Holding

Property inherited from a collateral (uncle) remains separate property; blending was not proved, so no deduction of the son's share is permissible.

Summary

M.P. Jain, adopted into his uncle's family, received 28 acres from the adoptive family and inherited 19 acres 19.5 gunthas from his natural father, who became his uncle after adoption. The Commissioner under Section 45(2) of the Maharashtra Agricultural Land (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 held that the inherited land was separate property, not ancestral, and the High Court affirmed this view, rejecting the claim that the land had blended with ancestral holdings. Jain appealed, seeking to have his son's one‑fifth share deducted on a notional partition by arguing that the separate property had merged with the ancestral stock. The Supreme Court held that land inherited from a collateral such as an uncle is separate property, and that blending requires a clear, proven intention to abandon the separate claim, which was not evidenced. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with costs.

Issues considered

Whether land inherited by a Hindu from a collateral (uncle) can be characterised as ancestral property for the purpose of computing surplus land under the Maharashtra Agricultural Land (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961.
Whether the appellant had demonstrated the requisite intention to blend his separate property with the ancestral property.

Legislation cited

Maharashtra Agricultural Land (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961s. 45(2)

Subjects

Hindu lawancestral propertyseparate propertyadoptionland ceilingblending of propertyMitakshara lawSection 45(2)Maharashtra Agricultural Land Act

Judgment

MADANLAL PHULCHAND JAIN A
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.

APRIL 9, 1992

[AM. AHMADI AND R.M. SAHAI, JJ.] B

Maharashtra Agricultural Land (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961-Sec-
tion 45 (2 )-Hindu-lnheriting land as nephew-Natural father having become
uncle in adoption-Such land-Whether separate or ancestrat--Computation
of swplus land. C
Hindu Law

Joint family-Blending of separate propert;r--Proof of-Necessity of
evidence for.
D
The appellant was taken in adoption in the family of his unde. On
adoption, he got about 28 acres of agricultural land from the adoptive
family. He also inherited land admeasuring 19 acres ana 19-1/2 gunthas
from his natural father, who died leaving beMnd no other heir.

The Commissioner, exercising power under Section 45(2) of the E
Maharashtra Agricultural Land (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, came to
the conclusion that the land inherited by the appellant was ·a separate
property and could not be characterised as ancestral property. The Com·
missioner, further took the view that since the land inherited by the
appellant could not be described as ancestral property, the appellant's
major son's share could not be deducted therefrom, and hence the surplus
F
had to be worked out without making any such deduction.

These views were confirmed by the High Court in a Writ Petition
brought under Article 227 of the Constitution. The contention that the
inherited property blended with the ancestral property and hence it had G
acquired the character of an ancestral property was rejected.

Aggrieved, the appellant appealed to this Court which granted spe-
cial leave confining it to the question of blending.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court, H
479
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] 2 S.C.R.

A HELD : 1. A Hindu can have interest in ancestral property as well
as acquire his separate or self-acquired property. If he acquires by in· -..(
heritance separate property a birth of a son or adoption of a son will not
deprive him of the power he has to dispose of his separate property by gift
or will. [481.H]

B 2. Excluding the property inherited from a maternal grandfather the
only property which can be characterised as ancestral property is the )t
property inherited by a person from his father, father's father, or father's
father's father. That means property inherited by a person from any other
relation becomes his separate property and his male issue does not take
c any interest therein by birth. [4828]
-"'(
--.
In the instant case, the property which the appellant inherited from
his uncle (natural father) was his separate property in which his major
son could not claim any share whatsoever. (4820] ~

D 3. Under the Mitakshara Law each son upon his birth takes an
interest equal to that of his father in ancestral property, both movable and
immovable. This right is independent of his father. [482E]

In the instant case, if the appellant is able to establish blending of
his separate property with ancestral property, the plea of deduction of
E
1/Sth share of his son on notional partition may perhaps be well founded.
It must, therefore be shown that the appellant had thrown his separate
property in the common stock with the intention of abondoning his
·..t.
separate claim thereon. [482F] ·

F 4. Evidence must be led to show a clear intention to give up his
separate rights and allow the separate property to be treated as an
---
ancestral property and be enjoyed by the coparceners. Such an intention
has to be proved by tendering evidence, since no such inference can be
drawn even from the fact that he had permitted his family members to use 7
it along with him nor can it be proved from the mere fact that the income
G
of the separate property was used for supporting his son or from the fact
that he had failed to maintain separate accounts of the yield of both sets
of properties. [482F-HJ

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2627 of
H 1982.
""'
M. P. JAIN v. STATE [AlfMADI, J.) 481

From the Judgment and Order dated 14.8.1980 of the Bombay High A
Court in Special Civil Application No. 9074 of 1977.

V.N. Ganpule and V.B. Joshi for the Appellant.

S.M. Jadhav and A.S. Bhasme for the Respondents.
B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

AHMADI, J. The appellant was taken in adoption in the family of
his uncle. On adoption he got agricultural land admeasuring about 28 acres
from the adoptive family. His natural father died leaving behind no other C
heir. Thereupon land admeasuring 19 acres and 19-1/2 gunthas was in-
herited by the appellant as nephew (since his natural father became his
uncle on his adoption). The Commissioner, Bombay Division, in exercise
of power under section 45(2) of the Maharasthra Agricultural Lands
(Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 came to the conclusion that the land
inherited by the appellant was a separate property and could not be D
characterised as ancestral property. This view of the Commissioner came
to be confirmed by the High Court in a Writ Petition brought under Article
227 of the Constitution. The High Court also rejected the contention that
the inherited property got blended with the ancestral property and hence
it had acquired the character of an ancestral property. The appellant's E
contention was that the 1/Sth share of his major son in the ancestral
property had to be determined on a notional partition and deducted from
his holding for the purpose of determining the surplus area under the
afor((said Act. The Commissioner as well as the High Court took the view
that since the land inherited by the appellant could not be described as
ancestral property, the appellant's major son's share could not be deducted F
therefrom and hence th(1 surplus had to be worked out without making any
such deduction.. The HighCourt als0 rejected the theory of blending and
hence this appeal.
\ WhiJe granting special leave this Court ordered that it shall be
confined to the question of blending. We have, therefore, to consider the G
limited question whether there was blending and the land inherited by the
appell3,nt formed part of the ancestral property. It is well settled that a
Hindu can have interest in ancestral property as well as acquire his
separate or self-acquired property. If he acquires by inheritance separate
property a birth of a son or adoption of a son will not deprive him of the H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] 2 S.C.R.

A power he hac; to dispose of his separate property by gift or will. That means
that a Hindu can own separate property besides having a share in ancestral
property. Therefore, when the appellant inherited the land left by his uncle
(natural father) that property came to him as a separate property and he
had an absolute and unfettered right to dispose of that property in the
manner he liked. It is
equally well settled that excluding the property
B inherited from a maternal grandfather the only property which can be
characterised as ancestral property is the property inherited by a person
from his father, father's father, or father's father's father. That means
property inherited by a person from any other relation becomes his
separate property and his male issue does not take any interest therein by
C birth. Thus property inherited by a person from collaterals such as a
brother, uncle, etc., cannot be said to be ancestral property and his son
cannot claim a share therein as if it were ancestral property. There can,
therefore, be no doubt that the property which the appellant inherited from
his uncle (natural father) was his separate property in which his major son
p could not claim aicy share whatsoever.

But the appellant contends that his separate property got blended
with his ancestral property and thereby acquired the character of ancestral
property in which his major son became entitled to JJSth share on notional
partition. It is true that under the Mitakshara Law each son upon his birth
E takes an interest equal to that of his father in ancestral property, both
moveable and immoveable. This right is independent of his father. There-
fore, if the appellant is able to establish blending of his separate property
with ancestral property, the plea of deduction of l/Sth share of his son on
notional partition may perhaps be well founded. It must, therefore, be shown
F that he had thrown his separate property into the common stock with the
intention of abandoning his separate claim theron. Evidence must be led
to show a clear intention on his part to give up his separate rights and allow
the separate property to be treated as an ancestral property and be enjoyed
by the coparceners. Such an intention has to be proved by tendering J
evidence, since no such inference can be drawn even from the fact that he
G had permitted his family memb~rs to use it along with him nor can it be
proved from the mere fact that the income of the separate property was
used for supporting his son or from the fact that he had failed to maintain
separate accounts of the yield of both sets of properties. In the present
case no such evidence had been adduced before the authorities below.
H Counsel for the appellant was unable to invite our attention to the factual
M. P. JAIN v. STATE [AHMADI, J.) 483

m?terial evidencing such merger or blending. Therefore, the submission A
based on the doctrine of merger cannot come to the rescue of the appel-
lant.

In the result we see no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same with
costs.
B
N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.