M/S. MODERN TAILORING HALL ETC.versusSHRI H.S. VENKUSA AND ORS.

A                   MIS. MODERN TAILORING HALL ETC.
                                     v.
                        SHRI H.S. VENKUSA AND ORS.

                                   APRIL 24, 1997

B              (M.M. PUNCHHI AND K. VENKATASWAMI, JJ.)

           Kamataka Rent Control Act, 1986 :

        Ss.2(1)(h) and 2( l)(j}-Eviction of tenant for bona fide requirement of
  landlord and for re-construction after demolition re;pectivel»--Landlord seek-
C ing eviction of tenants on ground after bonafide requirement after demolition
  and re-co11st1uctio11-Held-The grounds of eviction in two provisions being
  mutually exclusive have flowing therefrom separate individual rights and
  obligations and they cannot be pemiitted to overlap so as to con[er 011 the
  coun the discretion of employing one provision over the othe1~An application
D of landlord if not failing under S.21 (1) (h ), would, 011 its own, melit dismiss-
  al-Coult cannot treat it in its discretion as one under S.2J(l)(j) and order
  an unwanted eviction-The distinction qualitatively has to be maintained.

           Ramnikal Pitambardas Mehta v. lndradaman Amratlal Sheth, [1964]
    8 SCR Page 1, relied on.
E
           Smt. Rohinibai v. Vislmwnwthy, (1980) ILR (Vol. I) Karnaktaka
     Page, 340 (D.B.), approved.

           P.K Upadhyaya v. A. Venkatesh, ITR (1990) Karnataka, 4060, dis-
     approved.
F
           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 12709-10
     of 1996 Etc.

          From the Judgment and Order dated 21.6.96 of the Karnataka High
     Court in C.R.P. namely H.R.R.P. Nos. 1038-39 of 1995.
G
          C.S. Vaidyanathan, K.V. Vishwanathan and K.V. Venkataraman for
     the Appellants.

           S.N. Bhat for the Respondents.

H          The following Order of the Court was delivered :
                                          984
            MODERN TAILORING HALL v. H.S. VENKUSA                         985

      Leave was granted in these appeals limited to the question whether         A
after demolition and reconstruction of the building, the appellants-tenants
have a right of re-entry.


       The Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1986 in its Section 21 (l)(h)
confers on the landlord the right to claim eviction of a building bona fide      B
required for his own occupation and Section 21 (l)G) confers on ,him the
right to seek eviction to have the building demolished and reconstructed,
but subject to the right of re-entry of the tenant. These two rights are
encircled with corresponding obligations inasmuch as under the former
provision the landlord is required to enter the premises himself within the      C
statutory period failing which the tenant has a right of re- entry, and in the
latter provision, the landlord is required to give an undertaking so as to
ensure observance of the terms of re-entry on reconstruction of the build-
ing. The present cases are such in which the landlord has sought eviction
of the tenants under Section 21 (l)(h) of the Act on the ground that he
bona fide requires the premises for his own use and occupation but after         D
demolition and reconstruction. The point arising for consideration is
whether the landlord's claim was rightly based under Section 21 (1) (h) or
was it founded under Section 21(1)G)?

       The consistent view of the Karnataka High Court in a series of E
decisions starting from the case titled as Smt. Rohinibai v. Vishnumurthy,
(1980) ILR Karnataka Series Vol.1 Page, 340 (D.B.) is that the two
provisions, i.e., Section 21(1)(h) and Section 21 (l)(j) are mutually ex-
clusive and that demolition and reconstruction of a premises by the
landlord for his own use and occupation, after getting an order of eviction, F
clearly falls under Clause (h) of Section 21 (1) and not under Clause (j).
It has been viewed that the pica of the landlord for bona fide requirement,
for his own use and occupation of the premises under Section 21 (l)(h),
would include the occupation of the premises after making any alteration
or a new construction on securing an order of eviction. This c:>..1ended
meaning was given by the Karnataka High Court on the basis of a decision G·
reported in Ramnikal Pitambardas Mehta v. !11dradama11 Amratlal Sheth,
[1964] 8 SCR Page, 1, a decision by a three Member Bench of this Court.
Identical provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates
Control Act, 1947 were examined and it was held that the demolition of
the existing building and subsequent erection of a new building were only H
     986                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [1997) 3 S.C.R.

A intermediate steps in order to make the building fit for occupation by the
     landlord. A nitch was thus carved that till the new building was altered or
     reconstructed to the satisfaction of the landlord, his obligation to enter the
     premises within the statutory provided period got extended. It was also
     held that the provisions relating to demolition and reconstruction saddled
B    with the obligation to provide to the tenant re-entry could not possibly
     apply to the case where the landlord reasonably and bona fldely requires
     the premises for his own occupation even if he had to priorly demolish the
     premises and erect a new building on it. And further it was viewed that
     qualitatively the eviction under the provision, such as provided under
     Section 21 (l)G) of the Act presently in hand, would apply to cases where
C     the landlord does not require the premises for his own occupation, but
      requires it for erecting a new building to be let out to the tenants. Thus, it
      is obvious that the Karnataka High Court has maintained the distinction
      between the two provisions sharply and has never let these provisions
      overlap with each other.
D           There is a lone voice however made by the learned Single Judge of
      the High Court in ILR 1990 Karnataka 4060 - P.K. Upadhyaya v. A.
      Venkatesh to rule that if there be with the Court an occcasion to choose
      between Clauses (h) and G) in directing eviction of a tenant, it will have
      to lean in favour of Clause G) rather than ordering eviction under Clause
E     (h) of section 21(1) of the Act. This has been pressed into service to opt
      for eviction under Section 21 (l)G). This attempt of the learned Single
      Judge to demolish the exclusivity of the two sub- clauses GJ & (h) of
      Section 21 (1), well drawn by the Division Bench in Smt. Rohinibai v.
      Vishnumunhy, (1980) ILR Karnataka Series Vol. 1 Page 340 is uncalled
F     for. The ground of eviction given in the two provisions being mutually
      exclusive have flowing therefrom separate individual rights and obligations
      and they cannot be permitted to overlap so as to confer on the Court the
      discretion of employing one provision over the other. An application of the
      landlord, if not falling under Section 21(1)(h), would on its own, merit
G     dismissal. The Court cannot treat it in its discretion as one Section 21(1)G)
      and order an unwanted eviction. The distinction qualitatively has to be
      maintained. We therefore decline to take a view to the contrary, even if it
      be possible, than the one taken by the High Court based as it is on the
      decision of this Court in Ramnika/ Pitambardas Mehta v. Indradaman
 H    Amratlal Sheth, [1964] 8 SCR Page 1.
            MODERN TAILORING HALL vc H.S. VENKUSA                      987

       As a result, these appeals fail and are hereby dismissed. In passing   A
however it need be added that Civil Appeal Nos. 12712- 12713/96 would
have otherwise to be dismissed because sub-letting was another ground of
eviction as ordered by the High Court qua which leave has not been
granted and that matter had been put to rest. No costs.

R.P.                                                   Appeals dismissed.     B