Holding

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s finding that Mansaram was not of sound mind when he executed the deed of adoption and dismissed the appeal.

Summary

The dispute concerned a deed of adoption executed by Mansaram in 1944, which the appellant Madan Lal sought to enforce. The trial and district courts dismissed the suit, but the Rajasthan High Court set aside those judgments, holding that Mansaram was not of sound mind when he executed the deed. The Supreme Court examined the deed’s lack of essential particulars and the medical and testimonial evidence showing Mansaram’s mental incapacity, concluding that the adoption could not be validly effected. The Court affirmed that, under CPC Sec. 100, a higher court may re‑appreciate evidence and interfere with findings of fact of the final fact‑finding court in exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and the High Court’s decree upheld.

Issues considered

Whether the deed of adoption is valid given the alleged lack of mental capacity of the executant at the time of execution.
Whether the High Court may interfere with findings of fact recorded by the trial court under CPC Sec. 100.
Whether the deed contains sufficient particulars (date, place, witnesses) to prove a valid adoption.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 100

Subjects

adoptionmental capacityregistration of deedcivil procedurehigh court interferencefindings of factevidentiary standards

Judgment

594

A

MADAN LAL
v.
MST. GOP! & ANR.
B
August 29, 1980.
[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., S. MURTAZA FAZAL Au
AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.)

Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Sec. 100-Findings of fact recorded by the final
c Court of facts-Competency of the High Court to· interfere with findings-when
arises.
A deed of adoption was executed by one M on August 10, 1944 stating that
he had adopted the appellant. A suit to challenge this deed was filed contend·
ing that M was not in a fit state of mind when he executed the deed. The
suit was dismissed by the Trial Court and this order was confirmed by the
District Court. In second appeal the High Court set ?.side the judgments of
D the Courts below and decreed the suit.
Earlier M had executed another deed of adoption in favour of the appellant,
but the Registrar refused to register that deed on the ground that the executant
appeared to him to be a lunatic. The matter was remanded by the Mahakma
Kbas to the Registrar with a direction that the executant be recalled and the
question decided afresh. The Registrar thereupon examined the executant and
E finding him unable to understand the simplest questions put to him, and giving
wholly incorrect answers to elementary questions like whom he had adopted,
reaffirmed his pre-remand view and, refused to register the deed.
A Suit was then brought by the appellant on September 11, 1940 for the
compulsory registration of the aforesaid deed of aqoption. A written state·
ment was filed on behalf of M admitting the appellant's claim that he was
validly' adopted. The authority of that admission having been challenged, the
F High Court, in revision, ,examined the matter further and directed that an appro·
priate issue has been framed on the question. After the remand, the Joint
Kotwal passed an order on January 4, 1944 holding M was not of sound mind ,
and was incapable of protecting his interest in the suit. The High Court agreed
with the findings of the Joint Kotwal.
On appeal by special leave, and dismissing the appeal, it was,
G HELD : (1) Apart from the bald assertion that the appellant was takep
in adoption, the deed doe.s not mention the year, the date or the place of
adoption. It does not either mention the names of persons who were present
at the time of adoption. In fact there is no evidence whatsoever to show when
and where the adoption took place and even whether the necessary ceremonies
were performed. [597 C·D]
H (2) The real drift of the plaint is that M was not in a fit state of mind
at the relevant time, that no adoption could have taken place in fact and that,
therefore, the deed of adoption cannot confer on the· appellant the rights of
an adopted son. [597 E]
MADAN LAL v. MST. GOPI (Chandrachud, C.J.) 595

(3). The arg~ment that M was in a fit state of mind when he executed the A
deed c~nnot be accepted. Indeed the halting evidence of the doctor .. one of
the witnesses, throw a cloud on the mental capacity of M and renders it im-
probable that he could perform or authorise the performanc~ 'of the act ,,f
adoption or that he could have executed it with an understanding mind. His
.mental faculties were evidently too enfeebled to enable him to enter into a
transaction which in law has a religious-cum-spiritual significance and which, in
a wordly way, affects valuable rights to property. [597 F-H]
B

a-..
(4) The trial court and the District Court wholly ignored the weight ot
prepondering circumstances on the record and allowed their judgments to be
influenced by inconsequential matters. The High Court was, therefore, justified
in re-appreciating the evidence and coming to its own independent conclusion
on the basis of that evidence. [HJ
(5) The situation here was of an exceptional character, where evidence
which was incapable of supporting more than one conclusion was considered
c
as justifying a conclusion which no reasonable Tribunal could rationally reach.
This judgment will not be a charter for interferenee by the High Courts witb
findings of facts recorded by the Final Court of facts.. [598 B-C]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 219 of 1970.
D
Appeal by Special Leave from the J!udgment and Decree dated
30-4-1969 of the Rajasthan High Cou11t in S. B. Civil Regular Second
Appeal No. 569/65.
S. M. Jain, S. K. Jain and Indira Makwana for the Appellant.
R. K. Garg, V. J. Francis and Sushi[ K. Jain for the Respondent.
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
CHANDRACHUD, C.J.-A de~d of adoption is alleged to have been
executed by one Mansaram on August 10, 1944, stating that he had
adopted the appellant, Madan Lal. A suit to challenge that deed
was dismissed by the trial Court. The learned District Judge, J"odhpur. F
confirmed the judgment of the trial Court but in second appeal No. 569
of 1965, a learned single Judge of .the Rajasthan High Court set aside
the judgment of the Courts below and· decreed the suit. By this appeal
by special leave, the defendant questions the cqrrectness of the High
Court's judgment dated April 30, 1969.
G
The principal point of controversy involved in the suit was whether
Mansaram was in a fit state of mind when he executed the deed of
adoption. This, substantially, is a \question of fact but we find that
the· trial Court and the District Court wholly ignored ·the weight of
preponderating circumstances on the record and allowed their judgments
to be influenced by inconsequential matters. The High Court was.
therefore, justified in reappreciating the evidence and in coming to H
its own independent conclusion on the basis of that evidence.
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A Earlier, Ma,nsaram had allegedly executed another deed of adop-
tion in favour of the. appellant Madan Lal but the Registrar refused
to register that deed by his order Exhibit 2 dated January 29, 1940
on the ground that Mansaram( who presented the deed for registration,
appeared to him to be a lunatic. Tite matter was remanded by the
Mahakma Khas 1to the Registrar with a direction that Mansaram he
B recalled and the question whether the deed should be registered
decided afresh. The Registrar thereupon examined Mansaram and
passed an order Exhibit 3 dated July 14. 1940, stating that Mansaram.
no doubt, appeared to be a little better but that, while at one time
he talked like a sane man, he would, on occasions, fall into a reverie
and was completely lost to the world. The Registrar noted that
c Mansaram was unable to understand the simplest questions put to
him, that he took an unreasonably long time to answer those questions
and gave wholly incorrect answers to elementary questions like whom
\he had adopted and whether he himself was married or unmarried. The
Registrar,' therefore, reaffirmed his pre-remand view and refused to
D register the deed.

A suit was then brought by the appellant on September 11, 1940
for the compulsory registration of the aforesaid deed of adoption. The
Court of Joint Kotwal (No. 2), in which the suit was filed, was,
concededly, a regular Civil Court of competent jurisdiction at the
relevant time. A written statement was filed in that sui't by one Shri
E
Raj Narain, advocate, on behalf of Mansaram admitting the appellant's
claim that he was validly adopted by Mansaram. The authority of
that admission having been challenged, the learned Chief Justice of
the High Court, sitting in revision, made an order Exhibit 15 dated
August 16, 1941, stating that the matter did not appear to him to
F be "absolutely clear". He observed that Mansaram claimed to be
an M.A. in English though, in fact, he did not understand a simple
sentence in English. The learned Chief Justice, therefore. examined
the matcter fur!_her and made an order Exhibit 18 dated December
4, 1941, directing that an issue be framed on the question whether
Mansaram was of sound mind and was capable of protecting his own
G interest in the suit. After the remand, the learned Joint Kotwal
recorded the statement of Mansaram on December 14, 1943. llrnt
statement is at Exhibit 5. Mansaram's wit and wisdom is reflected
in a part of that statement wherein he said that he was 65 years of
age and that his mother was about 50 years old. When the fundamental
absurdity of this hypothesis was pointed out to him, he made a feeble
H attempt to correct himself by saying that his mother may be of 70
years of age. In fact, 1the record of the evidence given by Mansaram
before the Joint Kotwal shows that he gave, at one time, an impression
MADAN LAL v. MST. GOPI (Chandrachud, C.J.) 597 \

that his mother was alive and was living with him although, admittedly, A
she had died long since. In the circumstances, the Joint Kotwal passed
.an order on January 4, 1944 (which was the only order to pass) that
he had no hesitation in holding that Mansaram was not of sound
mind and was incapable of protecting his interest in the suit. The
learned Judge formed ~he impression, which he recorded in the
proceedings, that Mansaram was tutored to make certain statements B
on the questions arising in the suit and that he looked like a "frighten-
ed animal".
The deed of adoption dalted August 10, 1944, which is impugned
in the present suit, contains a bald . assertion that Mansaram had
taken the appellant Madan Lal in adoption. But, significantly, the c·
·deed does not mention ,the year, the date or the place of adoption.
It does not either mention, as adoption deeds generally mention, the
names of persons who were present at the tiime of adoption. In fact,
·on the record of this case there is no evidence whatsoever to show
when and where the adoption took place and even whether the
necessary ceremonies were performed. We cannot accept the sub- D
mission, though strongly pressed upon us by Shri Sobhagmal Jiain
who appears on behalf of the appellant, that what the plaintiff had
·Challenged in the suit Was the validity of the deed Of adoption and
not the factum of adoption. On a broad and careful reading of the
plaint we are Jellt in no doubt that the real drift of the plaint is that
E
Mansaram was not in a fit state of .mind at the relevant time, that
no adoption could have taken place in fact and that, therefore, the
deed of adoption cannot confer on the appellant the rights of an
·adopted son.

Relying on the evidence of Somdatt D.W. 2, Shri Raj Narain
F
D.W. 6, a lawyer, Moolraj D.W. 9 and Dr. Umraomal, D.W. 10,
Shri Sobhagmal Jain argues thalt Mansaram was in a fit state of mind
when he -executed the impugned deed. We are unable to accept this
:submission. Indeed, the halting evidence of Dr. Umraomal itself
throws a cloud on the mental cap~city of Mansaram and rendci"s it
improbable that he could perform or authorise the performance of G
the act of adoption or that he could have executed the deed of
adoption with an understanding mind. HJi.s mental faculties were
evidently too enfeebled Ito enable him to enter into a transaction
· ·which in law has a religious-cum-spiritual significance and which, in
a worldly way, affects valuable rights to property. The High Court
has examined every facet of the evidence with great care and we are H
iiI1 agreement with the learned Judge that Mansaram was not in a fit
:State of mind when he executed. the deed of adoption. He could
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A not have, possibly, understood the nature and consequences of what
he was doing.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed but there will be ·J..
no order as to costs.
May we add that this judgment, properly understood, will not be
B a charter for interference by the High Courts with findings of facts
recorded by the final Coutt of facts·. The situation, here, was of an
exceptional character where evidence which was incapable of supporting - -
more than one conclusion was considered as justifying a conclusion
which no reasonable tribunal could rationally reach. - ·

Appeal dismissed~
c
N.K.A.