Holding

The Supreme Court held that the Rent Controller cannot extend the statutory 30‑day period, that "amount due" includes arrears, interest and costs up to the date of the eviction order, and that once the ground for eviction is made out the Controller must pass the eviction order which the executing court must enforce.

Summary

The landlords (Madan Mohan and another) sought eviction of tenant Krishan Kumar Sood under the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 for non‑payment of rent. The Rent Controller ordered eviction on 29 July 1986, allowing the tenant 30 days to pay the "amount due". The tenant deposited Rs 8,500, which the landlords claimed was short by Rs 161.29, and the Controller extended the time to pay the shortfall. The High Court held the extension was invalid and that "amount due" meant only arrears of rent, setting aside the execution order. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the statutory 30‑day period cannot be altered, that "amount due" includes arrears, interest and costs up to the eviction order, and that once the ground for eviction is established the Controller must pass the eviction order and the executing court must enforce it. The High Court's order was set aside and the appeal was allowed, directing possession in favour of the landlords.

Issues considered

The Rent Controller's jurisdiction to extend the statutory 30‑day period for payment of the amount due under Section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987.
The meaning of "amount due" in the third proviso to Section 14(2)(i) – whether it includes interest and costs or only arrears of rent.
Whether the Rent Controller has discretion to refuse an eviction order when the statutory grounds are satisfied.
Whether the eviction order dated 29 July 1986 is a final order or merely interim, and the effect of payment within 30 days.
The propriety of the High Court's interference with the execution order.

Legislation cited

Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987s. 14(1), s. 14(2)(i), s. third proviso to 14(2)(i)

Subjects

rent controlevictionnon‑payment of rentamount duestatutory periodlandlord‑tenantHimachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Actexecution of eviction orderinterpretation of "may" vs "shall"

Judgment

MADAN MOHAN AND ANOTHER A
v.
KRISHAN KUMAR SOOD

JANUARY 12, 1993

(J.S. VERMA, YOGESHWAR DAYAL AND B
N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.)

Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987~egislative inten-
tion-i'rotection to tenant-When available.

- Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987-Section 14-Evic-
tion on the ground of non-payment of rent-Execution on application of
c
landlord-Extension of time to t,leposit arrear by executing Court-Whether
justified.

Himacl1al Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987.,..-Section 14(2)(i), D
3rd proviso, (v )-''Amount due''-Construction Rent Controller to specify what
the amount due-''May''-Meaning of

The respondent was a tenant at the rate of Rs. 183.33 per month in
the suit-P.remises. The respondent was in arrears of rent with effect from
1.3.19811 to 28.2.1983. E
On 7th March, 1983, predecessor-in-interest of appellant No.2 and
appellant No.1, filed an application for eviction of the respondent on the
ground of non-payment of rent.

The Rent Controller on 29.7.1986 passed an order of eviction.
F

On 13.8.1986 the respondent deposited a sum of Rs. 8,500 In the
court of the Rent Controller.

According to the appellants tbe am.ouot deposited was not in ac- G
cordance with the ·.~rder dated 29th julyi1986. They filed the execution
petition before th~·· Rent Controller seeking possession of the suit
premises.

The Rent Controller framed two issues: (a) whether the tender made
by the respondent or the rent amount was short as alleged; (b) Relief. H
107
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) 1 S.C.R.

A The Rent Controller held that the tender made by the respondent
was short of Rs. 161.29. While deciding issue No. 2, the Rent Controller
allowed 15 days' time to deposit the said amount.

The appellants being aggrieved by the order of the Rent Controller
filed a revision petition in the High Court.
B
Before the High Court the appellants submitted that the executing
court had no jurisdiction to extend the time for making good the deficien·
cy of Rs. 161.29 inasmuch as since period of 30 days was fixed by the
Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 itself, the court could
C not either enlarge or abridge this period.

The High Court dismissed the revision petition, holding that the
respondent was not liable to be evicted and also held that the order of the
executing court extending time to deposit Rs. 161.29 in pursuance of Its
order daed 29.7.1986 was of no consequence.
D
The landlord filed this appeal by special leave against the High
Court's judgment.

The respondent-tenant submitted that sub-section (2) of Section 14
gave discretion to the Controller to pass an order of eviction or not to _y
E pass an order of eviction, even if the ground mentioned in clauses (i) to
(v) of Sub-section (2) of Section 14 were made out; that the order of
eviction which was passed was not the final order in the sense that it was
an interim order and the final order was passed only after the expiry of 30
days if the tenant failed to avail of the second opportunity provided by the
third proviso to clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 14.
F
Allowing the appeal of the landlord, this Court

HELD : 1.01. The Rent Control Acts are measures to protect tenants
from eviction except on certain specified grounds if found established.
G Once the grounds are made out and subject to any further condition which
may be provided in the Act, the tenants would suffer ejectment. Again the
protection given in the Acts is not to give licence for continuous litigation
and bad blood. [117H]

1.02. The legislature which made the Act could not have envisaged
H that after the parties finish of one round of litigation, the party should be
MADAN MOHAN v. KRISHAN SOOD 109

--( relegated to another round of litigation for recovery of rent which accrued A
pendente lite. Whatever protection Rent Acts give, they do not give blanket
protection for 'non-payment of rent'. This basic minimom bas to be
complied with by the tenants. Rent Acts do not contemplate that if one
takes a house on rent, he can continue to enjoy the same without payment
or rent. [118A·BJ
B
1.03. Rent Control Acts are necessary social measures for protection
,,., of tenants. The Rent Control Laws have tried to balance the equity.
Landlord is duty bound to satisfy the ground of eviction mentioned in
various Rent Acts and if he does not satisfy, he cannot get the order of
eviction merely because the Act restricts bis rights. [122E) C
1.04. There are certain Rent Acts which, even when a ground of
eviction is satsified, still confer powers on the Rent Controller to consider
---.... the question of comparative hardship and it is only in those types of cases,
if the Controller is satisfied, he ca11 decline passing orders of eviction. But
if there is no such limitations, the Rent Controllers after the ground of D
eviction specified in the Act is made out, have no discretion to reject the
application. Once the order or eviction is passed the executing court is
duty bound to execute its orders. No question of equity or hardship arises
at that stage. [122F-GI

2.01. There is no prov1s1on in the Act for giving powers to the
E
Controller to direct payment or deposit of "pendente lite' rent for each
month during the pendency of the petition for eviction of the tenant. First
Proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 14 shows that in order to show
payment or valid tender as contemplated by clause (i) of sub-section (2)
of Section 14 by a tenant in default, be has to pay on the first date of F
~ bearing the arrears of rent aloogwith interest and costs of the application
which are to be assessed by the Controller. [116G-H]

2.02. Sub-clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 14 gives two oppor-
tunities to the tenant to avoid eviction. The first opportunity to avoid
eviction is if the tenant avails of the benefit of first proviso. This oppor· G
tunity is before the passing of the order of eviction. The second oppor-
tunity is after the order of eviction. The order which is passed for eviction,
is final in the sense as it is not an interim order. If the tenant avails of the
second opportunity as provided in the third proviso then the order of
eviction becomes inexecutable and he saves himself from eviction. [119G) H
-
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 1 S.C.R.

A 2.03. The Controller is required to dismiss the eviction application
if he is 11ot satisfied to the existence of any ground mentioned in clauses
(i) to (v) of sob-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act but where the Control-
ler is satisfied with existence of any of the grounds mentioned in clauses
(i) to (v) of sub- section (2) of Section 14 the Controller has no discretion
to decline to pass the order of eviction. [1198)
B
2.04. The order wn1ch the Controller passed was a composite order
of eviction in the sense that if the tenant wanted to save himself from '-',
eviction, he had to comply with the order. The order which was passed by
the Controller cannot be said to be an order without jurisdiction. It may
C be a right order; it may have been a wrong order. It was not a nullity that
the executing court will ignore it. But at the stage when the execution
application was filed, the Rent Controller could not go behind its own
order dated 29.7.1986. [USC)

2.05. If the Controller could not go behind its own order in execution
D proceedings, the High Court could not also go behind the order in revision
against the order of Controller refusing execution. It was not the ap-
propriate stage for the High Court to examine what order ought to have
been passed or to limit the efficacy of the order to its interpretation of the
words 'amount due" as mentioned in the third proviso to clause (i) of sub-
E section (2) of S•ction 14. [1180-E]

-
2.06. The landlord, as per the scheme of the section, cannot be worse
olT vis-a-vis a tenant who was good enough to deposit in court the arrears
of rent together with interest and costs on the first date of hearing. [1170]

F 2.07. In the present case the tenant spared no efforts to harass the
landlords. After the order of eviction dated 29th July, 1986 the matter did
not rest there. The tenant again failed to pay the rent and the landlord was
forced lo file another eviction petition on the ground of non-payment of
rent for the period from 1.3.1983 to. 30.11.1986 and it was only after the
G filing of the said eviction petition and in order to avoid eviction he
deposited the rent. It was only after the notice of the Special Leave Petition
was issued, the tenant chose to pay the rent from 1.12.1986 after keeping
it in arrears for practically six years. [123A-BJ

Om Parkash v. Sar/a Kumari & Ors., 1991 (1) Sim. L.C. 45, referred
H to.
MADAN MOHAN •.. KRISHAN SOOD 111

Shri Krishnan Kumar v. Shri Gurbux Singh, 1977 (2) RCR 62, ap· A
proved.

Shyamcharan Sharma v. Daramdas, [1980) 2 SCC 151; Miss Santosh
Mehta v. Om Prakash and others, (1980) 3 SCC 610; Ram Murti v. Bhola
Nath and another, (1984) 3 SCC 111 and Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari and
another v. Lakshmi Naryan Gupta, (1985) 3 SCC 53, distinguished. B

3.01. The 'amount due' occurring in the third proviso in the context
will mean the amount due on and upto the date of the order of eviction.
It will take into account not merely the arrears of rent which gave cause
of action to tile a petition for eviction but also include the rent which C
accumulated during the peodeocy of eviction petition as well. If the tenant
has been paying the rent during the peodeocy of the eviction petition to
the landlord, the 'amount due' will be only arrears which have not been
paid. [117C-D)
D
3.02. It will be advisable if the Controller while passing the order of
eviction on the ground specified in clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section
14 of the Act specifies the 'amount due" till the date of the order and not
merely leave it to the parties to contest it after passing or the order of
eviction as to what was the amount due. [117F] E
j
3.03. Io the context in which the expression 'may' is used it means
'shall'. Otherwise the section would read that 'not only the Controller
can reject an application when be is not satisfied with the ground but is
also entitled to dismiss the application when he is so satisfied." Such an
intention cannot be attributed to the legislature particularly when the F
consequences of non-satisfaction is expressly mentioned. Even if the
consequences of non-satisfaction was · not mentioned, the expression
'may' occurring would still mean 'shall" and all that would mean is that
if the grounds are not made out, be will be bound to dismiss the
application and if the grounds are made out, he is bound to pass the G
order of eviction. If any other interpretation is given to the word 'may'
the section may itself become subject matter of challenge under Article
14 of the Constitution of India. The Court shall avoid interpretation
which make the provisions violative of the Constitution if possible.

[1.7C·FJ H
•
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 1 S.C.R.

A CIVILAPPELLATEJURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.131 of1993.

From the Judgment and Order dated 17.12.1991 of the Himachal
Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision No. 210 of 1990.

P .P. Rao and Ashok K. Mahajan for the Appellants.
B D.D. Thakur, N.N. Bhat, E.C. Agrawala, AV. Palli and Ms. Purnima
Bhat for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

YOGESHWAR DAYAL, J. Special leave granted.
c With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the appeal itself
was heard.
The respondent is a tenant at the rate of Rs. 183.33 per month in the
premises in dispute i.e. Shop No. 50, The Mall, Sbimla. On 7th March,
D 1983, late Smt. Dhani Devi, Predecessor-in-interest of appellant No. 2 and
Sbri Madan Mohan, appellant No.l, filed an application for eviction of the
respondent on various grounds. One of the grounds on which the eviction
was claimed was non-payment of rent. It was stated in eviction petition that
the respondent was in arrears of rent with effect from 1.3.1980 to 28.2.1983.
The Rent Controller on 29.7.1986 passed an order of eviction on the
E ground of non-payment of arrears of rent. The operative part of the said
order is as under:

'In the light of my finding on issue No.l above, the application
is allowed on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and
the petition fails on other grounds. However, the respondent
F shall not be evicted from the premises in question if he pays to
the petitioner or deposit in this court a sum of Rs. 6,600, being
arrears of rent from 1.3.1980 to 28.2.1983 @ 2,200 p.a. plus
interest thereon @ 6% p.a. amounting to Rs. 609 .39,. up to
28.2.1983 and further interest on Rs. 6,600/- @ 6% p.a. from
1.3.1983 till 28.8.1986 plus costs assessed at Rs. 100 within a
G
period of 30 days from today.'

On 13.8.1986 the respondent deposited a sum of Rs. 8,500 in the
court of the Rent Controller, Shimla. According to the appellants, decree
holders, the amount due inclusive of interest and costs upto 29.7.1986 was
H Rs. 8,661.29 and till the date of deposit it worked out to Rs. 8,677.79 if the
MADAN MOHAN v. KRISHAN SOOD [DAYAL, J.) 113

interest was to be calculated at the ordered rate till 13.8.1986. A
According to the appellants the amount deposited was not in accord-
ance with the order of the ejectment dated 29th July, 1986 and was short,
and they filed the execution petition before the Rent Controller seeking
possession of the suit premises.
B
On the execution petition being opposed, the Rent Controller framed
the following two issues:

_?' "(a) Whether the tender made by the respondent of the rent
amount is short as alleged?
c
(b) Relief.'

By an order dated 18.5.1990 the Rent Controller while deciding issue
No. 1 held that the tender made by the respondent was short to the tune
-'\ of Rs. 161.29. However, while deciding issue No.2, the Rent Controller
allowed 15 days' time from the date of the order for deposit of the said D
amount.

The appellants being aggrieved by the order of the Rent Controller
dated 18.5.1990 filed revision petition in the High Court. It was submitted
on behalf of the appellants that the executing court had no jurisdiction to E
j extend the time for making good the deficiency of.Rs. 161.29 inasmuch as
since period of 30 days has been fixed by the Himachal Pradesh Urban
Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') itself, the
court could not either enlarge or abridge this period.

By the impugned judgment dated 17.12.1991, the High Court dis- F
missed the revision petition. The High Court while interpreting the words
'amount due" occurring in the third proviso to Section 14(2) (i) of the Act
held that these words referred to arrears of rent only and do not include
interest and costs.

It will be noticed that neither of the parties had challenged the order G
29.7.1986 by .which the order of eviction was passed on the ground of
non-payment of rent against the respondent but the respondent had been
\. given the liberty of avoiding eviction provided he deposited the amounts
as stated in the order within the period of 30days from the date of the said
order. Before the High _Court it was submitted on behalf of the appellants H
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) 1 S.C.R.

A that the executing court had no jurisdiction to extend the time to make
good the deficiency in the amount as directed by the order dated 29.7.1986.
It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that since the period of 30
days had been fixed in the Act itself the court could not enlarge or abridge
this period. The High Coutt agreed with this submission but posed a
question for itself, whether short fall of Rs. 161.29 which had been ordered
B to be deposited constitutes arrears of rent or interest and costs. While
following an earlier decision of the same High Coutt reported as Om
Parkash v. Sar/a Kumari & Ors., 1991 (1) Sim. L.C. 45 interpreted the word
"amount due" occurring in the third proviso to Section 14(2)(i) of the Act
wherein· it had been held that in order to save eviction the tenant is
C reqfilred to deposit only arrears of rent due at the time of filing application
for eviction and not arrears of rent together with interest and costs within
the statutory period of 30 days from the date of eviction order. After
answering the question the High Court took the view that the deficiency of
Rs. 161.29 pertains to interest and costs. So far as the arrears of rent which
D amounted to Rs. 6,600 for the period in question i.e. from 1.3.1980 to
28.3.1983 at the rate of Rs. 2,200 p.a. is concerned, it had been deposited
within 30 days. In view of this finding the High Court was of the view that
the respondent was not liable to be evicted. High Court also held that the
order of the executing court extending time to deposit Rs. 161.29 in
putsuance of its order dated 29.7.1986 is of no consequence.
E
The relevant part of Section 14 of the Act may be noticed:-

'14. Eviction of tenant -

(1) A tenant in possession of a building or rented land shall
F not be evicted therefrom in execution of a decre passed before
or after the commencement of this Act or otherwise, whether
before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this Act.

(2) A landlord who .seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the
G
Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after
giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause
against the applicant, is satisfied -

(i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due from
H him in respect of the building or rented land within fifteen days
MADAN MOHAN v. KRISHAN SOOD [DAYAL, J.] 115

after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy A
with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement by
the last day of the month next following that for which the rent
is payable:

Provided that if the tenant on the first hearing of the application
for ejectment after due service pays or tenders the arrears of B
rent and interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum on such
arrears together with the cost of application assessed by the
Controller, the tenant shall be deemed to have duly paid or
tendered the rent within time aforesaid:

Provided further that if the arrears pertain to the.period prior
c
to the appointed day, the rate of interest shall be calculated at
the rate of 6 per cent per annum:

Provided further that the tenant against whom the Controller
has made an order for eviction on the ground of non- payment D
of rent due from him, shall not be evicted as a result of his
order, if the tenant pays the amount due within a period of 30
days from the date of order; or

(ii) ... ... ;or
E
(iii) ... ... ;or

(iv) ... ... ;or

(v) ... ...,
F
the Controller may make an order directing the tenant to put
the landlord in possession of the building or rented land and
if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order
rejecting the application:'

A reading of the aforesaid relevant part of the Section shows that G
sub-section (1) of Section 14 creates a ban against the eviction of a tenant
except in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The ban is liable to
be lifted. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 provides the circumstances in which
the ban is partially lifted. It contemplates that where an eviction petition
is filed, inter alia, on the ground of non-payment of rent by the landlord, H
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 1 S.C.R.

A the Controller has to be satisfied that the tenant has neither paid nor
tendered the rent in the circumstances mentioned in clause (i) of sub-sec-
tion (2) of Section 14. He has to arrive at this satisfaction after giving a
reas~nable opportunity of showing cause against it to the tenant. But there
may be cases where the tenant, on being given notice of such an application
for eviction, may like· to contest or not to contest the application. The
B tenant is given the first 'Chance to save himself from eviction as provided
in the first proviso to clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 14. This first
proviso contemplates that the tenant may on the first hearing of the
application for ejectment pay or tender in court the rent and interest at
the rate mentioned in the proviso on such arrears together with the cost of
c application assessed by the Controller and in that case the tenant is
deemed to have duly paid or tendered the rent within the time as con-
templated by clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 14. Where the tenant
does not avail of tbis opportunity of depositing as contemplated by the first
proviso and waits for an ultimate decision of the application for eviction
D on the ground of non-payment of rent, the Controller has to decide it and
while deciding, the Controller has to fmd whether the ground contained in
clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 14 has been made out or not. If the
Controller_finds that the ground as contemplated by clause (i) of sub-sec-
tion (2) of Section 14 is made out, he is required to pass an order of
eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent due from him. A second
E opportunity to avoid eviction is provided by the third proviso to clause (i)
of sub-section (2) of Section 14. But the second opportunity is provided
after the order of eviction. The benefit of avoiding eviction arises if the
tenant pays the "amount due' within the period of 30 days of the date of
order.
F
The question is what is the meaning of the words "amount due'
occurring in the third proviso to clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 14
of the Act.

G It will be noticed that .there is no provision in the Act for giving
powers to the Controller to direct payment or deposit of ''pendente lite" rent
for each month during the pendency of the petition for eviction of the
tenant. First Proviso to sub-section (2) of section 14 shows that in order to -f
show payment or valid tender as contemplated by clause (i) of sub-section
(2) of Section 14 by a tenant in default, he has to pay on the first date of
H hearing the arrears of rent alongwith interest and costs of the application
MADAN MOHAN v. KRISHAN SOOD (DAYAL, J.] 117

which are to be assessed by the Controller. ,Surely where a tenant does not A
avail of the first opportunity and contests the eviction petition on the
--( ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and fails to show that he was not
in default and court finds that the ground has been made out, an order of
eviction has to follow. Therefore, it does not stand to reason that such a
tenant who contests a claim and fails to avoid order of eviction can still
avoid it by merely paying the rent due till the. date of the filing of the
B
application for ejectment. The third proviso to clause (i) of sub-section (2)
of Section 14 should also receive an interpretation which will safeguard the
rights of both the landlord and tenant. The "amount due" occurring in the
third proviso in the context will mean the amount due on and upto the date
of the order of eviction. It will take into account not merely the arrears of c
rent which gave cause of action to file a petition for eviction but also
include the rent which accumulated during the pendency of eviciion peti-
tion as well. If the tenant has been paying the rent during the pendency of
the eviction petition to the landlord, the "amount due" will be only arrears
which have not been paid. The landlord, as per the scheme of the section,
D
cannot be worse off vis-a-vis a tenant who was good enougb to deposit in
court the arrears of rent together with interest and costs on the first date
of hearing. If the interpretation given by tho High Court is accepted the
result would be .that the tenant will be better off by avoiding to pay the
arrears of rent with interest and costs on the first date of hearing and prefer
-;. suffering order of ejectment after contest and then merely offer the amount E
due as mentioned in the application for ejectment to avoid eviction. This
could not be the intention of the legislature.

In such cases it will he advisable if the Controller while passing the
order of eviction on the ground specified in clause (i) of sub-section (2) of F
Section 14 of the Act specifies the "amount due" till the date of the order
and not merely leave it to the parties to contest it.3fter passing of the order
of eviciton as to what was the amount due.

Surely the Rent Control Acts, no doubt, are measures to protect G
tenants .from eviction except on certain specified grounds if found estab-
lished. Once. the grounds are made out and subject to any further condition
\.
which may be provided in the Ac~ the tenants would suffer ejectment.
Again the proteciton given in the Acts is not to give licence for continuous
litigation and bad blood. H
)

118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 1 S.C.R.

A Surely the legislature which made the Act could not have envisaged
that after the parties finish off one round of litigation, the party should be )--
relegated to another round of litigation for recovery of rent which accrued
pendente lite. Whetever protection Rent Acts give they do not give blanket
protection for "non-payment of rent". This basic minimum has to be com-
plied with by the tenants. Rent Acts do not contemplate that if one takes
B a house on rent, he can ·continue tci enjoy the same without payment of
rent.

The order which the Controller passed was a composite order of
eviction in the sense that if the tenant wanted to save himself from eviction,
C he had to comply with the order. The order which was passed by the
Controller cannot be said to be an order without jurisdiciton. It may be a
right order; it may have been a wrong order. It was not a nullity that the
executing court will ignore it. But at the stage when the execution applica-
tion was filed, the rent Controller could not go behind its own order dated
D 29.7.1986. If the Controller could not go behind its own order in execution
proceedings, surely the High Court could not a)so go behind the order in
revision against the order of Controller refusing execution. It was not the
appropriate stage for the High Court to examine what order ought to have
been passed or to limit the efficacy of the order to its interpretation of the
words "amount due" as mentioned in the third proviso to clause (i) of
E sub-section (2) of Section 14. The question which the High Court posed
never arose.

Mr. Thakur, who appeared on behalf of the respondent submitted:

(1) that sub-section (2) of Section 14 gives discretion to the Control-
F ler to pass an order of eviction or not to pass an order of eviciton even if

G
the ground mentioned in clauses (i) to (v) of sub-section (2) of Section 14
are made out;

(2) that the order of eviction which was passed is not the final order
in the sense that it is an interim order. The final order is passed only after
·-
the expiry of 30 days if the tenant fails to avail of the second opportunity
provided by the third proviso to clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 14.

With due respect to learned counsel for the respondent we are not
able to persuad ourselves to agree with either of his submissions. It is true
H that sub-section (2) uses the expression "the Controller may make an order
MADAN MOHAN v. KRISHAN SOOD [DAYAL, J.] 119

directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building or A
rented land and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order
rejecting the application'.

It will be noticed that the Controller is required to dismiss the
eviction application if he is not satisfied to the existence of any ground
mentioned in clauses (i) to {v) of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act B
but where the Controller is satisfied with existence of any of the grounds
mentioned in clauses (i) to {v) of sub-section (2) of Section 14 the Con-
troller has no discretion to decline to pass the order of eviction. In the
context in which the expression "may'' is used it means "shall'. Otherwise
the section would read that 'not only the Controller can reject an applica- C
tion when he is not satisfied with the ground but is also entitled to dismiss
the application when he is so satisfied'. Such an intention cannot be
attributed to the legislature particularly when the consequences of non-
satisfaction is expressly mentioned. Even if the consequences of non-satis-
faction was not mentioned, we are of the view that the expression 'may"
occurring would still mean "shall" and all that would mean is that if the D
grounds are not made out, he will be bound to dismiss the application and
if the grounds are made out, he is bound to pass the order of eviction. If
any other interpretation is given to the word "may'' the section may itself
become subject matter of challenge under Article 14 of the Constitution of
India. The Court shall avoid interpretation which make the provisions E
violative of the Constitution, if possible.

Coming to the second submission, as we have noticed earlier, sub-
clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 14 gives two opportunities to the
tepant to avoid eviction. The first opportunity to avoid eviction is if the
tenant avails of the benefit of first proviso. This opportunity is before the F
passing of the order of eviction. The second opportunity is after the order
of eviction. The order, which is passed for eviction, is final in the sense as
it is not an interim order. If the tenant avails of the second opportunity as
provided in the third proviso then the order of eviction becomes inex-
ecutable and he saves himself from eviction. G

Having found that the question posed and answered by the High
Court was not relevant at the stage it was posed, namely during the
execution proceedings and, therefore, the order is bad.

The validity of the order of the executing court dated 18th May, 1990 H
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 1 S.C.R.

A now needs to be considered. The executing court, on consideration of the
evidence recorded during the execution proceedings held that the judg- 'r-
ment-debtor, respondent, himself calculated the interest for the period
1.3.1983 to 28.2.1986 with the result that Rs. 161.29 ps. was deposited less
by the judgment-debtor and thought that it had power to extend the time
for making up the deficiency and accordingly extended the time.
B
So far as the Himachal Pradesh High Court is concerned it has
consistantly taken the view that the executing court has no such power since
the time is fixed by the statute. R.S. Pathak, CJ. (As His Lordship then ""
was) in Shri Krishan Kumar v. Shri Gurbux Singh, (1977] 2 R.C.R. 62 while
c interpreting the third proviso to Section 14(2) (i) of the Act took the view
-~

thus:

'It is apparent that the statute itself provides a period of 30
days from the date of the order for payment of rental arrears ).. -

by the tenant. On such payment, the statute declares, effect will
D not be given to the order of eviction. The statute does not leave
the determination of the period to the Rent Controller. It is
not open to the Rent Controller, when disposing of the petition
for eviction, to make an order either abridging or enlarging the
period of 30 days. Indeed, the period having been determined
E by the statute itself, no order was necessary by the Rent
Controller. There being no power in the Rent Controller to
vary the period mentioned in the statute, it is apparent that the
order made by him in the execution proceedings is a nullity.
The Appellate Authority is right in the view taken by it.'

F Mr. Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent, referred us to -
Shyamcharan Shanna v. Dharamdas, (1980] 2 SCC 151; Miss Santosh Mehta ,_____
v. Om Prakash and others, (1980] 3 SCC 610; Ram Murti v. Bhola' Nath and
another, (1984] 3 SCC 111 and Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari and another v_
Lakshmi Narayan Gupta, (1985] 3 SCC 53 and submitted that this Court
bad, in spite of there being no express provisions to extend time taken the
G
view that the Court has inherent powers to extend time for deposit of rent.
We are of the view that the reliance placed on these cases is wholly
misplaced. --f

It may be noticed that the case of Shyamcharan Slramia (supra)
H related to the powers of the Court under Section 13(6) of the Madhya
(

MADAN MOHAN v. KRISHAN SOOD [DAYAL, J.] 121

Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1%L This Act contemplated an A
eviction petition being filed under Section 12 and one of the grounds for
_,. \' eviction was for failure of the tenant to pay or tender within two months
from the date of service of notice of demand of rent and Section 12 (3)
thereof provided that the order of eviction will nqt be passed on this
ground if the tenant makes the payment of deposit as requried by Section
13. Section 13(1) contemplated that when a suit has been instituted on any
B
of the grounds against the tenant for his eviction, the tenant shall, within
__,.,/ one month of the service of sunimons on him or within such further time
as the court may, allow in this behalf, deposit in the court or pay to the
landlord the arrears of rent and shall also continue to pay, month by month,
the future rent as well. Sub-section (5) of Section 13 contemplated that if c
the deposit was made as contemplated by sub-section (1) of Section 13 no
order for recovery of possession should be made on the ground of default
in the payment of rent. Sub-section (6) of Section 13 provide that if the
tenant fails to pay any amount as required by Section 13 the court had the
-~
power to strike out the defence and proceed with the hearing of the suit.
D
While dealing with the powers under Section 13(6) of the said Act this
Court took the view that the court had discretion to strike off the defence
or not even if there is delay in depositing rent falling due after institution
of suit for eviction. The Court held :

"In case of non-deposit or non-payment of rent by the tenant, E
1- Section 13(6) vests a discretion in the Court to order striking
off the tenant's defence against eviction; it neither clothes the
landlord with an automatic right to an eviction decree nor visits
the tenant with the penalty of such a decree being automatically
passed. If the court has the discretion to strike off or not to
F
strike off the defence, it has further discretion to condone the
default and extend the time for making the payment or deposit.
Such a discretion is a necessary implication of the discretion
not to strike off the defence. A different construction might
lead to perversion of an object of the Act, namely 'adequate
pretection of the tenant'." G

An express provision for extending time for deposit or payment was
'>..
not made in Section 13(1) becauses the consequences of non-payment was
proposed to be dealt with separately by Section 13(6) and the discretion
to extend time is incidental to the discretion in the said section to strike H
)

122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) 1 S.C.R.

A off or not to strike off the defence.

This view in Shyamc/1aran Shanna's case (supra) was followed by this
Court in Miss Santosh Mehta's case (supra) and Ram Mufti's case (supra),
which were the cases under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, which also
-
had the provisions simijar to the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control
B Act, 1%1 contemplating direction by the court to direct the tenant to pay
the pendente lite rents which have become due and consequences for not
complying with such directions.

Again the case of Genesh Prasad Sah Kesari (supra) related to the
C provisions for striking out the defence for failure of the tenant to deposit
arrears of rent within 15 days of date of the courts's order and this court
again followed the decision in the case of Shyamcharan Shanna.

These cases have no application where the final orders were passed
D after satisfaction of the Controller for entitling the landlord to seek eviction
on the grounds specified in the Act.

Mr. Thakur then submitted that this Court should not exercise its
powers under Section 136 of the Constitution of India as the rent laws are
meant for protection of the tenants. Rent Control Acts are necessary social
E measures for protection of tenants. The Rent Control Laws have tried to
balance the equity. Landlord is duty bound to satisfy the ground of eviction
mentioned in various Rent Acts and if he does not satisfy, he cannot get
the order of eviction merely because the Act restricts his rights. There are
certain Rent Acts which, even when a ground of eviction is satisfied, still
F confer powers on the Rent Controllers to consider the question of com-
parative hardship and it is only in those types of cases, if the Controller is
staisfied, he can decline passing orders of eviction. But if there is no such
limitations, the Rent Controllers, after the ground of eviction specified in
the Act is made out, have no discretion to reject the application. Once the
order of eviction is passed, .in the circumstances like the present, the
G executing court is duty bound to execute its orders. No question of equity
or hardship arises at that stage.

We are in complete agreement with the view expressed by R.S.
Pathak, CJ (as His Lordship then was ) in the aforesaid case of Shri
H Krishan Kumar.
MADAN MOHAN v. KRISHAN SOOD [DAYAL, J.] 123

In the present case the tenant spared no efforts to harass the A
landlords. After the order of eviction dated 29th July, 1986 the matter did
not rest there. The tenant again failed to pay the rent and the landlord was
forced to file another eviction petition on the ground of non-payment of
rent for the period from 1.3.1983 to 30.11.1986 and it was only after the
filing of the said eviction petition and in order to avoid eviction he
deposited the rent. The matter did not rest there even and it was only after B
the notice of the Special Leave Petition was issued in the present case that
the tenant chose to pay the rent from 1.12.1986 after keeping it in arrears
for practically six years.

In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case we set
asid~ the impugned order of the High Court dated 17th May, 1991 and the
c
order of the Rent Controller dated 18th May, 1990 and direct the Rent
Controller, Shimla, to issue the warrants of possession for ejectment of the
respondent from the premises in dispute and place the landlords/appellants
---.\.
in possession.

V.P.R. Appeal allowed.