but those rights
cannot be enforced until the award is made a decree of
the Court. It is one thing to say that a right is not created, it is E
an entirely different thing to say that the right created cannot be
enforced without further steps." [Emphasis supplied by us].
34. It is therefore quite clear that the "final and binding" clause in
Section 35 of the A&C Act does not mean final for all intents and
purposes. The finality is subject to any recourse that an aggrieved party
F
might have under a statute or an agreement providing for arbitration in
the second instance. The award is binding in a limited context.
35. Unless this interpretation is accepted, a second instance
arbitration would be per se invalid in India. This would be going against
the grain of a long line of decisions rendered by various courts in the
G
country which have accepted the validity of a two-tier arbitration
procedure under institutional rules and have not taken the view that a
two-tier arbitration procedure is per se invalid. Reference in this regard
may be made to a somewhat recent decision rendered. in Sllfi Lal Malta/
Ltd. v. l'rof(etto Gra110 Spa~ 4 wherein an award by the Board of Appeal
"(2014) 2 sec 433 H
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 9 S.C.R.

A of the Grain and Feed Trade Association, London was considered and
upheld. Similarly in Sub/ias/1 Aggarwal Agencies v. B/1ilwara
Syntltetics Ltd, ~ 5 the decision of an appellate Tribunal constituted under
the Delhi Hindustan Mercantile Association Rules and Regulations was
under consideration. Several other instances could be cited but that is
not necessary. There are several decisions of several High Courts to the
B
same effect and we see no error in the implicit acceptance of the general
principle of two-tier arbitrations.
Party autonomy
36. Party autonomy is virtually the backbone of arbitrations. This
Court has expressed this view in quite a few decisions. In two significant
c passages in Bltarat Aluminium Company v. Kaiser Aluminium
Tecllnical Services Inc. ~6 this Court dealt with party autonomy from
the point of view of the contracting parties and its importance in
commercial contracts. In paragraph 5 of the Report, it was observed:
"Party autonomy being the brooding and guiding spirit in
D arbitration, the parties are free to agree on application of three
different laws governing their entire contract-( I) proper law of
contract, (2) proper law of arbitration agreement, and (3) proper
law of the conduct of arbitration, which is popularly and in legal
parlance known as "curial law". The interplay and application of
these different laws to an arbitration has been succinctly explained
E
by this Court in Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd., 17
which is one of the earliest decisions in that direction and which
has been consistently followed in all the subsequent decisions
including the recent Reliance Industries Ltd. v. Union ofIndia 18 ."
[Emphasis supplied by us].
F Later in paragraph I 0 of the Report, it was held:
"In the matter of interpretation, the court has to make different
approaches depending upon the instrument falling for interpretation.
Legislative drafting is made by experts and is subjected to scrutiny
at different stages before it takes final shape of an Act, Rule or
G Regulation. There is another category of drafting by lawmen or
document writers who are professionally qualified and experienced
" ( 1995) I SCC 371 decided under the Indian Arbitration Act. 1940
"(2016) 4 SCCI 26, Hon'ble Judges/Coram: Anil R. Dave, Kurian Joseph and Amitava
Roy, JJ.
21
<1998) 1 sec Jos
H "(2014) 1sec603
M/S CENTROTRADE MINERALS & METAL INC. v. 107
HINDUSTAN COPPER LTD. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

in the field like drafting deeds, treaties, settlements in court, etc. A
And then there is the third category of documents made by laymen
who have no knowledge oflaw or expertise in the field. The legal
quality or perfection of the document is comparatively low in the
third category, high in second and higher in first. No doubt, in the
process of interpretation in the first category, the courts do make
B
an attempt to gather the purpose of the legislation, its context and
text. In the second category also, the text as well as the purpose
is certainly important, and in the third category of documents like
wills, it is simply intention alone of the executor that is relevant.
In the case before us, being a contract executed between
the two parties, the court cannot adopt an approach for c
interpreting a statute. The terms of the contract will have
to be understood in the way the parties wanted and intended
them to be. In that context, particularly in agreements of
arbitration, where party autonomy is the grund norm, how
the parties worked out the agreement, is one of the indicators to
D
decipher the intention, apart from the plain or grammatical meaning
of the expressions and the use of the expressions at the proper
places in the agreement." [Emphasis supplied by us].
37. In U11io11 ofI11dia v. Uttar Pradesh State Bridge Corporation
29
Ltd. this Court accepted the view 30 that the A&C Act has four
foundational pillars and then observed in paragraph 16 of the Report E
that:
"First and paramount principle of the first pillar is "fair, speedy
and inexpensive trial by an Arbitral Tribunal". Unnecessary delay
or expense would frustrate the very purpose of arbitration.
Interestingly, the second principle which is recognised in the F
Act is the party autonomy in the choice of procedure. This
means that if a particular procedure is prescribed in the arbitration
agreement which the parties have agreed to, that has to be
generally resorted to." [Emphasis supplied by us].
38. This is also the view taken in Law and Practice of
G
International Commercial Arbitration31 wherein it is said:
,. (2015) 2 sec 52
30
0.P. Malhotra on the Law and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation" (3'" Edn.
revised by Ms. lndu Malhotra, Senior Advocate) •
31
Chapter 6. Conduct of the Proceedings in Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides,
et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (Sixth Edition),(© Kluwer Law
International: Oxford University Press 2015) pp. 353 -414, paragraph 6.07
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 9 S.C.R.

A "Party autonomy is the guiding principle in determining the
procedure to be followed in an international arbitration. It is a
principle that is endorsed not only in national laws, but also by
international arbitral institutions worldwide, as well as by
international instruments such as the New York Convention.and
the Model Law."
B
39. However, the authors in Comparative International
Commercial Arbitration 3 ~ go a step further in that, apart from
procedure, they say that party autonomy permits parties to have their
choice of substantive law as well. It is said:

c "All modern arbitration laws recognise party autonomy, that
is, parties are free to determine the substantive law or rules
applicable to the merits of the dispute to be resolved by ·
arbitration. Party autonomy provides contracting parties with a
mechanism of avoiding the application of an unfavourable or
inappropriate law to an international dispute. This choice is and
D should be binding on the arbitration tribunal. This is also confirmed
in most arbitration rules." [Emphasis supplied by us].
40. Be that as it may, the legal position as we understand it is that
the parties to an arbitration agreement have the autonomy to decide not
only on the procedural law to be followed but also the substantive law.
E The choice ofjurisdiction is left to the contracting parties. In the present
case, the parties have agreed on a two tier arbitration system through
Clause 14 of the agreement and Clause 16 of the agreement provides
for the construction of the contract as a contract made in accordance
with the laws of India. We see nothing wrong in either of the two
'F clauses mutually agreed upon by the parties.
Public policy and two-tier arbitrations
41 . The question that now arises is the interplay between public
policy 'and party autonomy and therefore whether embracing the two-
tier arbitration system is contrary to public policy.
G 42. Years ago, it was said per Burroughs, J in Amicable Society
v. Bolla11d (Faunlleroy's Case): ;;Public policy is a restive horse and
when you get astride of it, there is no knowing where it will carry you."33
" Chapter 17 Determination of Applicable Law in Julian D. M. Le"; Loukas A.
Mistelis, et al., Comparative International Commercial Arbitration,(© Kluwer Law
International: Kluwer Law International 2003) pp. 411-437, paragraph 17-8
H 33 ( 1830) 4 Bligh. (N.S.) 194; 2 Dow. & Cl. 1
M/S CENTROTRADE MINERALS & METAL INC. v. 109
HINDUSTAN COPPER LTD. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

Perhaps to assist in getting over this uncertainty, Mustill and Boyd3• A
identify four classes of provision regarded by the courts as contrary to
public policy. They are: (i) Terms which affect the substantive content
of the award; (ii) Terms which purport to exclude or restrict the
supervisory jurisdiction of the Court; (iii) Terms which require the
arbitrator to conduct the reference in an unacceptable manner; and (iv)
B
Terms which purport to empower the arbitrator to carry put procedures
or exercise powers which lie exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
courts. Clause 14 of the agreement between the parties does not fall
under any of these situations ..
43. In our country, the case law on the subject has recently been
exhaustively discussed and stated in Associate Builders v. De/Iii c
Development Autlwrity35 and it is not necessary to revisit this. Briefly,
it has been held that an award could be set aside if it is contrary to:
(a) fundamental policy oflndian law; or
(b) the interest of India; or D
(c)justice or morality, or
(d) if it is patently illegal.
44. For the present we are concerned only with the fundamental
or public policy of India. Even assuming the broad delineation of the
E
fundamental policy oflndia as stated in Associate Builders we do not
find anything fundamentally objectionable in the parties preferring and
accepting the two-tier arbitration system. The parties to the contract
have 11ot by-passed any mandatory provision of the A&C Act and were
aware, or at least ought to have been aware that they could have agreed
upon the finality ofan award given by the arbitration panel of the Indian F
Counci 1of Arbitration in accordance with the Rules ofArbitration of the
Indian Council ofArbitration. Yet they voluntarily and deliberately chose
to agree upon a second or appellate arbitration in London, UK in
accordance with the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce. There is nothing in the A&C Act
G
that prohibits the contracting parties from agreeing upon a second instance
or appellate arbitration -either explicitly or implicitly. No such prohibition
or mandate can be read into the A&C Act except by an unreasonable
"The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in England, London, Butterworths
1982 pp. 245-246
"(20I5J 3 sec 49 H
no SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 9 S.C.R.

A and awkward misconstruction and by straining its language to a vanishing
point. We are not concerned with the reason why the parties (including
HCL) agreed to a second instance arbitration -the fact is that they did
and are bound by the agreement entered into by them. HCL cannot
wriggle out of a solemn commitment made by it voluntarily, deliberately
and with eyes wide open.
B
45. We decline to read the A&C Act in the manner suggested by
learned counsel for HCL and hold that the arbitration clause in the
agreement betWeen the parties does not violate the fundamental or public
policy oflndia by the parties agreeing to a second instance arbitration. It
follows from our discussion that the award which is required to be
c challenged by HCL is the award rendered on 291h September, 200 I by
the arbitrator in London.
Conclusion
46. In view of the above, the first question before us is answered
D in the affirmative. The appeals should be listed again for consideration
of the second question which relates to the enforcement of the appellate
award.
Nidhi Jain Matters adjourned.