Holding

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to revision petitions under Section 81 of the Assam VAT Act because Section 84 expressly limits the Limitation Act’s applicability to Sections 4 and 12, thereby excluding Section 5.

Summary

Patel Brothers, a registered dealer, faced reassessment orders after providing false exemption claims and subsequently filed revision petitions under Section 81 of the Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003, more than 335 days after the prescribed 60‑day limit. The petitions sought condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Guwahati High Court dismissed the applications, holding that Section 84 of the VAT Act limits the applicability of the Limitation Act to only Sections 4 and 12, thereby excluding Section 5. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the scheme of the VAT Act and concluded that the specific reference to Sections 4 and 12 reflects a clear legislative intent to exclude other provisions of the Limitation Act, including Section 5. Consequently, Section 5 cannot be invoked to condone the delay in filing revision petitions under Section 81. The Court upheld the High Court’s decision and dismissed the appeals.

Issues considered

Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to revision petitions filed under Section 81 of the Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003.
Whether Section 84 of the VAT Act, by limiting the Limitation Act’s applicability to Sections 4 and 12, expressly excludes Section 5.
Whether, in the absence of an express exclusion, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act would make Sections 4‑24 applicable to VAT proceedings.

Legislation cited

Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003s. 79, s. 80, s. 81, s. 84
Central Excise Act, 1994s. 35, s. 35-B, s. 35-EE, s. 35-G, s. 35-H
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956s. 8(5)
Limitation Act, 1963s. 12, s. 29(2), s. 4, s. 5

Subjects

Limitation ActSection 5VAT ActRevision petitionCondonation of delayLegislative intentSpecial lawSection 84Appellate jurisdictionTime limit

Judgment

[2017] 1 S.C.R. 95

MIS. PATEL BROTHERS A
v.
. STATE OF ASSAM AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos.49-56of2017)
JANUARY 04, 2017
B
[A. K. SIKRI AND ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, JJ.]
Limitation Act, 1963 - s.5 - Applicability of - Delay in filing
revision petition under special law - Condonation of - Delay in
filing revision petitions in the High Court under VAT Act -
Condonation of delay sought uls.5 of Limitation Act - High Court
dismissed the application for condonation of delay holding that c
provisions of s..5 of Limitation Act are not applicable to a proceeding
uls.81 of the VAT Act - On appeal, held: Applicability of the
provisions of the Limitation Act, is to be judged ft"om the provisions
of the special Act and not ft"om the terms of Limitation Act - s.84 of
the VAT Act made only ss.4, 12 of the Limitation Act applicable to D
the proceedings under the VAT Act - Legislative intent is to exclude
. other provisions, including s.5 of the Limitation Act - High Court
was, therefore, right in dismissing the application seeking
contlonation of delay - Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003 -
ss. 79,80,81,84 - Limitation Act, 1963 - ss.4 to 24, 12, 29(2) -
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 - s.8(5). E
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The approach which is to be adopted by the Court
is to examine the provisions of special law to arrive at a conclusion
as to, whether there was legislative intent to exclude the operation
F
of Limitation Act. In the instant case, section 84 of the VAT Act
made only sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act applicable to
the proceedings under the VAT Act. The apparent legislative
intent, is to exclude other provisions, including' section 5 oTthe
Limitation Act. Section 29(2) stipulates that in the absence of
any express provision in a special law, provisions of sections 4 to G
24 of the Limitation Act would apply. If the intention of the
legislature was to make section 5, or for that matter, other
provisions of the Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings-
under the VAT Act, there was no necessity to make specific
provision like section 84 thereby making only sections 4 and 12
!-!
95
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 1 S.C.R.

A of the Limitation Act applicable to such proceedings, inasmuch
as thes2 two Sections would also have become applie:ri)Ie by
virtue of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. It is, thus, clear that
the Legislature intended only sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation
Act, out of sections 4 to 24 of the said Act, applicable under the
VAT Act thereby excluding the applicability of the other
B
provisions. [Para 17] [106-C-F]
2. The scheme of VAT Act goes to show that it is a complete
code not only laying down the fornm but also prescribing the time
limit within which each forum would be competent to entertain
the appeal or revision. The underlying object of the Act appears .
c to be not only to shorten tbe length of tbe proceedings initiated
under the different provisions contained therein, but also to ensure
finality of the decision made thereunder. The fact that the period
of limitation described therein has been equally made applicable
to the assessee as well as the revenue lends ample credence to
D such a conclusion. It is clear that the application of section-5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 to a proceeding under section 81(1) of
the VAT Act stands excluded by necessary implication, by virtue
of the language employed in section 84. [Para 18) [106-H; 107-
A-B)

E 3 .. The court cannot interpret the law in such a manner so
as to read into the Act an inherent power of condoning the delay
by invoking section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 so as to
supplement the provisions of the VAT Act which excludes the
operation of section 5 by necessary implications. [Para 19) [107-
E)
F
Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Am:
(1976) 1 SCC 392 : [1976] 2 SCR 260; State of
Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. Anshwnan Shukla (2014)
1i1 SCC 814: (2014] 11 SCR 361 - distinguished.
Kausha/ya Rani v. Gopal Singh [1964] 4 SCR 982;
G Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. La/it Nd~ain Mishra (1974)
2 SCC 133: [1974] 3 SCR 31; Commissioner of
Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private
Limited & Am: (2009) 5 SCC 791 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
H [1976) 2 SCR 260 distinguished Para9
M/S. PATEL BROTHERS v. STATE
··-J
OF ASSAM AND ORS. 97

[1964] 4 SCR 982 referred Para 9 A
[2014] 11 SCR 361 distinguished Para 10
[197 4] 3 SCR 31 referred to Para 11
(2009) 5 SCC 791 referred to Para 13
CIVIL APPELLAI;E JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 49-56
of2017. B
From the Judgment !Ind Order dated 07.04.2016 of the High Court
ofGuwahati at Guwahati in Case Nos. MC 1041, 1019, 1021, 1022 of
2015, Case No. MC 2833 of 2014 in Revision Petition No. 30 of 2014,
Case No. MC 2834 of 2014 in Revision Petition No. 31 of 2014, Case
No. MC 2835 of2014 in Revision Petition No. 32 of2014 and Case No.
MC 2838 of2014 in Revision Petition No. 33 of2014. c
Arunabha Chowdhury, Karma Dorjee, Anupam Lal Das, Ms. Shruti
Choudhry, Sahil Monga, Advs. for the Appellant.
Nalin Kohli, Sr. Adv., Ankit Roy, VishakhaAhuja, Shuvodeep Roy,
Advs. for the Respondents.
D
The Judgment of the Cou11 was delivered by
A.K. SIKRI, J. Leave granted.
2. The question oflaw which has fallen for determination in these
appeals is as to whether provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 are applicable in respect ofrevision petition filed in the High Court
E
under Section 81 of the Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (hereinafter
referred to as the 'VAT Act').
3. ln order to decide this question, which is a pure question of law,
it is not necessary to state the facts in greater detail. The seminal facts
which require reproduction are mentioned below:
F
The appellant was running a business of purchasi1;g tea and is a
registered dealer under the Assam General Sales Tax Act, 1993 as well
as the VAT Act and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Based on the
sales of his business, the appellant had submitted the declaration in Form
'C' for the years 1998-1999, 1999-2000, 2000-2001 and 2001-2002
reflecting the value of sales. Based on the representation made by the G
appellant, Respondent No. 2/Superintendent of Tax allowed full
exemption of sales tax as per Section 8(5) of Central Sales Tax Act,
1956. But, the information given by the appellant turned out to be false
and as a result of which Respondent No .. 2 passed an order dated
29.0fi:2004 reducing the exemption granted to the petitioner for the year H
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 1 S.C.R.

A 1998-99 along with imposing penalty. Similar orders of re-assessment
were passed in respect of the other assessment years giving.rise to the
connected proceedings. Aggrieved by the order dated, 29.06.2004, the
appellant preferred appeals before Respondent No. 31Appellate Authority
along~with applications for the stay of the demand. By order dated
29.07.2005, Respondent No. 3 had directed the appellant to deposit 25%
B
of the demanded dues within 30 days and stayed rest of the demand.
The appellant preferred appeals before the Assam Board of Revenue/
Appellate Tribunal against the order dated 29.07.2005, which was
dismissed by the order dated 26.08.2008. A review application filed
against the aforesaid order came to be dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal
c by the order dated 27.08.2013. Aggrieved, appellant filed Revision
Petitions under section 81(1) of the VAT Act.
4. Section 81 of the VAT Act also prescribes a limitation period of
60 days within which such revision petition is to be preferred to High
Court. Since there was a delay of 335 days in filing these revision
D petitions, these petitions were filed along with applications under Section
5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of delay. The High
Court has dismissed the applications for condonation of delay holding
that provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable.
For this purpose, the High Court has referred to Section 84 of the VAT
Act which makes provisions of Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act,
E 1963 to such petitions. On that basis, it is held by the High Court that
since only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are made
specifically applicable to. these proceedings, by necessary implication
' Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands excluded.
5. It was argued by Mr. Chowdhury, learned counsel appearing
F for the aopellant, that the approach of the High Court in dealing with the
provisions of VAT Act and applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 to such
proceedings was faulty inasmuch as the High Court did not take note of
. and discussed other provisions of the VAT Act and also failed to give
due weightage to Section 29(2) of the Limitati011 Act, 1963.
G h~ the first instance, he referred to Section 79 of the VAT Act
which is a provision relating to appeals to the Appellate Authority. As
per Section 79(1) of the VAT Act, appeal against the order of the taxing
authority can be filed with the appellate authority within 60 days from
the date ofreceipt of such order of the taxing authority. Sub-section (2)
H of Section 79 ofthe VAT Act empowers the appellate authority to entertain
M/S. PATEL BROTHERS v. STATE OF ASSAM AND ORS. 99
[A. K. SIKRI, J .l

the appeal even beyond 60 days, provided it is presented within a further A
period of 180 days, ifthe appellate authority is satisfied that the appellant
was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the
stipulated period of60 days'.
6. The learned counsel next referred to Section 80 of the VAT
Act' which deals with appeals to the Appellate Tribunal inter alia against B
the orders of the Appellate Authority. Here also, period of 60 days for
preferring such an appeal is provided under sub-section (3) of Section
80 ofthe VAT Act and proviso to sub-section (3) empowers the Appellate
Tribunal to condone the delay, if the appeal is preferred within a further
period of 120 days, on sufficient cause being shown for not filing the
appeal :within 60 days of limitation prescribed. The learned counsel
c
contrasted the aforesaid provisions of Sections 79 and 80 with
Section 8 F of the VAT Act and pointed out that whereas there was
specifkprovision for condonation of delay in filing appeals under Sections
79 and 80 of the VAT Act, no such equivalent provision was made in
D
Relevant portion of Section 79 of the VAT Act reads as under: '"79. Appeals to the
appellate authority: (I) Any person aggrieved by .an order passed un6er the Act
·by a taxing authority lo,ver in rank than a Deputy Commissioner· of Taxes. ma~
appeal to the Appellate Authority. in the manner as may be prescribed. \vithin
s:x1y days from the date of receipt of such order.
(2) Where the Appellate Authority is satisfied that the appellant was
trevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal \Yithin the aforesaid E
period of sixty days, it may admit an appeal after the expiry of the said period
provided it is presented \Vithin a further period of one hundred eighty days··
80. Appeals to the Appellate Tribunal: (I) Any person aggrieved by any of the
following orders may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against such order,-
( a) an order passed by the Appellate Authority under Section 79, and
(b) an order passed by an authority not below the rank of Deputy
Commissioner of Taxes. F
(2) omitted.
(3) Every appeal under sub-section (I) shall be filed within sixty days of the
date. on which the order. sought )o be appealed against is communicated to the
person;
Provided that the Appellate tribunal may admit an appeal after the expiry of sixty
days if he is satisfied that the Appellant had sufficieQt reasons for not filing the
appeal within the aforesaid time, if, it is within a further period of one hundred G
t·.venty days.
3· ;.81. Revision to High Court : ( 1) Any dealer or other person, who is dissatisfied
\':ith the decision of the Appellate Tribunal. or the Commissioner may. within
sixty days after being notified of the decision of the Appellate Tribunal, file a
revision to the High Court, and the dealer or other person so appealing shall serve
a copy of the notice of revision on the respondents to the proceedings."
H
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20 I 7] I S.C.R.

A Section 81 of the VAT Act. As per Section 81 ofthe VAT Act, revision
can be preferred to the High Court against the order of the Appellate
Tribunal within 60 days. However, there is no provision giving specific
power to the High Court to condone the delay if the revision is preferred
beyond 60 days. As per the learned counsel, the reason for not providing
such a provision was that provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 including
B
Section S thercofwere applicable.
7. Insofar as Section 84 of the VAT Act' is concerned, it was
submitted that Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation A~'., ~ 063 were made
appliCable for specific purpose of computing the period 0flimitation under
the said Chapter and High Court committed a grave error while holding
c that because of the aforesaid provision only Sections 4 and 12 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 were made applicable to the VAT Act thereby
excluding other provisions of the Act.
8. For this purpose, the learned counsel relied upon Section 29(2)
of the Li;nitation Act, 1963' which makes provisions contained in Sections
D 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable in case of suit,
appeal or application under any special or local law, where these provisions
are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.
9. It was argued that in the absence of any provision expressly
excluding the applicability of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
E those Sections were applicable qua revision petitions filed under Section
8 I of the VAT
. ..
Act and, therefore, Section S of the Limitation Act, 1963
was also applicable to. such proceedings. To· placate his aforesaid
submissions, the learned counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court
in the case of Ma11gu Ram v. Mu11icipal Corporatio11 of Delhi &
F A11r. 6 • In that case, special leave petitions were filed against the
' Section 84 of the VAT Act reads as under: "84. Application of Section 4 and 1.2.nf
Li1nitation Act, 1963 : In co1nputing the period of limitation under this chapter,- the
provisions of Section 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall, so fnr as i"nay be,
apply.'"
' Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under: "29(2). Where any special
G or local la\v prescribes for any suit. appeal or application a period of limitation different
froin the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall npply as
if such period \Vere the period prescribed by the Schedule and tbr the purpose of
deterinining any period of li1nitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by
any special or local la\v, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall
apply only in so far as. and to the extent to which. they are not expressly excluded by
such special or local law:·
H • (1976); sec 392
MIS. PATEL BROTHERS v. STATE OF ASSAM AND ORS. IOI
[A. K. SJKR!, J.]

condonation of delay to the application for grant of special leave under A
Section 417, Cr.P.C., 1898 against acquittal of tl1e petitioners by the trial
court, in spite of the mandatory period of limitation provided in sub-
section (4) of Section 417. Question arose whether in the case of
Ka11shalya Rani v. Gopal Singfl.7 , which held Section 417, Cr.P.C.,
1898 a special law and excluded application of Section 5 on a construction
B
of Section 29(2)(b) of the old Act of 1908 applied under the corresponding
provision of Limitation Act, 1963 which governed the case. The 'Court
held that since the case was governed by Limitation Act, 1963,judgment
in Kauslwlya Rani case did not apply. For applicability of the Limitation
Act, 1963 to such proceedings, the Court referred to Section 29(2) of
the Limitation Act, 1963 holding that there is an important departure c
made by the Limitation Act, 1963 insofar as the provision contained in
_Section 29, sub-section (2), is concerned. Under the Indian Limitation
Act, 1908, clause (b) to sub-section (2) of Section 29 provided that for
the purpose of detern1!11fog any period of limitation prescribed for any
suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the application of
Section 5 was.in clear and specific terms excluded. But under Section
D
29(2) of Act, the provisions of Section 5 shall apply in case of special or
local law to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such
. special or local law. Since under the Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 is
specifically made applicable by Section 29 (2), it is only ifthe special or
local law expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5 that it would E
stand displaced. The Court held that there is nothing in Section 417(4),
Cr.P.C., which excludes the application of Section 5 of Limitation Act,
1963.
I 0. Learned counsel for the appellant also referred to the case of
State of Madhya Pradesh.. & A11r.. v; A11s/11111u111 Sliukht 8 • In that F
case, question of applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act arose in
relation to revision petition that can be preferred under Section 19 of the
M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (as it stood prior to its
amendment in 2005). The Court held that since unamended Section 19
did not contain any express rider on power of the High Court to entertain
applications for revision after expiry of prescribed limitation thereunder, . G
provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 would become applicable vide Section
29(2) thereof. It further held that as the High Court was conferred 'with
suo moto power under Section 19 of Adhiniyam, 1983 to call for record
7
(1964)4 SCR 982
"(2014) 10 sec 814 H
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I S.C.R.

A of an award at any time, there was no legislative intent to exclude the
applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. '
11. Mr. Nalin Kohli, learned senior standing counsel appearing for
the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the High Court had
exhaustively dealt with the issue and rightly fou~d that since Section 84
B of the VAT Act confined the applicability ofLimitationActonly in respect
of Sections 4 and 12 thereof to the proceedings under the said Chapter,
by necessary implication the other provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963
including Section 5 thereof stood excluded. He submitted tha! fgr,the
purpose of finding whether other provisions are excluded or not, the
focus should be on the scheme of the special law as laid down in
c Hukumdev Narain Ytulav v. lttfit·Nuruin Mishra' wherein it was
held that eyen ifthere exists no express exclusion in the special law, the
Court has right to examine the provisions of the special law to arrive at
a conclusion as to whether the legislative intent was to e.xclude the
operation of the Limitation Act. According to him, Section 84 of the
D VAT Act clearly depicted such a legislative intent.
12. After examining the matter in the light of law laid down in
various judgments cited by both the parties, we are of the view that the
High Court has given correct interpretation to the provisions of Section
81 of the VAT Act, when this provision is read along with Section 84
E thereof.
13. In the case of Commissioner of Customs um/ Central Excise
v. Honr:o India Private· Limited & Anr. '°, the question that fell for
determination was that as to whether the High Court had power to
condone the delay in presentation of the reference application under
F unamended Section 35-H(l) of the.Central Excise Act, 1994 beyond the
period prescribed by applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Unamended Section 35-H dealt with reference application to the High
Court. Under sub-section ( l) thereof, such reference application could
be preferred within a period of 180 days of the date upon which the
aggrieved party is served with notice ofi.in order under Section 35-C of
G the Central Excise Act. There was no provision to extend tlie period of
limitation for filing the application to the High Court beyond the.said
period and to condone the delay. Pertinently, under the scheme of the
Central Excise Act as well, in case of appeal to the Commissioner under
'(1974) 2 sec 133
H '" (2009) s sec 791
MIS. PATEL BROTHERS v. STATE OF ASSAM AND ORS. 103
rA. K. S!KRI, J.l
Section 35 of the Act, which should be filed within 60 days, there was a A
specific provision for condonation of delay upto 30 days if sufficient
cause is shown. Likewise, appeal to the Appellate Tribunal could be
filed within 90days under Section 35-B thereof and sub-section (5) of
Section 35-B gave power to the Appellate Tribunal to condone the delay
irrespective of the number of days, if sufficient cause is shown. Further,
B
Section 35-EE provided 90 days time for filing revision by the Central
Government and proviso thereto empowers the revisional authority to
condone the delay for a further period of 90 days. However, when it
came to making reference to the High Court under Section 35-G of the
Act, the provision only prescribed the limitation period of 180 days with
no-further clause empowering the High Court to condone the delay c
beyond the said period of 180 days. It was, thus, in almost similar
circumstances, the judgment was rendered by this Court. The categorical
opinion of the Court was that in the absence of any such power, the
High Court did not h_ave power to condone the delay. In that case also,
provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 were pressed
D
into service. But this argument was rejected in the following manner:
30. In the earlier part of our order, we have adverted to Chapter
VI-A of the Act which provides for appeals and revisions to various
authorities. Though Parliament has specifically provided an
additional period of 30 days in the case of appeal to the
Commissioner, it is silent about the number of days if there is E
sufficient cause in the case of an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal.
Also an additional period of90 days in the case of revision by the
Central· Government has bee·n provided. However, in the case of
an appeal to the High Court under Section 35-G and reference
application to the High Court under Section 35-H, Parliament has F
provided only !80 days and no further period for filing an appeal
and making reference to the High Court is mentioned in the Act.
31. In this regard, it is useful to refer to a recent decision of this
Court in Punjab Fibres Ltd [(2008) 3 SCC 73] The Commissioner
of Customs, Central Excise, Naida was the appellant in this case. G
While considering the very same question, namely, whether the
High Court.has power to condone the· delay in presentation of the
reference under Section 35-H(I) of the Act, the two-Judge Bench
taking note of the said provision and the other related provisions
following Singh Enterprises v. CCE [(2008) 3 SCC 70] concluded
H
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] l S.C.R.

A that: (Punjab Fibres Ltd. case [(2008) 3 SCC 73] , SCC p. 75,
para 8)
"8 . ... the High Court was justified in holding that there was no
power for condonation of delay in filing reference application."
32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35-B,
B 35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes the position clear that an appeal
and reference to the High Cou1t should be made within 180 days
only from the date of communication of the decision or order. In
other words, the language .used in other ,provisions makes the
position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority
c to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days
after expiry of60 days which is the preliminary limitation period
· for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning
the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period,
there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was
D no power to condone the delay after expiry of the ·prescribed
period of 180 days.
33. Even otherwise, for filing an appeal to the Commissioner, and
to the Appellate Tribunal as well as revision to the Central
Government, the legislature has provided 60 days and 90 days
E respectively, on the other hand; for filing an appeal and reference
to the High Court larger period of I 80 days has been provid.ed
with to enable the Commissioner and the other party to avail the
same. We are of the view that the legislature provided sufficient
time, namely, 180 days for filing reference to the High Court which
F is more than the period prescribed for an appeal and revision."
14. In the process, the Court also explained the expression
'expressly excluded' appearing in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act,
1963 in the following manner:
"34. Though, an argument was raised based on Section 29 of the
G Limitation Act, even assuming that Section 29(2) would be
attracted, what we have to determine is whether the provisions of
this section are expressly excluded in the case of reference to the
High Court.
35. It was contended before us that the words "expressly
H excluded" would mean that there must be an express reference
MIS. PATEL BROTHERS v. STATE OF ASSAM AND ORS. 105
fA. K. SIKRI, J.l

made-in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the A
Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this
regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law which here
in this case is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the remedy
provided therein is such that the legislature intended it to be a
complete code by itself which alone should govern the several
B
matters provided by it. If, on an examination of the relevant
provisions, it is clearthat the provisions of the Limitation Act are
necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot
be called in ,aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our
considered·view, that even in a case where the special law does
not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation c
Act by an express reference, it would nonethel~ss be open to the
court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those
provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the
special law exclude their operation. In other words, the applicability
of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be judged
D
not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of
the Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference application
to the High Court." -
The !lforesaid judgment is a complete answer to the arguments of
the appellant.
E
15. It may be relevant to mention here that after the judgment in
Honf(o India Private Limited & Am:, Section 35-H of the Central
Excise Act, 1994 was amended by the Parliament by Act 32 of 2003
with effe-ct from 14.05.2003 giving power to the High Court to condone
the delay by inserting sub-section (2A). It is, tl1erefore, for the legisfature
to set rightthe deficiency, if it intends to give power to the High Court to F
condone the delay in filing revision petition under Section 81 of the VAT
Act.
16. Argument predicated on 'no_express exclusion' loses its force
having regard to the principle of law enshrined in llukunulev Narai11
Yadav. Therein, the Comt made following observations while exaniining G
whether the Limitation Act would be applicable to the provisions of the
Representation of the People Act or not:
"17-. ... but what we have to see is whether the-scheme of the
special law, that is in this case the Act, and the nature of the
H
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 1 S.C.R.

A remedy provided therein are such that the legislature intended it
to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the
several matters provided by it. If on an examination of the relevant
provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are
necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot
be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our
B
view, even in a case where the special law does not exclude the
provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express
reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine
whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the
nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special raw exclttde
c theiroperation."
17. Thus, the approach which is to be adopted by the Court in
such cases is to examine the provisions of special law to arrive at a
conclusion as to whether there was legislative intent to exclude the
operation of Limitation Act. In the instant case, we find that Section 84
D of the VAT Act made only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act
applicable to the proceedings under the VAT Act. The apparent legislative
intent, which can be clearly evinced, is to exclude other provisions,
including Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 29(2) stipulates that in
the absence of any express provision in a special law, provisions of
Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply. If the intention of the
E legislature was to make Section 5, or for that matter, other provisions of
the Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings under the VAT Act,
there was no necessity to make specific provision like Section 84 thereby
making only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act applicable to such
proceedings, inasmuch as these two Sections would also have become
F applicable by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. It is, thus,
clear that the Legislature intended only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation
Act, out of Sections 4 to 24 of the said Act, applicable under the VAT
Act thereby excluding the applicability of the other provisions.
18. Judgment in the case of Mangu Ram would not come to the
G aid of the appellant as the Court found that there was no provision under
the Cr.P.C. from. which legislative intent to exclude Section 5 of the
Limitation Act could be discerned and, therefore, Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act was taken aid of. Similar situation prevailed in A11sl111nu111
S/111kla's case .. On the contrary, in the instant case, a scrutiny of the
scheme of VAT Act goes to show that it is a complete code not only
H
MIS. PATEL BROTHERS v. STATE OF ASSAM AND ORS. 107
rA. K. SIKRI, J.l

laying down the forum but also prescribing the time limit within which A
each forum would be competent to entertain the appeal or revision. The
underlying object of the Act appears to be not only to shorten the length
ofthe proceedings initiated under the different provisions contained therein,
but also to ensure finality of the decision made there under. The fact that
the period oflimitation described therein has been equally made applicable
B
to the assessee as well as the revenue lends ample credence to such a
conclusion. We, therefore, unhesitantly hold that the application of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to a proceeding under Section
81 (I) of the VAT Act stands excluded by necessary implication, by virtue
of th~ language employed in section 84.
19. The High Court has rightly pointed out the well settled principle c
of law that "the court cannot interpret the statute the way they have
developed the co111111on law 'which in a constitutional sense means
;udicially developed equity'. In abrogating or 111odiJYing a rule of
the common law the court exercises the same power of creation that
built up the common law through its existence by the judges of the D
past. The court can exercise no such power in respect of statue,
therefore, in the task of interpreting and applying a statue, Judges
have to be conscious that in the end the statue is the master not the
servant of the judg111ent and no judge has a choice between
implementing it and disobeying it." What, therefore, follows is that
the court cannot interpret the law in such a manner so as to read into the E
Act an inherent power of condoning the delay by invoking Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 so as to supplement the provisions of the VAT
Act which excludes the operation of Section 5 by necessary implications.
20. We, thus, do not find any infirmity in the judgment rendered by
the High Court. The present appeals are devoid of any merit and are, F
accordingly, dismissed.
Ankit Gyan Appeals dismissed.