Holding

Under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, a person who continues to occupy government land without lawful entitlement, including a successor‑in‑interest, is a “land grabber”, and the Special Court may adjudicate title, possession and related relief notwithstanding any pending regularisation application.

Summary

Mis Mahalaxmi Motors Ltd. purchased land that had vested in the State of Andhra Pradesh after the 1955 Abolition of Inams Act and constructed a workshop, but the High Court held the land belonged to the State and dismissed its writ petitions. The State, through the Mandal Revenue Officer, initiated proceedings under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, alleging the appellant was a land grabber and seeking eviction and compensation. The Special Court found the appellant to be a land grabber, relying on the fact that the predecessor‑in‑interest had no title and the appellant continued unlawful possession, a finding affirmed by the High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the scope of the Act, the definition of “land grabber”, and whether a pending regularisation application barred the State’s action. The Court held that the definition includes successors‑in‑interest, that an allegation of unlawful possession suffices to invoke the Act, and that pending regularisation does not oust the Special Court’s jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the Special Court’s order upheld.

Issues considered

Whether the Special Court constituted under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 has jurisdiction to determine title, possession and related civil matters.
Whether the definition of “land grabber” under Section 2(e) of the Act includes a successor‑in‑interest who acquired the land through a registered sale deed.
Whether the appellant’s pending application for regularisation of the land bars the State from initiating proceedings under the Act.
Whether possession based on a registered deed, without lawful entitlement, amounts to “land grabbing” requiring unlawful intent.
Whether the burden of proof under Section 10 of the Act lies on the State to establish that the appellant is a land grabber.

Legislation cited

Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972
Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982s. 10, s. 15, s. 2(e), s. 4, s. 8(1)
Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955s. 3(1)
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Subjects

land grabbingspecial court jurisdictiondefinition of land grabberpredecessor-in-interestregularisation applicationestoppelAndhra Pradesh Land Grabbing Acttitle and possessionunlawful possession

Judgment

MIS MAHALAXMI MOTORS LTD.
v.
MANDAL REVENUE OFFICER AND ORS.

OCTOBER 10, 2007
B
[S.B. SINHA AND H.S. BEDI, JJ.]

Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982:
C ss. 2(e),4 and 8(1)-Landgrabbing-Suit lands vested in State
Government-Application for occupancy certificate by a person
claiming himself as lnamdar of suit lands rejected-The said person
sold the suit land-Vendee raised constructions thereon-His
application for regularization rejected-Meanwhile application u/s 8(1)
D filed by State Government, allowed by Special Court-Order affirmed
by High Court-HELD: Definition of 'land grabber' is not restricted
to party to proceedings but also includes his predecessor-in-interest-
Only because a person has entered into possession ofland on the basis
of a purported sale deed, the same by itself would not be sufficient to
E hold that he did not enter over the land unauthorisedly, unfairly or
greedily-Question whether the land grabber has grabbed the land or
not, ordinarily is required to be determined as on the date offiling of
the application-An averment in the application u/s 8 that the procedee
had been in unlawful possession itselfis sufficient to invoke provisions
of the Act-Pendency of an application for regularization of land ;:i
F would not stand in the way of the State to initiate proceedings under
the Act-The facts ofthe matter squarely cover the ingredients ofs. 2(e)
ofthe Act-Doctrine ofestoppel-Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area)
Abolition of1nams Act, 1955-Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment
Act, 1905.
G
Land grabbing-Jurisdiction ofSpecial Court.
One' R' claiming ownership of certain lands as Inamdar, applied
for occupancy certificate from the State Government. His application
was rejected. 'R' then transferred the said lands by executing two
H 964
I

~ MIS MAHALAXMI MOTORS LTD. v. MANDAL 965
REVENUE OFFICER
registered sale deeds in January 1985 in favour of the appellant, and A
thereafter filed a writ petition before the High Court, which by its
order dated 63.1987 held that in view of s. 3(1) of the A.P. (Telangana
Area) Abolition oflnams Act, 1955 Act, the lands in question had
vested in the State. The said judgment attained finality. Despite this,
the appellant raised constructions on the suit lands. A notice under B
the A.P. Land Encroachment Act, 1905 was issued to the appellant
describing it as 'encroacher' of the suit land, which was
) unsuccessfully challenged by the appellant in a writ petition before
the High Court. The appellant also filed an application before the
State Government for regularization of the lands which was C
dismissed. The said order was challenged by the appellant in a writ
petition before the High Court. Meanwhile an application against
the appellant in terms of s. 8(1) of the A.P. Land Grabbing
(Prohibition) Act, 1982 was filed praying, inter alia, for eviction of
the appellant from the suit lands declaring it as land grabber and
for punishing it u/s 4(3) of the Act. The Special Court allowed the D
said application. The writ petition of the appellant having been
dismissed, it filed the instant appeal.
It was contended for the appellant, inter alia, that the Special
Court as also the High Court erred in not considering that the E
respondent neither pleaded nor proved the ingredients of the terms
'land grabber' and 'land grabbing' as defined in the Act; that the
appellant having entered into possession pursuant to registered sale
deeds, it was not questionable under the Act; that during the
pendency of the application of the appellant for regularization of the
lands in question, the application u/s 8 of the Act was not F
maintainable.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The Special Court constituted under the A.P. Land
-f Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 exercises jurisdiction of the Civil G
Court, provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure being applicable;
and, therefore, all questions relating to title and possession can be
gone into by it. The proceedings can be initiated in terms of Section
4 of the said Act against a person who continues to be in occupation,
othenvise than as a lawful tenant, of a grabbed land belonging to the H
I

__ \
966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R. \

A Government, local authority, religious or charitable institution or
endowment including a wakf, or any private person. If and when
proceedings are initiated under the Act, the proceedee not only can
raise a jurisdictional question but can also raise questions relating
to his ti tie and possession. Lawful entitlement on the part of a party
B to possess the land being the determinative factor, it is axiomatic
that so long as the land grabber would not be able to show his legal
entitlement to hold the land, the jurisdiction of the Special Court
cannot be held to be ousted. [Paras 30 and 31] (988-D, E; 989-B]
Konda Lakshmana Bapujiv. Government ofAndhra Pradesh and
C Ors., (2002] 3 SCC 258; State ofA.P. v. Smt. Pramela Modi and Ors.,
(2006) 11 SCALE 38; Union of India v. Tata Teleservices
(Maharashtra) Ltd., JT (2007) 10 SC 356 and Gouni Satya Reddi v.
Government ofAndhra Pradesh and Ors., [2004] 7 SCC 398, relied
on.
D A.P. Housing Boardv. Mohammad Sadatullah & Ors., (2007) 5
SCALE 681, referred to.
2.1. The definition of 'land grabber' is not restricted to the party
to the proceedings, but includes his predecessor-in-interest also.
E Once the land is held to be a Government land, the logical corollary
thereto would be that subject to the law oflimitation and prescription,
the State would not lose the said right to the opposite party.
[Para 33] (989-D, E]
2.2. What is necessary to be proved is the substance of the
F allegation. The proof of intention on the part of a person being his
state of mind, the ingredients of the provisions must be considered
keeping in view the materials on record as also circumstances
attending thereto. What would be germane for lawful entitlement to
remain in possession would be that the proceedee proves that he
G had bona fide claim over the land. The question in regard to lawful
entitlement of the proceedee, therefore, for invoking the charging
section plays an important and significant role.
[Paras 35 and 36] [989-G, H; 990-A, C]
Konda La/r.shmana Bapuji v. Government ofAndhra Pradesh and
H
'j·· MIS MAHALAXMI MOTORS LTD. v. MANDAL 967
REVENUE OFFICER
Ors., [2002] 3 SCC 258, relied on. A
-i'
2.3. The person's purported belief that he is legally entitled to
hold the land and his possession is not otherwise illegal must also
be judged not only from the point of time when he entered into the
possession or when he had acquired the purported title but also from
B
the point of view as to whether by reason of determination of such a
question by a competent court oflaw, he has been found to have no
title and consequently continuance of his possession becomes illegal.
1 The provisions of the Act must be construed so as to enable the
tribunal to give effect thereto. It cannot be construed in a pedantic
manner which if taken to its logical corollary would make the c
provisions wholly unworkable. [Para 37] [990-D, E, G]
3.1. Only because a person has entered into possession of a
land on the basis of a purported registered sale deed, the same by
itself, would not be sufficient to come to the conclusion thathe had D
--( not entered over the land unauthorisedly, unfairly, or greedily. For
determination of such an issue, the Special Court will be entitled to
take into consideration not only the rival claims of the parties, but
also the earlier round of litigation, if any, and subsequent conduct
of the proceedee himself. The question as to whether the land E
grabber had grabbed the land or not ordinarily is required to be
determined as on the date of filing of the. application.
[Paras 30, 37 and 38] [990-G, H; 991-A, B; 988-F]
)-
3.2. 'R', the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant, was
claiming the suit lands as if it were a grant by way oflnam. The High F
Court categorically came to the finding that the land in question had
vested in the State Government and 'R' was not entitled even to
grant of an occupancy certificate. 'R' had, therefore, no title over
the land. It was obligatory on the part of the appellant keeping in
view the doctrine of caveat emptor to examine the title of the vendor G
1 over the land, it purchased. Within a period of two years from the
date of purchase, the appellant became aware that it had acquired
no title thereto and it had illegally been occupying the land, as the
same belonged to the Government and, thus, the latter was entitled
to possess the same. Apart therefrom, the appellant was put to notice H
968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] I 0 S.C.R .. ~\
A that it was an encroacher. [Para 39) [991-C, DJ
4.1. An averment that the appellant had been in unlawful
possession itself is sufficient to invoke the proyisions of the Act.
So far as the pleadings in the application under Section 8 of the Act
are concerned, suffice it to say that the same was filed in a
B prescribed form. There does not exist any column where the
requisite pleadings by way of fulfilling the second part of the
ingredients of land grabbing could be pleaded. With the said
application, a concise statement was annexed. The said concise
statement, therefore, became a part of the application. It has
C categorically been stated therein that the appellant without having
any right or title illegally encroached upon the Government land.
The history of litigation and the area of encroachment had also been
specifically stated therein. A sketch map showing the same was
annexed the1·eto. The fact that the appellant had made constructions
D illegally and had been running a workshop was specifically pleaded.
One of the reliefs prayed for therein, inter alia, was to declare that
the appellant was a land grabber. It is, therefore, not .a case where
it can be said that the respondent failed to plead the requisite
ingredients of the definition of the term·'Jand grabbing'. It was,
E therefore, not necessary for respondent no. 1 to make averments
that the appellant illegally, forcibly, unscrupulously or with criminal
intention of grabbing the Government land entered upon the
Government land. Besides, pleadings of the parties, it is now well
settled, are not to be construed in a pedantic manner. The Special
F Court took note of the c<_mtentions of the parties and arrived at a
definite finding, having regard to the history of the litigation between
the parties, that the appellant was a land grabber.
[Paras 41, 42, 43, 45 and 46)
[991-H; 992-A, B; 993-C, D; 994-B, C, DJ
G Des Raj and Ors. v. Bhagat Ram (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors., (2007) 3
SCALE 371, relied on.
5. Pend ency of an application for regularization of the land
would not stand in the way of the State to initiate a proceeding under
H the Act. If and when the prayer of the land grabber for regularization
)
y_
I MIS MAHALAXMI MOTORS LTD. v. MANDAL 969
REVENUE 0 FFI CER [SINHA, J.]
oft.he land is allowed, he would become entitled thereto. The. A
application filed by the appellant before the State Government for
regularization of the land although may not be determinative of the
issue as to whether it is a land grabber or not could be taken into
consideration for a limited purpose, namely, admission or
acknowledgement on its part in regard to the title of the State. It B
was possible for the appellant to file an application for regularization
ofland without prejudice to its rights and contentions in the pending
proceedings, but having regard to the decisions rendered by the High
Court in two writ petitions, it would be fair to presume ~hat the
appellant filed the said application knowing fully well as to "'.here it C
stood. Once it had taken a specified stand knowing fully well that it
had no right, title and interest in or over the land in question, it cannot
in law turn round and contend that the same was not binding on it.
Doctrine of estoppel in a situation of this nature, would squarely
apply. [Paras 30 and 44] [988-G; 989-A; 993-E, F, G]
D
6. Keeping in view the fact that the appellant or his
predecessor-in-interest had no title and consequently he could not
acquire any title, all other contentions raised on behalf of the
appellant, pale into insignificance. The fact of the matter squarely
covers the ingredients of Section 2(e) of the Act. E
[Para 46] [994-D, E]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4755
of2007.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.4.2007 of the High Court F
of Judicature Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in W.P. No. 15920/2004.
Gopal Subramanium, ASG., Shyam Divan and T.K. Ganju, T.
Sudhakar Reddy, S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Bina Madhavan, Nupur (for
Lawyer Knit & Co.) Pramod Dayal, AK. Thakur, Nikunj Dayal, Manoj
y Saxena, Rajnish Kumar Singh, Rahul Shukla, T.V. George, Raghenth G
Basant, Balaji and Asheesh Jain for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
H
-~~
970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R. \

A 2. Interpretation and/or application of the provisions of the Andhra
Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (for short, 'the Act') is
y
involved in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated
30.04.2007 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Writ Petition
(Civil) No. 15920 of2004.
B Facts:
3. The land bearing Survey No. 82 situate in village Bowenpally and
Survey No. 15711 situate in Village Thokatta appurtenant to Trimulgheny "'f
Mandal, Hyderabad, admeasuring 7788 sq. metres were inam lands. The
c said lands vested in the State of Andhra Pradesh upon coming into force
of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition oflnams Act, 1955
(for short, 'the 1955 Act') with effect from 20.07.1955.
4. One B. Ramender Reddy and several others were claiming
ownership of the said lands purported to have acquired title of the
D Inamdars. They sought for the grant of occupancy certificate from the
I)._
State. The application filed in that behalf was rejected by the Collector.
5. Ramender Reddy, however, transferred his purported right, title
and interest in the said lands by reason of two registered deeds of sale
E dated 03.01.1985 and 05.01.1985 in favour;af the appellant, which is a
company registered and incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956.
6. Despite the fact that Ramender Reddy had already transferred
his right, title and interest in favour of the appellant-company by reason
of the aforementioned deeds of sale, he along with some others, who were ~
F also claiming similar rights, filed writ petitions before the Andhra Pradesh
High Court being Writ Petitions Nos. 8734 to 8737of1983 etc. The
said writ petitions were dismissed by reason of a judgment and order
dated 06.03.1987 by a learned Single Judge of the said Court opining
that in view of Section 3(1) of the 1955 Act the lands in question had
G vested in the State. The said judgment attained finality. Even a Special y·
Leave Petition preferred thereagainst has been dismissed by this Court.
7. Appellant, however, despite knowledge of the said judgment and
order dated 06.03.1987 allegedly made huge investments by raising
construction thereupon. A notice under the Andhra Pradesh Land
H
'l
I
M/S MAHALAXMI MOTORS LTD. v. MANDAL 971
REVENUEOFFICER[SINHA,J.]
--( Encroachment Act, 1905 was issued on it on 27.04.1987, wherein the A
company was described as an 'encroacher' of the land in question.
Questioning the legality of the said notice, a writ application was filed by
the appellant, which was marked as Writ Petition No. 5954of1987.
8. We may observe that during the pendency of the said writ petition.
the appellant filed an application for regularization of the said land before B
the State, relevant recitals whereof are as under :
"We are informed by the Honourable Mandal Revenue Officer
that an extent of781 sq. mtrs. Land is a Government land in the
Workshop and that the possession thereof must be delivered to C
the Government.
It is respectfully submitted that the workshop has been
functioning for last 10 years at the aforesaid S. Nos. and the portion
said to be belonging to the Government is abetting the main road
and if the same is taken over by the Government it will make D
impossible for us to have an access to the workshop apart
therefrom it will not be possible for us to utilize the workshop.
In the circumstances we request you to kindly Sir, to regularize
the ownership of that land and we are agreeable to pay a E
reasonable compensation to the Government for the land abutting
the main road and the land to our extent of 1485.08 sq. mtrs. in
the same survy no. which is lying vacant because if it is allotted to
-
> somebody then we will not have our access to our workshop.
If the land is not allotted to us the entire business of the F
company will be greatly affected and many families, depended will
be put to great loss and hardship.
In this connection we also wish to bring to your kind attention
that the land was initially inhabitable and unusable being full of G
boulders and rocks and after spending huge sums we had made it
suitable for construction purpose. This aspects may kindly be kept
in view while fixing the reasonable compensation payable by us
for the said land."
H
\'
972 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R. - \

A 9'. In response thereto, the appellant was asked to withdraw his writ
petition, being Writ Petition No. 5954 of 1987, so as to enable the
Government to examine the issue ofregularization of the possession,
subject of course, to the payment of the market value of the land.
Appellant, however, did not withdraw the said vmt application. Despite
B the same, ·the Collector allegedly made recommendations for regularization
of the land in favour of the appellant, stating:
"The Petitioner informed that the matter has been brought to
the Supreme Court and is pending. This Office has no information
with regard to the filing of case in the Supreme Court. However,
c the land is Inam land which is already vested with the Government
and possession has been assumed during the year 1987. Since the
Petitioner is a purchaser of the said land (partly) and has filed
undertaking to pay the prevailing Market value regularization of the
land in Sy. No. 82 Bowenpally village can be considered subject
D to outcome of the decision of the Supreme court, if any.
According to basic valuation register in the above vicinity the
Market value is @ Rs. 500/- to Rs. 850/- per sq. yard for the
years 1991-92 and between Rs. 780/- to Rs. 1240/-per sq. yard
in the year 1993.
E
Therefore the lands in Sy. No.15711 to an extent of 2763 sq.
yards and land in Sy. No. 82 of Bowenpally village to an extent
of 7728 sq. yards i.e. total 10491 sq. yards or 8772 sq. mtrs. is
recommended for regularization on payment of Market value@
F Rs. 1240/- per sq. yard in favour of the Mis Mahalaxmi Motor
Private Limited in relaxation of ban orders issued in G.O.Ms. No.
634 Revenue (Ann-III) Department dt. 2.7.1990."
10. The said writ petition was disf!.1issed by the High Court by a
G judgment and order dated 04.06.1996, holding :
"As the vendor of the Petitioner have (sic) failed to get
occupancy certificate in their favour, the Petitioner who is clainllng
.under its vendor cannot obtain any relief in this writ petition. The
writ petition therefore fails, and is accordingly dismissed.
H
'f
/ MIS MAHALAXMI MOTORS LTD. v. MAND AL 973
REVENUE 0 FFI CER (SINHA, J.]
However, the Petitioner is granted six weeks time for obtaining A
appropriate orders from the concerned authorities."
11. Prayer of the appellant for regularization of the land was rejected
by the State by an order dated 06.12.1999. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied
therewith, the appell~t filed another writ application before the Andhra B
Pradesh High Court, which was marked as Writ Petition No. 15 of2000.
12. During the pendency of the said proceedings, the First
Respondent herein initiated a proceeding in terms of Section 8( 1) of the
Act before the Special Court, praying, inter alia, for the foflowing reliefs:
"(i) Declare that the respondent is land grabber. c
(ii) Evict the respondent from the application scheduled land.
(iii) Award compensation of Rs. 20/- per sq. meters per month
from 1985 for the wrongful possession of the land in question.
D
(iv) Award cost of this petition.
(v) Punish the respondent under sub-section (3) uf Section 4
of tct.
(vi) Pass any other relief or reliefs as the Hon'ble Court may
deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case." E

13. Appellant filed its written statement in the said proceeding,
contending that the provisions of the said Act were not applicable.
14. On or about 30.07.2001, inter alia, on the premise that the
aforementioned order dated 06.12.1999 was not a speaking one, while F
allowing the writ petition No. 15 of2000, the High Court remitted the
matter to the State Government for consideration of the appellant's prayer
for regularization afresh having regard to the recommendations of the
Collector dated 22.10.1994 and that of the Commissioner dated
"'> 30.09.1997 within a period of two months. G
)

15. It is not in dispute that only recently, namely, on 03.08.2007,
the said prayer of the appellant for regularization of the land has been
rejected.
H
974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS '[2007] 10 S.C.R. -\
A 16. Before the Special Court, the appellant, inter alia, raised the
following contentions :
"(i) The petitioner did not enter upon the land suddenly or
unscrupulously but through registered sale deeds and it was
not a "land grabber" as defined in Section 2(d), (e) and (i) of
B the Act.
(ri) The sale deed clearly showed that the Petitioners were in
uninterrupted possession of the land since 1985, whi.le its
predecessors-in-title were in possession since 1960s. The
c predecessors-in-title had not been impleaded in LGC No. 7
of2000.
(rii) The Petitioner's application for regularization was pending
before the Government and the definitional requirement of a
"Land Grabber" had not been fulfilled.
D (iv) The initial burden of proving that the Petitioner was a Land
Grabber as mandated by Section 10 of the Act had not been
fulfilled
(v) The Petitioner was a bona fide purchaser of the property for
E valuable consideration and huge amount of money has been
spent to develop the land for an automobile workshop.
(vi) The Respondents had not initiated proceedings against the
Petitioner for over 12 years."

F 17. In view of the pleadings of the parties, the Special Court framed
the following issues :
"(i) Whether the Applicant has title to the application schedule
land?
(li) Whether the rival title set up by the Respondent is true, valid
G and binding?
(rii) Whether the Respondent is a land grabber within the meaning
of the Act XII of 1982?
(iv) In the event of success, whether the Applicant is entitled to
H the compensation as claimed?
1 MIS MAHALAXMI MOTORS LTD. v. MANDAL
REVENUE OFFICER [SINHA, J.]
975

(v) Whether any direction can be given by this Court for A
-i regulariz.ation in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 508 and 972?
(vi) To what relief?

18. By a judgment and order dated 11.08.2004, the Special Court
allowed the said application of the First Respondent, holding : B
" ... Thus, it is clear that the vendor of the respondent failed to get
Occupancy Certificate of the application schedule property and he
has no title to sell the same .. .ln Ex. B. 4 in para 7 of the Hon'ble
High Court categorically held stating "it is not in dispute that the
petitioner has purchased the land in 1985, but it was finally declared c
that the land belonged to the Government." Thus, the very
document relied by the respondent herein under Ex. B. 4 clearly
indicates that the application schedule land is a Government
land ....The very fact that he applied for regulariz.ation of the
application schedule land clearly indicates that the respondent having D
recogniz.ed the Government as titleholder ofthe application schedule
land applied for regulariz.ation of the same as he occupied the land
since more than 14 years and running garage ... Thus, the very
testimony of PW 1 clubbed with the documentary evidence Exs.
Al, A2 Pahanies, A3 village Map ofBowenpally and Thokatta E
Villages, A.4 rough sketch showing the application schedule land
clearly establishes that the application schedule land is a
Government land ... But this petition is filed in the year 2000 and
as his possession of the application schedule land is for 14 years,
he is not entitled to raise the plea of adverse possession." F
The Special Court further held :
"In view of our discussion on issues 1 and 2 as it was
established that respondent is in possession of the application
'(
schedule land without any legal entitlement, he can be ranked as G
land grabber within the meaning of the Act. .. The applicant did not
adduce any evidence for grant of compensation. There is no iota
of evidence in this regard .. .In view of the provisions of the A.P.
Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, the Special Court has no
jurisdiction to give any direction to the Government, who is the H
976 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.
-~.
A owner and who got title over the property for regularization of the
land ... But the learned counsel for the respondent contended that
above said proceeding for regularization is pending before the
Government. It is a matter between the Government and the
respondent. .. As the respondent is in possession of the application
B schedule land without any legal entitlement it can be dubbed as
land grabber within the meaning of the Act and liable for eviction
and ordered accordingly."
19. A writ petition filed thereagainst by the appellant before the
Andhra Pradesh High Court, which was marked as Writ Petition No.
C 15920 of 2004, has been dismissed by reason of the impugned judgment.
Submissions :
· 20. Mr. Shyarn Divan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
D of the appellant, raised the following contentions in support of the appeal: _ '
1

(i) The learned Special Court as also the High Court committed
a manifest error in passing the impugned judgment insofar as
they failed to take into consideration that the first respondent
neither pl.eaded nor proved the ingredients of the terms 'land
E grabber' and 'land grabbing' as defined in the said Act.
(ii) The averment to the effect that the appellant had allegedly
~ncroached the Government Jand was not sufficient to establish
the existence of the essential ingredients of the provisions of
the said Act that the appellant had any intention or knowledge
F to take possession of the land in question illegally.
(iii) Appellant herein, having entered into the possession pursuant
to two registered deeds of sale and having been allowed to
take possession and raise constructions upon expending a large
swn of money, must be held to be acted bona fide being under
G the impression that he had a right to do so. It was, therefore,
not a case where the appellant had taken possession of the
land belonging to the Government, unauthorizedly, unfairly and
greedily or snatched. forcibly, violently or unscrupulously the
subject land or that it was a successor in interest of any such
H
f----
1
MIS MAHALAXMI MOTORS LTD. v. MANDAL 977
REVENUE OFFICER [SINHA, J.]
person. A
(iv) Factual possession alone being not only the ingredient of the
provisions of the said A:ct, but intention of the person who is
alleged to have ·grabbed the land being imperative, the
impugned judgment cannot be sustained.
B
(v) The Special Court having not determined the second ingredient
of' Land Grabbing', namely, the intention of the person who
is alleged to have grabbed the land, the impugned judgment
cannot be sustained.
(vi) The application for regularization of the land in question having C
been pending before the State Government, no application
under Section 8 of the Act was maintainable.
(vii) Only because the appellant had filed an application for
regulariz.ation of the said land, the same by itself could not be
a ground to arrive at a finding that it had an intention to grab J::)
the said land as far back as in the year 1985.
(viii)Despite the order dated 30.07.2001, passed by a learned
Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in W.P (Civil)
No. 15 of 2000 directing the State Government to pass a E
speaking order on the appellant's application for regulariz.ation
in the light of the recommendations made by the Collector as
also the Commissioner, the State Government having failed to
do so, the learned Special Judge should not have adjudicated
upon the issue of 'land grabbing' in the said proceeding.
F
21. Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned Additional Solicitor General,
appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, submitted :
0) The provisions of the Act must be read harmoniously and so
read, it would be evident that the purported second element
(
of the definition would only mean that a person had taken G
possession of the land without any lawful entitlement.
(ii) Intention to illegally occupy the land in question cannot be the
sine qua non for determining the meaning of the term "land
grabbing" under the Act, as has been contended on behalf of H
I
/~\
978 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 10 S.C.R. '

A the appellant in this case, inasmuch once a person comes to
know that his predecessor in interest had no title to the land
in question, his possession would become illegal.
(iii) The contention of the appellant that during the pendency of
regulariz.ation proceeding, the State should not have initiated
B the proceeding before the Special Court, cannot be accepted
as:
(a) Firstly, the responsibility to check its vendor's title was on the
Petitioner. The doctrine of constructive notice would also
c operate against the Petitioner. If it failed to discharge its
responsibility, the Petitioner cannot claim to have acted without
an intention to illegally occupy State property.
(b) Any other interpretation would comple~ely frustrate the Act
itself It would effectively mean that as long as the land grabber
D is able to sell the larid to a third party, no one can be
proceeded against under the Act. Such an interpretation must
be avoided.
(c) In any event, the fact is that Petitioner was aware in 1987 that
it was illegally occupying State property. From that time
E onwards, its intention to continue to occupy the property is
clear. And the Respondents only commenced these
proceedings in 2000, when it was clear that the Petitioner had
no intention of vacating the land and handing over the same
to its rightful owner, the State. This is precisely the evil the Act
F aims to tackle.
(d) There is no provision in the Act that enables the Special Court
to direct the State to regularize an illegal occupancy. That is
not the function of the Special Court. As the Special Court
pointed out, if the Petitioner has a grievance in that regard, he
G should approach the appropriate forum. This cannot be used
as a defence in land grabbing proceedings.
Statutory provisions :
22. The said Act was enacted to prohibit the activity of land grabbing
H
M/S MAHALAXMI MOTORS LTD. v. MANDAL 979
REVENUE OFFICER [SINHA, J.]

in the State of Andhra Pradesh and to provide for matters incidental A
thereto and connected therewith.
23. Clauses (c), (d) and (e) of Section 2 of the Act define "land",
"land grabber" and "land grabbing" respectively in the following terms :
"(c) "land" includes rights in or over land, benefits to arise out of B
land and buildings, structures and other things attached to the
earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the
earth;"
"(d) "land grabber" means a person or a group of persons who
commits land grabbing and includes any person who gives C
financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession oflands
or for construction of unauthorized structures thereon, or who
collects or attempts to collect from any occupiers of such lands
rent, compensation and other charges by criminal intimidation,
or abets the doing of any of the above mentioned acts; and D
also includes the successors in interest."
"(e) "land grabbing" means every activity of grabbing of any land
(whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a
religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a
wakf, or any other private person) by a person or group of E
persons, without any lawful entitlement and with a view to
illegally taking possession of such lands, or enter into or create
illegal tenancies or lease and licences agreement or any other
illegal agreements in respect of such lands, or to construct
unauthorized structures thereon for sale or hire, or give such F
lands to any person on rental or lease and licence basis for
construction, or use and occupation, of unauthorized structures;
and the term "to grab land" shall be construed accordingly."

G
Section 3 of the Act provides for land grabbing to be unlawful in
the following terms :
"3. Land Grabbing to be unlawful:- Land grabbing in any form is
hereby declared unlawful; and any activity connected with or arising
H
~\
980 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R. \

A out of land grabbing shall be an offence punishable under this Act."
Section 4 of the Act provides for prohibition of land grabbing in the
following terms :
"4. Prohibition ofland grabbing:- (1 )_No person shall commit
B or cause to be committed land grabbing.
(2) Any person who, on or after the commencement of this
Act, continues to be in occupation, other\vise than as a lawful
tenant, of a grabbed land belonging to the Government, local
authority, religious or charitable institution or endowment including
c a wakf, or other private person, shall be guilty of an offence under
this Act.
(3) Whoever contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) or
sub-section (2) shall on conviction, be punished with imprisonment
D for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may
extend to five years, and with fine :which may extend to five
thousand rupees."
Section 7 provides for constitution of special courts, relevant portion
whereof, insofar as the same is relevant for the present discussions, is
E reproduced as under :
"7. Constitution ofSpecial Courts .-(1) The Government may,
for the purpose of providing speedy enquiry into any alleged act
of land grabbing, and trial of cases in respect of the ownership and
F title to, or lawful possession of, the land grabbed, by notificati.on,
constitute a Special Court. -
*** *** ***
(5-D)( i) Notwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil Procedure,
G 1908 (5 of 1908) the Special Court may follow its own procedure
which shall not be inconsistent with the principles of natural justice
and fair play and subject to the other provisions of this Act and of
any rules made thereunder while deciding the civil liability."
Section 8 of the Act provides for procedures and powers of the
H
I

1-
(

M/SMAHALAXMIMOTORSLTD. v. MANDAL 981
REVENUE OFFICER [SINHA, J.]
--i Special Courts, relevant portion whereof, insofar as the same is relevant A
for the purpose of the present case, reads as under :
"8. Procedure and powers of the Special Courts.-(1) The
Special Court may, either suo motu or on application made by any
person, officer or authority take cogniz.ance of and try every case
arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing or with respect to B
the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of, the land
grabbed, whether before or after the commencement of this Act,
and pass such orders (including orders by way of interim directions)
as it deems fit;
c
(1-A) The Special Court shall, for the purpose of taking
cogniz.ance of the case, consider the location, or extent or value
of the land alleged to have been grabbed or of the substantial
nature of the evil involved or in the interest of justice required or
any other relevant matter: D

Provided that the Special Court shall not take cogniz.ance of
any such case without hearing the petitioner;
(2) Notwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or in the Andhra E
Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972, any case in respect of an alleged
act of land grabbing or the determination of question of title and
ownership to, or lawful possession of any land grabbed under this
~- Act, shall be triable only in a Special Court constituted for the area
in which the land grabbed is situated; and the decision of the F
Special Court shall be final.

*** *** ***
(2-C) The Special Court shall determine the order in which the
civil and criminal liability against a land grabber be initiated. It shall G
be within the discretion of the Special Court whether or not to
deliver its decision or order until both civil and criminal proceedings
are completed. The evidence admitted during the criminal
proceeding may be made use of while trying the civil liability. But
additional evidence, if any, adduced in the civil proceedings shall H
.. ~·
\
982 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A not be considered by the Special Court while determining the
criminal liability. Any person accused of land grabbing or the
abetment thereof before the Special Court shall be a competent
witness for the defence and may give evidence on oath in disproof
of the charge made against him or any person charged together
B with him in the criminal proceeding:
Provided that he shall not be called as a witness except on
his own request in writing or his failure to give evidence shall be
made the subject of any comment by any of the parties or the
Special Court or give rise to any presumption against himself or
c any person charged together with him at the same proceeding.
*** *** ***
(6) Every finding of the Special Court with regard to any
alleged act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of the fact
D of land grabbing and of the persons who committed such land
grabbing, and every judgment of the Special Court with regard
to the determination of title and ownership to, or lawful possession
of, any land grabbed shall be binding on all pers0ns having interest
in such land."
E
Section 15 provides for Act's overriding effect over other laws.
Section 17-B of the Act provides for the guidelines for interpretation·
of the Act in the following terms : .-J
F "17-B. Guidelines for interpretation of Act:- The Schedule
shall constitute the guidelines for the interpretation and
implementation of this Act."
Precedents :
G 24. Interpretation of the provisions of the said Act and in particular
the definitions of "land grabber" and "land grabbing" came up for
consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Konda
Lakshmana Bapuji v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.,
(2002] 3 sec 258].
H
I

f
f MIS MAHALAXMI MOTORS LTD. v. MAND AL 983
REVENUE OFFICER [SINHA, J.]
We would examine the said decision in a bit detail. In that case the A
Special Court opined that the occupation of the land in dispute claimed
by the appellant therein was without any lawful entitlement. It also decided
the question of ownership and title to lawful possession of the land in
dispute on appreciating the evidence on record. It was held that the land
in dispute is not a part oflnam. A finding of fact was recorded in regard B
to absence of lawful entitlement of the appellant to the land and upholding
the title of the respondent that the land in question was a Government
land. A writ petition was filed thereagainst which was dismissed. This
Court while considering the appeal preferred by the land grabber, inter
alia, held:
c
(i) The Special Tribunal has only civil jurisdiction and the Code
of Civil Procedure is applicable to the proceedings before it,
whereas the Special Court has both the Civil as well as criminal
jurisdiction to which the provisions of both the Code of Civil
Procedure and Code of Criminal Procedure would apply. D
(ii) The Special Court exercises both the original and appellate
jurisdictions as well as court of sessions for all practical
purposes.
(iii) A mere allegation ofland grabbing is sufficient to invoke the E
jurisdiction of the Special Court.
(iv) The Civil Court's jurisdil:tion is ousted and the Act, which is
a special law, would prevail and as such the Special Court has
jurisdiction in respect of the matter dealt with thereunder.
(v) In terms of Section 10 of the Act, the burden of proof is on F
the person who alleges tl1at the land has not been grabbed by
him
(vi) The provisions of the Act not only deals with an action of a
._, wrong but also an offence. The definitions contained in Section G
2(d) and 2(e) are required to be construed strictly.
25. In Kanda Lakshmana Bapuji (supra), this Court interpreting
the expression "land grabbing" observed :
"31. Clause (e) of Section 2, quoted above, defines the expression H
984 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R. \
A "land grabbing" to mean: (1) every activity of grabbing of any land
(whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious
or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf, or any
other private person) by a person or group of persons; (2) such
grabbing must be: (i) without any lawful entitlement, and (ii) with a
B view to: (a) illegally taking possession of such lands; or (b) to enter
into or create illegal tenancies, lease and licence agreements or any
other illegal agreements in respect of such lands; or (c) to construct
unauthorised structures thereon for sale or hire; or (d) to give such
lands to any person on (i) rental, or (ii) lease and licence basis for
c construction, or (iii) use and occupation of unauthorised structures."
It was observed :
"37. The various meanings noted above, disclose that the term
"grab" has a broad meaning- to take unauthorisedly, greedily or
D unfa.lrly - and a narrow meaning uf snatching forcibly or violently
or by unscrupulous means. Having regard to the object of the Act
and the various provisions employing that term we are of the view
that the term "grab" is used in the Act in both its narrow as well
as broad meanings. Thus understood, the ingredients of the
expression "land grabbing" would comprise (i) the factum of an
E
activity of taking possession of any land forcibly, violently,
unscrupulously, unfairly or greedily without any lawful entitlement,
and (ii) the mens rea/intention - "with the intention of7with a view
to" (a) illegally taking possession of such lands, or (b) enter into .-i,
or create illegal tenancies, lease and licence agreements or any
F
other illegal agreements in respect of such lands, or (c) to construct
unauthorised structures thereon for sale or hire, or (d) to give such
lands to any person on (i) rental, or (ii) lease and licence basis for
construction, or (iii) use and occupation of unauthorised structures.
G 38. A combined reading of clauses ( d) and ( e) would suggest
that to bring a person within the meaning of the expression "land
grabber" it must be shown that: ( i )( a) he has taken unauthorisedly,
unfairly, greedily, snatched forcibly, violently or unscrupulously any
land belonging to the Government or a local authority, a religious
I-I or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf, or any
MIS MAHALAXMI MOTORS LTD. v. MAND AL 985
REVENUE OFFICER [SINHA, J.]
other private person; (b) without any lawful entitlement; and (c) A 1

with a view to illegally taking possession of such lands? or enter
or create illegal tenancies or lease and licence agreements or any
other illegal agreements in respect of such lands or to construct
unauthorised structures thereon for sale or hire, or give such lands
to any person on rental or lease and licence basis for construction, B
or use and occupation of unauthorised structures; or (ii) he has
given financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of
lands or for construction of unauthorised structures thereon; or (iii)
he is collecting or attempting to collect from any occupiers of such
lands rent, compensation and other charges by criminal intimidation; c
or (iv) he is abetting the doing of any of the abovementioned acts;
or (v) that he is the successor-in-interest of any such persons."
It was further observed :
" ... A mere prima facie bona fide claim to the land alleged to be D
grabbed by such a person, cannot avert being roped in within the
ambit of the expression "land grabber". What is germane is lawful
entitlement to and not a mere prima facie bona fide claim to the 1
and alleged to be grabbed ...
xxx xxx xxx E

70. The requisite intention which is an important ingredient of the
land grabber, though not stated specifically, can be inferred by
necessary implication from the averments in the petition and the
plaint and the deposition of witness like any other fact. If a person F
comes into occupation of any government land under the guise of
a perpetual lease executed by an unauthorised person having no
title to or interest in the land it cannot but be with a view to illegally
taking possession of such land. We make it clear that we are
expressing no opinion on the point whether those averments would G
constitute "mens rea" for purposes of offence under the Act."

26. We would consider the application of the aforementioned JegaJ ·
principles enumerated by this Court to the fact of the present case, a little
later; but before doing so, we may notice some other decisions, which
H
986 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A have been cited at the Bar.

27. In Gouni Satya Reddi v. Government ofAndhra Pradesh and
Ors., [2004] 7 SCC 398, a two-Judge Bench of this Court held:
"10. From a reading of the definitions of the phrases "land grabber"
B and "land grabbing" it is clear that the grabbing of any land must
be without any lawful entitlement and with a view to take
possession of such lands illegally. That is to say, the land grabber
must be aware of the fact that he is entering into the possession
illegally and without any lawful entitlement. If such elements as
c indicated above are missing in our view, it would not be a case of
land grabbing."

It was further held :
"13. The first thing to be noted is that the case of Respondent 3
D as sought to be made out in the petition as quoted in the earlier
part of this judgment was that the appellant had created false
documents by creating the false power of attorney in favour of
Prabhakara Rao and got the sale deed registered in his favour and
that the sale deed was also false. But we don't find any such finding
E having been recorded by the Special Court saying that the appellant
had created the false document by creating the false power of
attorney. In absence of any such finding it may be examined as to
what extent taking over of possession by the appellant without
lawful entitlement was " with a view to take possession illegally
F ". Mere fact of not being lawfully entitled to enter into possession
by itself would not lead to the inference of land grabbing unless
possession is illegally taken with that view in mind. It is a
necessary ingredient of land grabbing i.e. the person taking
possession must know it that he is acting illegally while taking
possession."
G
It was observed :
" ... The provisions of the Act would not cover such cases, unless
coupled with the fact of not being entitled to possession the person
enters into possession with a view to obtain illegal possession .
H
I MIS MAHALAXMI MOTORS LTD. v. MANDAL 987
REVENUE OFFICER [SINHA, J.]
Where such view of taking illegal possession is missing or lacking, A
a person would not be covered under the definition of the phrase ,
or expression "land grabber". The facts, to indicate such intention,
though have been pleaded, as indicated earlier, but no such finding
has been recorded. The mere fact of legally not entitled to the
possession would not fulfil the ingredients of the definitions of"land · B
grabber" and "land grabbing" ... "
28. However, recently in A.P. Housing Board v. Mohammad
Sadatullah & Ors., (2007) 5 SCALE 681, a Division Bench of this
Court opined that the plea of adverse possession cannot be gone into in C
a proceeding under the said Act, stating :
"41. In this connection, reference was made to a recent
decision of this Court in N Srinivasa Rao v. Special Court under
the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act and Ors., [2006] 4
SCC 214. A two Judge Bench of this Court in the above case D
held that the Special Court constituted under the Act has no
jurisdiction to decide question as to acquisition of title by adverse
possession in a proceeding under the Act as the same would fall
within the domain of Civil Court."
29. In State of A.P. v. Smt. Pramela Modi and Ors., (2006) 11 E
SCALE 38, a Division Bench of this Court held:
"28. It is thus seen that the Special Court can play the role of
a Civil Court and decide the disputed question of title and
possession. The extent ofjurisdiction as is permitted by the statute, F
therefore, is rather wide in its application. Three specific situations
have been noted namely,
(i) Jurisdiction can be had in regard to a case in respect of an
alleged act of land grabbing
G
(ii) Jurisdiction can be had in a case where determination of
question of title and ownership are involved and
(iii) Jurisdiction can be had where lawful possession of any
land grabbed under the Act is involved.
988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A All these three specific situations as envisaged by and under the
Statute would be triable in the Special Court. The condition
precedent for assuming jurisdiction by the Special Court is that the
case must have arisen out of any alleged act ofland grabbing and
a District Judge while acting as a Special Court merely acts as a
B Presiding Officer of the Court. Having regard to the provisions of
Section 8(2) read with Section 15 of the Act, no suit for title in
respect of the disputed land which was alleged to be grabbed by
the party could be entertained by the Civil Court. In other words,
the Civil Court is barred from trying the matters which fall within
c the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Court constituted under the
Act."

Application of law :
30. We are bound by the decision of the larger Bench in this case.
D The Special Court exercises a jurisdiction of the Civil Court, provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure being applicable. If it is a Civil Court, all
questions relating to title and possession can be gone into. The proceeding
can be initiated in terms of Section 4 of the said Act against a person
who continues to be in occupation, otherwise than as a lawful tenant, of
E a grabbed land belonging to the Government, local authority, religious or
charitable institution or endowment including a wakf, or any private person.
If and when a proceeding is initiated under the said Act, the proceedee
not only can raise a jurisdictional questions but can also raise questions
relating to his title and possession. It is, therefore, difficult to comprehend
F as to how the Special Court would be debarred from determining the
questions raised by the parties thereto. The question as to whether the
land grabber had grabbed the land which is a Government land or not
ordinarily is required to be determined as on the date of filing of the
application.
G Pendency of an application for regularization of the land, therefore, y·
in our opinion, would not stand in the way of the State to initiate a
proceeding under the Act. It is one thing to say that the question in regard
to regularization of a portion of t11e land in question was pending before
the Government in terms of the directions issued by the learned Single
H Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, but it is another thing to say
, MIS MAHALAXMI MOTORS LTD. v. MANDAL
REVENUE 0 FFI CER [SINHA, J.]
989

that the Special Court had no jurisdiction to continue the proceeding, A
which is otherwise validly initiated only because pendency of such an
application. If and when the prayer of the land grabber for regularization
of the land is allowed, he would become entitled thereto. We may,
however, hasten to add that we are assuming that the State had the
requisite jurisdiction to direct such regularization. B
31. Lawful entitlement on the part of a party to possess the land
being the determinative factor, it is axiomatic that so long as the land
grabber would not be able to show his legal entitlement to hold the land,
the jurisdiction of the Special Court cannot be held to be ousted.
c
32. The Act is a self-contained Code. In view of its power as also
applicability of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, the tribunal
can in a given case even entertain counter claims [See Union ofIndia v.
Tata Teleservices (Maharashtra) Ltd., JT (2007) 10 SC 356].
33. The Tribunal being possessed of extensive jurisdiction, subject D
of course to fulfillment of the conditions precedent, for initiation of the
proceeding, was entitled to go into all issues. We have furthermore to
bear in mind that the definition of 'land grabber' is not only restricted to
the party to the proceeding, but also includes his predecessor in interest.
Once the land is held to be a Government land, the logical corollary thereto .E
would be that subject to the law of limitation and prescription, the State
would not lose the said right to the opposite party.
>· 34. It may be true that absence oflawful entitlement by itself may
not be sufficient to pass a judgment and decree in favour of the State ·F
and against the land grabber, but also it must be shown that he had taken
illegal possession thereof
35. The Bench in Konda Lakshmana Bapuji (supra) has applied
both the broader and narrow meanings of the said expression. It would
1 not, however, mean that all the tests laid down therein are required to be G
satisfied to their letter and spirit. What is necessary to be proved is the
substance of the allegation. The proof of intention on the part of a persons
being his state of mind, the ingredients of the provisions must be considered
keeping in view the materials on records as also circumstances attending
H
990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A thereto. What would be germane for lawful entitlement to remain in ·,._ -
possession would be that if the proceedee proves that he had bona fide
claim over the land, in which event, it would be for him to establish the
same.
36. In Konda Lakshmana Bapuji (supra), this Court has
B categorically held that the requisite intension can be inferred by necessary
implication from the averments made in the petition, the written statement
and the depositions of witnesses, like any other fact. The question which '(
must, therefore, have to be posed and answered having regard to the claim
of the land grabber would be that, if on the face of his claim it would
C appear'that he not only had no title, but claimed his possession only on
the basis thereof, the same must be held to be illegal. The question in regard
to lawful entitlement of the proceedee, therefore, for invoking the charging
section plays an important and significant role.
D 37. We would like to add that the person's purported belief that he
is legally entitled to hold the land and his possession is not otherwise illegal
must also be judged not only from the point of time when he entered into
the possession or when he had acquired the purported title but also from
the point of view as to whether by reason of determination of such a
E question by a competent court of law, he has been found to have no title
and consequently continuance of his possession becomes illegal. If the
proceedee against whom a proceeding has been initiated under the
provisions of the said Act is entitled to raise the question of adverse
possession, which being based on knowledge of a lawful title and
F declaration of the hostile title on the part of the person in possession, there
does not appear to be any reason as to why knowledge of defect in his
title and consequently his possession becoming unlawful to his own
knowledge would not come within the purview of the term 'land grabbing'
as contained in Section 2(e) of the Act. The provisions of the Act must
be construed so as to enable the tribunal to give effect thereto. It cannot
G be construed in a pedantic manner which iftaken to its logical corollary
would make the provisions wholly unworkable. Only because a person
has entered into possession of a land on the basis of a purported registered
sale deed, the same by itself, in our considered opinion, would not be
sufficient to come to the conclusion that he had not entered over the land
H
MIS MAHALAXMI MOTORS LTD. v. MAND AL 991
REVENUE 0 FFI CER [SINHA, J.]
unauthorisedly, unfairly, or greedily. A'

38. For determination of such an issue, the Special Court will be
entitled to take into consideration not only the rival claims of the parties,
but also the earlier round of litigation, if any, and subsequent conduct of
the proceedee himself.
B
Determination :

39. The predecessor in interest of the appellant, Ramender Reddy,
was claiming the said land as if it was a grant by way oflnam. The Andhra
Pradesh High Court in W.P. No. 8734of1983 categorically came to the
finding that the land in question had vested in the State of Andhra Pradesh C
and Ramender Reddy was not entitled even to grant of an occupancy
certificate. Ra.mender Reddy had, therefore, no title over the land. It was ·
obligatory on the part of the appellant keeping in view the doctrine of
caveat emptor to examine the title of the vendor over the land, it purchased.
Within a period of two years from the date of purchase, the appellant D
became aware that it had acquired no title thereto and it had illegally been
occupying the land, as the same belonged to the Governinent and, thus,
the latter was entitled to possess the same. Apart therefrom, the appellant
was put to notice that it was an encroacher. Admittedly, it had been served
with a notice under the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act. The E
writ petition filed by it again was dismissed. Observations made therein
by the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh that its application
for regularization may be disposed of in the manner specified therein did
not and could not have clothed the appellant with a legal entitlement
thereto. F
40. It is one thing to say that by reason of the direction by the High
Court, its application for regularization of the land was liable to be
considered but it is another thing to say that its possession thereto became ,
lawful or otherwise it became legally entitled to possess the land. Right G
to possess the land must be referable to the title of the land not to mere
entitlement of its application for regularization to be considered.
41. So far as the pleadings in the application under Section 8 of the ,
Act is concerned, suffice it to say that the same was filed in a prescribed
H
992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A form. There does not exist any column where the requisite pleadings by }--
way of fulfilling the second part of the ingredients of land grabbing could
be pleaded. With the said application, a concise statement was annexed.
The said concise statement, therefore, became a part of the application.
It has categorically been stated therein that the appellant without having
B any right or title illegally encroached upon the Government land. The history
of litigation had also been specifically stated therein, which is to the
following effect :
(-
"4. It is submitted that the Respondent Company previously
known as M/s Mahalaxmi Motors Pvt. Limited changed its name
c as Jublee Honda Motors. The land encroached by the respondent
is surveyed by the Mandal Revenue Officer through Mandal
Surveyor and found that the respondent not only encroached 6946
sq. mtrs. (Amended as per orders passed in I.A. No. 94of2003
dated 13.06.2003) of Government land in Sy. No. 82 of
D Bowenpally, but also encroached an extent of 842 sq. mtrs.
(Amended as per orders passed in I.A. No. 94 of 2003 dated
+
13.06.2003) Government lands in Sy. No. 157/1 of Thokatta .
Village as shown in the sketch. The Respondent illegally encroached
the application scheduled property and 'construed sheds and running
E Mechanical workshop for vehicles. The company constructed
workshop and compound wall of an extent of 6946 Sq. Mts.
(Amended as per orders passed in I.A. No. 94 of.2003 dated
13.06.2003) in Sy. No. 82/p ofBowenpally and an extent of 842
Sq. Mtrs. (Amended as per orders passed in I.A. No. 94 of2003
F dated 13.06.,2003) in Sy. No.157/lP ofThokatta Village. The
'application schedule land is valuable land abutting Highway and it
is required for public purpose.
The cause of action arose when the Manda! Revenue Officer
has issued notice on 27./4.87 to the Respondent under Andhra
G Pradesh Land Encroachment Act and noticed that the Respondent y
illegally encroached the Government land.
It is submitted that the Application Scheduled land situated
abutting to the Hashamathpet Road which is a link road between
H two National High Ways running from Hyderabad to Karimnagar
M/S MAHALAXMIMOTORS LTD. v. MAND AL 993
REVENUE OFFICER [SINHA, J.]
and Nizamabad, and it is very valuable property and is required A
for public purpose. Tue market value of the land is Rs. 5000/- per
Sq. Mts. Tue Respondent wrongfully using the Government land
for Commercial purpose from 1985 and the Respondent is liable
to pay a sum of Rs. 20/- Sq. Mts. Per month from 1985 till the
date of disposal of the LGC as means profits/compensation to the B
Govememnt."
42. Thus, not only the history of litigation but also area of
encroachment was stated. A sketch map showing the same was annexed
thereto. The fact that the appellant had made constructions illegally and
had been running a workshop was specifically pleaded. One of the reliefs C
prayed for therein, inter alia, was to declare that the appellant was a
land grabber. It is, therefore, not a case where it can be said that the
respondent failed to plead the requisite ingredients of the definition of the
term 'land grabbing'.
D
43. We have noticed hereinbefore the findings of the learned Special
Court. The Special Court took note of the aforementioned contentions
of the parties hereto and arrived at a definite finding, having regard to the
history of the litigation between the parties, that the appellant was a land
grabber.
E
44. The application filed by the appellant before the State
Government for regularization of the land although may not be
determinative of the issue as to whether it is a land grabber or not could
be taken into consideration for a limited purpose, namely, admission or
acknowledgement on its part in regard to the title of the State. It was F
possible for the appellant to file an application for regularization ofland
without prejudice to its rights and contentions in the pending proceedings,
but having regard to the decisions rendered by the Andhra Pradesh High
Court in two writ petitions, it would be fair to presume that the appellant
filed the said application knowing fully well as to where it stood. Once it G
had taken a specified stand knowing fully well that it had no right, title
and interest in or over the land in question, it cannot in law turn round
and contend that the same was not binding on it. Doctrine of estoppel in
a situation of this nature, in our opinion, would squarely apply. An abstract
belief on the part of the appellant that its vendor had a marketable title H
•
-~
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 10 S.C.R. ,

A and it was getting a good title to the land is not decisive. Whether any }--
action was taken by the authorities of the State in regard to the possession
of Ramender Reddy or the appellant, in our opinion, is wholly irrelevant
inasmuch Ramender Reddy and consequently the appellant had no title
over the property nor acquired any title by prescription. Law does not
B contemplate any vacuum in the title. Either the State had the title or the
appellant and its predecessor.
45. Submission of Mr. Dewan that it was obligatory on the part of
'(-
the First Respondent to make averments that the appellant illegally, forcibly,
unscrupulously or with criminal intention of grabbing the Government land
c entered upon the Government land, in our opinion, in the fact situation
obtaining herein, was not necessary. Pleadings of the parties, it is now
well-settled are not to be construed in a pedantic manner. [See Des Raj
and Ors. v. Bhagat Ram (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors., (2007) 3 SCALE 371]

D 46. An averment that the appellant had been in unlawful possession
itself is sufficient to invoke the provisions of the said Act in view of the +
decision of this Court in Konda Lakshmana Bapuji (supra). Keeping in
view the fact that the appellant or the Ra.mender Reddy had no title and
consequently he could not acquire any title, all other contentions raised
E on its behalf, in our opinion, pales into insignificance. The fact of the matter
squarely covers the ingredients of Section 2(e) of the Act as interpreted
by this Court in Kondo Lakshniana Bapuji (supra).
47. Submission of the learned counsel that even an order dated
03.08.2007 is not a speaking order cannot be considered in this ~
F application. However, from a perusal of the said order, it is evident that
therein all relevant circumstances have been taken into consideration.
Recommendations made by the Collector or the Commissioner for
regularization of the land are not binding on the State.
48. We, therefore, are of the opinion that no case has been made
G y
out for interference with the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed
with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees twenty five
thousand only).
RP. Appeal dismissed.
H