Holding

An appeal under Section 129‑A of the Customs Act is limited to parties to the proceeding before the Collector or those specifically directed by the Board; a business rival or the Union of India, lacking a direct legal interest in the goods, are not "persons aggrieved" and cannot directly appeal to CEGAT.

Summary

Northern Plastics Ltd. imported X‑ray and graphic art films and claimed a concessional customs duty under a government notification, which was denied by the Assistant Collector of Customs. The Additional Collector later allowed clearance on full duty, prompting Hindustan Photo Films Ltd. (HPF), a business rival, and the Union of India (Ministry of Industries) to file appeals before the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT) alleging they were "persons aggrieved" under s.129‑A of the Customs Act. The Delhi High Court held that both HPF and the Union were aggrieved persons and allowed their appeals, but CEGAT had dismissed them on the ground of lack of locus standi. The Supreme Court examined the statutory scheme of the Customs Act and held that an appeal is a creature of statute; only parties to the proceeding before the Collector or those directed by the Board under s.129‑D can be "persons aggrieved" for purposes of s.129‑A. Consequently, HPF and the Union of India lacked the requisite direct legal interest and their appeals were not maintainable. The Court set aside the High Court judgment, allowed the appeal of Northern Plastics, and directed the High Court to decide the Union's writ petition on its merits.

Issues considered

Whether Hindustan Photo Films Ltd. and the Union of India qualify as "persons aggrieved" within the meaning of Section 129‑A of the Customs Act, 1962 for filing an appeal before CEGAT.
Whether the broader doctrine of locus standi applicable in public interest litigation under Articles 32 and 226 can be imported into the statutory right of appeal under the Customs Act.
What is the proper statutory procedure for challenging an order of the Additional Collector of Customs – direct appeal to CEGAT or recourse to the Board under Section 129‑D?

Legislation cited

Customs Act, 1962s. 122, s. 128-A, s. 129-A, s. 129-D, s. 129-DA, s. 129-DD
Customs Tariff Act, 1975

Subjects

Customs Actlocus standiperson aggrievedstatutory appealCEGATpublic interest litigationimport dutyappeal maintainabilitythird party

Judgment

A M/S. NORTHERN PLASTICS L'[D.
v.
HINDUSTAN PHOTO FILMS MFG. CO. LTD. AND ORS.

FEBRUARY 20, 1997

B (S.P. BHARUCHA AND S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.]

Customs Act 1962:-S. 129-D, Chapter XV.

Maintainability of a11 appeal under the Customs Act-011ly parties to
C the proceedings can appeal to CEGAT-'Locus Standi' to 'person aggrieved'
which tenn includes third parties who have direct legal interest but not those
merely wanti11g to appeal in general public interest or due to business rival-
ry-Appeal is a creature of Statute-The wider concept of 'Locus standi'
applicable to PIL cannot be earned to statutes-Union of India, in wider
D public interest, can challenge an order of the collector under Artcile 226
though not before CEGAT~blic Interest litigation-Locus standi.

Customs Tariff Act 1975-Chapter 37 of !st Schedule-Industrial
(Development & Regulation) Act 1951-S. 25(1), Item 20 of !st Schedule.

E The Appellant obtained Small Scale Industries registration, under
the Industries (Development & Regulation) Act 1951, for slitting and con-
fectioning of jumbo rolls of various types of films. They had for this pur·
pose imported X-ray films and graphic art films which arrived at the Port
of Bombay. While the Appellant claimed concessional rates of duty based .
on a notification by the Central Govt. on the said imported goods, the same
F was refused by the Assesstant Collector of Customs. The Appellant thereon
filed a Writ Petition before the High Court at Delhi werein the Respondent
HPF who was not originally a party, was made a party on he direction of
the Court and tht Single Judge passed an interim order for release of the'
goods at the concessional duty. This order was set aside by the Division
G Bench of the same High Court. However on an application by the Appellant
to the Collector of Customs, permission for clearance of the goods on
payment of the full duty was given and this order was also approved by the
Additional Collector. On learning of this order the Respondent HP1'' prayed
for stay or the order of the collector for premitting clearnace and removal
of the imported goods, before the Delhi High Court in the plending petition
H of the Appellant, which was eventually dismissed HPF also filed a Writ
252
NORTHERN PLASTICS LID. v. HINDUSfAN PHOTO FILMS MFG. CO. LID. 253

Petition with a similar prayer for an interim order before the Bombay High A
Court which was not granted, and HPF withdrew the petition later. A
Special Leave Petition filed by HPF against the order of the Delhi High
Court vacating ex-paJte stay against release of imported goods to Appellant
was dismissed as withdrawn.

A Writ Appeal was filed before the Division Bench of the Bombay B
High Court. However no interim order was passed was by the said Division
Bench. So HPF filed an appeal before the CEGAT which granted an
ex-parte interim order to operate for a week on which HPF withdrew its Writ
petition before the Bombay High Court. When this :nterim order of the
CEGAT expired and was not extended, HPF filed a Writ Petition appe11ling C
against the order of CEGAT on which the Division Bench of the Delhi High
Court directed the CEGAT to dispose off the appeal of HPF and to grant
a stay till final disposal of the case. While the appeal was pending disposal
before CEGAT, the Ministry of Industries also filed an appeal before the
same forum against the same of the order of the Additional Collector. The
CEGAT held that HPF, a business rival was not a Person aggrieved as D
contemplated under Section 129-A of the Customs Act and hence the
appeal was not maintainable. The appeal of the Industries Ministry was
also dismissed on the same grounds.

Aggrieved by the order of CEGAT, HPF filed a Writ Petition before E
the High Court at Delhi. The Division Bench of the High Court stayed the
clearance of the goods till disposal of the Writ Petition. Ministry of
Industries was also made a party to the said Writ Petition. The Union of
India also filed a separate Writ Petition against the very same order of the
GEGAT. By a common order the High Court disposed off the Petitions
holding that the Appeals before the CEGAT by HPF and the Union of India F
are maintainable as they are 'aggrieved persons' within the meaning of S
129-A of the Customs Act and that they had Locus S(andi in public interest.

Against the order of the Delhi High Court, the Appellant filed an SLP.
This Court granted Leave and the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports
was appointed as Receiver to dispose off the goods in question and deposit G
the sale proceeds in the Court. The sale was completed and the proceeds
were deposited in Court. It was submitted by the Appellant inter alia, that
the High Court was in error and that only the parties before the Collector
could appeal to the CEGAT; that the Relevant provisions of the Statue have
to be looked into to find out if third parties could appeal; that S 129-A of H
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) 2 S.C.R.

A the Act did not provide for such appeal; that an expanded concept of 'Locus
Sta11di' as applicable to l>IL preferred under Articles 226 and 32 is not
applicable to statutory right of appeal; that neither of the Respondents was

B
aggrieved by the order. '

On behalf of the Union of India it was submitted that the High Court
was right in its decision; that the Union of India and HPF were 'persons
-
aggrieved' within the meaning of S 129-A; that the order was illegal and the
goods were liable to confiscation; that the Union of India represented
Public interest, and in this case large amount of revenue was also involved.
On behalf of HPF it was pointed out that large sums were invested by the
C Govt. in HPF and therefore it cannot be said that there was no public
interest involved; that such import would flood the market and would
prejudice HPF's interests.

Allowing the Appeals, this Court

D HELD : 1. Appeal is a creature of statute. The right to appeal has to
be exercised by persons permitted by the statute to prefer appeals subject
to the conditions regarding the filing of such appeals. The wider concept of
locus standi in public interest litigation moved before this Court under
Articie 32 of the Constitution of India which itself is a fundamental right
E or under Article 226 before the High Court which also offers a constitution-
al remedy cannot be imported for deciding the right of appeal under the
statutory provisions contained in the Customs Act. Whether any right of
appeal is conferred on anyone against the orders passed under the Act in
the hierarchy of proceedings before the authorities has to be judged from
the statutory settings of the Act and not dehors them. Therefore, the High
F Court in the impugned judgment had erred in drawing the analogy from
the more elastic concept of locus standi under Article 32 or Article 226
evolved by this Court by its decisions on the subject. For judging the
competence and locus standi of the Union of India or the HPF for moving
appeals before CEGAT against the order of Additional Collector of Cus-
toms passed under Section 122 of the Act the answer must be found within
G the four corners of the Act itself, The High Court had committed a patent
error of law in taking the view that the concerned writ ·petitioners before it
had sufficient locus standi to prefer appeals before CEGAT. The decision
of CEGAT that they had no such locus standi was perfectly justified on the
scheme of the Act and it was wrongly set aside by the High Court.
H [267-D, 268-E-G, 277-G]
NORIBERN PLASTICS LTD. v. HINDUSTAN PHOTO FILMS MFG. CO. LTD. 255

. Anant Mills Co. Ltd. Etc. Etc. v. State of Gujarat & Others Etc. Etc., A
AIR (1975) SC 1234 = [1975] 2 SCC 175, followed.

- Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar Etc. Etc.,· AIR (1975)
SC 2092, distinguished.

2. S 129 deals with Appeals to Collector (Appeals) and S 128-A deals B
with 'procedure in ·appeal'. The Appellate 'Tribunal is constituted as per
S 129 of the Act, Section 129-DA gives powers of revision to Board or
Collector of Custom in certain cases. Similarly S 129-DD gives powers of
revision to Central Govt. to entertain revision petitions against certain
orders of Collector (Appeals). The aforesaid provisions of the Act leave no c
room for doubt that they represent a complete scheme or code for cha!-
lenging the orders passed by the Collector (Customs) in exercise of his
statutory powers. It is axiomatic that the importer against whom the
Collector bas passed the impugned order of adjudication and who is called
upon to pay the customs duty which, according to him, is not payable is . D
certainly an 'aggrieved person' who can prefer an appeal under S 129-A
(1) of the Act. So far as departmental authorities themselves are concerned
including the Collector of Customs no direct right of appeal is conferred
on Collector to prefer appeal against his own order before CEGAT. How-
ever there is sufficient safeguard made available to the Revenue by the Act
E
for placing in challenge erroneous orders of adjudication as passed by the
Collector of Customs by moving the Central Board of Excise and Customs
under S 129-D (1) for a direction to the Collector to apply to the CEGAT
for determination of such point arising out of the decision or order as may
be specified by the Board of Revenue in this connection. Similarly ·a
statutory remedy is provided to the Collector of Customs in connection F
with orders of Appellate Collector of Customs passed immediately before
the appointed day and also in connection with the orders passed by
Collector of Customs under S 128-A, to direct proper officer to appeal on
:; his behalf as laid down by S 129-A (2). Revisional powers are also con-
__,'
ferred on the Central Board of Excise and Customs against the orders of G
Collectors of Customs as provided by S 129-DA (1) as well as on the
Central Govt. under contingencies contemplated by S 129-DD(l). These
are the only statutory modes contemplated by the Act by resort to which
the orders of Collector (customs) could be brought in challenge before
higher statutory authorities including the CEGAT. In the light of this H
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] 2 S.C.R.

A statutory scheme, therefore, it is not possible to agree with the contention
of the Ld counsel for the respondents that sub-section (1) of section 129-A

B
entitles any and every person feeling aggrieved by the decision or order of
the Collector of Customs as an adjudicating authority, to prefer statutory
appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Neither the Central Govermnent through
the Industries Department, nor the rival Company or industry operating
in the same field as the importer can as a matter of right prefer.an appeal
-
as 'person aggrieved'. (271-D-H, 272-A-C]

3. It is true that the phrase 'person aggrieved' is wider than the
phrase 'party aggrieved'. But in the entire context of the statutory scheme
C specially sub-section (2) of Section 129-A it has to be held that only the
parties to the proceedings before the adjudicating authority, Collector of
Customs could prefer such an appeal to the CEGAT and the adjudicating
authority under S 122 can prefer such an appeal only when directed by
Board under S 129-D(l) and not otherwise. It is easy to visualise that even
D a third party may get legitimately aggrieved by the order of the Collector of
Customs being the adjudicating authority if it is contended by such third
party that the goods imported really belong to it and not to the purported
importer or that he had financed the same and, therefore, in substance he
was interested in the goods and consequently the release order in favour of
the purported importer was prone to create a legal injury to such a third
E party which is not actually arraigned as a party before the adjudicating
authority and was not heard by it. Under the circumstances such a third
pary might perhaps be treated to be legally aggrieved by the order of the
Collector of Customs as an adjudication authority and may legitimately
prefer an appeal to the CEGAT as 'person aggrieved'. That is the reason
F why the Legislature in its wisdom has used the phrase 'Any person
,.
aggrieved' by the order of Collector of Customs as adjudicating authority
in S 129-A(l). But in order to earn a locus standi as 'person aggrieved' other
than the arraigned party before the Collector of Customs as an adjudicat-
ing authority it must be shown that such person aggrieved being a third
party has a direct legal interest in the goods involved in the adjudication
G process. Itcannot be a general public interest or interest of a business rival
as is being projected by the contesting respondents. (272-C-H]
-
Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai, Advocate General of
Maharashtra, Bombay, (1970) 2 SCC 484 and Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v.
H Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed and Others, (1976) 1 SCC 671, follow~d.
NORTIIERNPLASTICS L1D. v. HINDUSTAN PHOTO FILMS MFG. CO. L1D. 257

4. So far as the Union of India is concerned, it may have to subserve A
a larger public interest by raising the.present dispute and may legitimately
feel aggrieved by the order of the Additional Collector of Customs. But
even if it is so, the statutory procedure laid down by the Parliament in its
wisdom for enabling the challenge to the adjudication order of the Collec-
tor of Customs by 'way of Appeals or revisions as per the aforesaid relevant B
statutory provisions has got to be followed in such an eventuality. Bypass-
ing the said statutory procedure, a direct frog leap to GEGAT is contra-
indicated by the statutory scheme of the Act. If such direct appeals are
permitted the very scheme of S 129-D(l) would get stultified. It must,
therefore, be held that direct appeal filed by the Union of India through
Industries Ministry to CEGAT under S 129-A (1) was clearly incompetent. C
-- It may be added that the Union of India could have used the mode set out
in S 129-D but it did not do so. (275-H, 276-A-C]

S. So far as the appeal filed by the HPF is concerned it is still on a
weaker footing even though HPF may be a public limited Company wholly D
owned by the Central Govt. and even if the Central Govt. might have sunk
more than Rs. 400 crores in constituting it, its function would still remain
in the domain of commercial enterprise. It may be a limb of the Central
Govt. or its alter ego so far as Article 12 of the Constitution is concerned
and may be. treated as a State so that it can be at the receiving end to answer E
challenges about violation of constitutional guarantees or statutory
provisions under which it may be acting, but that would not clothe it with
a legal locus standi to prefer a statutory appeal before CEGAT under S
129-A(l). From the point of view of that provision it is no more than a
business rival and cannot be said to be a 'persen aggrieved' by the ad-
judicatory order of the Collector of Customs releasing imported goods to F
the appellant on payment of full customs duty. It has also to be noted that
the Customs Act nowhere provides for any special interest of such public
concerns which may be operating as rivals.in the same commercial field in
which the importer may be operating. In the absence of any special
statutory provision for protecting the interest of such Govt. concerns or G
Publ!c sector undertakings no statutory locus standi can be culled out in
their favour on the express language of the relevant provisions of the Act.
It must therefore be held that HPF was a mere business rival operating in
the same commercial field and carrying on the same commercial activities
as the appellant. Its locus standi to challenge the order of Additional Col-
lector of Customs in favour of the appellant, therefore, gets squarely ruled H
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) 2 S.C.R.

A out. Counsel for the HPF in this connection submitted that if imported
goods of the appellant were allowed to enter the market HPF's commercial
interest would be materially prejudiced and by now it has already become
a sick unit. That is neither here nor there. The said grievance would still be
in the realm of damnum sine injuria. Consequently the appeal filed before
the CEGAT also must be treated to be incompetent and could not be
B covered by the sweep of S 129-A (1) of the Act. (276-D-H, 277-A-B]

Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed And
Others, (1976) 1 SCC 671, relied on.

C K Ramdas Shenoy v. The Chief Officers Town Municipal Council
Udipi and Others, ·(1975) 1 SCR 680, referred to.

6. As the High Court has noted in the impugned judgment, the other
--
contentions in the writ petitions filed by the contesting respondents were
D not considered by it in view of its decision on the right of appeal which was
made available to the concerned writ petitioners before the CEGAT. The
High Court was not at all justified in presuming what it should do in case
the appellant's appeal succeeded before this Court. Proper direction in
that connection should have been given by this Court in such an even-
tuality. High Court could not have pre-empted the same by the impugned
E judgment. However in view of the fact that other contentions in the writ
petitions were not examined by the High Court in any case they will now
have to be examined by it. As the decision on the right to appeal to CEGAT
made available to the contesting respondents by the High Court is being
set aside, the question remains as to what further appropriate orders can
F be passed in this connection. So far as this question is concerned it may
be noted that two writ petitions were moved, one by Union of India being
Civil Writ Petition No. 3083 of 1989 and another by HPF being Civil Writ
Petition No. 2286of1989. HPF being a business rival of the appellant has
no right to challenge the order of the Additional Collector of Customs,
Bombay passed in favour of the appellant its writ petition being Civil Writ
G Petition No. 2286 of 1989 filed before the High Court will stand dismissed.
However Writ petition filed by the Union of India being Civil Writ Petition
No. 3023 of 1989 will have to be permitted to proceed further on remaining
controversy before the High Court in so far as Union of India seeks to
1
challenge the order of the Collector Customs, Bombay dated l 51/5 h June
H 1989. Union of India could legitimately challenge the s~id order before
NORTiillRN PLASTICS LID. v. HINDUSTAN PHOTO FILMS MFG. CO. LID. (S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 259

appropriate forum in public interest and as it has wider locus standi at A
least in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if not
before CEGAT, its challenge in the writ petition under Article.226 against
the said order cannot be told off the gates. That challenge will have to be
examined by the High Court under Article 226 on its own merits. It is
obvious that it will be open to the appellant as contesting respondent to B
try_ to support the impugned order of the Assistant Collector/Collector of
Customs on all legally permissible grounds. In short the said controversy
between the Union of India on the one hand and the appellant on the other
in Union of India's writ petitian No. 3023 of 1989 will have to be examined
by the Division Bench of the High Court on its own merits. [278-A-H]
c
-- CML APPELLATE JURISDICfION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2035-36
of 1990.

From the Judgment and Order dated 9.3.90 of the Delhi High Court
in C.W.P. No. 3023 and 2286 of 1989.
D
D.A. Dave, Parag Tripathi, A:T. Patra, Gautam Khaitan for O.P.
Khaitan & Co. for the Appellant.

Dhruv Mehta, S.K. Mehta and Fazlin Anam for the Respondent.

A. Subba Rao, S.A. Matto, V.K. Verma for the Union of India. E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. MAJMUDAR, J. M/s. Northern Plastics Ltd. is the common
appellant in these two appeals moved by it after obtaining special leave to
appeal from this Court against a common judgment dated 9th March 1990 F
passed by the High Court of Delhi in two Civil Writ Petitions, one moved
by M/s. Hindustan Photo Films Mfg. Co. Ltd. ('HPF' for short), respondent
No. 1 in C.A. No. 2035 of 1990, and the other the Union of the India,
respondent No. 1 in the companion Civil Appeal No. 2036 of 1990. The
question posed for our consideration is as to whether 1st respondents in
these civil writ appeals could be said to be 'persons aggrieved' within the G
meaning of Section 129-A of the Customs Act, 1962 (hereinafter referred
to as 'the Act') so that they could challenge before be Customs, Excise and
Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal ('CEGAT' for short) the order passed
by the Additional Collector of Customs, Bombay dated 5th June 1989
agreeing with the notings made by the Assistant Collector of Customs H
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) 2 S.C.R.

A dated 31st May 1989 recommending release of the imported goods to the
common appellant on payment of full customs duty. The CEGAT took the
view that respondent No. 1 in both these appeals had no locus standi to
prefer appeals against the said order. The High Court of Delhi by the
Impugned judgment has taken a contrary view and has ruled in favour of
B the locus standi of these respective respondents. ·

Before we deal with the aforesaid question it will be necessary to
note the relevant background facts leading to the present controversy
between the parties. They project a chequered history. The common
appellant, Northern Plastics Ltd., which will hereinafter be referred to as
1
C the appellant' for the sake for convenience, is said to have obtained Small
Scale Industries Registration (SSI Registration) on 24th August 1985 for
slitting and confectioning of jumbo rolls of various types of films. The said
registration, according to the appellant, was obtained under. the Industries
(Development & Regulation) Act, 1951 ('IDR Act for short). A notifica-
tion was issued by the competent authority under the said Act on 18th July
D 1986 effectively taking away the exemption from requirement of licence in
respect of Item 20 of 1st Schedule to the IDR Act thus making it obligatory
for owner of industrial undertaking to have licence within six months. It is
the case of the appellant that although it was not the owner of industrial
undertaking as defined by the IDR Act, under a mistaken belief it applied
E for COB licence on 8th December 1986. On 7th July 1988 a notification
was issued by the Central Government in exercise of its powers under
sub-section (1) of Section 25 of the Act exempting jumbo rolls of graphic
art films and jumbo rolls of photographic colour paper, of width 1 metre
or more of length 600 metres or more, falling within Chapter 37 of the First
F Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (51 of 1975), when imported into
India, from so much of that portion of the duty of customs leviable thereon
under the said First Schedule as was in excess of the amount calculated at
the rate of 60 per cent ad valorem, subject to the following conditions :

(i) the importer undertakes conversion of the said jumbo rolls by
G slitting or confectioning into finished products;

(ii) the importer holds an industrial licence under the Industries
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951), for slitting
and confectioning of photo-sensitised materials from jumbo rolls.

H According to the appellant the benefit of this concession in import duty on
NORTHERN PLASTICS LTD. v. HINDUSTAN PHOTO FILMS MFG. CO. LTD. (S.S. MAJMUDAR, J.] 261

the jumbo rolls of various types of films which were being imported by the A
appellant was available to it. The appellant had imported various consign-
ments of articles of X-Ray films and graphic art films through the port at
Bombay between January 1989 and May 1989. The shipments concerned
for the same consignments were made in favour of the appellant by the
foreign exporter~ ·between 15th December 1988 and 20th April 1989. B .
According to die Appellant the goods were .worth Rs. 246 lacs ap-
proximately in foreign exchange. That the appellant had paid customs duty
amounting to Rs. 196 lacs on these consignments and the additional duty
if the exemption was not available to the appellant on these consignments
would have becomes payable to the extent of Rs. 130 lac. The total value

- of the goods imported at Bombay port by the appellant during the C
aforesaid period worked up to Rs. 572 lacs according to the appellant. The
Assistant Collector of Customs (Bombay) had not granted the requisite
relief of concessional import duty payable for the imported consignments
of the appellant. Hence a writ petition being Civil Writ Petition No. 2021
of 1988 was moved by the appellant in the High Court of Deihl where D
principal relief sought was for the grant of benefit of the aforesaid customs
exemption notification. A prayer was also made for issuance of COB
licence by ~tl!e competent authorities under the IDR Act. Initially the
appellant haJ not joined M/s. 'HPF', a public sector undertaking in the
said writ petition as a respondent as it was merely a business rival of the E
appellant. However oli ·an application by the HPF a Division Bench of the
High Court by its order dated St)l May 1989 allowed it to be a party-respon-
dent in the appellant's petition. In the aforesaid writ petition filed by the
appellant before High Court of Delhi initially an order was passed by a
learned Single Judge directing removal and release of the jumbo rolls F
imported by the appellant at Bombay at concessional rate of customs duty.

-- However this interim order was set aside by a Division Bench of the High
Court by its order 8th May 1989. Pending ,this writ petition in the Delhi
High Court, upon an appellaht by the appellant, an order was proposed to
be passed by the Assistant Collector of Customs (Bombay) on 31st May
1989 permitting the clearance of the imported consignment of the appellant G
upon payment of full rate of c,ustoms duty. The said proposed order was
placed for approval before the-Additional Collector of Customs (Bombay).
Below the said proposal the Addition~ Collector of Customs (Bombay)
1

put his endorsement agreeing to the said proposal on 1st June 1989. The
said order which came to be communicated to the appellant on 5th June H
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) 2 S.C.R.

A 1989 entitled the appellant to clear the imported goods on payment of full
customs duty without availing of the benefit of the concessional rate of
import duty pursuant to the earlier referred notification dated 7th July
1988.

B Having come to know about this order of the Additional Collector
of CustoJllS, HPF which is a public sector undertaking wholly owned by
Government of India, which was already joined as a party, at its own
request, to the appellant's pending petition, moved an interim relief ap-
plication in that petition for staying the clearance and removal of the goods
imported by the appellant. The High Court by its order dated 9th June
C 1989 in vacation granted ex-parte stay of the Collector's order. The interim
relief application of HPF was subsequently heard by another Vacation -
Judge in the High Court on 21st June 1989 and after completion of the
arguments on behalf of the HPF on 26th June 1989 a request was made
for not pronouncing the judgment in the said interim relief application.
D However the said request was not granted and the interim relief application
of HPF was dismissed on 26th June 1989 by the High Court. That there-
after HPF filed a writ petition in the High Court of Bombay on that very
day, that is, 26th June 1989 praying for similar interim relief against release
of the imported goods to the appellant. The High Court rejected the
a
request for parte interim relief. A Special Leave Petition was also moved
E by the HPF before this Court against the Delhi High Court order dated
26th June 1989 vacating the ex parte stay granted against the release of
imported goods in favour of the appellant. The said Special Leave Petition
was dismissed as withdrawn by this Court. After HPF's Special Leave
Petition was dismissed as withdrawn by this Court on 27th June 1989 a writ
F appeal was moved by th HPF before a Division Bench of the Bombay High
Court against the order of learned Single Judge refusing to grant ex parte
stay in writ petition of HPF, but no interim relief was granted by the High
Court even in this writ appeal. Under these circumstance HPF filed an
appeal to CEGAT on 28th June 1989 against the order of Additional
G Collector of Customs (Bombay) dated 5th June 1989. An ex parte interim
order was obtained from CEGAT for a week up to 6th July 1989. HPF
then withdrew the writ petition before the Bombay High Court. In the
meantime the status quo order granted by CEGAT expired on 6th July
1989 and it was not extended. HPF then filed a writ petition before the
-
High Court of Delhi being Writ Petition No. 1932 of 1989 against the order
H dated 7.7.1989 passed by CEGAT and the Division Bench of the High
NORTHERN PLASTICS LTD. v. HINDUSTAN PHOTO FILMS MFG. CO. LTD. [S.B. MAlMUDAR, J.] 263

Court passed an ex parte stay of the order of the Additional Collector of A
Customs dated 5th June 1989 on 12th July 1989. The High Court of Delhi
by its order dated 17th July 1989 disposed of Writ Petition No. 1932 of
1989 moved by the HPF against the Additional Collector's order and
directed CEGAT to dispose of the appeal of the HPF. The High Court,
·however, further directed that till the final disposal of the appeal by the B
CEGAT the stay granted on .12th July 1989 would continue. Before HPF's
appeal could be h.eard by the CEGAT an appeal being No. 2072 of 1989
was field by the Ministry of Industries, New Delhi before CEGAT under
Section 129- A of the Act against the very same order of Additional

-
Collector dated 5th June 1989. A Bench of CEGAT by its order dated 31st
July 1989 dismissed the appeal of HPF against Collector of Customs on C
the ground that HPF being a business rival of the appellant was not 'person
aggrieved' as contemplated by Section 129-A of the Act and hence the
appeal was not maintainable. Thereafter on 8th August 1989 the other
appeal filed by Ministry of Industries against the very same order of
Additional Collector of Customs was also dismissed as not maintainable, D
the Ministry of Industries being held not an 'aggrieved person' within the
meaning of Section 129-A of the Act. Under these circumstances HPF filed
another Writ Petition No. 2286 ·of 1989 in the Delhi High Court on 9th
August 1989 challenging two orders - (i) the order of CEGAT dated 31st
July 1989 holding its appeal as not maintainable; and (ii) the order of
Additional Collector of Customs (Bombay) ordering release of the im- E
ported goods to the appellant. A Division Bench of the High Court while
admitting the writ petition restrained clearance of the goods in favour of
the appellant pending the writ petition. In the said writ petition Ministry
of Industries was also permitted on its application to be impleaded as
party-respondent. The Union of India representing Ministry of Industries F

-- in its turn filed another writ petition being Civil Writ Petition No. 3023 of
1989 on 24th October 1989 before the High Court of Delhi against the
order dated 8th August 1989 passed by CEGAT against it. That petition
was also admitted by the High Court of Delhi. Both these writ petitions .
were heard together and by a common order dated 9th March 1990 a
Division Bench of the High Court took the view that the appeals filed by G

- the respective first respondents in these appeals were maintainable before
the CEGAT as they could be said to be 'persons aggrieved' within the
meaning of Section 129-A of the Act and that they had sufficient locus
standi in public interest to maintain their appeals. In the result the Division
H
e

264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] 2 S.C.R.

A Bench of the High Court partly allowed the writ petitions of both the first
respondents in these appeals moved by the Union of India as well as HPF
and passed the following order :

"We have held that the Union of India and M/s. Hindustan Photo
Films Ltd. are 'aggrieved persons' and can maintain an appeal
B under Section 129-A of the Customs Act. The main question in
the writ petition at the root of the entire controversy between the
parties is whether the said importation of the photo-sensitized
material at Bombay was legal or not would now be decided by the
Appellate Tribunal. But assuming that M/s. Northern Plastics Ltd.
c takes an appeal against our order to the Supreme Court and our
decision is reversed, still the question of the legality of the impor-
tation would be open to the parties to be argiled in this writ petition
before us. Thus, till the main question of legality of importation is
finally disposed of, in the interests of justice, it is necessary that
the subject-matter of the controversy, viz. the imported goods, are
D preserved in the custody of the Customs Authorities and are not
released. Since the goods are now stored under the suitable con-
ditions of storage with M/s. Northern Plastics Ltd. there is no
likelihood of their deteriorating. No variation in our order dated
9.8.89 in regard to the release of goods is, therefore, called for.
E
The writ petition is partly allowed to the extent indicated
above."

As already noted the aforesaid common order of the Division Bench of the
F High Court of Delhi has resulted in present two appeals on grant of special
leave by this Court. Pending these appeals it was felt by this Court that the
imported goods in question were likely to deteriorate with passage of time
and if that happened the contesting parties would stand to suffer ir-
retrievably. Consequently by an order dated 25th April 1990 a Bench of
G two learned judges of this Court was pleased to direct that Chief Controller
of Imports and Exports may be appointed as Court Receiver for disposing
of the goods in question by sale in auction as expeditiously as possible and
j
at the maximum price they will fetch in the market. It was further directed
that the amount of the sale proceeds of the auction shall forthwith be
deposited by the receiver in this Court to the credit of these appeals.
H Accordingly the goods were auctioned. By a further order dated 21st
NOR111BRN PLASTICS LID.'· HINDUSTAN PHOTO FILMS MFG. CO. LID. [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 265

September 1990 another Bench of two learned Judges of this Court ac- A
cepted the offer of four purchasers who had offered to purchase all the
disputed goods for a total sum of Rs. 1,40,00,000. Four auction sales were
confirmed in favour of the concerned auction purchasers. By the same
order it was directed that the auction amount shall be deposited by this
Court in a Fixed Deposit Account and the amount so deposited shall
remain in the custody of the Court and shall be disposed of in accordance.
B
.
...-
,. with the final judgment in the appeals pending before the Customs, Excise .
and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal. The aforesaid order was passed
for the obvious reason that by that time under the common judgment under
" appeal CEGAT was directed by the High Court to disposed of the appeals

-- of Union of India as well as HPF pursuant to its judgment. However as
these appeals are being disposed of finally by us by the present judgment
appropriate orders will have to be passed by us in connection with this
deposited amount. We shall do so after considering the main question
c

involved in controversy between the parties in these appeals.

For the purpose of these appeals we shall assume that the order of
D
Assistant Collector of Customs (Bombay), as approved by the Additional
Collector of Customs (Bombay), of 1st June 1989 was in itself appealable
to CEGAT under Section 129-A of the Act being a decision and order
passed by an adjudicating authority under Section 122 of the Act. We
assume as aforesaid for the simple reason that Shri Dave, learned senior E
counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended that the said endorse-
ment of the Additional Collector of Customs was of an administrative
nature and was not appealable. Neither CEGAT nor the High Court of
Delhi has considered that question and as that question strictly does not
arise for our consideration in the present appeals for deciding the con-
F
troversy .
. between the parties we have assumed as aforesaid.

Rival Contentions
I

Shri Dave, learned senior counsel for the appellant has vehemently
contended that the Division Bench of the High Court had patently erred G
.__ in taking the view in the impugned common judgment that HPF as well as
..... Industries Ministry of the Union of India were 'aggrieved person' within
the meaning of Section 129-A of the Act. According to Shri Dave, the only
parties which could prefer appeal to CEGAT could be either the aggrieved
importer or the Collector of Customs after following the procedure of H
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] 2 S.C.R.

A Section 129-D of the Act. That save and except these two parties no third
party had a right to appeal under the Act. That right of appeal under the
Act is a creature of statute. Therefore, we have to took at the relevant
provisions of the statute with a view to finding out whether an appeal lies
at the instance of any third parties like the present first respondents in both
B these appeals. Shri Dave in this connection placed strong reliance on
Section 129-A sub-section (1) as well as sub-section (3) thereof. In support
of his submission he placed reliance on judgments of this Court to which
we will make a reference at an appropriate stage. Shri Dave submitted that
the concept or locus standi as expanded by decisions of this Court in
connection with public interest litigations moved before this Court under
C Article 32 or before the High Courts, under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India had no application to the statutory right of appeal to be culled out
from the express language of the statute creating the appellate forum and
also confirming the right of appeal to the parties mentioned therein. In the
alternative, submitted Shri Dave, neither the Industries Ministry nor the
D HPF, which is a rival commercial concern, can be said to be aggrieved by
the order of the Assistant Collector of Customs (Bombay) directing release
of the imported goods in favour of the appellant on payment of full customs
duty. Shri Dave also tried to submit that it could not be urged by the
contesting· respondents that the import of the goods in question was
unauthorised as for additional import licence purchased by the appellant
E actual user test was not applicable. For resolving the present controversy
it is not necessary to consider this alternative contention of Shri Dave. We
will confine our decision to the limited question whether appeals moved
by each of the first respondents in these appeals before CEGAT were
maintainable or not.
F
Learned counsel Shri Subba Rao appearing for the Union of India
as well as· learned counsel appearing for HPF on the other hand tried to
support the decision rendered by the High Court of Delhi and submitted
that on the express language of Section 129-A sub- section (1) of the Act
G the Industries Ministry of the Union of India as well as HPF could be said
to be 'persons aggrieved'. That according to the Industries Ministry of
Union of India the appellant had imported goods which were liable to
confiscation under the Act and, therefore, the order of the Additional
Collector of Customs (Bombay) was patently erroneous. That it affected
the public revenue as well as the effective implementation of IDR Act and,
H therefore, it could not be said that the Industries Ministry did not represent
NORTHERN PLASTICS LTD.'· HINDUSTAN PHOTO FILMS MFG. CO. LTD. (S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.) U,7

sufficient public interest to maintain the appeal before CEGAT. Learned A
counsel for HPF in his turn submitted that HPF which is wholly owr,ed

- Government company where more than Rs. 400 crores are sunk by Central
Government from public coffers is a limb of the Union of India itself ;.,1d
when such large extent of public funds are involved in the working of HPF
it cannot be said that it did not represent sufficient public interest .to
maintain the appeal against the order of Additional Collector of Customs
B
._... by which huge quantity of illegally imported goods were sought to be
released in favour of the appellant. That such goods, if permitted to be
imported, would result in flooding the local market and would severely
prejudice the working of HPF which is a public concern that has now gone
c
-- sick and hence the High Court had committed no error in holding that the
HPF had sufficient locus standi to maintain its appeal before CEGAT.

In the light of these rival contentions we now proceed to consider
the question posed for our decision.

D
At the outset it must be kept in view that appeal is a creature of
statute. The right to appeal has to be exercised by persons permitted by
the statute to prefer appeals subject to the conditions regarding the filing
of such appeals. We may in this connection usefully refer to a decision of
four learned Judge of this Court in the case of The Anant Mills Co. Ltd.
Etc. Etc. v. State of Gujarat & Others Etc. Etc., AIR (1975) SC 1234 = E
(1975) 2 SCC 175. In that case Khanna, J., speaking for the Court had to
consider the question whether the provision of statutory appeal as per
Section 406(2)(e) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act,
1949 which required the appellant to deposit the disputed amount of tax
before appeal could be entertained could be said to be in any way violative
F
of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Repelling the aforesaid challenge
to the vires of the said provisions the following pertinent observations were
made in para 40 of the Report :

".... The right of appeal is the creature of a stature. Without a
statutory provision creating such a right the person aggrieved is G
,,__ not entitled to file an appeal. We fail to understand as to why the
Legislature while granting the right of appeal cannot impose con-
ditions for the exercise of such right. In the absence of any special
reasons there appears to be no legal or constitutional impediment
to the imposition of such conditions. It is permissible, for example, H
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) 2 S.C.R.

A to prescribe a condition in criminal cases that unless a convicted
person is released on bail, he must surrender to custody before his
appeal against the sentence of imprisonment would be entertained.
Likewise, it is permissible to enact a law that no appeal shall lie
against an order relating to an assessment of tax unless the tax had
-
been paid. Such a provision was on the statute book in Section 30
B of the. Indian Income-tax, 1922. The proviso to that section
provided that ' ...... no appeal shall lie against an order under sub-
section {1) of Section 46 unless the tax had been paid. Such
conditions merely regulate the exercise of the right of appeal so
that the same is not abused by a recalcitrant party and there is no
c difficulty in the enforcement of the order appealed against in case
the appeal is ultimately dismissed. It is open to the Legislature to
impose an accompanying liability upon a party upon whom legal
right is conferred or to prescribe conditions for the exercise of the
right. Any requirement for discharge of that liability or the fulfil-
ment of that condition in case the party concerned seeks to avail
D
of the said right is a valid piece of legislation, and we can discern ·
no contravention of Article 14 in it... .. "

It has also to be noted that the wider concept of locus standi in public
interest litigation moved before this Court under Article 32 of the Con-
E stitution of India which itself is a fundamental right or under Article 226
before High Court which also offers a constitutional remedy cannot be
imported for deciding the right of appeal under the statutory provisions
contained in the Customs Act. Whether any right of appeal is conferred
-
on anyone against the orders passed under the Act in the hierarchy of
proceedings before the authorities has to be judged from the statutory
F settings of the Act and not dehors them. Therefore, in our view, the High
Court in the impugned judgment had erred in drawing the analogy from
the more elastic concept of locus standi under Article 32 or Article 226
evolved by this Court by its decisions on the subject. It is also to be
--
appreciated that the decision of this Court in Bar Council of Maharashtra
v. M.V. Dabholkar Etc. Etc., AIR {1975) SC 2092 was based on an entirely
G different statutory scheme. For judging the competence and locus standi
of the Union of India or the HPF for moving appeals before CEGAT
against the order of Additional Collector of Customs passed. under Section
122 of the Act the answer must be found from within the four corners of
the Act itself.
H
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] 2 S.C.R.

A Cust.oms and Excise Revenues Appellate Tribunal established
under Section 3 of the Customs and Excise Revenues Appellate
Tribunal Act, 1986, against such order.

(3) Every appeal under this section shall be filed within three
months from the date on which the order sought to be appealed
B against is communicated to the Collector of Customs, or as the
case may be, the other party preferring the appeal.';

Section 129-D(l) of the Act also deserves to be noted at this stage. It reads
as under:
c
"129-D. Powers of Board or Collector of CustOfl!S to pass certain
orders. - (1) The Board may, of its own motion, call for and examine
the record of any proceeding in which a Collector of Customs as
an adjudicating authority has passed any decision or order under
this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or
D
propriety of any such decision or order and may, by order direct
such Collector to apply to the Appellate Tribunal or, as the case
may be, the Customs and Excise Revenues Appellate Tribunal
established under Section 3 of the Customs and Excise Revenues
Appellate Tribunal Act, 1986, for the determination of such points
E arising out of the decision or order as may be specified by the
Board in its order.''

Section 129-DA gives powers of revision to Board or Collector of Customs
in certain cases and as we are concerned here with further proceedings
F against the order of Collector of Customs sub-section (1) of Section
129-DA would be relevant. It reads as under :

"129-DA. Powers of revision of Board or Collector of Customs in
certain cases. - (1) The Board may, of its own motion or on the
application of any aggrieved person or otherwise, call for and
G examine the record of any proceeding in which a Collector of
Customs has passed any decision or order not being a decision or
order passed under sub-section (2) of this section of the nature
.. referred to in sub-section (5) of Section 129-D for the purpose of
satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety or such
H decision or order and may pass such order thereon as it thinks fit.''
NORTIJERN PLASTICS LTD. v. HINDUSfAN PHOTO FILMS MFG. CO. LTD. (S.B. MAJMUDAR l.J 271 .

Similarly Section 129-DD gives powers of revision to Central Government A
to entertain revision petitions against certain orders of the Collector (Ap-
peals). It provides as under :

"129-DD. Revision by Central Government. - (1) The Central
Government may, on the application of a person aggrieved by any B
order passed under Section 128-A, where the order is of the nature
referred to in the first proviso to sub-section ( 1) of Section 129-A,
annul or modify such order.

Explanation. - For the purpose of this sub-section, 'order passed
under Section 128-A' includes an order passed under that section C
before the commencement of Section 40 of the Finance Act, 1984,
against which an appeal has not been preferred before such com-
mencement and could have been, if the said section had not come
in~o force, preferred after such commencement to the Appellate
Tribunal." D
The aforesaid provisions of the Act leave no room for doubt that they
represent a complete scheme or code for challenging the orders passed by
the Collector (Customs) in exercise of his statutory powers. It is axiomatic
that the importer against whom the Collector has passed the impugned
order of adjudication and who is called upon to pay the customs duty E
which, according to him, is not payable is ceitainly an 'aggrieved person'
who can prefer an appeal under Section 129- A(l) of the Act. So far as
departmental authorities themselves are concerned including the Collector
of Customs no direct right of appeal is conferred on Collector to prefer
appeal against his own order before the CEGAT. However there is suffi- F
>
cient safeguard made available to the Revenue by the Act for placing in
challenge erroneous orders of adjudication as passed by the Collector of
Customs by moving the Central Board of Excise and Customs under
Section 129-D(l) for a direction to the Collector to apply to the CEGAT
for determination of such point arising out for the decision or order as may
be specified by the Board of Revenue in this connection. Similarly a G
statutory remedy is provided to the Collector of Customs in connection
with orders of the Appellate Collector of Customs passed immediately
before the appointed day and also in connection with the orders passed by
Collector of Customs under Section 128-A, to direct proper officer to
appeal on his behalf as laid down by Section 129-A(2). Revisional powers H
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS· (1997) 2 S.C.R.

A are also conferred on the Central Board of Excise and Customs against the
orders of Collectors of Customs as provided by Section 129-DA(l) as well
as on the Central Government under contingencies contemplated by Sec-
tion 129-DD(l). These are the only statutory modes contemplated by the
Act by resort to which the orders of Collector (Customs) could be brought
in challenge before higher statutory authorities including the CEGAT. In
B
the light of this statutory scheme, therefore, it is not possible to agree with
the contention of learned counsel for the contesting respondents that
sub-section (1) of Section 129-A entitles any and every person feeling
aggrieved by the decision or order of the Collector of Customs as an
adjudicating authority, to prefer statutory appeal to the Appellate Tribunal.
C Neither the Central Government, through Industries Department, nor the
rival company or industry operating in the same field as the importer can
as a matter or right prefer an appeal as 'person aggrieved'. It is true that
the phrase 'person aggrieved' is wider than the phrase 'party. aggrieved'.
But in the entire context of the statutory scheme especially sub-section (3)
D of Section 129-A it has to be held that only that parties to the proceeding5
before the adjudicating authority Collector or Customs could prefer such
an appeal to the CEGAT and the adjudicating authority under S.122 can
prefer such an appeal only when directed by the Board under Section
129-D(l) and not otherwise. It is easy to visualise that even a third party
may get legitimately aggrieved by the order of the Collector of Customs
E being the adjudicating authority if it is contended by such a third party that
the goods imported really belonged to it and not to the purported or that
he had financed the same and, therefore, in substance he was interested in
the goods and consequently the release order in favour of the purported
importer was prone to create a legal injury to such a third party which is
F not actually arraigned as a party before the adjudicating authority and was
not heard by it. Under such circumstances such a third party might perhaps
be treated to be legally aggrieved by the order of the Collector of Customs
as an adjudicating authority and may legitimately prefer an appeal to the
CEGAT as a 'person aggrieved'. That is the reason why the Legislature in
its wisdom has used the phrase 'any person aggrieved' by the order of
G Collector of Customs as adjudicating authority in Section 129-A(l). But
in order to earn a locus standi as ..person aggrieved' other than the
arraigned narty before the Collector of Customs as an adjudicating
authority it must be shown that such a person aggrieved being third party
has a direct legal interest in the goods involved in the adjudication process.
H It cannot b~ a general public interest or interest of a business rival as is
NOR1l!ERN PLASTICS LID. v. HINDUSTAN PHOTO FILMS MFG. CO. LID. [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 273

being projected by the contesting respondents before us. In this connection A"
we may refer to a Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the case
of Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai, Adv.ocate General of
Maharashtra, Bombay, [1970] 2 SCC 484. Question before the Constitution
Bench in that case was as to whether Advocate General of the High Court
who was to be issued a notice in disciplinary proceedings by the Bar B
. Council as per the provisions of Section 35(2) of the Advocates Act, 1961
had locus standi to prefer an appeal against the order of the disciplinary
authority under Section 37 of the Advocates Act before Bar Council of
India. A majority of the Constitution Bench took the view that the Advo-
cate General had no such locus standi. He could not be said to be a 'person
aggrieved' by the decision of the disciplinary authority exonerating the C
concerned delinquent advocate. Mitter, J., speaking for the majority con-
sidered the question in the light of the statutory settings of the Act and
observed that to decide the question one had to look at the proceedings
of this Kinds. We may refer to the pertinent observations in this connection
made in paras 9 and 10 of the Report of the said judgment of Mitter, J. : D

"Generally speaking, a person can be said to be aggrieved by
an order which is to his detriment, pecuniary or otherwise or causes
him some prejudice in some form.or other. A person who is not
a party to a litigation has no right to appeal merely because the
judgment or order contains some adverse remarks against him. But E
it has been held in a number of cas~s that a person who is not a
party to a suit inay prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate
court and such leave would not be refused where the judgment
would be binding on him under Explanation 6 to Section 11 of the
Code of civil procedure. We find ourselves unable to take the view F
that because a person has been given notice of some proceedings
wherein he is given a right to appear and make his submissions,
he should without more have a tight of appeal from an order
rejecting his contentions or submission. An appeal is a creature of
statute and if a statute expressly gives a person a right to ;,ippeal,
the matter rests there. G

Innumerable statutes both in England and in India give the
right of appeal to 'a person aggrieved' by an order made and the
provisions of such statutes have to be construed in each case to
find out whether the person prefering an appeal falls within that H
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] 2 S.C.R.

A expression. As was observed in Robi11so11 v. Cuney, (7 QBD 465)
the words 'person aggrieved are 'ordinary English words which are
to have the ordinary meaning put upon them'. According to
Halsbury's Laws of England (Third Edition, Vol. 25), page 293,
footnote 'h' :

B 'the expression is nowhere defined and must be construed by
reference to the context of the enactment in which it appears and
all the circumstances.'

Attempts have however from time to time been made to define the
expression in various cases. In Ex parte Sidebotham /11 re
c Sidebotham (14 Ch D 458 at 465) it was observed by James, L.J.:

'But the words 'person aggrieved' do not really mean a man
who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if
some other order had been made. A 'person aggrieved' must be a
D man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a
decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him
of something, or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully
affected his title to something."

A Bench of four learned Judges of this Court in the. case of Jasbhai
E Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed and Others, (1976) 1
SCC 671 had to examine the scheme of Bombay Cinemas Regulation Act
1958 and a rule therein with a view to finding out whether a rival cinema
owner could appeal against a No Objection Certificate granted to an
applicant who wanted to establish a cinema theatre of his own. Sarkaria,
F J., speaking for the Court observed that under the relevant provisions of
the Regulations no right was conferred by way of special interest on such
rival cinema owner as he did not satisfy the test of 'person aggrieved'. Nor
could he be treated to be a valid objector being resident of the locality or
person to whom any special right of objection was conferred by the
statutory scheme. Thus he was merely a rival cinema owner who was likely
G to be adversely affected in his commercial interest if another cinema
theatre got established and came to be run in the light of the No Objection
Certificate. That such an interest was considered to be too remote to clothe
the objections with a right to object to the No Objection Certificate to run
a cinema under the Rules. Paras 47 of 48 of the Report in this connection
H deserve to be noted :
NORIBERN PLASTICS LTD. v. HINDUSTAN PHOTO FILMS MFG. CO. LTD. (S.B. MA.IMUDAR, J.J 275

"Thus, in substance, the appellant's stand is that the setting up A
of a rival cinema house in the town will adversely affect his
momopolistic commercial interest, causing pecuniary harm and
loss of business from competition. Such harm or loss is not wrong-
ful in the eye of law, because it does not result in injury to a legal
right or a legally protected interest, the business competition B
causing it being a lawful activity. Juridically, harm of this descrip-
tion is called damnum sine injuria, the term injuria being here used
in its true sense of an act contrary to law (Salmond on
Jurisprudence, 12th Edn. by Fitzgerald, (p. 357, para 85). The
reason why the law suffers a person knowingly to inflict harm of
this description on another, without holding him accountable for C
it, is that such harm done to an individual is a gain to society at
large.

In the light of the above discussion, it is demonstrably clear
that the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. D
He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In
fact, the impugned order does not operate s a decision against him,
much less does it, wrongfully affect his title to something. He has
not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal

-·· grievance. He has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on.
Therefore he is not a 'person aggrieved' and has no locus standi E
to challenge the grant of the no-objection certification."

Shri Subba Rao, learned counsel for Union of India contended that
the Central Government through the Industries Ministry had sufficient
interest in the litigation in question as large public revenue was involved F
and the protection to be conferred on the local manufacturers and those
dealing in local markets had to be guarded against the onslaught of
mushroom importers. That this public interest was sought to be vindicated
by the Union of India by raising the present dispute. If the concerned
import was found to' be illegal the goods would be liable to confiscation.
That when more than Rs. 400 crores were sunk by the Union of India in G
its company HPF it could not be said that the. Union of India through the
Ministry of Industries was a total stranger and had no locus standi what-
soever to challenge the order of the Additional Collector of Customs. So
for as the Union of India is concerned we may proceed on the basis that
it may have to subserve a larger public interest by raising the present .H
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] 2 S.C.R.'

A dispute and may legitimately feel aggrieved by the order of the Additional
Collector of Customs. But even if it is so, the statutory procedure laid down
by the Parliament in its wisdom for enabling the challenge to the adjudica-
tion order of the Collector of Customs by way of appeals or revisions as
per the aforesaid relevant statutory provisions, to which we have made a
B mention, has got to be followed in such an eventuality. Bypassing the said
statutory procedure a direct frog leap to CEGAT is contra-indicated by
the statutory scheme of the Act. If such direct appeals are permitted the
very scheme of Section 129-D(l) would get stultified. It must, therefore, be
held that direct appeal filed by the Union of India through Industries

C
Ministry to CEGAT under Section 129-A(l} was clearly incompetent. It
may be added that the Union of India could have used the mode set out
in section 1290, but it did not do so.
1
So far as the appeal filed by HPF is concerned it is still on a weaker
footing. Even though HPF may be a public limited company wholly owned
D by the Central Government and even if Central Government might have
sunk more than Rs. 400 crores in constituting it, its function would still
remain in the domain of commercial enterprise. It may be a limb of the
Central Government or its alter ego so far as Article 13 of the Constitution
is concerned and may be treated as a State so that it can be at the receiving
end to answer challenges about violation of constitutional guarantees or
E statutory provisions under which it may be acting, but that would not clothe •
it with a legal locus standi to prefer a statutory appeal CEGAT under
Section 129-A(l). From the point of view of that provision it is no more
than a business rival and cannot be said to be a 'person aggrieved' by the
adjudicatory order of the Collector of Customs releasing imported goods
p to the appellant on payment of full customs duty. It has also to be noted
that the Customs Act nowhere provides for any special interest of such
public concerns which may be operating as rivals in the same commercial
filed in which the importer may be operating. In the absence of any special
--
statutory provision for protecting the interest of such Government concerns
or public sector undertakings no statutory locus standi can be culled out
G in their favour on the express language of the relevant provisions of the
Act noted by us earlier. It must, therefore, be held that HPF was a mere
business rival operating in the same commercial field and carrying on the
same commercial activities as the appellant. Its locus standi to challenge
the order of Additional Collector of Customs in favour of the appellant,
H therefore, gets squarely ruled out by the ratio of the decision of this Court
NORTHERN PLASTICS LTD.v. HINDUSTAN PHOTO FILMS MFG. CO. LTD. [S.B. MAJMUDAR. l.J 277

in the case offasbhai Motibhai Desai (supra). Learned counsel for the HPF A
in this connectio~ submitted that if imported goods of the appellant were
allowed to enter the market HPFs commercial interest would be materially
prejudiced and by now it has already became a sick unit. That is neither
here nor there. The said grievance would still be in the realm of demnum
sine injuria as indicated in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai's case (supra) by this B
Court. Consequently the appeal filed by HPF before the CEGAT also must
be treated to be incompetent and could not be covered by the sweep of
Section 129-A(1) of the Act.

Learned counsel for HPF invited our attention to a· decision of a
two-member Bench of this Court in the case of K Ramadas Shenoy v. The C
Chief Officers, Tow11 Municipal Council, Udipi and Other~~ [1975] 1 SCR
680. In that case a resident in a locality wherein a cinema building was
being constructed contrary to the binding To\vn Planning Scheme, was held
to be entitled to challenge the said violation of the Scheme by construction
of cinema building. Said decision is rendered on its own facts. The statutory D
Scheme was for the benefit of persons residing in the .locality. Under the
said Scheme the Municipal authorities owned a public duty and obligation
under the statute to see that the residential area is not spoiled by un-
authorised construction. Under these circumstance it was held that the
aggrieved party had sufficient locus standi under Article 226 of the Con-
stitution of India to move the High Court against the violation of the E
statutory scheme by the municipal authorities. It is easy to visualise that in
that this Court was concerned with the locus standi of an 'aggrieved party'
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which is of a wider nature
as compared to the statutory right of appeal under a given statutory scheme
before a statutory authority created by that very statute. The said decision F
is, therefore, of no avail to HPF. ·

As a result of the aforesaid discussion it must be held that the High
Court had committed a patent error of law in taking the view that the
concerned writ petitioners before it had sufficient locus standi to prefer
.
appeals before CEGAT. The decision \
of CEGAT holding that . they had G
no such locus standi was perfectly justified on the scheme of the Act and·
it was wrongly set aside by the High Court. Consequently the appeals will
be required to be allowed.

However a further question survives for our. consideration. As the H
278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] 2 S.C.R.

A High Court has noted in the impugned judgment, the other contentions in
the writ petitions filed by the contesting respondents were not considered
by it in view of its decision on the right of appeal which was made available
to the concerned writ petitioners before the CEGAT. We have, however,
to observe in this connection that the High Court was not at all justified
in presuming what it should do in case the appellant's appeal succeeded
B
before this Court. Proper direction in that connection should have been
left to be given by this Court in such an eventuality. High Court could not
have been pre-empted the same by the impugned judgment. However in
view of the fact that other contentions in the writ petitions were not
examined by the High Court in any case they will now have to be examined
c by it. As the decision on the right to appeal to CEGAT made available to
the contesting respondents by the High Court is being set aside by us, the
question remains as to what further appropriate orders can be passed in
this connection. So far as this question is concerned it may be noted that
two writ petitions were moved, one by Union of India being Civil Writ
D Petition No. 3023 of 1989 and another by HPF being Civil Writ Petition ·
No. 2286 of 1989. As we have taken the view that HPF being a business
rival of the appellant had no right to challenge the order of Additional
Collector of Customs, Bombay passed in favour of the appellant its writ
p"etition being Civil Writ Petition No. 2286 of 1989 filed before the High
Court will stand dismissed. However writ petition filed by the Union of
E India being Civil Writ Petition No. 3023 of 1989 will have to be permitted
to proceed further on remaining controversy before the High Court in so
far as Union of India seeks to challenge the order of Collector of Customs,
Bombay dated 1st/5th June 1989. As we have taken the view that Union
of India could legitimately challenge the said order before appropriate
F forum in public interest and as it has wider locus standi at least in
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if not before
CEGAT, its challenge in the writ petition under Article 226 against the
said order cannot be told off the gates. That challenge will have to be
examined by the High Court under Article 226 on its own merits. It is
G obvious that it will be open to the appellant as contesting respondent to
try to support the impugned order of the Assistant Collector/Collector of
Customs on all legally permissible grounds. In short the said controversy
between the Union of India on the one hand and the appellant on the
other in Union of India's Writ Petition No. 3023 of 1989 will have to be
examined by the Division Bench of the High Court on its own merits. As
H the proceedings are pending since long before the High Court so far as
NORTI!ERN PLASTICS LTD. v. HINDUSTAN PHOTO FILMS MFG. CO. LTD. [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.J 279

the aforesaid challenge is concerned it would be in the interest of justice A
to request the High Court to decide the said writ petition on the merits of
the question regarding the legality and propriety of the order of Collec-
tor/Assistant Collector of Customs dated 5th June 1989 as expeditiously as
possible preferably within a period of four months from the date of receipt
of a copy of this order at its end.
B
Now remains the last question as to what is to be done about the
amount fetched in auction of the goods pursuant to the interim order of
this Court dated 24th September 1990. We cannot accede to the request
of the learned counsel for the appellant that the said invested amount with
accrued interest may be permitted to be withdrawn by the appellant at this C
stage by furnishing bank guarantee. In our view as the amount is lying
deposited and invested by this Court since more. than six and half years by
now and as we are requesting the High Court to decide the pending writ
petition of Union of India on the surviving question as aforesaid within four
months from the date of receipt of copy of the present order it would be
in the interest of all concerned to continue the investment of the deposited D
amount of the auction price by this Court and to direct that the withdrawal
of that amount shall abide by the final result of the writ petition of the
Union of India before the High Court and shall also remain subject to the
result of further appeal, if any, against the High Court's judgment in the
said writ petition. E

- The appeals are accordingly allow.ed. the common judgment under
appeal as rendered by the High Court is quashed and set aside with a
direction to the High Court to decide on merits the Union of Indi.::'3 Writ
Petition No. 3032 of 1989 on the remaining grounds in the light of the
observations made in this judgment. There will be no order as to costs in F
the facts and circumstance of these cases.

J.M.A Appeal allowed.