Holding

The application under Section 18 was barred by limitation because the six‑week period from receipt of the valid notice under Section 12(2) had expired, and no power exists to condone the delay.

Summary

The appellant, a lessee of land acquired for a railway project, was denied compensation when the Special Land Acquisition Officer declared a "nil award" on 29‑8‑1994, awarding compensation only to the land owners. A telegram sent on 18‑9‑1994, received on 20‑9‑1994, served as notice under Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. The appellant filed a writ petition and was directed to seek a reference under Section 18; he filed the application on 20‑2‑1995, beyond six weeks of receiving the notice. The High Court held the application barred by limitation and the State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed that the telegram constituted valid notice, the limitation period is six weeks from receipt of such notice, and neither the Land Acquisition Officer nor the court can condone delay. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

What is the period of limitation for filing an application for reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act when notice under Section 12(2) is received?
Does a telegram notifying the declaration of award satisfy the requirement of notice under Section 12(2)?
Can the Land Acquisition Officer or the court condone delay in filing the Section 18 application?

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 12(2), s. 17(3)(a), s. 18(1), s. 18(2)(a), s. 18(2)(b), s. 31, s. 8(2)

Subjects

Land acquisitionCompensationLesseeNil awardLimitation periodSection 18 referenceNotice under Section 12Condonation of delay

Judgment

r
•
A MAHADEO BAJIRAO PATIL
v.
ST ATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.

SEPTEMBER 6, 2005

B [B.P. SINGH AND S.B. SINHA, JJ.]

land Acquisition Act, I 894 :
~

Section I I-Award of compensation, Meaning-After considering the .....
claim of the appellant for compensation, LAO rejected the claim holding that
c appellant being a lessee was not entitled to any compensation as compensation
was payable only to the land owners-Held, it would not cease to be an award
JP
under section I I-Such awards are commonly described as nil awards.

Section I 2(2)-Notice of award made by LAO to the applicant-Held,
D is a clear intimation of making of the award requiring the owner or person
interested to receive the compensation awarded-Notice need not contain all
the details of the award including the consideration fixed by the LAO and its ·•
manner of determination of the compensation.

Section I 8(2) proviso (b)-Reference, limitation for making application
E for-Six weeks of receipt of the notice from the collector under section I 2(2)
or six months from the date of knowledge of award-LAO sent a telegram
to the applicant informing him the factum and date ofdeclaration ofaward-
Held, it amounts to giving notice under section I 2(2) and period of limitation
for filing the application under section I8 was six weeks from the date of
F receipt of the notice and not six months from the date of knowledge of the
~
awards.

Section I 8(2)-Limitation for making reference-Delay, Condonation
of-Application for reference under section I 8 filed after six weeks of the
receipt of notice under s2ction I 2(2)~Held, the application was barred by
G limitation -LAO making a reference or the Court considering such a
reference has no power of condonation of delay in making an application
under section I 8.

The LAO made an award rejecting the claim of the appellant for
compensation holding that as compensation was payable only to the land
,. :
H
1182
MAHADEO BAJIRAO PATIL v. STATE 1183
> '
owners, appellant being a lessee was not entitled to any compensation. The A
LAO sent a telegram to the appellant informing him thefactum and date
of declaration of award. Appellant made an application for making a
reference under section 18 of the Act after six weeks from the receipt of
that telegram. The High Court held that the application was barred by
limitation. Hence this appeal. B
Dismissing the appeal, the Court

... • HELD : I. Having considered the claim of the appellant for
compensation, the Special Land Acquisition Officer rejected the claim.
The Land Acquisition Officer held that the applicant being lessee was not c
entitled to any compensation and compensation was payable only to the
land owners. This does amount to making of an award, commonly described
as "nil award". If the appellant was aggrieved by such an award, it was
open to him to seek reference under section 18 of the Act which the
appellant actually did. (1190-B, C] D
2. Notice under section 12(2) of the Act is a clear intimation of
making of the award requiring the owner or person interested to receive
the compensation awarded under section II of the Act. It is not necessary
that the notice should contain all the details of the award including the
consideration by the Land Acquisition Collector and its manner of E
determinations of the compensation. No particular from is prescribed by
the Act or the Rules. (1188-D)

3. A mere perusal of section 18 discloses thatthere are three situations
for which period of limitation has been provided for making an application F
' for reference. Firstly, ifthe person making, the application was present or
represented before the Collector all the time when he made his award, the
application must be filed within six weeks from the date of the Collector's
award. Second and third situations are envisaged by Section 18(2)(b). The
second situation envisaged is where a notice is received by the applicant
under Section 12 sub-section (2) of the Act. In such a case, the period of G
limitation prescribed is six weeks from the date of the receipt of the notice
or within six months from the date of the Collector's award whichever
period shall first expire. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the

.. •
appellant was not present when the award was made and, therefore, Section
18(2)(a) is not applicable to the facts of the case. (1187-F, G, H; 1188-Aj H
1184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. ~
....
A Since, the application under Section 18 was not filed within six weeks
of the receipt of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, the High Court did
not commit any error in holding that the application was barred by
limitation. Land Acquisition Officer making a reference, or the Court
considering a reference under Section 18 of the Act has no power of
B condonation of delay in making an application under the aforesaid Section.
[1190-E)

State of Punjab and Another v. Satinder Bir Singh, [1995) 3 SCC 330, ..
....
I

relied upon.

C· Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer
and Anr., AIR(l961) SC 1500, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 867 of 2003.

From the Judgment and order dated 30.10.2001 of the Bombay High
D
Court in F.A. No. 981 of 1996.

V.A. Mohta, Nilkanta Nayak, D.M. Nargolkar for the Appellant.
•,

.,
S.K. Dholakia and V.N. Ganpule, Atul Chitale, Ray Vikaram Nath,
E Ms. Suchitra, Atul Chitale, S.S. Shinde and Mukesh K. Giri for the
Respondents.

The Judgmen~ of the Court was delivered by

B.P. SINGH, J. : This appeal by special leave is directed against the
F judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated October "
30, 2001 in First Appeal No. 981 of 1996. By the aforesaid judgment the High
Court allowed the appeal preferred by the State of Maharashtra/respondent
No.I herein and held that the application filed by respondent No.I under
Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act for mak\ng a reference was barred
G by limitation. The sole question which, therefore, -arises for consideration in
the instant appeal is whether the said application filed by the appellant herein -
under Section I 8 of the Land Acquisition Act was barred by time.

H
The facts of the case in so far as they are relevant for the disposal of
this appeal are as follows:-
.. ;
-
MAHADEO BAJIRAO PATIL v. STATE [B.P. SINGH, J.] 1185

One Kulkarni held a lease executed on December 3, 1979 for a period A
of 20 years in respect of an area of I 42 Hectares 78 Acres from the State of
Maharashtra for mining Silica sand. The aforesaid lessee applied to the State
of Maharashtra on May 3, 1991 for transfer of the mining lease in favour of
the appellant herein. In the mean time, on October 8, 1991 a proposal was
submitted to the Collector of Sindhudurg by Respondent No.136, namely, B
Mis. Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. for acquisition of land for the purpose
of the said Corporation situated in village Achirne. Pursuant thereto land
measuring 13 Hectare 9 Acres were notified for acquisition by Notification
• issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act on February 13, 1992.
-c Subsequent thereto the Government by its Order dated February 20, 1992
allowed the application for transfer of mining lease in favour of the appellant C
herein. This included the lands notified for acquisition of village Achirne. The
agreement was thereafter executed by and between the aforesaid Kulkarni and
the appellant on May 15, 1992 and the lease-hold rights were transferred in
favour of the appellant.
D
On July 25, 1992 a declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued
in respect of the lands earlier notified on February 13, 1992.

Sometime in May 1994, the appellant filed a writ petition before the
High Court of Bombay being Writ Petition No. 1238 of 1994 for quashing
the acquisition proceeding as also the inquiry conducted under Sections 9 and E
l l of the Act. It was also prayed that respondent No. l 36 Mis. Konkan
Railway Corporation. Ltd. be restrained from taking any further action in the
matter. This writ petition was disposed of by order of June 7, 1994 which
directed the State of Maharashtra to comply with the requirements of Section
l 7(3)(a) of the Act within eight weeks and declare the award within eight F
weeks thereafter. The award ultimately came to be declared on August 29,
1994 which awarded compensation only to the land owners/ respondents 2
to 135 and not to the appellant who was a mere lessee and found not entitled
to grant of compensation. It is also not disputed that on September 18, 1994
a telegram was sent to the appellant herein by the Special Land Acquisition
Officer informing him of the declaration of the award which translated into G
English reads as follows:-

"This Office No. LQN/Konkan Railway Project/Sank-3-Achirne
463/9 l dated 3 I -8-94 be perused Mouje Achirne Taluka Vaibhavwadi
Award No.463/91 has been declared on 29-8-94". H
1186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A
,
"As per the discussion in this AwaTd first demand is rejected".

On receiving the telegram on September 20, 1994 the appellant
\
immediately applied to the Collector for pro·1iding him a copy of the award
filed in his office. Thereafter, on December 9, 1994, the appellant filed Writ
B Petition No.447of1995 before the Bombay High Court. In the Writ Petition,
he admitted the· fact that although an award had been. declared by the Special
Land Acquisition Officer it had not been officially served upon him. The
appellant annexed to this writ petition as Ex.Ban ordinary copy of the award
and challenged the validity of the award in as much as the appellant had not
been awarded any compensation. This writ petition was disposed of by the
· C High Court by its judgment and order of January 30, 1995 directing the
appellant to seek remedy under Section 18 of the Act with liberty to make
an appropriate application for condonation of delay. On February 20, 1995
an application under Section 18 of the Act was filed. The Joint Civil Judge
who heard the aforesaid Land Reference No.69of1995 allowed the reference
D application and awarded compensation of Rs.4 crores to the appellant with
interest@ 10% per annum from November 1, 1996 onwards. We may only
notice that in the aforesaid writ petition the land owners/ respondents 2 to 135
were added as party respondents while respondent No.136 intervened in the
writ petition making a grievance that in the land reference case- no order
should have been passed in the absence of respondent 136 i.e. M/s Konkan
E Railway Corporation. Ltd. si°'ce the acquisition was made at the instance of
the .aforesaid Corporation.

The State of Maharashtra challenged the judgment and order of the
Joint Civil Judge in First Appeal No.981 of 1996 before the Bombay High
F Court. It was contended, inter alia, that the application for reference made
under Section 18 was barred by limitation and there was no power in the Court
or the Land Acquisition Officer to condone the delay in filing an application
,under Section 18 of the Act. The High Court by its impugned judgment and
order has upheld the contention of the State of Maharashtra.

G From the facts noticed a~ove it cannot be disputed that an award had
been declared by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on August 29, 1994.
Intimation about the declaration of the award was sent to the appella1_1t by
telegram dated September 18, 1994 which was admittedly received by the
appellant on September 20, 1994. In the writ _petition filed on December 9,
H 1994 the appellant admitted knowledge of the fact that an award has been
MAHADEO BAJIRAO PATIL v. STATE [B.P. SINGH, J.] 1187

- \
declared but asserted that a copy of the award had not been officially served
upon the appellant. However, an ordinary copy of the award was annexed to
A

the writ petition as Ext-B. The application under Section 18 of the Act was
made by the appellant on February 20, 1995. Section 18 of the Act reads as
follows :-
B
"IS.Reference to Court (I) Any person interested who has not
accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector,
• require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the
determi%tion of the Court, whether his objection be to the
measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the
persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the c
compensation among the persons interested.

(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection
to the award is taken :
D
Provided that every such application shall be made-

(a) if the person making it was present or represented before
the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six
weeks from the date of the Collector's award.
E
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice
from the Collector under section 12, sub-section (2); or within
six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever
period shall first expire".
; F
A mere perusal of section 18 discloses that there are three situations
for which period of limitation has been provided for making an application
for reference. Firstly, if the person making the application was present or
represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, the
application must be filed within six weeks from the date of the Collector's G
award.

In the instant case, it is not disputed that the appellant was not present
when the award was made and, therefore, Section 18(2)(a) is not applicable
to the facts of this case.
H
1188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Second and third situations are envisaged by Section 18 (2) (b). The
second situation envisaged is where a notice is received by the applicant under
' 'I

Section 12 sub-section (2) of the Act. In such a case, the period of limitation
prescribed is six weeks from the date of the receipt of the notice or within
six months from the date of the Collector's award whichever period shall first
expire. In the instant case, the High Court has held the application to be barred
B by limitation, firstly, on the ground that the telegram sent to the appellant on
September 18, 1994 amounted to a notice under sub-section (2) of Section
12 of the Act, and secondly, on the ground that in any event as on December .,
9, 1994 the applicant had not only knowledge of the fact that an award had
been declared but had also a copy of the award which he annexed with writ
,..
c petition as Ext.B. If the date of knowledge is taken to be December 8, 1994,
even then the application under Section 18 was barred by limitation. The
correctness of these findings has been assailed before us.

It is by now well settled that notice under Section 12(2) of the Act is
a clear intimation of making of the award requiring the owner or person
D
interested to receive the compensation awarded under Section 11 of the Act.
It is not necessary that the notice should contain all the details of the award
including the consideration by the Land Acquisition Collector and its manner
of determination of the compensation. No particular form is prescribed by the
Act or the Rules.
E
In State of Punjab and Another v. Satinder Bir Singh, [1995] 3 SCC
330 this Court held :-

"The question then is whether the notice under Section 12(2) is a
valid notice. From a conjoint reading of Sections l'l and 12, it is clear
F
that notice is only an intimation of making of the award requiring
the owner or person interested to receive compensation awarded
under Section 11. On receipt of the notice, if the person interested
receives compensation without protest, obviously no reference need
be made. The determination of compensation becomes final and
G binds the parties. When he receives the compensation under protest
as contemplated under Section 31 of the Act, the need to make the
application for reference under Section 18(1) would arise. At that
juncture it will be open to the person interested either to make an
inspection of the award which was conclusive between him and the
Collector by operation of sub-section (I) of Section 12, or seek a #--.
H
- MAHADEO BAJIRAO PATIL v. STATE [B.P. SINGH, J.]

certified copy of the award from the Collector and the contents.
Thereon he could make necessary objection for the determination
l 189

A

inter alia, of compensation for the land. It is not necessary that the
notice should contain all the details of the award including his
consideration and its manner of determination of the compensation
as opined by the learned Judge of the High Court. It is not incumbent B
that the person interested should immediately make the reference
application on his receiving compensation under Section 31. In other
' words receipt of the amount and making the reference application
are not simultaneous. The statutory operation oflimitation mentioned
by Section I 8(2) does not depend on the ministerial act of
communication of notice in any particular form when the Act or C
Rules has not prescribed any form. The limitation begins to operate
from the moment the notice under Section 12(2) is received or as
envisaged by Section 18(2)".

It is not disputed that a telegram was sent to the appellant by the D
Special Land Acquisition Officer informing the appellant that the award had
• been declared on August 29, 1994 and further ,stating that the first demand
as discussed in the award was rejected. The counsel for the appellant sought
to contend before us that though this telegram intimated the factum of
declaration of the award necessary particulars were not disclosed therein. On
the other hand, counsel for respondent No. I and 136 contended that the E
telegram clearly mentions the fact that the demand of the appellant had been
rejected. The appellant sought to contend that the reference to "first demand"
in the telegram is to the request of the appellant made on September l 5, I 993
to change the alignment of the railway track so that the mining .area of which
the appellant was the lessee, was not disturbed. It was this demand that had F
been rejected. Such a plea does not appear to have been raised before the High
Court. The appellant has not placed before us a copy of the award declared
by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. The representation made by him on
September 15, 1993 to the Collector, Sindhudurg, of which copy had no cloubt
been endorsed to the Special Land Acquisition Officer, did not relate to any
claim of compensation payable in respect of the lands to be acquired. It was G
only a representation confined to the request made by the appellant to change
the railway alignment so that the mining area was not disturbed. He submitted
that the appellant later claimed compensation amounting to Rs.29 crores by
a demand made on May 26, 1994. We are not persuaded to accept this
contention. The Special Land Acquisition Officer while making an award was H
1190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
1
A certainly not concerned with the alteration of railway track alignment. He was
only concerned with the grant of compensation in accordance with law
relating to the lands forming subject matter of the declaration under Section
6 of the Act. The submission urged on behalf of the appellant before the High
Court that since no amount had been awarded to the appellant, the award
declared on August 29, 1994 was not an award under Section 11 of the Land
B
Acquisition Act, must also be rejected. It is not disputed before us and also
noticed by the High Court, that the Land Acquisition Officer held that the
appellant being a lessee was not entitled to any compensation and compensation
was payable only to the land owners, namely, respondents 2 to 135.

C We are here not concerned with the correctness of the decision, but the
fact remains that having considered the claim of the appellant for compensation,
the Special Land Acquisition Officer rejecfed the claim. This does amount to
the making of an award, commonly described as "nil award". If the appellant
was aggrieved by such an award, it was open to him to seek reference under
D Section 18 of the Act which the appellant actually did. We, therefore, cannot
hold that no award as envisaged by Section 11 of the Act was declared on
August 29, 1994, since the claim of the appellant was considered and was
totally rejected. There was, therefore, no question of giving any calculation
of the manner in which the compensation was computed. Since, the application
under Section 18 was not filed within six weeks of the receipt of notice under
E Section 12(2) of the Act, the High Court did not commit any error in holding
that the application was barred by limitation. It was not disputed before us
that the Land Acquisition Officer making a reference, or the Court considering
a reference under Section 18 of the Act has no power of condo nation of delay
in making an application under the aforesaid Section.
F
The next ground on which the High Court held the application to be
barred by limitation is that in any event the appellant had knowledge of the
award being made on December 8, 1994, since he filed a copy of the award
as annexure to the writ petition filed on December 9, 1994 and, therefore,
should have filed the application under Section 18 of the Act within six weeks.
G The submission urged on behalf of the appellant relying upon the decision
of this Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land
Acquisition Officer and Anr., AIR ( 1961) SC 1500 that in the instant case even
if it is assumed that the appellant had knowledge of the award at least on
December 8, 1994, he could make an application within six months from the
H date of such knowledge, would have deserved serious consideration, but for
MAHADEO BAJIRAO PATIL v. STATE [B.P. SINGH, J.] l l9 l
'
the finding recorded by us earlier that the appellant had notice under Section A
l 2(2) of the Act and, therefore, period oflimitation for filing the application
under Section l 8 was six weeks from the date of receipt of the notice and
not six months from the date of knowledge of the award.

In the view that we have taken, we find no merit in this appeal and B
the same is, accordingly, dismissed.

. ' K.G . Appeal dismissed.

'

;