Supreme Court of India
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND ORS.versusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR.
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 768
- Decided
- 11 November 2010
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA
Holding
The land was a private forest under the 1975 Act and its vesting in the State was lawful, proportionate and not irrational.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined whether a 53‑acre portion of Survey No. 345‑A in Dahisar was a "private forest" under the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 on the appointed day of 30 August 1975, and whether the State’s acquisition of that land was proportionate and lawful. The Court held that the land was indeed a forest on the appointed day, falling within the inclusive definition of "forest" in s.2(c‑i)(ii) and therefore a "private forest" under s.2(f). It further found that the State’s action complied with the statutory scheme, the notice under the Indian Forest Act was valid, and the acquisition was not irrational or disproportionate. Applying the doctrine of proportionality, the Court concluded that the State’s vesting of the land served public interest without violating administrative law principles. Consequently, both appeals were dismissed, confirming the land’s status as a private forest vested in the State.
Issues considered
- Whether the 53‑acre portion of Survey No. 345‑A was a "forest" and consequently a "private forest" under the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 on 30 August 1975.
- Whether the State’s acquisition and vesting of the land complied with the doctrine of proportionality and was not irrational or disproportionate.
- Interpretation of the terms "forest" and "private forest" in the Act, including the effect of the land’s prior classification and quarrying activities.
- Whether the notice issued under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 was valid and sufficient for vesting.
- Whether the State’s action violated principles of natural justice or the Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness.
Legislation cited
- Bombay Land Revenue Codes. 37
- Bombay Salsette Estate Abolition Act, 1951
- Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980
- Indian Forest Act, 1927s. 34-A, s. 35(3), s. 38
- Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975s. 21, s. 2(c-i)(ii), s. 2(f), s. 3, s. 5, s. 6-19
Subjects
private forestland acquisitionforest lawproportionalityadministrative lawenvironmental lawstatutory interpretationWednesbury principlesustainable development
Judgment
[201 OJ 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 37
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION A
AND ORS.
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 2147-48 of 2004)
NOVEMBER 11, 2010 8
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA AND
ANIL R. DAVE, JJ.]
Forests - Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, C
1975 - ss.2 (c-i), 2(f), 3, 4, 5, 6 to 19 and 21 - "Forest" and
"private forest" - Vesting in the State - State Government
attempted to acquire the land in question as a "private forest"
amidst the efforts of the Maharashtra Land Development
Corporation to continue its quarrying operations in the area D
- Dispute as to whether on the appointed day, i.e., 30.08.1975
under the Maharashtra Private (Acquisition) Forest Act, 1975
the appellant's land of 53 acres was a "private forest" or not -
Held: The provisions of the Act present no apparent conflict
with the overarching objective of vesting 'private forests' with E
the State in the Government's efforts to protect them - The
definition of a 'forest' as enunciated in s. 2 (c-i) (ii) is an
inclusive definition and therefore, it would not be appropriate
to give it a restrictive meaning - In light of the legislative
scheme of the Act, and its provisions, it is clear that the F
portion. of land, measuring 53 acres vested with the
respondent-State as a 'private forest' - That the area fell within
a part designated as 'forest' on the 30th of August, 1975 is
beyond dispute and is supported by the evidence on record
- Therefore, by virtue of s.2 (c-i) (ii), the portion in dispute will G
also be designated as a 'private forest' u/s. 2(f) - The
respondent-State was only acting in accordance with the
principles envisaged in the Act - This action cannot in any
way said to be disproportionate or irrational solely because
37 H
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A it divests the appellant-Corporation of the land - The
circumstances of this case, especially in so far as it relates
to the quarrying operations conducted by the appel/ant-
Corporation in the said area, merit that the State protects the
interests of the general public by acquiring the land as a
B private forest.
Interpretation of Statutes - Preamble to the Act - Held:
Is the guiding light to its interpretation.
Administrative Law - Principle of proportionality - Held:
c The Wednesbury principle of reasonableness has given way
to the doctrine of proportionality - Unless the impugned
administrative action is advantageous and in public interest
such an action cannot be upheld - Any administrative
authority while exercising a discretionary power will have to
D necessarily establish that its decision is balanced and in
proportion to the object of the power conferred - The test of
proportionality is concerned with the way in which the decision-
maker has ordered his priorities, i.e., the attribution of relative
importance to the factors in the case - Thus, it is not so much
E the correctness of the decision that is called into question, but
the method to reach the same.
Ecology/Environment - Preservation of the eco-system
is an immutable duty under the Constitution - A fine balance
must be struck between environmental protection and
F development.
The instant appeal was placed in the context of the
State Government's attempt to acquire the land in
question as a "private forest", amidst the efforts of the
G Maharashtra Land Development Corporation to continue ·
its quarrying operations in the area.
The question involved in the instant appeal was as
to whether on the appointed day, i.e., 30.08.1975 under
H
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF 39
MAHARASHTRA
the Maharashtra Private (Acquisition) Forest Act, 1975 the A
appellant's land of 53 acres was a "private forest" or not.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1. The instant case is one that must seek to
attain a fine balance between the process of development B
on the one hand, and the ecological imperative of
preserving the environment on the other. This Court has
for long been an outspoken critic of attempts to degrade
the environment, and a vocal supporter of sustainable
development. A developing country like ours cannot C
afford to ignore the growing needs of teeming millions,
but this development shall have to resonate with the
preservation of the environment. Preservation of the eco-
system is an immutable duty under the Constitution - a
/
fine balance must be struck between environmental D
protection and development. Many regions in India are
biodiversity 'hotspots', known to host a staggering
variety of flora and fauna. However, they are under the
constant threat of environmental degradation and rapid
depletion of natural resources, due to various factors, E
including the desire to earn quick money. Consequently,
a major challenge in this backdrop is to arrive at a
successful model of sustainable development - one that
aims to preserve the rich ecosystem, while addressing
the economic needs of the people in the region. [Paras F
27 and 28) [56-F-H; 57-A-D]
T. V. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India (1997)
2 SCC 267 and G/anrock Estates v. State of Tamil Nadu
[Decision of Supreme Court in Writ Petition (Civil) Nos.
242 of 1988 and 408 of 2003) - referred to. G
2.1. The issue of whether the land in question was a
'forest' on the appointed day, has to
~ . be seen in the
context of whether the entire land that encompassed the
H
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A disputed area was a 'forest' on the said date. In this
regard the legislative scheme of the Act is required to be
seen. [Para 36] [63-C-D]
2.2. The definition of a 'forest' as enunciated in
8 Section 2 (c-i) (ii) of the Maharashtra Private Forest
(Acquisition) Act, 1975 specifically includes "land which is
part of a forest or lies within it or was part of a forest or was
lying within a forest on the 30th day of August, 1975". It is
already established that subsequent to proceedings
C initiated under the Bombay Salsette Estate Abolition Act,
1951, the entire land bearing Survey No. 345-A was held
to be a "forest" vide an order dated 24th December, 1964.
A bare reading of the provision also indicates that the
definition of 'forest' is an inclusive definition and
therefore, it could have a wider connotation and it would
D not be appropriate to give it a restrictive meaning. Every
word and phrase of the Act is to be understood in its
context and must be given significance so that they are
not rendered redundant. The appellant has steadfastly
maintained that the interpretation of the provisions
E cannot mean land which was a forest in the past (i.e.
before 30th August, 1975) to be a 'forest' according to the
Act. This argument might have had some force had the
time period in question related to many decades or even
a century before. The aforementioned proceedings were
F concluded in proximity to the appointed day in question,
and the character of land cannot be said to have changed
over such a relatively short period of time. It is beyond
doubt that the land which encompassed the said portion
of 53 acres belonging to the appellant-Corporation was
G a 'forest' on the appointed day. [Para 34] [61-G-H; 62-A-
E]
2.3. The appellant submitted that although the word
'Forest' was added in the Record of Right after such
H
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF 41
MAHARASHTRA
proceedings, it was later dropped when the matter went A
up in appeal to the Commissioner. Even if this were to
be considered, it is to be noted that the preponderance
of evidence seems to indicate the land in Survey No. 345
was considered as 'forest'. This is amply supported by
documentary evidence, including the mortgage deed of B
1900, and the revenue records of the past 50 years.
Moreover, the conveyance deed dated 29.3.1975 which
was executed by the Court Receiver to the appellant,
·clearly describes the land as "piece or parcel of forest
land with structures". This is further buttressed by the c
mutation entries till 1969-70 which described the land as
a forest. Even the mutation entries from 1970-71, have
only changed the recording to 'huts, quarry and grass'
which does not in any way dispute the nature of the land.
That apart in the enquiry conducted under sub-Section(2) D
of Section 37 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, it was
admitted by the Company through whom the appellant
had derived title that the land was forest land. Therefore,
there is overwhelming documentary evidence and also
contemporaneous evidence on record to prove and E
establish that the land, in question, even in recent times
was considered as forest land and also retained its
character as such. [Para 35] [62-F-H; 63-A-C]
2.4. The Preamble to the Act, which is the guiding
light to its interpretation, also expresses similar concerns F
as to the depletion of forest cover in the State. In this
light, it is important to construe the provisions of the Act
in tune with the purpose of its enactment. Such a rule of
interpretation has been supported by the decisions of this
Court in a catena of cases. [Para 37] [64-8-C] G
2.5. The purpose of the statute and the intention of
the legislature in enacting the same must be of
paramount consideration while interpreting its
provisions. In this instance, moreover, the provisions of H
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A the Act present no apparent conflict with the overarching
objective of vesting 'private forests' with the State in the
Government's efforts to protect them. Further, it is
important to note that the said area was being used for
qu~rrying operations by the appellant-Corporation. That
B the said portion in the area of Survey 345-A measuring
209 acres is claimed to be rocky and devoid of growth
certainly does not change the character of the forest land.
It cannot be disputed that within forest areas, there exists
water bodies swamp land, grass land etc. The very
c existence of such land within the forest area would and
could not change the nature and character of the forest
land and the same would still continue to be treated as
forest land. In many instances across the country, mining
and quarrying operations, while regulated, do take place
in forest land, and they can very well be considered as
D
forest produce. However, the harmful effects of the
ecological imbalance that may result as a consequence
of quarrying operations in a forest zone is also to be
considered. [Para 38) [65-F-H; 66-A-B]
E 2.6. In light of the legislative scheme of the Act, and
its provisions, it is clear that the said portion of the land,
measuring 53 acres will vest with the respondent-State
as a 'private forest'. That the area fell within a part
designated as 'forest' on the 30th of August, 1975 is
F beyond dispute and is supported by the evidence on
record. Therefore, by virtue of Section 2 (c-i) (ii) of the Act,
the portion in dispute will also be designated as a 'private
forest' under Section 2(f) of the Act, and the authorities
are directed to maintain it as such. [Para 39) [66-C-D]
G
Union of India v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. (2008) 7
SCC 502; Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General
Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and Ors. (1987) 1 SCC 424;
Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. L. V. A. Dixitulu
and Others (1979) 2 SCC 34 - referred to.
H
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF 43
MAHARASHTRA
3.1. The appellant-Corporation further alleged that the A
State's decision to consider the disputed land as
automatically vested with the Government was irrational
and disproportionate. However, the common yardstick to
determine whether the act on the part of the Government
violates established principles of administrative law has B
been the Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness,
employed both by English and Indian Courts. The
Wednesbury principle of reasonableness has given way
to the doctrine of proportionality. [Paras 41, 42 and 43]
[67-B-E; 68-B] C
3.2. The principle of proportionality envisages that a
public authority ought to maintain a sense of proportion
between particular goals and the means employed to
achieve those goals, so that administrative action
impinges on the individual rights to the minimum extent D
to preserve public interest. Thus implying that
administrative action ought to bear a reasonable
relationship to the general purpose for which the power
has been conferred. The principle of proportionality
therefore implies that the Court has to necessarily go into E
the advantages and disadvantages of any administrative
action called into question. Unless the impugned
administrative action is advantageous and in public
interest such an action cannot be upheld. At the core of
this principle is the scrutiny of the administrative action F
to examine whether the power conferred is exercised in
proportion to the purpose for which it has been
conferred. Thus, any administrative authority while
exercising a discretionary power will have to necessarily
establish that its decision is balanced and in proportion G
to the object of the power conferred. This principle has
found favour in recent times with this Court, and a
number of decisions reflect the shift towards the doctrine
of proportionality. [Paras 44 and 45] [68-F-H; 69-A-B]
H
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R
A 3.3. The test of proportionality is concerned with the
way in which the decision-maker has ordered his
priorities, i.e., the attribution of relative importance to the
factors in the case. Thus, it is not so much the
correctness of the decision that is called into question,
B but the method to reach the same. [Para 50] [70-D-E]
3.4. In the instant case, it is seen that the decision of
the Government has been guided by the provisions in the
Act, which seek to conserve and protect private forests
in the State of Maharashtra that have been facing severe
C depletion and exploitation. Therefore, the Act, which
provides for the vesting of private forests with the
Government, does so in the general interests of the
public in tune with principles of environmental protection
and sustainable development. The respondent-State was
D only acting in accordance with the principles envisaged
in the Act. This action cannot in any way be said to be
disproportionate or irrational solely because it divests the
appellant-Corporation of the land within Survey 345-A.
The circumstances of this case, especially in so far as it
E relates to the quarrying operations conducted by the
appellant-Corporation in the said area, merit that the State
protects the interests of the general public by acquiring
the land as a private forest. [Para 51] [70-F-H; 71-A]
F Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1983) 2 SCC
442; Ex-Naik Sardar Singh v. Union of India and Ors. (1991)
3 SCC 213; Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v.
Employees Assn. (2007) 4 SCC 669; Charanjit Lamba v.
Commanding Officer, Southern Command and Ors. AIR 2010
G SC 2462 - referred to.
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v.
Wednesbury Corporation (1947) 2 All ER 680; Council of
Civil Services Unions v. Minister for the Civil Services [1985]
AC 374 - referred to.
H
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF 45
MAHARASHTRA
Case Law Reference: A
(1997) 2 sec 267 referred to Paras 23, 25
(2008) 1 sec 502 referred to Para 37
(1987) 1 sec 424 referred to Para 37 B
(1979) 2 sec 34 referred to Para 37
(1947) 2 All ER 680 referred to Para 42
(1985] AC 374 referred to Para 43 c
(1983) 2 sec 442 referred to Para 46
(1991) 3 sec 213 referred to Para 47
(2001) 4 sec 669 referred to Para 48 D
AIR 2010 SC 2462 referred to Para 49
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
2147-2148 of 2004.
E
From the Judgment & Order dated 8.10.2003 of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 1052 of
1998.
P.P. Rao, Jay Savla, M.P. Savla, Meenakshi Ogra, Shilpi F
Choudhary, M. Qamaruddin, Ambar Qamaruddin, M.
Qamaruddin, Apeksha Sharan, Purshotam S.T. Utsav, Sidhu,
Fitza Moonis for the Appellant.
Shekhar Naphade, Madhavi Diwan, Sanjay Kharde and
Asha Gopalan Nair for the Respondents. G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J. 1. Since the issues
H
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A raised and argued in these matters are inter-connected, we
propose to dispose both of them by this Order. Civil Appeal
No. 2147 is filed by the Maharashtra Land Development
Corporation against the State of Maharashtra seeking to
challenge the judgment and order of the Bombay High Court
B dated October 8, 2003 in Writ Petition No. 1052 of 1998. Civil
Appeal No. 2148 is filed by K.N. Shaikh against the State of
Maharashtra seeking to challenge the judgment and order of
the Bombay High Court dated October 8, 2003 in Writ Petition
No. 1383 of 2002.
c 2. At the first stage we will deal with Civil Appeal No. 2147,
and after pronouncing the judgment herein we shall deal with
Civil Appeal No. 2148.
Civil Appeal No. 2147 of 2004
D
3. By the judgment in Writ Petition No. 1052 of 1998, the
High Court reversed the order and concurrent findings recorded
by the Sub-Divisional Officer on 23rd April, 1985 and the
Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on 21st February, 1998 wherein
E it was held that the land in question is neither "forest" nor
"private forest" as referred to in the Maharashtra Private Forests
(Acquisition) Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").
4. The gamut of events that led to the passing of the
impugned judgment and order of the High Court may be
F elaborated here. The land in question was part of an original
Survey No. 345 in village Dahisar, Maharashtra, measuring
about 650 acres. At all relevant times, it was shown as "forest
land" in the Revenue records. In or about 1947, out of 650
acres, around 365 acres was acquired for the purpose of
G creating a National Park at Borivli. Original Survey No. 345 was
subsequently divided into three survey numbers, being Survey
Nos. 345-A, 345-B and 345-C. The land which was acquired
was Survey No. 345-B. From the remaining land, land
admeasuring about 75 acres was given Survey No. 345-C and
H
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF 47
MAHARASHTRA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
the land in question admeasuring about 209 acres was given A
Survey No. 345-A.
5. It is the case of the State of Maharashtra that village
Dahisar was Ex-Khot village. The whole land of Survey No. 345
of village Dahisar was originally owned by ex-khot of the area B
by name Haji Ali Kasam Agboatwala, who expired in the year
1945. Administration Suit No. 3415 of 1957 was filed in the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay and the Court Receiver,
High Court of Bombay was appointed as the Court Receiver
for administration and management of the estate belonging to
Agboatwala. In 1962, in pursuance of an order passed by the C
High Court, the suit land was sold which was purchased by one
M/s. Veekaylal Investment Company ("Company" for short) from
the Court Receiver. According to the case of the State, even
at that juncture the suit land was "forest land". In 1963-64,
proceedings were initiated under the Bombay Salsette Estate D
Abolition Act, 1951, and vide an order dated 24th December,
1964, the entire land bearing Survey No. 345-A was held
"forest" and vested in the State under Section 4 of the said Act.
6. On 27th August, 1975, a notice was issued by the State E
Government to the Company under sub-Section (3) of Section
35 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 calling upon the Company,
the owner of the land, to show cause as to why notification
under sub-Section (1) of Section 35 of the Act should not be
issued for regulating and/or prohibiting the non-forest activities F
on the land. The said notice was issued in respect of total area
of land bearing Survey No. 345-A admeasuring 209 acres.
7. On 30th August, 1975, the Maharashtra Private Forests
(Acquisition) Act, 1975 came into force under which allegedly
land bearing Survey No. 345-A stood acquired and vested in G
the State Government on the appointed day i.e. August 30,
1975. Accordingly, on October 8, 1975, the Sub-Divisional
Officer, Bombay Sub-urban District, in exercise of power under
Section 5 of the Act, issued notice to the company to hand over
possession of the entire land of Survey No. 345-A admeasuring H
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A 209 acres. The company filed a reply to the said notice
contending that the land bearing Survey No. 345-A was not
"forest", much less a "private forest". The company also called
upon the Collector to hear and decide the question as to
whether or not the land was "forest" or "private forest" and
B whether it vested in the State Government under the Act. An
inquiry was conducted under Section 6 of the Act by the Sub-
Divisional Officer, Bombay Suburban District, wherein notices
were issued to the company, being the owner of the land as
well as to the Court Receiver. Subsequently, by an order dated
C 12th November, 1975, the Sub-Divisional Officer held the land
to be "private forest" and also held that the land stood acquired
and vested in the State of Maharashtra. The company was,
therefore, called upon to hand over possession of the land
within 10 days to the Collector of Bombay.
D 8. The company challenged the said order passed by the
Sub-Divisional Officer by filling an appeal before the
Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and the Maharashtra Revenue
Tribunal vide its order dated 20th March, 1976 dismissed the
appeal, upholding and confirming the order passed by Sub-
E Divisional Officer and observing that the land in question was
"forest" within the meaning of Section 2(c-i) of the Act of 1975.
It was also held to be "private forest" falling under Section 2(f)
of the Act and as such, stood acquired and vested in the State
of Maharashtra. The said order was never challenged in further
F proceedings by the company and became final, conclusive and
binding on the parties.
9. It may be stated that when the question of handing over
actual and physical possession of land bearing Survey No. 345-
A came up, it was revealed that out of 209 acres of land of
G Survey No. 345-A, land admeasuring about 53 acres was in
possession of the Maharashtra Land Development Corporation
(the appellant herein), and 50 acres was in possession of K.N.
Shaikh (appellant in Civil Appeal No. 2148 of 2004). The
Company, in the circumstances, handed over to the
H
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF 49
MAHARASHTRA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
Respondent-State, possession of land ad measuring about 106 A
acres of land out of 209 acres of Survey No. 345-A.
10. The appellant-Corporation herein objected to handing
over possession of the land which was with it. It filed
Miscellaneous Petition No. 512 of 1976 in the Bombay High
B
Court challenging the notice issued by Sub-Divisional Officer.
It also challenged an order dated November 12, 1975 passed
by Sub-Divisional Officer, holding the land to be "forest" as also
judgment and order dated March 20, 1976 passed by Revenue
Tribunal confirming the order passed by Sub-Divisional Officer. C
The orders were not challenged by the aggrieved party and they
had become final. The appellant-Corporation herein challenged
the above decisions, contending that they were inter a/ia in
violation of principles of natural justice. The said Miscellaneous
Petition No. 512 of 1976, however, came to be settled on the
basis of consent terms arrived at between the parties on 19th D
April, 1984. The consent terms, inter alia, provided that fresh
inquiry will be conducted under Section 6 of the Act regarding
vesting of the property admeasuring 53 acres in possession
of the appellant-Corporation. It was also ordered that in case
the authority comes to the conclusion that the land in E
possession of appellant-Corporation is a "forest" and "private
forest" and that it stood acquired and vested in the Government
of Maharashtra, the appellant-Corporation would hand over
possession of the land to the Sub-Divisional Officer.
F
11. In pursuance of the consent terms arrived at between
the parties, the Sub-Divisional Officer conducted fresh inquiry
under Section 6 of the Act, after issuing necessary notice to
the appellant-Corporation herein. After hearing the appellant-
Corporation, the Sub-Divisional Officer, by an order dated 23rd
G
April, 1985, held that land admeasuring 53 acres out of Survey
No. 345-A in possession of the appellant-Corporation was
neither a forest nor "private forest" and as such did not stand
acquired and vested in the Government of Maharashtra in
accordance with the provisions of the Act.
H
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A 12. The Respondent State challenged the said order
passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer by filing an appeal before
the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Maharashtra Revenue
Tribunal, vide its judgment and order dated 29th September,
1986, allowed the appeal, set aside the order passed by the
B Sub-Divisional Officer and declared that the land admeasuring
53 acres in possession of respondent No. 1 as 'forest" and
"private forest" as defined in the Act. The Tribunal also held that
in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the land stood
acquired and vested in the State of Maharashtra.
c 13. Aggrieved with the order passed by Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal dated 29th September, 1986, the appellant-
Corporation filed Writ Petition No. 4726of1986 in the Bombay
High Court. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court vide
its judgment and order dated 13/17th March, 1992 confirmed
D the order passed by Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, holding
that the land in possession of respondent No. 1 was "forest"
and "private forest", and as such, stood acquired and vested
in the State of Maharashtra.
E 14. The appellant-Corporation challenged the order
passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and confirmed
by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court by carrying the
matter to this Court. This Court, by an order dated 27th August,
1992, allowed the appeal, set aside the order passed by this
F Court as well as by Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and
remanded the matter to the Tribunal, directing it to dispose of
the appeal afresh by affording to both the parties an opportunity
of adducing additional evidence.
15. After remand, the matter was placed before the
G Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. It was re-heard and vide its
judgment and order dated 4th December, 1992, the Tribunal
held that the entire land bearing Survey No. 345-A admeasuring
209 acres was neither "forest" nor "private forest" and did not
stand acquired and vested in the State of Maharashtra.
H
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF 51
MAHARASHTRA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
16. The Department of Forest, being aggrieved by the A
above decision of Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, filed Writ
Petition No. 2023 of 1994 in the Bombay High Court and the
High Court vide its judgment and order dated 11 /15/16/17th
April, 1996 allowed the petition and quashed and set aside the
order passed by Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal concluding that B
the entire land bearing Survey No. 345-A, admeasuring 209
acres was "forest" and "private forest" which stood vested in
the Government of Maharashtra under the provisions of the Act
of 1975.
17. The judgment and order of the Bombay High Court C
was again challenged by the appellant-Corporation,
approaching this Court by way of Special Leave Petition No.
14259 of 1996 and this Court vide its order dated 24th
September, 1996, again set aside the order of the High Court
and remanded the matter to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal D
by granting liberty to the parties to lead further evidence before
the Tribunal and by directing the Tribunal to reach a decision
having regard to the material on record as also which might
be brought on record by the parties.
E
18. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, in pursuance of
the direction issued by the Apex Court, considered the question
in the light of the rival contentions and the evidence before it
and by an order dated 21st February, 1998, and once again
held that the land in question cannot be treated as "forest" or
F
"private forest" under the Act of 1975, and hence no action
could be taken under the said Act. The appeal filed by the
Respondents came to be dismissed. It is that order passed
by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on 21st February, 1998
which was challenged by the respondent in Writ Petition No. G
1052 of 1998 before the Bombay High Court.
19. The Bombay High Court, however, allowed the petition
(Writ Petition No. 1052 of 1998] and decided in favour of the
State of Maharashtra, Respondent herein. In deciding the
matter, the Bombay High Court held: H·
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A "81. The Tribunal then stated:
"In this view of the admitted position, we cannot altogether
refrain ourselves from finding some substance in the
submission of respondent No. 1 to the effect that in the
absence of any fresh evidence from the appellant, there
B
is no fresh material to disturb the finding of the Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal as given in its last judgment of 4th
December, 1992."
With respect, the above approach of the Maharashtra
c Revenue Tribunal is not in consonance with law and
cannot be approved. It is not open to the Tribunal to
proceed on the basis that since "there is no fresh material
to disturb the finding" of the MRT as given in its judgment
dated 4th December, 1992, the said finding called for no
D interference. Once a petition was filed against the said
judgment in the High Court and the High Court set aside
that judgment and the Supreme Court allowed the appeal
directing the Tribunal to consider and decide the matter
afresh, in the eye of law, it cannot be said that there were
E "findings" by the Tribunal in its earlier judgment and in
absence of "fresh evidence'', those findings need not be
disturbed. To us, therefore, it is clear that this is a
jurisdictional error committed by the Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal and the order is indeed vulnerable.
F ... 104. On various grounds discussed by us in earlier part
of the judgment, the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal has
committed an error of law apparent on the face of the
record by holding that the land bearing Survey No. 345-A
of village Dahisar was neither "forest" nor "private forest"
G and by taking such view, it exceeded jurisdiction and
hence, the said decision deserves to be quashed by this
Court by exercising powers under Articles 226 and 227 of
the Constitution and accordingly, the said decision is
quashed and set aside.
H
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF 53
MAHARASHTRA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
105. For the aforesaid reasons, in our opinion, the petition A
(Writ Petition No. 1052 of 1998) deserves to be allowed
and is accordingly allowed. The order passed by the
Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on 21st February, 1998 in
Appeal No. Forest-3 of 1997 is quashed and set aside
and the land bearing Survey No. 345-A situate at Dahisar B
is held to be "private forest" under the provisions of the
Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 and
deemed to have vested in the State Government. Rule is
accordingly made absolute. In the facts and circumstances,
however, there shall be no order to costs." c
Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, the appellant-
Corporation has approached this Court by way of appeal.
20. In this appeal, we heard the learned counsel appearing
for both parties. Mr. Ashok Desai, Senior Advocate and Mr. Jay D
Savla, appearing on behalf of the appellant-Corporation,
submitted that the findings of the Sub-Divisional Officer in
concluding that the appellant-Corporation's land was not a
'private forest' on the appointed day, i.e. 30.08.1975, would be
final, subject to the decision of the Tribunal. Such a conclusion, E
according to the counsel for the appellant-Corporation,
stemmed from the language of Section 6 of the Act. Emphasis
was also placed by the counsel on the fact that the Sub-
Divisional Officer, while deciding the matters, considered the
fact that the land was dropped from acquisition in earlier land F
acquisition proceedings and it was not found suitable for the
development of a National Park.
21. According to the counsel for the appellant-Corporation,
the Indian Forest Act, 1927 clearly differentiates between
"Government Forest" and "Privately Owned Forest". While it was G
admitted that the Government can regulate or prohibit certain
activities in such land, ownership would continue to vest with
the private party. It was the counsel's submission that there is
therefore, no automatic vesting of a privately owned forest, i.e.
"private forest'" with the Government. Learned counsel also took H
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A us through the reasons behind the decision of Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal to buttress his arguments. Adjudication as to
the nature of land whether it is "forest" or "private forest",
according to Counsel for the appellant-Corporation, had to be
done in accordance with the provisions of 1975 Act.
B
22. It was submitted that the respondent-State had two
opportunities in separate rounds of litigation to produce
evidence, documentary or otherwise, and despite such
opportunities, no evidence was adduced. Counsel for the
C appellant-Corporation stated that twice the matter had reached
upto the highest Court of the country and that on both the
occasions, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the
appellant-Corporation, remanded the matter to the Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal and granted liberty to the parties to adduce
additional evidence. It was the contention that additional
D evidence had not been led by the respondent herein but further
materials had been produced on record by the first respondent
and that if on the basis of such materials, the Tribunal had
decided the matter in favour of the appellant-Corporation,
counsel contended, the State [respondent herein] had no right
E to make grievance against such order.
23. As regards the Bombay High Court's reliance on the
decision of this Court in T. V. Godavarman Thirumulpad
v. Union of India, reported at (1997) 2 sec 267, it was pleaded
F by the counsel for the appellant-Corporation that "forest land"
as considered by this Court in the light of the Forest
Conservation Act, 1980, must be understood according to its
literal, dictionary meaning, and must not be understood to
include any area recorded as forest in the Government records
G irrespective of ownership. Moreover, it was also contended that
the provisions of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 do not deal
with the acquisition or vesting of 'privately owned land' or 'forest'
as the case may be. Lastly, it was also contended by the
counsel for the appellant-Corporation that the notice purportedly
H issued under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF 55
MAHARASHTRA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
declaring the land to be a 'private forest' was never produced A
in previous stages of litigation, and no opportunity to dispute
the particulars of the notice was ever provided to the appellant-
Corporation.
24. On behalf of the respondent-State, it was submitted B
that in the proceedings initiated under Section 37 of the
Bombay Land Revenue Code, and in the enquiry held in
respect of the applicability of the Bombay Salsette Estate
Abolition Act, 1951, it was found that the land in Survey No. 345
is a forest land. Before the Mamlatdar, evidence was adduced C
by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant-Corporation, M/
s. Veekaylal Investment Company, to the effect that Survey No.
345 was a 'jungle'. It was contended by the learned counsel
appearing for the respondent-State that the Company at the
time took the stand that the land in question is a jungle, and
not a waste land, with a view to prevent its vesting in the State D
Government under Section 4 of the Bombay Salsette Estate
Abolition Act, 1951. It was urged before this Court that the
appellant-Corporation, now as the successor-in-interest of M/
s. Veekaylal Investment Company is adopting a diametrical
opposite stand that the said land is not a forest land and hence E
is not permissible.
25. Counsel for the Respondent-State also contended that
Survey No. 345-A in its entirety is part of Sanjay Gandhi
National Park Division. In view of the interim orders passed by F
the Bombay High Court from time to time, and in particular, of
the orders dated 7th May 1997 and 17th July 1999 which
applied to the said land, according to counsel for the State
Government, the land over which the State Government claimed
ownership was "forest" and "private forest" and vested in the G
State Government. It was also submitted that irrelevant and
extraneous factors have been kept in mind by the Tribunal for
coming to the conclusion that the land was not forest/private
forest. Counsel contended that the Maharashtra Revenue
Tribunal did not take into account and consider in their proper H
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
perspective, the relevant provisions of the Indian Forest Act,
A 1927, Maharashtra Private Forest (Acquisition) Act, 1975 as
well as other Acts and various decisions of the Supreme Court,
including T. V. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India,
reported at (1997) 2 sec 267.
B 26. It was also the submission of the respondent-State that
the provisions of the Maharashtra Private Forest (Acquisition)
Act, 1975 must be given an expansive interpretation in view of
the fact that the Act was introduced to ameliorate grave
concerns over the fact that private forests in Maharashtra had
C been severely depleted due to unregulated, unrestricted and
excessive exploitation. A bare reading of the Act, it was
contended, would make it clear that the definition of "forest"
under Section 2 (c-i) (ii) includes land which was part of a forest
in addition to land which is presently part of one, and even for
lands which could be treated as forests in the future. Moreover,
D the State submitted, the definition of 'private forests' in Section
2 (f) of the Act is not only confined to any 'forest' which is not
the property of the Government, but also includes, inter alia ,any
'land' in respect of which a notice has been issued under
Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act. As long as it was
E established that the land was subject to such a notice, the
learned counsel contended, it was enough to vest the land in
the State Government without any enquiry.
27. This case is placed in the context of the State
F Government's attempt to acquire the land in question as a
"private forest", amidst the efforts of the Maharashtra Land
Development Corporation to continue its quarrying operations
in the area. Therefore, this case is one that must seek to attain
a fine balance between the process of development on the one
G hand, and the ecological imperative of preserving the
environment on the other. This Court has for long been an
outspoken critic of attempts to degrade the environment, and
a vocal supporter of sustainable development.
28. Since Independence, India has travelled a long way on
H
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF 57
MAHARASHTRA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
the path of progress and industrialization to achieve a better A
quality of life. A developing country like ours cannot afford to
ignore the growing needs of teeming millions, but this
development shall have to resonate with the preservation of the
environment. Mahatma Gandhi once said that earth provides
enough to satisfy every man's need but not every man's greed. B
It is the greed of the mankind which has brought environment
degradation and pollution. Preservation of the eco-system is
an immutable duty under the Constitution - a fine balance must
be struck between environmental protection and development.
Many regions in India are biodiversity 'hotspots', known to hostc
a staggering variety of flora and fauna. However, they are under
the constant threat of environmental degradation and rapid
depletion of natural resources, due to various factors, including
the desire to earn quick money. Consequently, a major
challenge in this backdrop is to arrive at a successful model of D
sustainable development - one that aims to preserve the rich
ecosystem, while addressing the economic needs of the people
in the region.
29. In as recently as September 2010, this Court has
observed in Glanrock Estates v. State of Tamil Nadu [Writ E
Petition (Civil) Nos. 242 of 1988 and 408 of 2003] that :
"8. [ .... ] [F]orests in India [are] an important part of the
environment. They constitute [a] national asset. In various
judgments of this Court delivere.d by the Forest Bench of F
this Court in the case of T.N. Godavarman v. Union of
India (Writ Petition No. 202of1995), it has been held that
"inter-generational equity" is part of Article 21 of the
Constitution. What is inter-generational equity? The present
generation is answerable to the next generation by giving G
to the next generation a good environment. We are
answerable to the next generation and if deforestation
takes place rampantly then inter-generational equity would
stand violated. The doctrine of sustainable
development also forms part of Article 21 of the H
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A Constitution. The "precautionary principle" and the "polluter
pays principle" flow from the core value in Article 21. The
important point to be noted is that in this case we are
concerned with vesting of forests in the State. When we
talk about inter-generational equity and sustainable
B development, we are elevating an ordinary principle of
equality to the level of over- arching principle."
30. However, it is pertinent to note here that the primary
issue involved in this case is as to whether on the appointed
day, i.e., 30.08.1975 under the Maharashtra Private
C (Acquisition) Forest Act, 1975 the Appellant's land of 53 acres
was a "private forest" or not. In this regard, we have perused
the relevant sections of the Act, and the same may be produced
herein. The Preamble of the Act reads thus:
D "An Act to acquire private forests in the State and to
provide for certain other matters.
WHEREAS the forest land in the State is inadequate:
And WHEREAS the private forest in the State is generally
E in highly degraded and over-exploited state and is
adversely affecting agriculture and agricultural population;
AND WHEREAS it is, therefore, expedient to acquire
private forests in the State of Maharashtra generally for
F conserving their material resources and protecting them
from destruction or over-exploitation by their owners and
for promoting systematic and scientific development and
management of such forests for the purpose of attaining
and maintaining ecological balance in the public interest
G [... ]
AND WHEREAS it is also expedient to provide that in the
case of owners of private forests (other than those whose
lands were used for extracting minor minerals such as
quarries) whose total holdings of lands became less than
H twelve hectares on the appointed day on account of
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN .. v. STATE OF 59
MAHARASHTRA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
acquisition of their forest lands under this Act, or whose A
total holdings of lands was already less than twelve
hectares on the day immediately preceding the appointed
day, the whole or the appropriate portion of their forest
lands so acquired shall be restored to, and revested in,
them, so that their total holdings of lands may be twelve B
hectares or else, as the case may be, and they may be
able to continue to earn their livelihood from such lands;
and to provide for certain other purposes hereinafter
appearing."
The State Act defines "forest" in section 2(c-i) thus:
c
"Forest" means a tract of land covered with trees (whether
standing, felled, found or otherwise), shrubs, bushes, or
woody vegetation, whether of natural growth or planted by
human agency and existing or being maintained with or D
without human effort, or such tract of land on which such
growth is likely to have an effect on the supply of timber,
fuel, forest produce, or grazing facilities, or on climate,
stream flow, protection of land from erosion, or other such
matters and includes- E
(i) land covered with stumps of trees of forest:
(ii) land which is part of a forest or lies within it or was part
of a forest or was lying within a forest on the 30th day of
August, 1975: F
(iii) such pasture land, water-lodged or cultivable or non-
cultivable land, lying within or linked to a forest, as may be
declared to be forest by the State Government:
(iv) forest land held to let for purpose of agriculture or for G
any purposes ancillary thereto:
(v) all the forest produce therein, whether standing, felled,
found or otherwise;"
H
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A It also defines "private forest" in Clause (f) of section 2
which reads as under:-
"Private forest" means any forest which is not the property
of Government and includes;
B (i) any land declared before the appointed day to be a
forest under section 34-A of the Forest Act;
(ii) any forest in respect of which any notification issued
under sub-section (1) of section 35 of the Forest Act, is in
c force immediately before the appointed day;
(iii) any iand in respect of which a notice has been issued
under sub-section (3) of section 35 of the Forest Act, but
exciuding an area not exceeding two hectares in extent as
the Collector may specify in this behalf;
D
(iv) land in respect of which a notification has been issued
under section 38 of the Forest Act;
(v) in a case where the State Government and any other
E person are jointly interested in the forest, the interest of
such person in such forest;
(vi) sites of dwelling houses constructed in such forest
which are considered to be necessary for the convenient
enjoyment or use of the forest and lands appurtenant
F thereto."
31. Section 3 of the Act mandates that all private forests
will vest in the State Government. Section 4 enumerates steps
to be taken by the Government on acquisition of private forests.
G Section 5 enables the State Government to take over
possession of private forests. Sections 6 to 19 deal with
settlement of disputes, determination of amount to be paid to
the owners of private forests, deduction of amount of
encumbrances and extinguishment of rights of other persons,
H appeals, revisions etc. Section 21 empowers the State
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF 61
MAHARASHTRA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
Government to declare certain lands as private forests. It also A
provides that on publication of the notification by the State
Government regarding declaration of any land as private
forests, certain consequences would ensue.
32. In the context of this legislative scheme, the primary
8
argument of the appellant-Corporation has been that the State's
contention to give an expansive interpretation to the term 'forest'
as defined in Clause (c-i) of section 2 of the Act is erroneous.
The State has submitted that 'forest' would include even land
which was a forest in past irrespective of whether on the C
appointed day, i.e, 30.8.1975, the same was not a forest.
According to the appellant, accepting such an interpretation
would tantamount to land which was a forest even 50 or 100
years ago, to stand vested and acquired on the appointed day,
resulting in an absurdity. To buttress this argument, it has been
the endeavour of the appellant to prove that the said portion of D
the land was not a forest on the appointed day.
33. The appellant-Corporation has pointed out to us the
conclusions reached by both the Authorities in their orders
dated 23.4.1985 and 21.2.1998. These orders relied on the fact E
that the portion of the said land was under quarrying operations,
and that it was too rocky and devoid of tree growth. Moreover,
land acquisition proceedings initiated vide order dated
15.9.1973 were withdrawn on the recommendation of the Forest
Department. All these findings were put forth by the appellant- F
Corporation to contend that the land was not a forest as per
the provisions of the Act.
34. Despite these averments, we are unable to agree with
the contention of the appellant-Corporation. The definition of a
'forest' as enunciated in Section 2 (c-i) (ii) of the Act specifically G
includes "land which is part of a forest or lies within it or was
part of a forest or was lying within a forest on the 30th day of
August, 1975". It is already established that subsequent to
proceedings initiated under the Bombay Salsett~ Estate
H
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A Abolition Act, 1951, the entire land bearing Survey No. 345-A
was held to be a "forest" vide an order dated 24th December,
1964. A bare reading of the provision also indicates that the
definition of 'forest' is an inclusive definition and therefore, it
could have a wider connotation and it would not be appropriate
B to give it a restrictive. meaning. Every word and phrase of the
Act is to be understood in its context and must be given
significance so that they are not. rendered redundant. The
appellant has steadfastly maintained that the interpretation of
the provisions cannot mean land which was a forest in the past
c (i.e. before 30th August, 1975) to be a 'forest' according to the
Act. This argument might have had some force had the time
period in question related to many decades or even a century
before. The aforementioned proceedings were concluded in
proximity to the appointed day in question, and the character
of land cannot be said to have changed over such a relatively
0
short period of time. It is beyond doubt that the land which
encompassed the said portion of 53 acres belonging to the
appellant-Corporation was a 'forest' on the appointed day. In
our considered opinion, the facts on record seem to
overwhelmingly support such a conclusion.
E
35. The appellant has submitted that although the word
'Forest' was added in the Record of Right after such
proceedings, it was later dropped when the matter went up in
appeal to the Commissioner. Even if this were to be
F considered, it is to be noted that the preponderance of
evidence seems to indicate the land in Survey No. 345 was
considered as 'forest'. This is amply supported by documentary
evidence, including the mortgage deed of 1900, and the
revenue records of the past 50 years. Moreover, the
G conveyance deed dated 29.3.1975 which was executed by the
Court Receiver to the appellant, clearly describes the land as
"piece or parcel of forest land with structures". This is further
buttressed by the mutation entries till 1969-70 which described
the land as a forest. Even the mutation entries from 1970-71,
H have only changed the recording to 'huts, quarry and grass'
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF 63
MAHARASHTRA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
which does not in any way dispute the nature of the land. That A
apart in the enquiry conducted under sub-Section(2) of Section
37 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, it was admitted by the
Company through whom the appellant had derived title that the
land was forest land. Therefore, there is overwhelming
documentary evidence and also contemporaneous evidence on B
record to prove and establish that the land, in question, even
in recent times was considered as forest land and also retained
its character as such.
36. Therefore, the issue of whether the land in question was C
a 'forest' on the appointed day, has to be seen in the context
of whether the entire land that encompassed the disputed area
was a 'forest' on the said date. In order to seek the reasons
behind such an analysis, we need only look into the legislative
scheme of the Act, which has been elaborated hereinabove.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons, which supplement and D
aid in the interpretation of the provisions, state:
"The total forest area in the State [of Maharashtra] is
approximately 21 per cent of the total area. This is less that
the national average and is also substantially less that the E
33 1/3 per cent recommended by the National Forest
Policy
Out of the total area under Forests, a considerable area
is private forests. While no detailed survey has been made, F
a Committee appointed a decade ago estimated the same
as approximately 8,985 sq.kms. These forests are in a very
bad state of regression. On the one hand, they have been
severely depleted due to unregulated, unrestricted and
excessive exploitation, and on the other hand, there has
been a lack of fresh plantation and investment in these G
areas. Of late, there has been an excessive spurt of
indiscriminate fellings and these valuable forests are fast
disappearing. As owners of such forests have failed to
reboise these areas, large areas have been rendered
barren and uncultivable and more and more areas are H
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A increasingly being brought to the same state ... "
37. The Preamble to the Act, which is the guiding light to
its interpretation, also expresses similar concerns as to the
depletion of forest cover in the State. In this light, it is important
to construe the provisions of the Act in tune with the purpose
8
of its enactment. Such a rule of interpretation has been
supported by the decisions of this Court in a catena of cases.
In Union of India v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd., reported at
(2008) 7 SCC 502, this Court observed that all statutes have
to be considered in light of the object and purport of the Act. In
C Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and
Investment Co. Ltd. and Ors., reported at (1987) 1 SCC 424,
this Court held that:
"Interpretation [of statutory provisions] must depend on the
D text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation.
One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what
gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are
important. That interpretation is best which makes the
textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best
E interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this
knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and
then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by
phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the
context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-
F maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections,
clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear
different than when the statute is looked at without the
glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we
must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each
section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant
G
and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire
Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be
construed in isolation, Statutes have to be construed so
that every word has a place and everything is in its place."
H In Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. L. V. A.
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF 65
MAHARASHTRA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
Dixitulu and Others, reported at ( 1979) 2 SCC 34, a A
Constitutional Bench of this Court observed:
"The primary principle of interpretation is that a
constitutional or statutory provision should be construed
'according to the intent of they that made it' (Code}.
B
Normally, such intent is gathered from the language of the
provision. If the language of the phraseology employed by
the legislation is precise and plain and thus by itself,
proclaims the legislative intent in unequivocal terms, the
same must be given effect to, regardless of the
consequences that may follow. But if the words used in the C
provision are imprecise, protean, or evocative or can
reasonably bear meaning more than one, the rule of strict
grammatical construction ceases to be a sure guide to
reach at the real legislative intent. In such a case, in order
to ascertain the true meaning of the terms and phrases D
employed, it is legitimate for the court to go beyond the
arid literal confines of the provision and to call in aid other
well-recognised rules of construction such as its legislative
history, the basic scheme and framework of the statute as
a whole, each portion throwing light on the rest, the purpose E
of the legislation, the object sought to be achieved and the
consequences that may flow from the adoption of one in
preference to the other possible interpretation."
38. Therefore it is clear that the purpose of the statute and
F
the intention of the legislature in enacting the same must be of
paramount consideration while interpreting its provisions. In this
instance, moreover, the provisions of the Act present no
apparent conflict with the overarching objective of vesting
'private forests' with the State in the Government's efforts to
protect them. Further, it is important to note that the said area G
was being used for quarrying operations by the appellant-
Corporation. That the said portion in the area of Survey 345-A
measuring 209 acres is claimed to be rocky and devoid of
growth certainly does not change the character of the forest
land. It cannot be disputed that within forest areas, there exists H
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A water bodies swamp land, grass land etc. The very existence
of such land within the forest area would and could not change
the nature and character of the forest land and the same would
still continue to be treated as forest land. In many instances
across the country, mining and quarrying operations, while
B regulated, do take place in forest land, and they can very well
be considered as forest produce. However, the harmful effects
of the ecological imbalance that may result as a consequence
of quarrying operations in a forest zone is also to be
considered.
c 39. Thus, in light of the legislative scheme of the Act, and
the provisions discussed herein, we are of the considered
opinion that the said portion of the land, measuring 53 acres
will vest with the respondent-State as a 'private forest'. That the
area fell within a part designated as 'forest' on the 30th of
D August, 1975 is beyond dispute and is supported by the
evidence on record. Therefore, by virtue of Section 2 (c-i) (ii)
of the Act, the portion in dispute will also be designated as a
'private forest' under Section 2(f) of the Act, and the authorities
are directed to maintain it as such.
E
40. It may also be cursorily mentioned here that both parties
have made submissions with regard to the requirement of
issuance of notice as per Section 35(3) of the Act. Neither the
issuance and service of the notice, nor its publication in the
F Government Gazette could be challenged as both the exercises
have been done in the present case. The High Court in its
impugned order has extensively dealt with the same and has
recorded a finding that notice was issued to the registered
owner and served. These conclusions have not been
specifically challenged by the appellant. It is proved and also
G recorded that the notice under Section 35(3) of Forest Act was
issued to the owner on 8.8.1975 and was served on the
recorded owner. Since the notice was issued and served on
the recorded owner, the same was sufficient compliance. In
order to fortify our conclusions we also rely on the judgment of
H this Court in Chintamani Gajaman Ve/kar Vs. State of
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF 67
MAHARASHTRA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
Maharashtra & Ors. reported in (2003) 3 SCC 143, wherein A
this Court held that irrespective of whether the notice was
served on the land owner before the appointed date or not,
issuance of notice before that day would itself be sufficient for
vesting the land in the State.
B
41. The appellant-Corporation has also alleged that the
State's decision to consider the disputed land as automatically
vested with the Government was irrational and disproportionate.
In this regard, it was the argument of the learned counsel for
the appellant that while it may be possible for the Government
to regulate and prohibit certain activities in 'forest' lands, the C
ownership would continue to vest with the private owners, and
there cannot be any automatic vesting of the same. Thus it was
argued that taking away the ownership of the land was wholly
disproportionate in nature.
D
42. Being called upon to review this administrative action,
we have examined as to whether the same amounts to
irrational or disproportionate. The common yardstick to
determine whether the acton the part of the Government
violates established principles of administrative law has been E
the Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness, employed both
by English and Indian Courts. The Wednesbury principle was
enunciated by Lord Greene MR in Associated Provincial
Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation reported
at (1947) 2 All ER 680. To quote the learned Judge on the F
principle enunciated:
"What then are those principles? They are well
understood. They are principles which the court looks to
in considering any question of discretion of this kind. The
exercise of such discretion must be a real exercise of the G
discretion. If, in the statute conferring the discretion, there
is to be found expressly or by implication matters which
the authority exercising the discretion ought to have
regard to, then in exercising the discretion it must have
regard to those matters. Conversely, if the nature of the H
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A subject matter and the general interpretation of the Act
make it clear that certain matters would not be germane
to the matter in question; the authority must disregard
those irrelevant collateral matters."
43. However, the Wednesbury principle of reasonableness
8
has given way to the doctrine of proportionality. Through his
decision in the celebrated case of Council of Civil Services
Unions v. Minister for the Civil Services reported at [1985] AC
374, Lord Diplock widened the grounds of judicial review. He
mainly referred to three grounds upon which administrative
C action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground
being "illegality", the second "irrationality" and the third
'procedural impropriety'. He also mentioned that by further
development on a case to case basis, in due course, there may
be other grounds for challenge. He particularly emphasized the
D principles of proportionality. Thus, in a way, Lord Diplock
replaced the language of 'reasonableness' with that of
'proportionality' when he said:
"By 'irrationality' I mean what can by now be succinctly
E referred to as 'Wednesbury unreasonableness' ... It applies
to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic.
or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person
who had applied his mind to the question to be decided
could have arrived at it. ... "
F 44. The principle of proportionality envisages that a public
authority ought to maintain a sense of proportion between
particular goals and the means employed to achieve those
goals, so that administrative action impinges on the individual
rights to the minimum extent to preserve public interest. Thus
G implying that administrative action ought to bear a reasonable
relationship to the general purpose for which the power has
been conferred. The principle of proportionality therefore
implies that the Court has to necessarily go into the advantages
and disadvantages of any administrative action called into
H question. Unless the impugned administrative action is
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF 69
MAHARASHTRA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
advantageous and in public interest such an action cannot be A
upheld. At the core of this principle is the scrutiny of the
administrative action to examine whether the power conferred
is exercised in proportion to the purpose for which it has been
conferred. Thus, any administrative authority while exercising
a discretionary power will have to necessarily establish that its B
decision is balanced and in proportion to the object of the
power conferred.
45. This principle has found favour in recent times with this
Court, and a number of decisions reflect the shift towards the C
doctrine of proportionality.
46. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported
at (1983) 2 SCC 442, this Court held that ifthe penalty imposed
is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct, it would
violate Article 14 of the Constitution. D
47. In Ex-Naik Sardar Singh v. Union of India and Ors
reported at (1991) 3 sec 213 where instead of one bottle of
brandy that was authorized, the delinquent was found carrying
four bottles of brandy while going home on leave. He was
E
sentenced to three months rigorous imprisonment and
dismissal from service which was found by this Court to be
disproportionate to the gravity of the offence proved against him.
48. In Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v.
Employees Assn. reported at (2007) 4 SCC 669 this Court F
stated that the doctrine of proportionality has not only arrived
in our legal system but is here to stay. With the increasing
presence and visibility of administrative law and the need to
control possible abuse of discretionary powers by various
administrative authorities, certain principles have been evolved G
by reference to which the action of such authorities can be
judged. If any action taken by an authority is contrary to law,
improper, irrational or otherwise unreasonable, a court
competent to do so can interfere with the same while
exercising its power of judicial review. H
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A 49. In Charanjit Lamba vs. Commanding Officer,
Southern Command and Ors, reported at AIR 2010 SC 2462,
it was held that
"The constitutional requirement for judging the question of
reasonableness and fairness on the part of the statutory
8
authority must be considered having regard to the factual
matrix obtaining in each case. It cannot be put in a
straitjacket formula. It must be considered keeping in view
the doctrine of flexibility. Before an action is struck down,
the court must be satisfied that a case has been made out
c for exercise of power of judicial review. We are not
unmindful of the development of the law that from the
doctrine of Wednesbury unreasonableness, the court is
leaning towards the doctrine of proportionality .... "
D 50. The test of proportionality is therefore concerned with
the way in which the decision-maker has ordered his priorities,
i.e., the attribution of relative importance to the factors in the
case. Thus, it is not so much the correctness of the decision
that is called into question, but the method to reach the same.
E In this context, we are to see if the decision of the respondent-
State in considering the disputed property to be automatically
vested with the Government is commensurate with public
interests, in a way that affects individual rights in a minimal way.
51. The decision of the Government, as we have elucidated
F earlier, has been guided by the provisions in the Act, which
seek to conserve and protect private forests in the State of
Maharashtra that have been facing severe depletion and
exploitation. Therefore, the Act, which provides for the vesting
of private forests with the Government, does so in the general
G interests of the public in tune with principles of environmental
protection and sustainable development, to which we have
alluded at the outset. In our opinion, the respondent-State was
only acting in accordance with the principles envisaged in the
Act. This action cannot in any way said to be disproportionate
H or irrational solely because it divests the appellant-Corporation
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF 71
MAHARASHTRA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
of the land within Survey 345-A. The circumstances of this case, A
especially in so far as it relates to the quarrying operations
conducted by the appellant-Corporation in the said area, merit
that the State protects the interests of the general public by
acquiring the land as a private forest.
B
52. Therefore, after giving thoughtful consideration to the
issues, we find that the appellant has failed to make out any
case before us for interference with the orders passed by the
High Court. Hence, in the light of the aforesaid issues, principles
and precedents in question, we are of the considered opinion C
that the appeal is without merit and deserves to be dismissed.
Civil Appeal No. 2148 of 2004
53. Civil Appeal No. 2148 is filed by K.N. Shaikh [appellant
herein] against the State of Maharashtra seeking to challenge D
the judgment and order of the Bombay High Court dated
October 8, 2003 in Writ Petition No. 1383 of 2002. The said
Writ Petition was preferred against the decision of the
Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal upholding the order of the Sub-
Divisional Officer declaring that the survey No. 345-A constitutes E
a private forest in terms of Section 2(f) of the Maharashtra
Private Forest Act, 1975 and that it stood vested in the State
Government in terms of Section 3(1) thereof. The Bombay High
Court, while dismissing Writ Petition No. 1383 of 2002, held:
"So far as Writ Petition No. 1383 of 2002 is concerned, F
the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal considered the matter
again after the review petition was allowed by this Court
and dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner appellant.
We see no infirmity in the reasons recorded and
conclusions reached by the Tribunal. In our opinion, the G
said decision requires no interference. The petition,
therefore, deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly
dismissed."
54. Before this Court, Counsel for the appellant herein has
H
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A contended that the Bombay High Court failed to consider the
additional subm;ssions put forth by the appellant, and
proceeded to dismiss the appeal in a common judgment.
However, upon hearing the learned counsel and on perusal of
the submissions, we find that the appellant herein has placed
B similar, if not identical, arguments to that of the Maharashtra
Land Development Corporation.
55. Counsel for the appellant herein has primarily
contended that the meaning of 'forest' must be understood in
its ordinary sense, and that it would be inconceivable to think
C of forest land without trees and shrubbery. Consequently, it was
submitted, the rocky area devoid c,f growth cannot be
considered a 'forest' and must instead be understood as a
wasteland that cannot vest with the State Government. For
reasons elaborated in the previous appeal, we are unable to
D agree with the learned counsel for the appellant. The land in
question remains, in essence, a forest and the mere purported
presence of a rocky area therein cannot change its character.
56. Moreover, it is pertinent to observe that the appellant
E has based his claim on the basis of possession of land without
any deed of conveyance or sale deed to support the same.
Moreover, such a claim is not based on any interest on the land,
but on the fact that the appellant used to perform quarrying
operations on the same. Therefore, the Maharashtra Revenue
F Tribunal while holding that the land in question cannot be treated
as "forest" or "private forest" under the Act of 1975, still chose
to dismiss the claim of the appellant herein. In appeal, the High
Court was also inclined to do the same. Consequently, it is clear
that the appellant stands on the same, if not weaker, footing
G as the Corporation. In the light of the reasons that we have
enunciated in Civil Appeal No. 2147 of 2004, which are entirely
applicable to the case at hand, we find that the appeal is without
merit and deserves to be dismissed.
8.8.8. Appeal dismissed.
H
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