M/S CHENNAI PROPERTIES & INVESTMENTS LTD., CHENNAIversusTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL 111, TAMIL NADU
- Citation
- 2015 INSC 300
- Decided
- 9 April 2015
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- A K SIKRI
Holding
Income from letting out properties is to be treated as business income when letting out is the main object of the assessee.
Summary
Chennai Properties & Investments Ltd., a company whose memorandum of association states that its main object is to acquire and let out properties, earned rental income from two properties and disclosed it as business income. The assessing officer treated the same income as "income from house property" and taxed it accordingly. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal held that the income was business income, but the Madras High Court reversed this view, relying on East India Housing case. The Supreme Court examined the nature of the company's activity, the object clause, and precedents such as Karanpura Development and Sultan Brothers, concluding that letting out was the business of the assessee and the income must be taxed as business income. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the High Court judgment set aside, and the ITAT order restored.
Issues considered
- Whether income derived from letting out properties by a company whose main object is to acquire and let out properties constitutes business income under the Income Tax Act, 1961 or income from house property.
- Whether the object clause of a company's memorandum of association determines the character of income for tax purposes.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
[2015] 4 S.C.R. 413 413
M/S CHENNAI PROPERTIES A
& INVESTMENTS LTD., CHENNAI
V.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
CENTRAL 111, TAMIL NADU B
Civil Appeal No. 4494 of 2004
APRIL 09, 2015.
[ A.K. SIKRI AND R. F. NARIMAN,JJ. ] C
Income Tax Act, 1961: Business income - ff an
assessee acquires properties and lets out and such letting
out of properties is the business of assessee then the
income received from letting out of such properties is D
business income - It cannot be treated as 'income from
the house property'.
East India Housing and Land Development Trust Ltd.
v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal (1961) 42 E
ITR 491; Sultan Brothers (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Income Tax 1964 (5) SCR 807; Karanpura Development
Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal 44
ITR 362 SC - relied on.
F
Case Law Reference
(1961) 42 ITR 491 relied on. Para 2
1964 (5) SCR 807 relied on. Para 2
G
44 ITR 362 SC relied on. Para 8
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
4494 of 2004.
413 H
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 4 S.C.R.
A From the Judgment and Order dated 05.09.2002 of the
High Court of Judicature at Madras in Tax Case No. 129 of
1997
with
8
C. A. Nos. 4491-4493 of 2004
Pridesh Kapur, Ms. Radha Rangaswamy, Rupinder
Singh, V. Balachandran, for the Appellant.
C Guru Kirshna Kumar, Niranjana Singh, S. A. Haseeb,
Anil Katiyar, 8. V. Balaram Das, for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A. K. SIKRI, J.
D
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4494 OF 2004.
1. The appellant-assessee is a company incorporated
under the Indian Companies Act. Its main objective, as
stated in the Memorandum of Association, is to acquire the
E properties in the city of Madras (now Chennai) and to let
out those properties. The assessee had rented out such
properties and the rental income received therefrom was
shown as income from business in the return filed by the
F assessee. The assessing officer, however, refuse to tax the
same as business income. According to the a:::~essing
officer, since the income was received from letting out of
theproperties, it was in the nature of rental income. He,
thus, held that it would be treated as income from house
G property and taxed the same accordingly under that Head.
2. The assessee filed the appeal before the
Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) who allowed the
same by his orders dated 06.04.1989 holding it to be
H
CHENNAI PROP. & INVESTMENTS LTD. v. THE 415
COMMNR. OF l.T. CENTRAL Ill, T. N. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]
income from business and directed that it should be treated A
as such and taxed accordingly. Aggrieved by that order, the
Department filed appeal before the Income Tax Appellate
Tribunal which declined to interfere with the order of the
Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and dismissed the B
appeal. The Department approached the High Court. This
appeal of the Department has been allowed by the High
Court vide its order dated 05.09.2002 holding that the
income derived by letting out of the properties would not
be income from business but could be assessed only C
income from house property. A perusal of the impugned
judgment of the High Court would show that it has primarily
rested its decision on the basis of the judgment of this
Court in 'East India Housing and Land Development Trust D
Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal [(1961)
42 ITR 49] as well as the Constitution Bench judgment of
this Court in 'Sultan Brothers (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Income Tax' [1964 (5) SCR 807]. C·
E
3. From the aforesaid facts, it is clear that the question
which is to be determined on the facts of this case is as
to whether the income derived by the company from letting
out this property is to be treated as income from business F
or it is to be treated as rental income from house property.
4. Wtq_ have heard the learned counsel for the parties
on the aforesaid issue. Before we narrate the legal principle
that needs to be applied to give the answer to the G
aforesaid question, we would like to recapitulate some
seminal features of the present case.
5. The Memorandum of Association of the appellant-
H
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 4 S.C.R.
A company which is placed on record mentions main objects
as well as incidental or ancillary objects in clause· Ill. (A)
and (B) respectively. The main object of the appellant
company is to acquire and hold the properties known as
8 "Chennai House" and "Firhavin Estate" both in Chennai and
to let out those properties as well as make advances upon
the security of lands and buildings or other properties or
any interest therein. What we emphasise is that holding the
aforesaid properties and earning income by letting out
C those properties is the main objective of the company. It
may further be recorded that in the return that was filed,
· entire income which accrued and was assessed in the said
return was from letting out of these properties. It is so
D recorded and accepted by the assessing officer himself in
his order.
6. It transpires that the return of a total income of
Rs.244030 was filed for the assessment year in question
E that is asse~sment year 1983- 1984 and the entire income
was through letting out of the aforesaid two properties
namely, "Chennai House" and "Firhavin Estate". Thus, there
is no other income ot the assessee except the income
F from letting out of these two properties. We have to decide
the issue keeping in mind the aforesaid aspects.
7. With this background, we first refer to the judgment
of this Court in East India Housing and Land Development
G Trust Ltd.'s case which has been relied upon by the High
Court. That was a case where the company was
incorporated with the object of buying and developing
landed properties and promoting and developing markets.
H Thus, the main objective of the company was to develop
CHENNAI PROP. & INVESTMENTS LTD. v. THE 417
COMMNR. OF l.T. CENTRAL Ill, T. N. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]
the landed properties into markets. It so happened that A
some shops and stalls, which were developed by it, had
been rented out and income was derived from the renting
of the said shops and stalls. In those facts, the question
arose for consideration was: whether the rental income that B
is received was to be treated as income from the house
property or the income from the business. This court while
holding that the income shall be treated as income from the
house property, rested its decision in the context of the
main objective of the company and took note of the fact that C
letting out of the property was not the object of the
company at all. The court was therefore, of the opinion that
the character of that income which was from the house
property had not altered because it was received by the D
company formed with the object of developing and setting
up properties.
8. Before we refer to the Constitution Bench judgment
in the case of Sultan Brothers (P) Ltd., we would be well E
advised to discuss the law laid down authoritatively and
succinctly by this Court in 'Karanpura Development Co. Ltd.
v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal' [44 ITR 362
(SC)]. That was also a case where· the company, which F
was the assessee, was formed with the object, inter alia, of
acquiring and disposing of the underground coal mining
rights in certain coal fields and it had restricted its activities
to acquiring coal mining leases over large areas,
developing them as coal fields and then sub-leasing them G
to collieries and other companies. Thus, in the said case,
the leasing out of the coal fields to the collieries and other
companies was the business of the assessee. The income
which was received from letting out of those mining leases H
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 4 S.C.R.
A was shown as business income. Department took the
position that it is to be treated as income from the house
property. It would be thus, clear that in similar
circumstances, identical issue arose before the Court. This
8 Court first discussed the scheme of the Income Tax Act and
particularly six heads under which income can be
categorised I classified. It was pointed out that before
income, profits or gains can be brought to computation,
they have to be assigned to one or the other head. These
c heads are in a sense exclusive of one another and income
which falls within one head cannot be assigned to, or taxed
under, another head. Thereafter, the Court pointed out that
the deciding factor is not the ownership of land or leases
D but the nature of the activity of the assessee and the nature
of the operations in relation to them. It was highlighted and
stressed that the objects of the company must also be kept
in view to interpret the activities. In support of the
E aforesaid proposition, number of judgments of other
jurisdictions, i.e. Privy Counsel, House of Lords in England
and US Courts were taken note of. The position in law,
ultimately, is summed up in the following words:-
F "As has been already pointed out in connection with
the other two cases where there is a letting out of
premises and collection of rents the assessment on
property basis may be correct but not so, where the
letting or sub-letting is part of a trading operation. The
G diving line is difficult to find; but in the case of a
company with its professed objects and the manner
of its activities and the nature of its dealings with its
property, it is possible to say on which side the
H operations fall and to what head the income is to be
CHENNAI PROP. & INVESTMENTS LTD. v. THE 419
COMMNR. OF l.T. CENTRAL Ill, T. N. [A K. SIKRI, J.]
assigned." A
9. After applying the aforesaid principle to the facts,
which were there before the Court, it came to the
conclusion that income had to be treated as income from
business and not as income from house property. We are B
of the opinion that the aforesaid judgment in Karanpura
Development Co. Ltd.'s case squarely applies to the facts
of the present case.
10. No doubt in Sultan Brothers (P) Ltd.'s case,
c
Constitution Bench judgment of this Court has clarified that
merely an entry in the object clause showing a particular
object would not be the determinative factor to arrive at an
conclusion whether the income is to be treated as income D
from business and such a question would depend upon the
circumstances of each case, viz., whether a particular
business is letting or not. This is so stated in the following
words: - E
"We think each case has to be looked at from a
businessman's point of view to find out whether the
letting was the doing of a business or the exploitation
of his property by an owner. We do not further think F
that a thing can by its very nature be a commercial
asset. A commercial asset is only an asset used in
a business and nothing else, and business may be
carried on with practically all things. Therefore, it is G
not possible to say that a particular activity is
business because it is concerned with an asset with
which trade is commonly carried on. We find nothing
in the cases referred, to support the proposition that
certain assets are commercial assets in their very H
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 4 S.C.R.
A nature."
11. We are conscious of the aforesaid dicta laid down
in the Constitution Bench judgment. It is for this reason, we
have, at the beginning of this judgment, stated the
B circumstances of the present case from which we arrive at
irresistible conclusion that in this case, letting of the
properties is in fact is the business of the assessee. The
assessee therefore, rightly disclosed the income under the
c Head Income from· Business. It cannot be treated as
'income from the house property'. We, accordingly, allow
this appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court
and restore that of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. No
orders as to costs.
D
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4491-4493 OF 2004
12. The appeals are disposed of in terms of the
aforesaid order in Civil Appeal No. 4494 of 2004.
E
Devika Gujral Appeals disposed of.
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