Holding

Both the child and his parents are consumers under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, and the Commission was correctly empowered to award compensation to each of them.

Summary

A minor child was admitted to Spring Meadows Hospital for typhoid treatment. A nurse administered an injection without proper testing, causing the child to suffer cardiac arrest, brain damage and a vegetative state. The parents filed a complaint under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, seeking compensation for the child's injury and for their own mental agony. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission awarded Rs. 12.5 lakh to the child and Rs. 5 lakh to the parents. The hospital appealed, arguing that only the child could be a "consumer" and that the Commission could not award compensation to the parents. The Supreme Court held that both the child (as a beneficiary) and the parents (as hirers of the services) fall within the definition of consumer under Section 2(1)(d)(ii) and that the Commission was empowered to award separate compensation for the child’s injury and the parents’ mental agony. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The minor child’s parents are they consumers under Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986?
Can the Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission award compensation to both the child and the parents under Section 14(d) of the Act?
Is compensation for mental agony of the parents permissible despite the hospital’s humanitarian approach?

Legislation cited

Consumer Protection Act, 1986s. 12(1)(a), s. 14(d), s. 2(1)(d)(ii)

Subjects

Consumer Protection ActMedical negligenceMinor patientDefinition of consumerCompensation for mental agonyHospital liabilitySection 2(1)(d)Section 14(d)

Judgment

A M/S. SPRING MEADOWS HOSPITAL ANO ANR.
v.
HARJOL AHULWALIA THROUGH
K.S. AHULWALIA AND ANR.

MARCH 25, 1998
B
[S. SAGHIR AHMAD AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

Consumer Protection Act, 1986-Section 2(i)(d)(ii)-Consumer-
Definition of-ls wide and includes J:erson who hires or avail services-And
C also beneficiary of such services others than the person who hires or avails
services-Minor child admitted and treated in the hospital by doctor-Held,
both the parents of the child as well as the child would be 'Consumer' within
the meaning of Section 2(i)(d)(ii).

D Compensation-Medical Services-Minor child admitted to hospital-
Diagnosised as Typhoid Fever-Jnjuction administered without testing
sensitivity-Child collapsed-Suffered cardiac arrest-Rendered in vegetative
state, brain damaged-Hospital authorities negligent-Irreparable loss
suffered by the child and his parents-Held, awarding compensation to child
and his parents for injury each one of them has sustained is justified.
E Medical Services-Function of-Medical ethics-To ensure that
superiority of doctors is not abused in any manner.
Medical Services-Hospital authorities negligent-Irreparable loss
suffered by both the child as well as parents-Mental agony of parents-
Cannot be undone by the approach shown by the hospital authorities.
F
The Respondents claimed compensation to the tune of Rs. 28 lacs on
account of negligence and deficiency on the part of the hospital authorities
for the irreparable damages suffered and the minor child having been reduced
to a vegetative state. The National Commission awarded Rs. 12.5 lacs as
compensation to the minor child and Rs. 5 lacs to the parents of the minor
G child.
In this appeal challenging the order of the Commission the appellants
contended that the complaint having been filed by the minor child who was
the inpatient in the ho~pital through his parents, the said minor child can
only be the consumer and parents cannot claim any compensation under the
H Consumer Protection Act for the mental agony they have suffered and award
428
SPRING MEADOWS HOSPITAL v. H. AHULWALIA 429
of compensation of Rs. 5 lacs is favour of the parents is beyond the competence A
of the Commission, and therefore, Section 14(d) of Consumer Protection
" Act, should not be interpreted in such a way enabling the Commission to
award compensation both to the minor child and his parents. The appellants
further contested the claim of the perants for mental agony on the pretext
of the humanitarian approach shown by the hospital authorities.
B
Dismissing the appeal, this Court
. .(

HELD : 1. The National Commission has rightly awarded compensation
in favour of the parents in addition to the compensation in favour of the minor
child.
c
2. The definition clause (ii) of Section 2(i)(d) is wide enough to include
not only the person who hires or avails services but also the beneficiary of
such services ot:1er than the person who hires services. As such both the
child as well as the parents of the child come within the meaning of Section-
2(i)(d)(ii) of the Act and compensation awarded in favour of both of them is
justified. (438-F(
D

3. There is no infirmity in order of the Commission awarding different
amounts of compensation on different heads, to both the consumers, firstly
the minor child taking into account the cost of equipments and the recurring
expenses that would be necessary for the minor child who is merely having
E
vegetative life and secondly the parents of the minor child for their acute
mental agony and the life long care and attention which the parents would
have to bestow on the minor child. (439-C-D(

4. The attitude of a patient is poised between trust in the learning of

- ,_ another and the general distress of one who is in a state of uncertainty and
such ambivalence naturally leads to a sense of inferiority and it is, therefore,
the function of medical ethics ot ensure that the superiority of the doctor is
not.abused in any manner. (436-C(
F

5. The compensation claimed by the parents of the minor child for
their life long mental agony cannot be undone by the humanitrain approach G
shown by the hospital authorities. (439-H(
(
Whitehouse v. Jordan and another, (B&I) I All ER 267, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7708 of
1997 Etc. H
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1998] 2 S.C.R.

A From the Judgment and Order dated 16.6.97 of the National Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in O.P. No. 292 of 1994. ...
Arun Khosla, K. Nijhawan, S. Rajaappa, Sanjiv Shanna, Ashok K. Gupta,
(H.D. Shourie) fer Caveator-in-person for the appearing parities.

B The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

G.B. PATTANAIK, J. These two appeals arise out of the order dated ). .,. .
16th June, l 997 passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as 'the Commission') in Original
Petition No. 292 of l 994. The H~spital is the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 7708
c of l 997 while the insurance company is the appellant in the other appeal.
When the special leave applications out of which the two aforesaid appeals
arise were listed for preliminary hearing, the court had issued notice limited
to the award of Rs. 5 lacs as compensation to the parents of the child even
though the insurance company has raised the question of its liability \o pay
the compensation in question.
D
A Complaint Petition was filed by minor Harjo! Ahluwalia through his
parents Mrs. Harpreet Ahluwalia and Mr. Kamaljit Singh Ahluwalia before the
Commission alleging that the minor was being treated at a NL!rsing Home in
Noida in December, l 993. As there was no improvement in his health the said
E minor was brought to Mis. Spring Meadows Hospital, appellant in Civil
Appeal No. 7708 of 1997 on 24th of December, 1993. In the hospital the patient
was examined by the Senior Consultant Paediatrician, Dr. Promila Bhutani and
on the advice of the said doctor the patient was admitted as an in-patient in
the hospital. The doctor made the diagnosis that the patient was suffering
from typhoid and intimated the parents that medicines have been prescribed
F for the treatment of the typhoid fever. On the 30th of December, 1993 at 9.00
a.m. Miss Bina Matthew, nurse of the hospital asked the father of the minor
patient to get the injection-Inj Lariago - to be administered intravenously to
the minor patient. The father of the minor child purchased the medicine which
' -=

was written down by the nurse and gave it, whereupon the nurse injected the
G same to the minor patient. The patient, immediately on being injected collapsed
while still in the lap of his mother. It was further alleged that before administering
the injection the nurse had not made any sensitive test to find out whether
there would be any adverse reaction on the patient. Seeing the minor child
collapse the parents immediately called for help and the Resident Doctor Dr.
Dhananjay attended the patient. Said Dr. Dhananjay told the parents that the
H child had suffered a cardiac arrest and then by manually pumping the chest
SPRING MEADOWS HOSPITAL v. H. AHULWALIA [G.B. PA TT ANAIK, J ] 431

the Doctor attempted to revive the heartbeat. The hospital authorities then A
summoned an Anaesthetist, Dr. Anil Mehta who arrived within half an hour
...,,.. and then started a procedure of manual respiration by applying the oxygen
cylinder and manual Respirator. In the meantime Dr. Promila Bhutani also
reached the hospital and the minor child was kept on a device called manual
Respirator. Though the child was kept alive on the manual ventilator but the
condition of the child did not show any improvement. In course of treatment
B
as the minor's platelets count fell, a blood transfusion was given but still no
~ .l
improvement could be seen. Dr, Mehta, therefore, intimated the parents that
the hospital does not have the necessary facilities to manage the minor child
and the should be shifted to an Intensive Care Unit equipped with an Auto
Respirator. On the advice of Dr. Mehta the parents brought the child and c
admitted him in the Paediatric Intensive Care Unit of the All India Institute
of Medical Sciences on the 3rd January, I 994. In the Institute the doctors
examined the minor child thoroughly and informed the parents that the child
is critical and even if the would survive, he would live only in a vegetative
state as irreparable damage had been caused to his brain and there was no
chance of revival of the damaged parts. The minor was then kept in the D
Paediatric Intensive Care Unit of the AIIMS till 24th of January, 1994 and was
thereafter discharged after informing the parents that no useful purpose
would be served by keeping the minor child there. Dr. Anil Mehta as well as
Dr. Naresh Juneja, Chief Administrator of Spring Meadows Hospital, however,
offered to admit the minor child at their hospital and to do whatever was E
possible to stabilise the condition of the child and accordingly the minor child
was again admitted to the hospital. The complainant alleged that the child on
account of negligence and deficiency on the part of the hospital authorities
suffered irreparable damages and could survive only as a mere vegetative and
accordingly claimed compensation to the tune of Rs. 28 lacs.
F
- ». On behalf ofthe appellants objection was filed before the commission
taking the stand that no payment having been made it cannot be said that
the services of the hospital having been availed for consideration and as such
the complainant is not a consumer within the definition of 'Consumer' in the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986. It was further stated that there has been no
deficiency or negligence in service on the part of the doctors of the hospital G
and the negligence, if any, is on the part of the nurse who misread the
I· prescription. It was also contended that immediate steps have been taken by
Dr. Dhananjay as well as Dr. Mehta and the hospital authorities had summoned
three specialists to examine the patient. It was further stated that the patient
was taken to the All India Institute of Medical Sciences by the parents for H
~
)

432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1998] 2 S.C.R.

A better treatment but on being discharged from the Institute the hospital
authorities on sympathetic consideration readmitted the child and are taking
all possible steps and giving all possible treatment without any payment and
at no point of time there has been any negligence on the part of the doctors
attending the minor child in the hospital. It was also urged that in any event
B the liability to pay compensation would be that of the insurer.

Miss Bina Matthew the nurse who injected the Lariago injection to the
)
child, who was opposite party No.2 before the Commission field her objections
stating therein that she is a qualified nurse and had exercised all diligence and
care in discharging her duties. It was further stated that the patient was under
C the treatment of Dr. Bhutani who had the duty to decide the course of
treatment and as nurse she was only working under her control and direction.
She also stated that as the patent was already taking lariago syrup and when
the doctor advised that injection should be given she thought that the same
lariago injection to be given and it was the duty of the doctor to give the
injection and take all care.
D
The insurer-opposite no. 3- which is appellant in Civil Appeal No. 7858
of 1997 contested the claim and took the defence that there has been no
deficiency in service on the part of the insurance company and the provisions
of the Consumer Protection Act could not be invoked against the insurer.
E According to the insurer the insurance company issued medical establishment
professional negligence errors and omissions insurance policy and the terms
and conditions of the policy would indicate that the liability of the insurer,
if any, is to the extent of 12,50,000 and not beyond the same and further the
insurer cannot be made liable when the liability in question has arisen on
account of negligence or deliberate non-compliance of any statutory provisions
F or intentional disregard of the insured's administrative management of the
need to take all reasonable steps to prevent the claim. According to the
insurer the nurse Miss Bina Matthew was not a qualified nurse at all and she
was not authorised to take up the employment as a nurse not having been
registered with any Nursing Council of any State. It was also stated that the
present state of affairs of the minor child is on account of negligence of an
G unqualified nurse and therefore the insurer cannot be made liable to pay for
any loss or damage sustained. In course of the proceedings before the
·\
Commission to assess the minor's condition and rehabilitation requirement
the .Commission referred the matter to the Medical Superintendent, Safdarjung
Hospital by order dated 28th January, 1997, and in pursuance to such order
H the said minor was examined and a report was received by the Commission
SPRING MEADOWS HOSPITAL v. H. AHULWALIA [GB PA TT ANAJK, J.l 433

from the Medical Superintendent, Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi. The A
Commission also examined witnesses including Dr. J.S. Nanra and Dr. A.S .
..r
Ahluwalia who testified that on account of a medicine having been injected
the minor suffered from cardiac arrest on account of which the brain has been
damaged. On the basis of the oral and documentary evidences on record the
Commission came to the conclusion that the child had suffered from cardiac
arrest and cause of such cardiac arrest was intravenous injection of lariago
B
. .( of high dose. The Commission also came to the conclusion that there has
been considerable delay in reviving the heart of the minor child and on
account of such delay the brain of the minor child got damaged. On the
question of the negligence of services the Commission came to the conclusion
tha,t there was a clear dereliction of duty on the part of the nurse who was c
not even a qualified nurse and the hospital is negligent liav!ng employed
such unqualified people as nurse and having entrusted a minor child to her
care. The Commission also came to the conclusion that Dr. Dhananjay was
negligent in the performances of his duties inasmuch as while Dr. Bhutani had
advised that the injection should be given by the doctor but he permitted the
nurse to give the injection. The Commission, ultimately came to the finding D
that the minor patient had suffered on account of negligence, error and
omission on the part of nurse as well as Dr. Dhananjay in rendering their
professional services and both of them were negligent in performing their
duties in consequence of which the minor child suffered and since the doctor
and the nurse were employees of the hospital the hospital is responsible for E •
the negligence of the employees and the hospital is liable for the consequences.
The Commission then determined the quantum of compensation and awarded
12.5 lacs as compensation to the minor patient. In addition to the aforesaid
sum of Rs. 12.5 lacs, the Commission also awarded Rs. 5 lacs as compensation
to be paid to the parents of the minor child for the acute mental agony that
:=>< >-
has been caused to the parents by reason of their only son having been F
reduced to a vegetative state requiring life long care and attention. On the
question of the liability of the reinsurance company the Commission came to
hold that the said insurance company is liable to indemnify the amount of Rs.
12,37,500 in terms of the policy on account of the liability of the hospital as
the case is fully covered under the indemnity clause. The Commission then
G
considered the question as to how the amount of compensation should be
I- disbursed for being spent for the welfare of the child and then issued certain
directions with which we are not concerned in this appeal.

The learned counsel for the appellant appearing for the hospital
contended that the complaint having been filed by the minor child who was H
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 2 S.C.R.

A the in-patient in the hospital through his parents the said minor child can only
be the consumer and the parents cannot claim any compensation under the
Consumer Protection Act for the mental agony they have suffered and as
such the award of compensation to the tune of Rs. 5 lacs in favour of the
parents is beyond the competence of the Commission. The learned counsel
then urged that under the Consumer Protection Act the consumer to whom
B services has been provided can make a complaint and in the case in hand the
services having been provided to the minor patient, he becomes the consumer
).
and consequently no compensation can be awarded in favour of the parents
of the consumer and according to the learned counsel it is apparent from the
provisions of Section 12(I)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act. The learned
C counsel lastly contended that under Section 14(1) (d) of the Act the
Commission would be entitled to pay such amount as compensation to the
consumer for any loss or damage suffered by such consumer and in the case
in hand the minor child being the consumer the Commission was not competent
to award compensation to the parents for the mental agony they have suffered.
The learned counsel for the insurer - appellant in the other appeal vehemently
D contended that insurer cannot be held liable to indemnify the hospital who
is the insured as the said hospital had employed unqualified people to treat I
the patients and the direction of the Commission that the insurer would
indemnify the insured is unsustainable in law. But we are not in a position
to examine this contention advanced on behalf of the learned counsel appearing
E for the insurer in view of the limited notice issued by this Court. It would not
be open for us to entertain this question for consideration as the notice
issued by this Court indicates that only the award of compensation to the
parents of the minor child and the legality of the same can only the considered.
We are, therefore, unable to examine the contention raised by the learned
counsel appearing for the insurer.
F
In view of the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for
the hospital the following questions arise for our consideration:

I. The minor child being the patient who was admitted into the
hospital for treatment can the parents of the child be held to be
G consumers so as to claim compensation under the provisions of
the Consumer Protection Act?
\

2. Is the Commission under the Act entitled to award compensation
to the parents for mental agony in view of the powers of the
H Commission under Section 14 of the Act?
SPRING MEADOWS HOSPITAL v. H. AHULWALIA [G.B. PATTANAIK. J.] 435

0
~. Even if the child as well as the parents of the child would come A
under definition of the 'Consumer' under Section 2(1) (d) of the
'( Act whether compensation can be awarded in favour of both the
consumers or compensation can be awarded only to the
beneficiary of the services rendered, who in the present case
would be child who was admitted into the hospital?
, B
Before we examine the aforesaid questions it would be appropriate to
.I..
notice the scenario in which the Parliament enacted the Consumer Protection
Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The United Nations had passed a
resolution in April, 1985 indicating certain guidelines under which the
Government could make law for better protection of the interest of the
consumers. Such laws were necessary more in the developing countries to
c
protect the consumers from hazards to their health and safety and make them
available speedier and cheaper redress. Consumerism has been a movement
in which the trader and the consumer find each other as adversaries. Till last
two decades in many developed and developing countries powerful consumer
organisations have come into existence and such organisations have been D
. instrumental in dealing with the consumer protection laws and in expansion
of the horizon of such laws. In our country the legislation is of recent origin
and its efficacy has not been critically evaluated which has to be done on
th_ basis of experience. Undoubtedly the Act creates a framework for speedy
disposal of consumer disputes and an attempt has been made to remove the
E
existing evils of the ordinary court system.

The Act gives a comprehensive definition of consumer who is the
principal beneficiary of the legislation but at the same time in view of the
comprehensive definition of the term 'consumer' even a member of the family
cannot be denied the status of consumer under the Act and in an action by F
L
any such member of the family for any deficiency of service, it will not be
open for a trader to take a stand that there is no privily of contract. The
Consumer Protection Act confers jurisdiction on the Commission in respect
of matters where either there is defect in goods or there is deficiency in
service or there has been an unfair and restrictive trade practice or in the
G
matter of charging of excessive price. The Act being a beneficial legislation
intended to confer some speedier remedy on a consumer from being exploited
by unscrupulous traders, the provisions thereof should receive a. liberal
construction.

In the case in hand we are dealing with a problem which centres round H
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1998] 2 S.C.R.

A the medical ethics and as such it may be appropriate to notice the broad
responsibilities of such organisations who in the garb of doing service to the
y
humanity have continued commercial activities and have been mercilessly
extracting money from helpless patients and their family members and yet do
not provide the necessary services. The influence exhorted by a doctoi is
B unique. The relationship between the doctor and the patient is not always
equally balanced.

The attitude of a patient is poised between trust in the learning of

C
another and the general distress of one who is in a state of uncertainty and
such ambivalence naturally leads to sense of inferiority and it is, therefore,
the function medical ethics to ensure that the superiority of the doctor is not
abused in any manner.
'
It is a great mistake to think that doctors and hospitals are easy targets
for the dissatisfied patient. It is indeed very difficult to raise an action of
negligence. Not only there are practical difficulties in linking the injury sustained
D with the medical treatment but also it is still more difficult to establish the
standard of care in medical negligence of which a complaint can be made. All l
these factors together with the sheer expense of bringing a legal action and
the denial of legal aid to all but the poorest operate to limit medical litigation
in this country. With the emergence of the Consumer Protection Act no doubt
E in some cases patients have been able to establish the negligence of the
doctors rendering service and in taking compensation thereof but the same
is very few in number. In recent days there has been increasing pressure on
hospital facilities, falling standard of professional competence and in addition
to all, the ever increasing complexity of therapeutic and diagnostic methods
and all this together are responsible for the medical negligence. That apart
F there has been a growing awareness in the public mind to bring the negligence
of such professional doctors to light. Very often in a claim for compensation
arising out of medical negligence a plea is taken that it is a case of bona fide
mistake which under certain circumstances may be excusable, but a mistake
which would tantamount to negligence cannot be pardoned. In the former
G case a court can accept that ordinary human fallibility precludes the liability
while in the latter the conduct of the defendant is considered to have gone
beyond the bounds of what is expected of the reasonably skill of a competent
doctor. In the case of Whitehouse v. Jordan and another, [1981] I ALL ER
267, an obstetrician had pulled too hard in a trial of forceps delivery and had
thereby caused the plaintiffs head to become wedged with consequent
H asphyxia and brain damage. The trial judge had held the action of the defendant
SPRING MEADOWS HOSPITAL v. H. AHULWALIA (G.B. PA TT ANAIK, J.] 437
to be negligent but this judgment had been reversed by Lord Denning, in the A
.,.. ... Court of Appeal, emphasising that an error of judgment would not tantamount
to negligence. When the said matter came before the House of Lords, the
views of Lord Denning on the error of judgment was rejected and it was held
that an error of judgment could be negligence if it is an error which would
not have been made by a reasonably competent professional man acting with
ordinary care. Lord Fraser pointed out thus :
B
~
"The true position is that an error of judgment may, or may not,
be negligent; it depends on the nature of the error. If it is one that
would not have been made by a reasonably competent professional
man profession to have the standard and type of skill that the defendant c
holds himself out as having, and acting with ordinary care, then it is
negligence. If, on the other hand, it is an error that such a man, acting
with ordinary care, might have made, then it is not negligence."

Gross medical mistake will always result in a finding of negligence. Use D
of wrong drug or wrong gas during the course of anaesthetic will frequently
lead to the imposition of liability and in some situations even the principle
of Res ipsa loquitur can be applied. Even delegation of responsibility to
another may amount to negligence in certain circumstances. A consultant
could be negligent where he delegates the responsibility to his junior with the
knowledge that the junior was incapable of performing of his duties properly. E
We are indicating these principles since in the case in hand certain arguments
had been advanced in this regard, which will be dealt with while answering
the questions posed by us.

Question Nos. 1 and 3 are inter-linked, and therefore, they are discussed
J together. The answer to both these questions would depend upon an
F
""" interpretation ·of the expression 'consumer' in Section 2(l)(d) of the Act.
Section 2(l)(d) is extracted hereinbelow in extenso:

2(1 )( d) : " Consumer" means any person who -

(i)
G
buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or
promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system
of deferred payment and includes any user of such goods other
than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or
promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system
of deferred payment when such use is made with the approval H
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1998) 2 S.C.R.

A of such person, but does not include a person who obtains such
goods for resale or for any commercial purpose; or
(ii) hires or avails of any services for consideration which has been
paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under
any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of
B such services other than the person who hires or avails of the
services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and
partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when
such services are availed of with the approval of the first
mentioned person;

C Explanation : For the purpose of sub-clause (i) "commercial
purpose" does not include use by a consumer of goods bought and
used by him exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood, by
means of self-employment.

In the present case, we are concerned with clause (ii) of Section 2( I)( d).
D In the said clause a consumer would mean a person who hires or avails of
any services and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the
person who hires or avails of the services. When a young child is taken to
a hospital by his parents and the child is treated by the doctor, the parents
would come within the definition of consumer having hired the services and
E the young child would also become a consumer under the inclusive definition
being a beneficiary of such services.

The definition clause being wide enough to include not only the person
who hires the services but also the beneficiary of such services which
beneficiary is other than the person who hires the services, the conclusion
F is irresistible that both the parents of the child as well as the child would be
consumer within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Act and as such can
claim compensation uncier the Act.

So far as the second question is concerned, the contention of the
learned counsel for the appellant is that Section 14 being the provision
G authorising the Commission to pass appropriate orders under one or more of
the clauses (a) to (i) and clause (d) alone being the provision for award of
compensation, the Commission is entitled to award compensation for any loss
or injury suffered by the consumer due to the negligence of the person whose
services had been hired and that being the position it would be open for the
H Commission to award compensation to the minor child who has suffered
SPRING MEADOWS HOSPITAL" H. AHUL WALIA [G.B. PA TT ANAIK, J ] 439

injury and not the parents. In other words, the learned counsel urged that A
clause (d) of Section 14 may not be interpreted enabling the Commission to
award compensation both to the minor child and his parents. We see absolutely
no force in the aforesaid contention inasmuch as the Commission would be
entitled to award compensation under clause (d) to a consumer for any loss
or injury suffered by such consumer due to the negligence of the opposite B
party. If the parents of the child having hired the services of the hospital are
consumer within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d)(ii) and the child also is
consumer being a beneficiary of such services hired by his parents in the
inclusive definition in Section 2(1)(d) of the Act, the Commission will be fully
justified in awarding compensation to both of them for the injury each one
of them has sustained. In the case in hand the Commission has awarded C
compensation in favour of the minor child taking into acco_unt the cost of
equipments and the recurring expenses that would be necessary for the said
minor child who is merely having a vegetative life. The compensation awarded
in favour of the parents of the minor child is for their acute mental agony and
the life long care and attention which the parents would have to bestow on

. 'y
the minor child. The award of compensation in respect of respective consumers D
are on different head. We see no infirmity with the order of the Commission
awarding different amount of compensation on different head, both being
consumers under the Act. Accordingly, the Commission in our considered
opinion rightly awarded compensation in favour of the parents in addition to
the compensation in favour of the minor child. E
The learned counsel for the appellants in course of his argument has
contended that not only the hospital authorities had immediately on their own
taken the assistance of several specialists to treat the child but also even after
the child was discharged from the All India Institute of Medical Sciences,
~- humanitarian approach has been taken by the hospital authorities and child F
has been taken care of by the hospital even wi_thout charging any money for
the services rendered and consequently in such a situation the award of
damages for mental agony to the parents is wholly unjustified. We, however,
fail to appreciate this argument advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for
the appellants inasmuch as the mental agony of the parent will not be dismissed G
in any manner merely seeing the only child living a vegetative state on
account of negligence of the hospital authorities on a hospital bed. The
agony of the parents would remain so long as they remain alive and the so-
called humanitarian approach of the hospital authorities in no way can be
considered to be a factor in denying the compensation for mental agony
suffered by the parents. H
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [1998] 2 S.C.R.

A In the premises as aforesaid, the contentions raised by the learned
counsel appearing for the app~llants having failed, the appeal fails and is
dismissed.

Accordingly both the appeals are dismissed with costs of Rs. 5,000.

B N.J. Appeals dismissed.

(