Holding

A transfer of a Hindu minor’s property by a de facto guardian is void ab initio under Section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, and the transferee acquires no interest; the minor may repudiate the transfer upon attaining majority.

Summary

The appellant Madhegowda purchased the share of a minor, Sakamma, in a property from her sister Madamma, who acted as a de facto guardian, in 1961. After attaining majority, Sakamma sold the same share to Ankegowda in 1967, leading to a suit for declaration of title, partition and possession. The trial court and first appellate court held that Sakamma had no title because the earlier sale to Madhegowda was valid, but the Karnataka High Court reversed, granting partition to the respondents. The Supreme Court examined whether a de facto guardian can alienate a minor’s property under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, and held that such alienation is void ab initio under Section 11, the transferee acquires no interest, and the minor may repudiate the transfer upon attaining majority. Consequently, the High Court’s decree was upheld and the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether a sister acting as a de facto guardian can lawfully alienate the immovable property of a Hindu minor under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956.
Whether a transfer made by a de facto guardian is void or voidable, and whether the transferee acquires any title.
Whether the minor, upon attaining majority, can repudiate the invalid transfer without filing a suit within three years.
Applicability of Section 11 of the Act to the present transaction and its effect on the parties' rights.

Legislation cited

Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956s. 11, s. 12, s. 4, s. 6, s. 8

Subjects

Hindu Minority and Guardianship Actde facto guardianminor's propertyvoid transferrepudiationpartition suitsection 11alienationtitle dispute

Judgment

.A MADHEGOWDA (D) BY LRS.
v.
ANKEGOWDA (D) LRS. AND ORS.

NOVEMBER 20, 2001

B [D.P. MOHAPATRA AND DORAISWAMY RAJU, JJ.]

Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956-Sections 4, 6, 8, 11 and
12-Alienation.of minor's property by de facto guardian-Validity of-Held,
is per se illegal and void ab initio-Transferee of such an alienation acquires
C no interest in the property-No need to set aside such an invalid alienation
by filing a suit-Minor on attaining majority can repudiate the transfer-
Transfer on attaining majority in a lawful manner asserting his/her title is
sufficient indication of repudiation.

Words and Phrases :
D
"Guardian"-Meaning of-Jn the context of Section 4(b) of the Hindu
Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956.

Original owner of the property in dispute died leaving behind his
two daughter viz. respondent No. 10 and respondent No. 11. When re· \-
E spondent No. 10 was a minor, her sister, respondent No. 11, acting as her
guardian, sold her share of the property to the appellant. Subsequently,
respondent No. 10, on attaining majority sold her share of the property to
predecessor of respondent Nos. 1 to 9 who filed a suit for declaration of
title, for partition and for delivery of possession. Trial Court dismissed
F the suit holding that respondent No. 10 had no valid title in the property
on the date she executed the sale deed in favour of predecessor of re·
spondent Nos. 1 to 9 since her interest in the suit property had already
r
been sold in favour of appellant and which had not been annulled by filing
a suit within three years of her attaining majority. First Appellate Court
dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of Trial court. However, on
G
second appeal, the High Court holding that the respondent Nos. 1 to 9
were entitled to half share in the suit property, passed an order for
partition and delivery of possession. Appellants filed a review petition,
but was not successful.

H Hence the present appeals.
290
MADHEGOWDA v. ANKEGOWDA 291
Dismissing the appeals, the Court A

HELD : 1.1. High Court was justified in decreeing the suit for parti·
tion and separate possession by setting aside the Judgment of the trial
. Court which was confirmed by the First Appellate Court. (301-B]

1.2. Section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 B
provides that no person shall be entitled to dispose of or deal with the
property of a Hindu minor merely on the ground of his or her being the de.
facto guardian of the minor. It is clear from the statutory provisions that
with the avowed object of saving the minor's estate being misappropriated
or squandered by any person, by a relation or a family friend claiming to c
be a well-wisher of the minor, Section 11 was enacted to prohibit any such
person from alienating the property of the minor. Thus, in view of the clear
statutory mandate, any violation of the prohibition incorporated in Sec·
tion 11 of the Act is ab initio void. In the instant case, undoubtedly re-
spondent No. 11, sister of the minor is not a 'guardian' as defined in S.4(b) D
of the Act. Therefore, she can only be taken to be a 'de facto guardian' and
to such a transfer provision of S.11 of the Act squarely applies.
(297-C-D; 299-C; 300-F]

Hunooman Persaud Pandey v. Musamut Babooee Mundraj Koonwaree,
6 MIA 393, overruled. E

Kondamudi Sriramulu v. Myneni Pundarikakshayya etc., AIR 36 (1949)
FC 218 and Ganayya and Anr. v. Radhabai and Ors., [1997] 11 SCC 332,
relied on.
F
1.3. A transferee of alienation in violation of S.11 does not acquire
any interest in the property. Such an invalid transaction is not required to
be set aside by filing a suit or judicial proceeding. The minor, on attaining
majority, can repudiate the transfer. After attaining majority, if he/she
transfer his/her interest in the property in a lawful manner asserting his/
her title to the same that is sufficient to show that the minor has repudiated G
. the transfer made by the 'de facto' guardian'/'manager'. In the instant
case, there Is no finding recorded by the trial Court or the First Appellate
Court that respondent No. 10, the minor after attaining majority had
ratified the invalid transfer, even assuming that the flaw in the transfer
could be cured by ratification. (300-H; 301-A-B] H
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A 2. Instant case is not a case of alienation of minor's interest in a 'joint
family property'. Therefore, the question whether the provisions of S.11 is
applicable in the case of transfer of minor's interest in a joint family, does
not arise for consideration. [300-E]

Sri Narayan Bal & Ors. v. Sridhar Sutar & Ors., [1996] 8 SCC 54 and
B Nathuni Mishra & Ors. v. Mahesh Mishra & Ors., AIR (1963) Patna 146 and
Dhanasekaran v. Manoranjithammal and Ors., AIR (1992) Madras 214,
referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : CivH Appeal Nos. 5652-5653
of 1998.
c
From the Judgment and order dated 11.1.93 and 8.9.97 of the Karnataka
High Court in R.S.A. No. 1134n9 and C.P. (FR) No. 1535 of 1993 in R.S.A.
No. 1134of1979.

Pranab Kumar Mullick for the Appellants.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:

D.P. MOHAPATRA, J. One Ninge Gowda was the original owner of
the property in dispute. He died leaving two daughters namely Smt.Sakamma,
respondent no. I 0 herein, and Smt.Madamma, respondent no. I I herein. When
E Smt. Sakamma was a minor, her sister Smt. Madamma purportedly acting as
her guardian, sold her share of the property left by Ninge Gowda to Madhegowda,
appellant herein by a registered Sale Deed dated 24.4.1961. It is the case of
the appellant that the share of the minor Smt. Sakamma was sold to collect
funds for her marriage. The appellant was put in possession of the property and
F he continues in possession of the same till date.

Smt. Sakamma attained imajority sometime in 1961-62. She sold her
share of the property to Ankegowda, predecessor of respondent nos. I to 9
herein, by the registered Sale Deed dated 1.7.1967. Since there was a dispute
regarding possession of the property, Ankegowda initiated a proceeding under
G Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code before the Sub-Divisional
Magistrate, Srirangapatna which was registered as Criminal Misc.7/67-68. In
the said proceeding, the learned Magistrate held that the appellant was in -- -
possession of the property on the date of the preliminary order and he would
continue to remain in possession of the same till dispossessed by the competent
H Court.
MADHEGOWDA v. ANKEGOWDA [MOHAPATRA, l.] 293
Thereafter Ankegowda (plaintiff) filed Original Suit No.69/69, in the A
Court of the Munsif, Srirangapatna seeking a declaration of title, for partition
of the share of his vendor Smt. Sakamma and for delivery of possession of the
same to him citing Smt. Sakamma (defendant no. I), Smt. Madamma (defend-
ant no. 2) and S. Madhegowda (defendant no. 3) as parties. The learned Munsif
dismissed the suit. The appeal filed by Ankegowda, Regular Appeal No. 44/ B
78, in the Court of the Civil Judge, Srirangapatna proved unsuccessful. The
learned Civil Judge concurred with the findings of the learned Munsif and
dismissed the appeal by his judgment dated 24.7.1979.

The trial Court and the First Appellate Court dismissed the suit on
recording the concurrent finding that Smt. Sakamma (Defendant No. I) had no C
valid title in the property on 1.7.1967, the date on which she executed the
re£istered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, since her interest in the suit
property had already been sold in favour of S. Madhegowda (Defendant No.
3) by the registered sale deed dated 24.4.1961 executed by her sister
Smt.Madamma (Defendant No. 2). The Courts further held that Smt. Sakamma D
could not have validly sold the suit property to the plaintiff without getting the
sale deed dated 24.4.1961 annulled by filing a suit within three years of
attaining majority. The decisions were based on the notion that the sale deed
executed by Smt. Madamma in favour of Madhegowda was not void but
voidable only. E
Respondent nos. I to 9, successors-in-interest of Ankegowda, filed Regu-
lar Second Appeal No. 1134n9 in t_he High Court of Karnataka challenging the
judgment/decree of the trial Court as confirmed by the First Appellate Court.
The High Court by its judgment rendered on I Ith January, 1993 allowed the
sei;ond appeal, set aside the judgment/decree of the Courts below and held that F
the respondents I to 9 are entitled to half-share in the suit property, ordered
for partition and delivery of possession of their share out of the same. The
application filed for review of the judgment CP (FR) No.937/97 was dismissed
by the order dated 8.9.1997. Hence, these appeals by the defendant.

The question that falls for determination in the case relates to compe- G
tence of Smt. Madamma to sell the interest of her minor sister Smt.Sakamma
in the property as her guardian. If the question is answered in the affirmative
and it is held that Smt. Madarnma was competent to alienate the share of her
minor sister as her guardian, then the trial Court and the first Appellate Court
were right in holding that the transaction of sale was voidable one and Smt. H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A Sakamma having failed to repudiate the sale within the prescribed period of
three years after attaining majority, the sale in favour of the appellant stood
confirmed. If, on the other hand, it is !teld that Smt. Madamma had no com-
petence to alienate the share of her minor sister in the. property, then the
transaction was· a void one which was not required to be repudiated by Smt.
B Sakamma by filing a suit withi~ the prescribed period. Then the judgment of
. the High Court holding the ·sale to be void is to be confirmed.

The answer to the question formulatecl above depends on the interpre·
talion of Section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (here·
inafter referred to as 'the Act') and its interaction with other relevant prov'sions
C of the Act.

In Section ·4 clause (b) the expression guardian' is defined to mean a
person having the care of the person of a minor or of his property or of both
his person and property, and includes :

D (i) a natural guardian;

(ii) a guardian appointed by the will of the minor's father or mother,

(iii) a guardian appointed or declared by a court, and

E (iv) a person empowered to act as such by or under any enactment
relating to any Court of Wards;

In clause (c) the term 'natural guardian' is defined to mean any of the
guardians mentioned in Section 6.

F In Section 6 of the Act provisions are made regarding 'natural guardians
of a Hindu minor' in respect of the minor's person as well as in respect of the
minor's property. The Section reads as follows :

"The natural guardians of a Hindu minor, in respect of the minor's
person as well as in respect of the minor's property (excluding his or
G
her undivided interest in joint family property), are ·

(a) in the case of a boy or an unmarried girl · the father, and after
him, the mother : provided that the custody of a minor who has
not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the
H mother;
MADHEGOWDA v. ANKEGOWDA [MOHAPATRA, J.] 295

(b) in the case of an illegitimate boy or an illegitimate unmarried girl A
- the mother, and after her, the father;

Provided that no person shall be entitled to act as the natural guardian
of a minor under the provisions of this section -

(a) if he has ceased to be a Hindu, or B

(b) if he has completely and finally renounced the world by becom-
ing a hermit (vanaprastha) or an ascetic (yati or sanyasi).

Explanatio.n - In this section, the expressions 'father' and 'mother' do
not include a step-father and a step-mother."
c
In this connection it is relevant to consider the power of a natural
guardian to alienate the property of the minor, provision regarding which is
made in Section 8 of the Act. In Sub-section (I) of Section 8 it is declared that
the natural guardian of a Hindu minor has power, subject to the provisions of D
the section, to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the
benefit of the minor or for the realisation, protection or benefit of the minor's
estate; but the guardian in no case can bind the minor by a personal covenant.

In Sub-section (2) of Section 8 it is laid down that the natural guardian
E
shall not, without the previous permission of the Court -

(a) mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or other-
wise, any part of the immovable property of the minor or

(b) lease any part of such property for a term exceeding five years F
or for a term extending more than one year beyond the date on
• which the minor will attain majority.

In Sub-section (3) in which the consequences of contravention of sub-
section (I) or sub-section (2) are provided it is laid down that "any disposal
G
of immovable property by a natural guardian, in contravention of sub-section
(I) or sub-section (2), is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person
claiming under him".

In Sub-section (4) of Section 8, a provision is made that "No court shall
grant permission to the natural guardian io do any of the acts mentioned in sub- H
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A section (2) except in case of necessity or for an evident advantage to the
minor".

In Sub-section (5) of Section 8, it is provided that "the Guardians and
Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890), shall apply to and in respect of an application
for obtaining the permission of the Court under sub-section (2) in all respects
B as if it were an application for obtaining the pennission of the Court under
Section 29 of that Act".

Section 11 of the Act reads as follows :

"De facto guardian not to deal with minor's property - After the
c commencement of this Act, no person shall be entitled to dispose of,
or deal with, the property of a Hindu minor merely on the ground of
his or her being the de .facto guardian of the minor."

This Section brings about a material change in the law relating to de facto
D guardians or de facto managers of a Hindu minor's estate by enacting in
express tenns that after the commencement of the Act, no person has the right
or authority to do any act as a de facto guardian of such minor. Although the
expression 'de facto guardian' is often used in judgments, there is in law
nothing like a de facto guardian. The statute recognises a natural guardian or
a testamentary guardian or a guardian appointed by the Court. In law a person
E who is not a guardian as aforementioned who takes interest upon himself, the
general management of the estate of a minor can be more appropriately de-
scribed as 'de facto manager'. Before enforcement of the Act some confusion
prevailed over the powers of de facto guardian or manager for alienating the
property of his/her ward. It was held by the Privy Council in Hunooman
F Persuad Pandey 's case, 6 MIA 393, that a de facto guardian had the same
power of alienating the property of his ward as a natural guardian. Section 11
has done away with the authority of any person to deal with or dispose of any ..
property of a Hindu minor on the ground of his being the de facto guardian
of such minor. Any alienation by a de facto guardian will be governed by the
provisions in Section 11 of the Act. The alienation, being against the statutory
G
prohibition, would be void ob initio and the alienee would not acquire any title ,..
to the property.

Section 12 of the Act reads as follows :

H "Guardian not to be appointed.for tninor's undivided interest in joint
MADHEGOWDA v. ANKEGOWDA [MOHAPATRA, J.] 297

family property - Where a minor has an undivided interest in joint A
family property and the property is under the management of an adult
member of the family, no guardian shall be appointed for the minor in
respect of such undivided interest :

Provided that nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the
jurisdiction of a High Court to appoint a guardian in respect of such B
interest."

From the statutory provisions noted above, it is clear that with the
avowed object of saving the minor's estate being mis-appropriated or squan-
dered by any person, by a relation or a family friend claiming to be a well-
wisher of the minor, Section 11 was enacted to prohibit any such person from
c
alienating the property of the minor. Even a natural guardian is required to seek
permission of the Court before alienating any part of the estate of the minor
and the Court is not to grant such permission to the natural guardian except in
case of necessity or for an evident advantage to the minor. So far as de facto
guardian or de facto manager is concerned, the statute has in no uncertain terms D
prohibited any transfer of any part of minor's estate by such a person. In view
of the clear statutory mandate, there is little scope for doubt that any transfer
in violation of the prohibition incorporated in Section 11 of the Act is ab initio
void.

The Federal Court in the case of Kondamudi Sriramulu v. Myneni E
Pundarikakshayya etc., AIR 36 (1949) FC 218, explaining the phrase 'de facto
guardian' used in Hanooman Persaud Pandey's case (supra), made the follow-
ing observations :

"Before concluding my observations about the scope of the decision in
F
Hanuoomna Persaud Panday's case, 6 M.I.A. 393: (18 W.R.81 P.C.),
I would like to make a few observations about the phrase "de facto
guardian". In my opinion, it is a loose phraseology for the expression
"de facto manager" employed in Hanooman Persaud Panday's case, 6
M.l.A. 393: (18 W.R.81 P.C.); their Lordships in different parts of the
judgment used the words, guardian, curator and de facto manager. This G
phrase is certainly not known to any text of Hindu law, but it aptly
describes the relations and friends who are interested in the minor and
who for love and affection to him assume superintendence over his
estate. A father may not necessarily be the guardian of an illegitimate
child, but his de facto guardianship cannot be repudiated. Such is the H
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A case of the natural father of an adopted son, cf. Ganga Prasad v. Hara
Kanta Chowdhury, 7 Kl.(:. 234:(15 C.W.N. 558). A person who is not
attached to the minor by ties of affection or other reasons of affinity and
remains in charge of his estate is in truth a mere intermeddler with his
estate. In order to come within the scope of the rule in Hanooman
Persaud Panday's case, 6 M.l.A. 393: (18 W.R.81 P.C.), it is necessary
B
that there is course of conduct in the capacity of a manager."

The Federal Court took the view that "in law there is nothing like a de
facto guardian. There can only be a de facto manager, although the expression
'de facto guardian' has been used in text books and some judgments of Courts.
C That is the correct description of a person generally managing the estate of a
minor without having any legal title to do so."

This Court in the case of Sri Narayan Bal and Ors. v. Sridhar Sutar &
Ors., (1996] 8 SCC 54, construing the provisions of applicability of Section
8 to a case of transfer of the undivided interest of a Hindu minor in a joint
D
family property held that the joint Hindu family by itself is a legal entity
capable of acting through its Karla and other adult members of the family in
management of the joint Hindu family property and that Section 8 in view of
the express terms of Sections 6 and 12, would not be applicable where a joint
Hindu family property is sold/disposed of by the Karla involving an undivided
E interest of the minor in the said joint Hindu family property. In that connection,
this Court made the following observations :

" ...... Each provision, and in particular Section 8, cannot be viewed in
isolation. If read together the intent of the legislature in this beneficial
legislation becomes manifest. Ordinarily the law does not envisage a
F
natural guardian of the undivided interest of a Hindu minor, other than
the undivided interest in joint family property, is alone contemplated
under Section 8, whereunder his powers and duties are defined. Sec-
tion 12 carves out an exception to the rule that should there be no adult
member of the joint family in management of the joint family property,
G in which the minor has an undivided interest, a guardian may be
appointed; but ordinarily no guardian shall be appointed for such
undivided interest of the minor. The adult member of the family in the
management of the joint Hindu family property may be a male or a
female, not necessarily the Karta. The power of the High Court oth-
H erwise to appoint a guardian, in situations justifying, has been pre-
MADHEGOWDA v. ANKEGOWDA [MOHAPATRA, J.] 299
served. This is the legislative scheme on the subject. Under Section 8 A
a natural guardian of lhe property of the Hindu minor, before he
disposes of any immovable property of the minor, must seek permis-
sion of the Court. But since there need be no natural guardian for the
minor's undivided interest in the joint family property, as provided
under Sections 6 and 12 of the Act, the previous permission of the
B
court under Section 8 for disposing of the undivided interest of the
minor in the joint family property is not required ....... "

This Court, in the case of Ganayya and Anr. v. Radhabai and Ors.,
[1997] ll sec 332, considering the question of applicability of the provisions
of Section I; of the Act, held : "A bare reading of Section 11 goes to show c
that it explicitly provides that after the commencement of the said Act no
person shall be entitled to dispose of or deal with the property of a Hindu minor
merely on the ground of his or her being the de .facto guardian of the minor."
In that case the case of the appellants was that their father, who was blind from
birth, died on 16.2.1957 leaving behind him the appellants who were minors.
D
The appellants' uncle Nagayya was cultivating the land in question as Manager
even during the life time of their father as he was blind and the appellants were
minors. One Balayya, husband of appellants' mother's sister, leased out the
lands in dispute to the said Nagayya, the real uncle of the appellants'. On the
basis of that lease made by the de facto guardian of the appellants' Nagayya,
the uncle of the appellants', made the application for conferral of ownership E
rights of the land in dispute and for determination of purchase price of the said
land under Section 48 read with Sections 46 and 49-A of the Bombay Tenancy
and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958. The Addi. Tahsildar
allowed the application which was upheld by the Sub-Divisional Officer in
appeal and the Revenue Tribunal in revision. The High Court also dismissed F
the appellants' application filed under Article 227 Of the Constitution. The
High Court held that the provisions of Section 11 of the Act were not attracted
to the facts of the case and, therefore, dismissed the petition. This Court,
allowing the appeal, held that the High Court fell into a patent error in taking
the view that Section II was not attracted to the facts of the case.
G
A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Nathuni Mishra
ai1d Ors. ''· Mahesh Misra & Ors., AIR (1963) Patna 146, took the view that
Section 11 does not deal with the disposal of the undivided interest of a minor
in a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara School of Law. The Court
further held that the said Section cannot be pleaded as a bar for disposal of joint H
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A family property by the Manager or the Karta of the family for legal necessity.

A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Dhanasekaran
v. Manoranjithammal & Ors., AIR 1992 Madras 214, construing Section 11 of
the Act, held, inter alia, that the property of a Hindu minor referred to in
Section 11 will include all his properties, including his undivided interest in the
B
joint family property and consequently that the sale by the de facto guardian
of the minor's interest in the joint family property was void ab initio. The
Division Bench approved the decision of the single Judge in this regard.
However, the Division Bench did not agree with the view taken by the single
Judge that the sale by a de facto guardian of the minor's interest in the joint
c family is void and held "Section 11 renders the sale voidable only".

We have carefully considered the principles laid down in the
aforementioned decisions so far as relevant for the purpose of adjudication of
the issue arising in the present case. It is to be kept in mind that this is not a
D case of alienation of minor's interest in a 'joint family property'. As noted
earlier, Ninge Gowda died leaving his two daughters, namely Smt. Sakamma
and Smt.Madamma. It is not the case of any of the parties that the suit property
was a 'joint family property' in the hands of Ninge Gowda or that the alienation
by Smt.Madamma. who is the sister of the minor, was a transfer of the minor's
interest in the 'joint family property'. Therefore, the question whether the
E provision in Section 11 is applicable in the case of transfer of minor's interest
in a 'joint family' does not arise for consideration here. Section II includes all
types of properties of a minor. No exception is provided in the Section.
Undoubtedly Smt. Madamma, sisterofthe minor, is not a 'guardian' as defined
in Section 4(b) of the Act. Therefore, she can only be taken to be a 'de facto
F guardian' or l)lOre appropriately 'de facto manager'. To a transfer in such a case
Section 11 of the Act squarely applies. Therefore, there is little scope for
doubt that the transfer of the minor's interest by a de.facto guardian/manager
having been made in violation of the express bar provided under the Section
is per se invalid. The existence or otherwise of legal necessity is not relevant
G in the case of such invalid transfer. A transferee of such an alienation does not
acquire any interest in the property. Such an invalid transaction is not required
-
to be set aside by filing a suit or judicial proceeding. The minor, on attaining
majority, can repudiate the transfer in any manner as and when occasion for
it arises. After attaining majority if he/she transfers his/her interest in the
property in a lawful manner asserting his/her title to the same that is sufficient
H
MADHEGOWDA v. ANKEGOWDA [MOHAPATRA, J.] 301

to show that the minor has repudiated the transfer made by the 'de facto A
guardian' /'manager'.

In the case in hand there is no finding recorded by the trial Court or the
First Appellate Court that Smt. Sakamma, the minor, after attaining majority,
had ratified the invalid transfer, even assuming that the flaw in the transfer
could be cured by ratification. On the facts of the case the High Court was B
justified in setting aside the judgment of the trial Court which was confirmed
by th! First Appellate Court and was right in decreeing the suit for partition
and separate possession.

Thus, these appeals, being devoid of merit, are dismissed. However, in c
the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

S.V.K. Appeals dismissed.