Holding

An appeal that is held to be pending under Section 95(i)(c) of the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, even if later found to be barred, entitles the appellant to the scheme’s benefits, and the rejection of the KVSS declaration is quashed.

Summary

Mis. Swan Mills Ltd., a textile manufacturer, was served with show‑cause notices for differential excise duty and challenged the assessment before the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals). The appellant filed a declaration under Section 89 of the Finance Act, 1998 to avail the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme (KVSS) which allowed settlement of disputed tax by paying 50% of the arrears. The Designated Authority rejected the declaration on the ground that the appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals) was time‑barred. The Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal held that the appeal was filed within the limitation period, making it pending for KVSS purposes. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding the appeal was not pending. The Supreme Court examined the meaning of “pending” under Section 95(i)(c) of KVSS, held that an appeal remains pending even if later found to be barred, and therefore the appellant was entitled to the benefits of KVSS. The Court set aside the High Court’s order, quashed the rejection of the declaration, and allowed the appeal.

Issues considered

The appeal filed before the Commissioner (Appeals) was within the statutory limitation period.
Whether an appeal deemed time‑barred but later held pending under KVSS qualifies as a "pending" appeal for the scheme’s benefits.
Whether the Designated Authority could reject the KVSS declaration on the basis of alleged limitation.
Whether the benefits of KVSS could be availed after the scheme’s termination.

Legislation cited

Central Excise Act, 1944s. 111A
Finance Act, 1998s. 87(f), s. 89, s. 90, s. 92
Income Tax Act, 1961s. 246, s. 264

Subjects

Kar Vivad Samadhan SchemeKVSSCentral ExciseLimitation periodPending appealSection 89 declarationInterest under Section 111ATax arrears settlementAppellate Tribunal

Judgment

'
::: MIS. SWAN MILLS LTD. A
."""' v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

JULY 26, 2007

[DR. ARIJIT PASAY AT AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.] B

. :/... Central Excises Act, 1944:

Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998-Finance Act, 1998~ss.89,
95(i)(c)-Jncome Tax Act, 1961-ss. 246 and 264-Demand notices-, c
Confirmed by Commissioner (appeals)-Appeal to tribunal-Meanwhile KVSS;
declaration filed by assessee-Rejection of, on the ground that appeal by
assessee to Commissioner (appeals) was filed after limitation period and
delay was not condoned hence assess"!ent had become final-Challenge
against-Held: Tribunal had held that appeal was within time-That being D
,,, so, appeal was to be treated as pending-Since KVSS was applicable to all
~
pending matters, order of rejection of KVSS declaration is set aside.

Kar Vivad Smadhan Scheme, 1998-0bject of-Discussed.

The appdlant was served with show cause notices for recovery of E
differential duty. Assistant Commissioner vide Order in original dated
12.11.1997 confirmed the demands covered thereunder alongwith interest.
Aggrieved appellant preferred appeal on 2.9.1998 before Commissioner
(Appeals). The Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the demand notices.

In 1998, KVSS scheme was introduced which provided for settling tax : F
--->r
arrears by paying 50% of disputed tax arrears. Appellant filed declaration I
under s. 89 of Finance Act, 1998 on 31.12.1998 for seeking the benefit of
KVSS Scheme. This declaration was rejected on 25.2.1999 on the ground
that appeal was filed by appellant before Commissioner (Appeals) after
limitation period for filing appeal had already expired and the delay in filing
' appeal was not condoned by the Commissioner (Appeals). Appellants preferred G
appeal before CEGAT. On 29.11.1999, CEGAT held that appeal before
Commissioner (Appeals) was within time and thus remanded the matter for
I fresh disposal.

531 H
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 8 S.C.R.

A The Commissioner (Appeals) vide order dated 29.6.2001 upheld the
order in original dated 12.11.1997. On 2.4.2001 appellant filed appeal before
Commissioner (Appeals) for reconsideration of earlier order dated 25.2.1999
whereby declaration under s.· 89 of Finance Act was rejected and for giving
the benefit of KVSS Scheme.

B The Superintendent of Central Excise on 18.1.2002 informed the
appellant that application under s. 89 was re-examined and since KVSS
Scheme no longer existed, question of accepting the application does not arise. ~

)I-

Appellants made an applieation dated 5.2.:2002 to Chief Commissioner
for direction to Commissioner to look into appellants' request for KVSS
c scheme .. The demand was confirmed by the dismissal of appeal by
Commissioner (Appeals) on 29.6.2001. Thereafter appellant deposited the
entire duty and penalty on 7.10.2004. On 3.11.2004, the Superintendent asked
I
appellant to pay interest und~r s.l lAA of Central Excises Act, 1944 for
delayed payment of duty. Appellant did not make the payment inspite of repeated
D letters for interest by the depar~ment. Thereafter appellant sent letter to
Commissioner for reconsideration of the matter. Commissioner informed
appelh1nt that benefit of KVSS cannot be extended as the scheme no longer ~- "· i
l

existed. Appellant filed writ petition before High Court seeking acceptance 'I-
\
of declaration under s. 89 of Finance Act. The High Court held that since

E
appeal was filed after limitation period, appellant was not entitled to get the ~
benefit of KVSS. Hence the present appeal..

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. The object of KVSS Scheme was to put an end to all pending )-
.
matters in the form of appeals, refer;ences, revisions and writ petitions under
F the IT Act/WT Acts. 95(i)(c) of the Scheme _was different from appeals under
-+- t
s.246, revisions under s: 264, appeals under s. 260-A, etc. of the IT Act and
similar provisions under the WT Act. Under the IT Act, there is a difference
between appeals, revisions and references. However; those differences were >-
obliterated and appeals, revisions and references were put on par under s.
'
G 95(i)(c) of the Scheme. The object behinds. 95(i)(c) in putting on par appeals, ~
references and revisions was to put an end to litigation in various forms and '
at various stages under the IT Act/Wealth Tax Act and, therefore, the rulings
on the scope of appeals and revisions under the rt .Act or on Voluntary
c
Disclosure Scheme, will not apply to this case. (Para 17] (537-F-H; 538-AJ

H 1.2. The Finance Act, 1998 introduced a scheme called the Kar Vivad
•
SWAN MILLS LTD. v. U.0.1. [PASAYAT,J.] 533
Samadhan Scheme, 1998. It was a recovery scheme. Under the Scheme, the A
... ....._
tax arrears had to be outstanding as on 31-3-1998. Under s. 87(f), "disputed
tax" was defined to mean total tax determined and payable under the IT Act/
Wealth Tax Act in respect ofan assessment year but which remained unpaid,
as on the date of making of the declaration from which TDS, self-assessed
tax, advance tax paid, if any, had to be deducted under s. 90; the DA had to ,
determine the amount payable and for that purpose, he had to determine the , B
tax arrear as well as the disputed amount as defined under s. 87(f). Thus, the
DA had to make an assessment of tax arrears, disputed amount and a.mount
i. payable for each year of assessment; that the appeal was barred ~gainst the
order under s. 90; that such determination had to be done within 60 days from
the receipt of the dech&ration and based thereon the DA had to issue a 'C
certificate. In other words, till the completion of the afore-stated exercise,
the appellant could not have paid the amount of tax and, therefore, the appellant
was not liable to pay interest as his liability accrued only after the
ascertainment of the amount payable under s. 90. (Para 171 (538-B-EJ
~·'

.. .,_
2. Undisputedly, the Tribunal held that the appeal was within time. That D
being so, for the purpose of KVSS the appeal was to be treated as pending.
The High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petition. Orders of
the Designated Authority rejecting the declaration filed by the appellant are
quashed. (Paras 17 and 181(537-B-C;539-C-D)

Commissioner of Income Tax, Rajkot v. Shatrusailya Digvijaysingh E
Jadeja, (2005) 7 sec 294, relied on.

CIVIL APPEL LA TE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3281 of2007.

From the Judgment & Order dated 28.04.2006 of the High Court of
Bombay at Mumbai in Writ Petition No. 605 of 2006. F
~

M.H. Patil, Shri Narain and Sandeep Narain (for Mis. S. Narain & Co.)
for the Appellant.

Mohan Parasaran, A.S.G., A. Subba Rao and B. Krishna Prasad for the
Respondents. G

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. I. Leave granted.

... 2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a Division Bench H
>- "Ir.I
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 8 S.C.R.

A of the Bombay High Court dismissing the Writ Petition filed by ~he appellant.
,.
3. The background facts in a nutshell are as follows: >-

The appellant is a composite Textile Mill engaged in manufacture of
cotton yam, man-made yam, cotton fabrics and man-made fabrics as well as
B the processing amongst other activities. For the period from October, 1994 to
February, 1997, the appellant was served with 14 Show Cause Notices for
recovery of differential duty of approximately Rs. 50 lakhs. The said show
cause notices were adjudicated by the Assistant Commissioner of Central <
Excise, Mumbai-II vide Order-in-original No. 781/398/97 to 794/411/97 dated ~
12th November, 1997, confirming the demands covered thereunder along with
c interest. The Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise also imposed penalty
of Rs. 5,000/-. There being incorrect computation, he directed the Range
Superintendent to verify figures and work out the fresh demand. The Range
Superintendent re-worked the duty amount of Rs. 9,40,753/- and issued a
r
demand notice on 18th May, 1998 requiring the appellant to pay the said ,.
~
D amount aiong with penalty of Rs. 5,000/-.
~

Dissatisfied with the order-in-original dated 12th November, 1997 passed
by lhe Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise and the order of Range -'1
....
Superintendent dated 18th May, 1998, the appellant preferred appeal before
the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) on 2nd September, 1998 along
E with stay application. Th.e Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) vide
order dated 28th December, 1998 asked the appellant to deposit the entire
amount of duty and penalty within four weeks from the date of the order.

Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998, came out with Scheme known as "Kar Vivad
Samadhan Scheme, 1998" (for short, 'KVSS'). The said scheme provided for
F settling the tax arrear by paying 50% of the disputed tax arrear. Under the
KVSS, the Commissioner of Central Excise was appointed as Designated ~-
Authority. The scheme was operative from l st September, 1998 to 31st January,
1999. The appellant filed declaration under Section 89 of the Finance Act, 1998
before the Commissioner of Central Excise on 31st December, 1998.
G
The aforesaid declaration filed by the appellant came to be rejected by
.;::
the Designated Authority vide his order dated 25th February, 1999 on the
ground that appeal was filed by the appellant before the Commissioner of
Central Excise (Appeals) a{!er the limitatior. for filing the appeal had already .\-
expired and that delay in filing the appeal was not condoned by the
H Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals). ~
!
- ~

SWAN MILLS LTD. v. U.0.1. [PASAYAT,J.] 535

.... Aggrieved by the order ir. appeal dated 25 February, 1999, the appellant A
""" preferred appeal before the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate
Tribunal, West Regional Bench, Mumbai (for short, 'the Tribunal').

4. The Tribunal vide its order dated 29th November, 1999 held that the
appeal preferred by the appellant before the Commissioner (Appeals) was
within time and, accordingly, set aside the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) B
and remanded the matter back to him for fresh disposal in accordance with
law.
~
5. On remand, the Commissioner (Appeals) vide order dated 29th June,
2001 upheld the order-in-original dated 12th November, 1997.
c
6. After the Tribunal passed the order on 29th November, 1999 holding
that the appeal preferred by the appellant before the Commissioner (Appeals)
was withir. time, the appellant approached the Designated Authority vide its
letter dated 24th April, 2001 for reconsideration of the earlier order dated 25th
February, 1999 and give the appellant the benefit ofKVSS in the matter of the
D
..., application filed under Section 89 of the KVSS on 28th January, 1999 .
>--
7. The Superintendent of Central Excise, Range II on I 8th January, 2002
informed the appellant that the Applicatio1! under Section 89 of the KVSS was
re-examined by the ChiefCommissioner'.s office, Mumbai and since the KVSS
no longer exists, the question of accepting the application does not arise. E
8. The appellant then made an application dated 5th February, 2002 to
the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise with a request for direction to the
Commissioner concerned to look into the appellant's request for KVSS.

9. As the order-in-original dated 12th November 1997/18th May, 1998 F
~ had attained finality on dismissal of the appellant's appeal by the Commissioner
(Appeals) on 29th June, 2001, the order was enforced and the appellant
deposited the entire duty and penalty on 7th October, 2004.

10. The Office of Superintendent of Central Excise vide letter 3rd
November, 2004 asked the appellant to pay the interest of Rs. 11,58,64 7/- G
under Section I lAA of the Central Excise Act, 1944 for delayed payment of
duty. By subsequent letter dated 22nd November, 2004 the appellant was
again called upon to pay the interest of Rs. I 1,58,647/- failing which it was
--f
informed that recovery of Government dues shall be made under Section 142
of the Customs Act, 1962.
H
fl..

536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 8 S.C.R.
(
A 11. Despite repeated letters when the appellant failed to pay interest
amount of Rs. l l,58,647/-, the Superintendent of Central Excise vide letter >-
dated 29th September, 2005 again called upon the appellant to pay the interest
(Government dues) immediately. It was thereafter that th.e appellant on 10th
October, 2005 sent a letter to the Commissioner of Central Excise for
reconsideration of the matter.
B
12. The Commissioner of Central Excise vide letter dated 19th October,
2005 informed the appellant that benefit of KVSS cannot be extended to it as
the scheme is no longer in existence. It is then that the appellant approached
>
the Bombay High Court by filing a writ petition. The appellant challenged
c principally the order dated 25th February, 1999 passed by the Designated
Authority. It prayed for direction to the respondents to accept the appellant's
declaration dated 31st December, 1998 made under Section 89 of Finance Act,
f--
1998 in respect of KVSS and restrain the respondents from recovery of
interest amount of Rs. 11,58,647/- as per the final demand dated 7th December,
2005.
D
13. Analysing the various provisions of the KVSS the High Court held ......
that since the appeal was filed after the limitation and delay was not condoned, ---i
the appellant is not entitled to get the benefit of KVSS.

14. According to the High Court the crucial word was "pending" and,
E therefore, the decision in Commissioner of Income Tax, Rajkot v. Shatrusailya
Digvijaysingh Jadeja, (2005] 7 SCC 294 relied upon by the appellant was not
applicable.

15. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that the Designated Authority erred in rejecting the declaration made under
F KVSS on the ground that the appeal preferred by the appellant on 2.9.1998
before the Commissioner (Appeals) was time barred and, therefore, it cannot
be said that any appeal was pending under Section 95(ii)(c) of KVSS. The
appeal dated 2nd September, 1998 in respect of order-in-original dated 12th
November, 1997/15th May, 1998 was in time and it has been so held ultimately
G by the Tribunal. Therefore, the Designated Authority ought to have considered
the matter. The High Court noted that ~he appellant kept quite and did not
take steps in challenging the order dated 25th February, 1999 passed by the
\
Designated Authority rejecting the declaration made by the appellant under
KVSS for some time but filed an appeal against the order dated 25th February, \-
1999 passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) rejecting the
H
-~

SWAN MILLS LTD. v. U.0.1. [PASAYAT, J.] 537
appellant's appeal as time barred by filing an appeal before the Tribunal. By A
order dated 29th November, 1999 the Tribunal allowed the appeal setting aside
the order passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) and
remanded the matter to the Commissioner (Appeals).

16. Learned counsel for the respondents supported the order of the
High Court. B
17. Undisputedly, the Tribunal held that the appeal was within time.
That being so, for the purpose of KVSS the appeal was to be treated as
pending. In Shatrusailya 's case (supra) this Court has held as follows:

"I 0. The basic point which we are required to consider in this case .C
is the meaning of the word "pending" in_ Section 95(i)( c) of the said
Scheme.

11. The object of the Scheme was to make an offer by the Government
to settle tax arrears locked in litigation at a substantial discount. It ,
provided that any tax arrears could be settled by declaring them and D
paying the prescribed amount of tax arrears, and it offered benefits
and immunities from penalty and prosecution. In several matters, the ·
Government found that a large number of cases were pending at the
recovery stage and, therefore, the Government came out with the said ,
Scheme under which it was able to unlock the frozen assets and E
recover the tax arrears.

12. In our vie~\f, the Scheme was in substance a recovery scheme
though it was n'omenclatured as a "litigation settlement scheme" and
was not similar to the earlier Voluntary Disclosure Scheme. As stated
above, the said Scheme was a complete code by itself. Its object was F
to put an end to all pending matters in the form of appeals, references,
revisions and writ petitions under the IT Act/WT Act. Keeping in
mind the above object, we have to examine Section 95(i)(c) of the·
Scheme, which was different from appeals under Section 246, revisions
under Section 264, appeals under Section 260-A, etc. of the IT Act and ,
similar provisions under the WT Act. Under the IT Act, there is a G
difference between appeals, revisions and references. However, those
differences were obliterated and appeals, revisions and references
were put on par under Section 95(i)(c) of the Scheme. The object
behind Section 95(i)(c) in putting on par appeals, references and'
revisions was to put an end to litigation in various forms and at H
~ ...

538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 8 S.C.R.

A various stages under the IT Act/Wealth Tax Act and, therefore, the _,>-. ....
rulings on the scope of appeals and revisions under the IT Act or on
Voluntary Disclosure Scheme, will not apply to this case.

13. One more aspect needs to be looked into. The Finance (2) Act,
1998 introduced a scheme called the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme,
B 1998. It was a recovery scheme. Under the Scheme, the tax arrears had
to be outstanding as on 31-3-1998. Under Section 87(f), "disputed tax"
was defined to mean total tax determined and payable under the IT
)'<
Act/Wealth Tax Act in respect of an assessment year but which
remained unpaid as on the date of making of the declaration from
which TDS, self-assessed tax, advance tax paid, if any, had to be
c deducted under Section 90; the DA had to determine the amount
payabl~ and for that purpose, he had to determine the tax arrear as •'
well as the disputed amount as defined under Section 87(f). Thus, the
DA had to make an assessment of tax arrears, disputed amount and
amount payable for each year of assessment; that the appeal was
D barred against the order.under Section 90 (see Section 92); that such
determination had to be done within 60 days from the receipt of the -...\
'
declaration and based thereon the DA had to issue a certificate. In
other words, till the completion of the afore-stated exercise, the
appellants could not have paid the amount of tax and, therefore, the
appellants was not liable to pay interest as his liability accrued only
E after the ascertainment of the amount payable under Section 90. In the
present matter that exercise has been completed; that taxes have been
recovered by the sale of lands; that amounts have been paid pursuant
to the determination by the DA, may be under the orders of the High
Court and, therefore, we do not wish to reopen the matter.
F 14. In the case of Dr Renuka Dat/a this Court has held on interpretation )-o-

of Section 95(i)(c) that if the appeal or revision is pending on the date
of the filing of the declaration under Section 88 of the Scheme, it is
not for the DA to hold that the appeal/revision was "sham",
"ineffective" or "infructuous" as it has.
G
15. In the case of Raja Kulkarni v. State of Bombay this Court laid
down that when a· section contemplates pendency of an appeal, what
is required for its application is that an appeal should be pending and
\--
in such a case there is no need to introduce the qualification that it
should be valid or competent. Whether an appeal is valid or competent
H is a question entirely for the appellate court before whom the appeal

,I
)
~-

SWAN MILLS LTD. v. U.0.1.[PASAYAT,J.] 539
is filed to decide and this determination is possible only after the A
appeal is heard but there is nothing to prevent a party from filing an
appeal which may ultimately be found to be incompetent e.g. when it
is held to be barred by limitation. From the mere fact that such an
appeal is held to be unmaintainable on any ground whatsoever, it
does not follow that there was no appeal pending· before the Court. B
16. To the same effect is the law laid down by the judgment of this
Court in the case of Tirupati Balaji Developers (P) Ltd. v. State of
Bihar, [2004] 5 SCC I in which it has been held that an appeal does
not cease to be an appeal though irregular and incompt:tent.

18. The ratio in Shatrusailya 's case (supra) is clearly applicable. In the C
instant case the appeal is to be treated as pending. The High Court was not
justified in dismissing the writ petition. The impugned order of the High Court
is set aside. Orders of the Designated Authority rejecting the declaration filed
.\ by the appellant are quashed. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs .

D.G. Appeal allowed.
D'
'".\