Holding

The Standing Committee is a valid executive arm of the Divisional Board, empowered to conduct the enquiry and impose sanctions, and the Board’s findings were duly supported by evidence, making the High Court’s interference a manifest error of law.

Summary

The Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education conducted secondary examinations in March 1990 and discovered that moderators' mark‑sheets of 283 candidates had been tampered, benefitting the students. The Board appointed enquiry officers, held hearings without advocates and barred parents from participation, and the Standing Committee of the Divisional Board subsequently withheld the declaration of results and debarred the students. The students challenged the action in writ petitions; the Bombay High Court quashed the Board’s notification, holding the Committee lacked authority and that the enquiry violated natural justice. On appeal, this Court held that the State Board is empowered to constitute Divisional Boards and Standing Committees, that the Standing Committee is an executive arm of the Divisional Board and validly exercised its powers, that the enquiry complied with the statutory procedure and the Board’s findings were supported by the admissions and circumstantial evidence, and that the High Court erred by re‑evaluating the evidence. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court judgment, upheld the notification with limited modifications and directed the Board to declare results for certain candidates.

Issues considered

The statutory authority of the Standing Committee of the Divisional Board to conduct enquiries and impose penalties under the Maharashtra Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Board Act, 1965 and its 1977 Regulations.
Whether the enquiry procedure—excluding advocates and limiting parental participation—violated the principles of natural justice.
The appropriate standard of proof in a domestic educational enquiry (balance of probabilities vs. beyond reasonable doubt).
Whether the High Court was entitled to substitute its own assessment of the evidence and quash the Board’s order.
The validity of the impugned notification in the absence of recorded reasons.

Legislation cited

Maharashtra Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Board Act, 1965s. 18, s. 23, s. 4
Maharashtra Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Board Regulations, 1977s. Regulation 14, s. Regulation 9(2)(XVIII)

Subjects

education lawexamination fraudunfair meansnatural justicestandard of proofadministrative lawdomestic enquirystanding committeeboard regulations

Judgment

A
MAHARASHTRA STATE BOARD OF SECONDARY AND
HIGHER SECONDARY EDUCATION
....
'\.
v. r
K.S. GANDHI AND ORS. ,,---

MARCH 12, 1991
B -
[N.M. KASLIWAL AND K. RAMASWAMY, JJ.]

Maharashtra Secondary and Higher Secondary Board Act, 1965/ ~
Maharashtra Secondary and Higher Secondary Board Regulation
1977: Sections 4, 18 and 23/Regulations 9(2)(XVIII) and 14---Mark-
sheets found tampered with-Enquiry held-Tampering with know-
c ledge or consent of candidates parents or guardians-Students alone to
take part in the inquiry-Advocates, parents or guardians not allowed_
_,,_r -
.....
Validity of enquiry.

The appellant-Board conducted secondary examinations in the 'r
D month of March 1990. During recounting of the marks obtained by the
candidates it was found that moderators' mark-sheets relating to 283
examinees, which included the 53 respondents, had been tampered
with. The declaration of their results was withheld pending enquiry.
Several writ petitions were tiled against non-declaration of the results
and the High Court directed the appellant to take expeditious action to
E declare the results. ·~

--
The Board appointed seven enquiry officers to conduct the
enquiry. Show cause notices were issued to the students informing them
of the nature of tampering, the subjects in which the marks were found
tampered with, the marks initially obtained and the marks increased
F due to tampering, and also indicated the proposed punishment, if in the
enquiry it would be found that marks wer.e tampered with the know-
ledge or connivance or at the instance of the candidates or parents or --..,
,.-""'\'
guardians. They were also informed that they would be at liberty to
inspect the documents at the Divisional Board at Bombay; they were
entitled to adduce documentary and oral evidence at the hearing; they
G would also be permitted to cross-examine the witnesses of the Board, if
....
any; they would not be entitled .to appear through an advocate, and the
parents or guardians would be permitted to accompany the students at
the time of enquiry, but they would not be entitled to take part in the
enquiry.
-~ ..
H All the candidates admitted that the marks initially awarded by

772
M.B.O.E. v. K.S. GANDHI 773

-~ the examiners had been tampered with in the moderators' mark-sheets;
and due to tampering the marks were increased and the increase was to A
their advantage. However, they denied that either they or their parents
or guardians were privy to the tampering.

The Enquiry Officers submitted their reports holding that the
moderators' mark-sheets had been fabricated and submitted the B
.>-___reports to the Board. The Standing Committee constituted in this
.~ ·regard considered the records and the reports and resolved to withhold,
as a measure of punishment, the declaration of the results of their
exami.llations and to debar the students to appear in the supplementary

-.... ·:-. · examination. The notification to that effect was published on 31.8.1990
and the report submitted to the High Court.

The High Court allowed the writ petitions. One Hon'ble Judge
c
~· held that the Standing Committee was devoid of power, and because it
did not obtain the approval of the Divisional Board, the impugned
notification was without authority of law. On merits, the learned Judge
held that the Standing Committee did not apply its mind in the proper D
perspective to the material facts, and therefore, the fmding that
tempering was done at the instance of the examinees /parents /guardians
was perverse. The other Hon'ble Judge held that the examinees were
~ not guilty of the mal-practices and their guilt had not been established.

Before this Court, it was contended on behalf of the respondents E
that the Act empowered the Divisional Board to deal with the use of
=- unfair means at the fmal examination, and the Standing Committee was
an alien body to the Divisional Board; the students were minors and
neither the parents nor anybody like an advocate was permitted to
assist the students; answers to the questionnaire were extracted from
the students to confess their guilt; no adequate opportunity was given to F
~ the students at the enquiry; the evidence without subjecting it to cross-
examination was of no value; the Standing Committee did not apply its
mind to the facts, nor recorded reasons in support of its conclusion that
· the examinee /parents /guardians were parties to the fabrication; the
Board should establish the guilt of the examinees beyond all reasonable
doubts; the standard of proof ought to be of a high degree akin to trial G
'>--.- in a criminal case; the test of benefit to an examinee was preposterous;
· no evidence was placed on record, nor was it proved and hence the
findings of the Standing Committee were clearly based on no evidence;
the Enquiry Report contained only conclusions bereft of the statement
of facts and reasons in support thereof; and the order ought to have
been a speaking order preceded by a fair enquiry and the report must H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 1 S.C.R.

be based on cogent evidence.
A
On behalf of the Board, it was inter alia contended that all tht~
examinees admitted in answers to the questionnaire that tampering was
done and it was to their advantage, and that \in view of the admission,
the need to examine any person from the concerned section was
B obviated.

AHowing the appeals, upholding the notification subject to
modifications, this Court,

HELD: (1) There is no manner of doubt that unfair means were
used at the fmal Secondary Examination by fabricating the Modera-
C tors' .mark-sheet of the examinees, in a concerted manner, admittedly,
to benefit the students. [782C]

(2) The State Board is empowered to constitute the Divisional
Boards and the Standing Committees. The State Board is also
.D empowered to make regulations to conduct examinations and also to
deal with the use of unfair means at the fmal examination conducted by
the Board. The Divisional Board is empowered to conduct within its
area the fmal examination on behalf of the State Board. The Divisional
Board is also empowered to deal with the cases of unfair means accord-
ing to the procedure laid down by the State Board. [783F-G]
E
(3) The Standing Committee is an executive arm of the Divisional
Board for the efficient and expeditious functioning of the Board as
adumberated under the Act itself. It is not a foreign body. When the
Standing Education Committee takes the decision its decision is on
behalf of the Divisional Board, and the decision of the Divisional Board
F in turn is on behalfof the State Board. [786E-F]

(4) On a fair and harmonious reading of the relevant provisions i'
of the Act and the Maharashtra Secondary and Higher Secondary Edu- '
cation Board, Regulation, 1977 the Examination Committee of the Divi-
sional Board is itself a statutory body which acted on behalf of the
G Divisional Board and is not a delegate of the Divisional Board. [786H]

State of U.P. v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi & Anr., [1978] 2 S.C.C.
102; Khargram Panchayat Samiti & Anr. v. State of West Bengal &
Ors., [1987] 3 S.C.C. 82; Baradakanta Misra v. High Court of Orissa &
Anr., [1976] Suppl. S.C.R. 561 and Tej Pal Singh (dead) through L.rs.
H v. State of U.P. &Anr., [1986] 3S.C.R. 429,referredto.
M.B.O.E. v. K.S. GANDHI 775

··~ ( S) The Standing Committee is an integral part of the Divisional A
Board and its acts are for and on behalf of the Divisional Board.
Accordingly, the Board must be deemed to have passed the impugned
notification as per the scheme of the provisions of the Act and the
Regulations. Therefore, the fmding of the learned Judge that the Stand-
ing Committee had no power to take the impugned decision etc. without B
approval of the Divisional Board is clearly illegal and cannot be
, J..____ sustained. [789B-C, Fl

(6) While exercising the powers under Article 226 or Article 136
of the Constitution, the High Court or this Court, is not sitting as a

... Court of Appeal on the fmdings of facts recorded by the Standing
Committee (Domestic Enquiry Board) nor have power to evaluate the
evidence as an appellate court and to come to its own conclusions. If the
c
conclusions reached by the Board can be fairly supported by the evi-
dence on record then the High Court or this Court has to uphold the
decision, though as appellate court of facts, it may be inclined to take a
different view. [789C)
D
(7) Fabrication cannot be done except to benefit the examinees.
The fabricator had done it for reward in concert with outside agencies.
Therefore, the inference from these facts drawn by the Standing Com-
mittee that the examinees/parents/guardians were responsible to fabri-
cate the moderators' mark-sheets is based on evidence. [790G]
E

- (8) It is not open to the High Court to evaluate the evidence to
come to its own conclusions. Thereby the High Court has committed
manifest error of law warranting interference by this Court. [ 791A)

(9) The Writ Court would not interfere with an order of educa-
F
tional institution. Therefore, what the writ court needs to do is to find
~ whether fair and reasonable opportunity bas been given to the students
in the given facts. [792F]

D.M.K. Public School v. Regional Joint Director of Hyderabad,
A.I.R. 1986 A.P. 204; G.B.S. Omkar v. Shri Venkateswara University,
G.
A.I.R. 1981A.P.163.

( 10) Assistance of an Advocate to the delinquent at a domestic
enquiry is not a part of the principles of natural justice. It depends on
the nature of the inquiry and the peculiar circumstdttces and facts of a
particular case. [792H)
H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991] 1 S.C.R.

(11) The regulations and the rules of enquiry specifically exclu-
A
ded the assistance of an advocate at the inquiry. Therefore, the omfa-
sion to provide the assistance of a counsel at the inquiry is not violatiYe
of the principles of natural justice. [793A]

( 12) The procedure adopted at the inquiry was fair and just and it
B was not vitiated by any procedural irregularity nor was violative of the
principles of natural justice~ The absence of opportunity to the parents ___...l__
or guardians, in this background, did not vitiate the legality or validity
of the inquiry conducted or decision of the Committee. [793G-H]

(13) Unless the rule expressly or by necessary implications,
excluded recording of reasons, it is implicit that the principles of
c natural justice or fair play does require recording of reasons as a part of
fair procedure. In an. administrative decision, its order /decision 'itself
may not contain reasons. It may not be the requirement of the rules, but
at the least, the record should disclose reasons. It may not be like a
judgment. But the reasons may be precise. [794F]
D
Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor & Ors., [1973] 2 S.C.C.
836; Gurdial Singh Fiji v. State of Punjab & Ors., (1979] 2 S.C.C. 368
and S. N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, J. T. 1990 (3) S.C. 630, referred to.

(14) The omnipresence and omniscience of the principle of - ~
E natural justice acts as deterrence to arrive at arbitrary decision in
flagrant infraction of fair play. But the applicability of the principles of
natural justice is not a rule of thumb or a straight jacket formula as an
abstract proposition of law. It depends on the facts of the case, nature of
the inquiry and the effect of the orde11-decision on the rights of the
person and attendant circumstances. [795F]
F
(15) In the instant case, since the facts are admitted, the need to >
their reiteration was obviated and so only conclusions have been stated
in the reports. The omission to record reasons is neither illegal, nor is
violative of the principles of natural justice. [795H-796A]
,~1

Khardah Co. Lta. v. Their Workmen, [1964] 3 S.C.R. 506; A.K.

I Roy, etc. etc. ~· Union ~f ~ndia & Ors., (1982] 1 S.C.C. 271; Pett v_. J
Grehound Racing Association Ltd., (1968] 2 ALL Eng. Reports 545;--"".
Union of India v. H.C. Goel, [1964] 4 S.C.R. 718; M/s. Bareilly Elect-
ricity Supply Ccfl. Ltd. v. The Workmen & Ors., [1971] 2 S.C.C. 617;
Shanti Prasad Jain v. The Director of Enforcement, (1963] 3 S.C.R.
H 297; Merla Ramanna v. Nallaparaju & Ors., (1955] 2 S.C.R. 941;
M.B.O.E. v. K.S. GANDHI 777

Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India & Ors:, [1986] 3 S.C.C. 229; .
Government Medical Store Depot, Karna/ v. State of Haryana & Anr., A
[1986} 3 S.C.R. 450; M/s. Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Gangadhar &
Ors., {1964] 2 S.C.R. 809; State of Punjab v. Bhagat Ram, [1976] 2
S.C.R. 370; Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor
Sabha,, [1980) 2 S.C.R. 146; Union of India & Ors. v. Mohd. Ramzan
Khan, J.r. (1990) 4 S.C. 456; Vishwa Nath v. State of Jammu & Kash- B
__;..___ mir, [1983] 1 S.C.C. 215; Olga Tellis & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal
Corporation etc., [1985] 3 S.C.C. 545, referred to.

(16) Court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of do-

- mestic tribunals appointed by the education bodies like universities. [799F]

( 17) In dealing with the validity of the impugned order passed by
a University under Article 226 the High Court is not sitting in an appeal
c
over the decision on this question. Its jurisdiction is limited and though
it is true that if the impugned order is not supported by any evidence the
High Court may be justified to quash the order but the conclusion that
the impugned order is not supported by any evidence must be reached D
after considering the question as to whether the probabilities and
circumstantial evidence do not justify the said conclusion. The enquiry
held by domestic tribunals in such cases must no doubt be fair and the
students must be given adequate opportunity to defend themselves and
holding such enquiries, the tribunal must follow the rules of natural
justice. [799F-G] E

Board of High S~hool and Intermediate Education U.P. v.
Sagleshar Persad & Ors., [1967] 3 S.C.R. 767 and Bihar School Exami-
nation Board. v. Subhas Chandra Sinha & Ors., [1970] 3 S.C.R. 963,
referred to.
F
( 18) The examination committee has jurisdiction to take decision
in the m.atter of use of unfair means not only on direct evidence but also
on probabilities and circumstantial evidence. There is no scope for
importing the principles of criminal trial while considering the pro-
bative value of probabilities and circumstantial evidence. The Examina-
tion committee is not bound by technical rules of evidence and proce- G
dure as are applicable to Courts. [801E·FJ
I
)._.
Seth Gulabchand v. Seth Kudilal & Ors., [1966] 3 S.C.R. 623;
Ghazanfer Rashid v. Board H.S. & I Edn. U.P., A.I.R. 1970
Allahabad 209; Miller v. Minister of Pensions, [1947) All. E.L.R. 372;
. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Chet Ram & Ors., [1989] 2 S.C.C. 425, i H
referred to.
A
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 1 S.C.R.

(19)There is an unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation
...
'..>
of the degree of probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic proba-
bility must, in the last analysis, rest on the robust common sense and,
ultimately, on the trained intuitions of the Judge. [8020]

(20) Strict rules of the Evidence Act, and the standard of proof
B
envisaged therein do not apply to departmental proceedings of domestic
tribunals. It is open to the authorities to receive and place on record all
the necessary, relevant, co~ent and acceptable material facts though not
proved strictly in conformity with the Evidence Act, the material must
be germane and relevant to the facts in issue. In grave cases like
forgery, fraud, conspiracy, misappropriation, etc. seldom direct
c evidence would be available. Only the circumstantial evidence would
furnish the proof. Inference from the evidence and circumstances must
. be carefully distinguished from conjectures or speculation. [8050-E]

State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal & Anr.,, [1988] 4 S.C.C. 302;
D. Hanumant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1952] S.C.R. 1091; Reg.
v. Hodge, [1838] 2 Law 227; Bank of India v. J.A.H. Chinoy, A.I.R.
1950 P.C. 90; Khwaja v. Secretary of State, [1983] 1 All E.L.R. 765
(H.L.); Sodhi Transport Co. & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Anr. etc., [1986]
1 S.C.R. 939; Bhandari v. Advocates Committee, [1956] A.E.L.R. 742
(P.C.); Glynn v. Keale University & Anr., [1971] 2 A.E.R. 89 (Ch. D.);
In Re: An Advocate, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 245; Shri Krishan v. The
E
Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 376 and Shiva-
jirao Nilangekar Patil v. Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi & Ors. & Vice
Versa, [1987] lS.C.R. 458, referred to.

(21) The standard of proof is not proof beyond reasonable doubt
"but" the preponderance of probabilities tending to draw and infer-
·-
F
ence that the fact must be more probable. Standard of proof cannot be
put in a straight jacket formula. No mathematical formula could be laid
on degree of proof. The probative value could be gauged on facts and
circums~ces in a given case. The Standard of proof is the same both in
civil cases and domestic enquiries. [805H-806B]
G (22) The conclusion reached by the Education Standing Commit-
tee that the fabrication was done at the instance of either the examinees
or their parents or guardians is amply borne out from the record. The
High Court over-stepped its supervisory jurisdiction and trenched into
the arena of appreciation of evidence to arrive its own conclusion on the
specious plea of satisfying 'conscience of the court'. [806G]
H
M.B.O.E. v. K.S. GANDHI [RAMASWAMY, J.] 779

a 0 { CIVIL APPELLATE'. JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 491-
544of1991. A.

From the Judgment and Order dated 12.12.1990 of the Bombay
High Court in W.P. Nos. 2646, 2659, 2651, 2649, 2657, 2664, 2648,
2647,2666,2658,2662,2663,2667,2665,2691,2693,2694,4091,4098,
4155,2743,2789,2791,2790,2740,4290,2824,2858,2848,3052,2863, B
),._ 2848,2844,2843,2832,2852,4846,4844,3312,5101,5102,3313,3207,
· 3064, 3005, 3335, 3188, 5123, 3514, and 4844of1990.

T.R. Andhyarujana, S.N. Wakharia, P.H. Parekh, D.Y.
;,- Chandrachud and Ms. Shalini Soni for the Appellant.

P. Chidambaram, Arnn Jaitley, LR. Joshi, M.N. Shroof, C'
Ms. Indu Malhotra, Ms. Alka Mukhija, Harish N. Salve, Ms. Shi-
reen Jain, J.P. Cama, Mukul Mudgal, Mrs. Urmila Sirur, Dileep •
Pillai P. Kesava Pillai, Kailash Vasdev and Vimal Dave for the
Respondents.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

K. RAMASWAMY, J. We have heard the learned counsel on
;... __ either side and grant special leave to appeal in all the cases.
I

The quest for just result to save the precious academic years to E
the students while maintaining the unsullied examination process is the
core problem which the facts have presented for solution. •

The appeals arise from the common judgment of a Division
Bench of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 2646 of 1990
and batch. The appellant for short 'the Board' conducted secondary F
~ examinations in the month of March 1990, whereat the marks
· awarded, after the formalities of valuation by the examiners of the
anwser-sheets in each subject; the random counter check by the
moderators and further recounting at the Board, Moderators' mark-
sheets sent to Pune for feeding the computer to declare the results
were found tampered with the appellant. Thereon, admittedly, it was G
)._ found that monderators' mark-sheets relating to 283 examinees which
include 53 respondents in these appeals were tampered, in many a case
in more than 2 to 8 subjects, and in few cases in one subject. As a
result, 214 examinees who were otherwise to fail would pass, and the
remaining 69 examinees have improved their ranking, which would be
in some cases exceptionally good. The declaration of their results were H
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 1 S.C.R.

A
withheld pending further enquiry and the rest were declared on June } a ·
30, 1990. Several writ petitions were filed in the High Court against ( - ..
non-declaration of the results and the High Court directed to take "--
expeditious action to declare the results of the examination within the
specified time. The Board appointed seven enquiry officers to conduct
the enquiry. Show cause notices were issued to the students on July 30,
B 1990 informing them of the nature of tampering, the subjects in which
the marks were found tampered with, the marks initially obtained and --"'
the marks increased due to tampering, and also indicated the proposed . . __
punishment, if in the enquiry it would be found that marks were
tampered with the knowledge or connivance or at the instance of the
candidates or parents or guardians. They were also informed that they .,__,._~
would be at liberty to inspect the documents at the Divisional Board at
c Bombay. They were entitled to adduce documentary and oral evidence
at the hearing. They will also be permitted to cross-examine the
witnesses of the Board, if any. They would not be entitled to appear .....,..,..
through an Advocate, but the parents or guardians would be permitted r
to accompany the students at the time of enquiry, but they are not
D entitled to take part in the enquiry. The candidates submitted their
explanations denying the tampering and appeared before the Enquiry
Officers on· August 8, 9, 10, 20, 21 and 22, 1990. At the enquiry, each
student inspected the record. A questionnaire was given to be filled in
writing. Every candidate was shown his answer book, marks awarded )
in the subject/subjects and the tampered marks in the moderators' -~
E marks-sheets. All the candidates admitted that the marks initially
awarded by the examiner were tampered in the moderators mark··
sheets; du~ to tampering the marks were increased and the increase
was to their advantage. However, they denied that either they or their
parents or guardians were privy to the tampering. The Enquiry Offi··
cers submitted their reports holding that the moderators mark-sheets
F have been fabricated and submitted the reports to the Board. The
Standing Committee constituted in this regard considered the records "->
and the reports on August 29, 1990, discussed pros and cons and '
expressed certain doubts about the possibility of the candidates/
parents/guardians committing fabrication. They. sought for and
obtained legal·opinion in that regard. On August 30, 1990 the Standing
G Committee resolved to with hold, as a measure of punishment, the
declaration of the results of their examinations and to debar the 283 1 .
students to appear in the supplementary examination to be held in . . . . .,_
October, 1990 and March, 1991. The notification was published on
August 31, 1990 and submitted the report to the High Court. There-
after the High Court considered the cases on merits. The learned
H Judges by separate but concurrent judgments allowed the writ
petitions.
M.B.O.E. v. K.S. GANDHI {RAMASWAMY, J.] 781

Sugla, J. held that the Standing Committee of the Divisional
A
Board under the Maharashtra Secondary and Higher Secondary
Education Board Act of 1965 for short 'the Act' was devoid of power.
It did not obtain the approval of the Divisional Board, and therefore,
the impugned notification was without authority of law. On merits also
it was held that the Standing Committee did not apply its mind in the
proper perspective to the material facts. Therefore, the finding that B
tampering was done at the instance of the examinees/parents/guar-
dians is perverse. Bharucha, J. without going into the jurisdictional
issue agreed with Sugla, J. and held that the preponderance of the
-probalities would show that the examinees were not guilty of the mal-
practices. The guilt has not been established. The examinees might
well be innocent. Accordingly, the impugned notification dated
August 31, 1990 was quashed. Mandatory injunction was issued to the c
Board to declare the results of 253 examinees within two weeks from
the date of the judgment and marks were directed to be communicated
to the examinees within a period of two weeks thereafter. -

The admitted facts are that the mark-sheets of the examiners were D
not tampered. Only the moderators' mark-sheets were tampered. As
per th~ procedure, after the marks were scrutinized at the State Board
and found the marks tallied and to be correct, the moderators' mark-
sheets were sent to the computer at Pune, obviously in sealed packets,
for feeding the results. After the date of recounting the marks in the
office of the State Board at Bombay and before the date of taking E
them to feed the computer, moderators' mark-sheets, were tampered.
The individual students were put on notice of the marks they original-
ly obtained and the tampered marks in the subject/subjects con-
cerned. They were also given the opportunity to lead evidence on their
behalf and if the witnesses were examined on behalf of the Board they
would be permitted to cross-examine them. They inspected the F
records. The questionnaire given to all the examinees at the enquiry
were before us at the hearing including the 53 respondents in the
appeals. We have perused the questionnaire. It is clear from the
answers given to the questionnaire that all the examinees admitted the
marks they originally got and the tampered marks on the moderators'
mark-sheets. They also admitted that the tampering was to their G
advantage. Everyone denied the complicity of either of the candidates
or the parents or the guardia,ns. Thus it is clear that at the enquiry
there is no dispute that the moderators' mark-sheets were tampered,
though the candidates, obviously and quite expectedly, denied their
complicity in that regard. Due to tampering 214 would have been
passed and 69 accelerated their ranking and percentage to seek admis- H
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991] 1 S.C.R.

sion into prestigious insitutions. The racket of large scale tampering
A
wading through 80,000 moderators' mark-sheets obviously was done
by concerted action. It is clear that from large body of moderators'
mark-sheets, it is not possible to pick the marks-sheets of the con-
cerned examinee alone unless there is concerted and deliberate
efforts, in conspiracy with some members of the staff ~ntrusted with
B the duties in this regard, for illegal gratification. It is also not an
innocent act of mere corrections as is sought to be made out by Sri
Chidambaram, the learned counsel for the respondents. We have no
manner of doubt that unfair means were used at the final Secondary
Examination held in March 1990, by fabricating the Moderators'
mark-sheets of 283 examinees, in a concerted manner, admittedly, to ......_ .......[ ~

benefit the students concerned.
c
The first question, therefore, is whether the Standing Committee
of the concerned Divisional Board has power under the Act and Regu-
lations to enquire into the use of unfair means committed at the final
examination conducted under the Act. Section 4 of the Act declares
D that the State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education is
a body corporate. Section 18 enumerates. the powers and duties of the
State Board. Clause (t) of Sec. 18 empowers the Board to make regu-
lations for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act.
Clause (g) empowers the Board to give to the candidates certificates
after passing final examination. Clause (m) empowers to recommend
E measures and to prescribe conditions of discipline. Clause (w) gives
residuary power to do all such acts and things as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of the Act. Section 19 gives powers and entrust
duties to the Divisional Board of each division. Clause (f) postulates,
"to conduct in the area of its jurisdiction the final examination on
behalf of the State Board." Clause ( 1) provides, "to deal with cases of
F use of unfair means according to the procedure laid down by the State
Board.". Sect~on 23 provides that power of appointments of the Com-
mittees by the State Board. Sub-Section (2) thereof provides that:

"The State Board may appoint such other Committees as it
thinks necessary for the efficient performance of its
G functions."
~·
Equally sub-section (3) of Sec. 23 empower thus:

"Each Divisional Board shall appoint Committees designa-
ted as follows:
H
(d) Examination Committee.
M.B.O.E. v. K.S. GANDHI [RAMASWAMY, J.] 783

~ Sub-section (5) states thus:
A
· "The constitution of every Committee appointed by the
State Board or a Divisional Board, the term of office of its
members and the duties and functions to be discharged by it
shall be such as may be prescribed."
B
~ Section 36 empowers the State Board to make regulations for the
purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the.Act. Sub-section
(2) thereof states that:

"In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the

-- foregoing power, such regulations may provide for all or
any of the following matters, namely:
c

(a) the constitution, powers and duties of the Committees.
appointed under section 23;

(f) the arrangement for the conduct of final examinations D
by the Divisional Boards and publication of results;

(n) any other matter which is to be or may be prescribed
under this Act."

Sub-section (3) provides: E

-- "No regulation made under this section shall have effect
until the same has been sanctioned by the State Govern;nent. ··

Thus it is clear that the State Board is empowered to constitute the
Divisional Boards and the Standing Committees. The State Board is F
also empowered to make regulations to conduct examinations and also
to deal with the use of unfair means at the final examination conducted
by the Board. The Divisional Board is empowered to conduct within
its area the final examinations on behalf of the State Board. The Divi-
sional Board is also empowered to deal with the cases of unfair means
according to the procedure laid down by the State Board. · G

The State Board made regulations named as Maharashtra Secon-
dary and Higher Secondary Education Board Regulations 1977 which
came into force with effect from July 11, 1977. Regulation 9(2)(xviii)
reads thus:
H
784. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991) 1 S.C.R.

A "to lay down the procedure and specify the penalties to be .)..-·
followed by the Divisional Boards, in dealing ,with cases of
use of unfair means by persons seeking admission to or
appearing at the examinations conducted under the autho-
rity of the State Board."

B Under Regulations 14 the Standing Committee of the Divisional
Board was to be constituted under sub-regufation (1) thereto. Sub- _..l .
regulation (2) provides:

"Subject ·to the provisions of the Act and the Regulations,

c
the Standing Committee shall have the following duties and
functions, namely- ...
(x) to deal with cases of use of unfair means by parsons
seeking admission to or appearing at the final examina-
tions, according to the procedure laid down by. the State
D Board."

By a resolution passed at the meeting of the State Board held on
October 26, 1985, Exhibit 'z' provides the procedure for enquiry.
Clause 3(f) defines 'misconduct' as follows:

E "Misconduct" shall mean any illegal or wrongful act or
conduct which is alleged to have been resorted to by any
candidate and/or any member of the staff, at, for or in
respect of the final examinati~n and, without prejudice to
the generality of the foregoing, shall include ...... .
tampering with the documents issued by the Board or
F otherwise howsoever changing a candidate's results in any
manner whatsoever and generally acting in such a manner ~
so as to affect or impede the conduct of the final examina-
tions and fair declaration of results thereof." ·

Clause (4) empowers to conduct an enquiry either suo moto or on a
G complaint about any misconduct and the procedure in that regard so
that the Chairman of the Divisional Board may entrust the enquiry /
into the alleged misconduct to any member or members of the Divi- ~
sional Board other than the members of the Standing Committee.
Clause (5) empowers to entrust the enquiry. The Enquiry Officer shall
give a notice in writing to the candidate .... setting forth the nature of
H the misconduct alleged against the candidate and call upon the candi-
M:B.0.E. v. K.S. GANDHI [RAMASWAMY, J.] 785

-(date to show cause within the time specified therein. It also empowers
A
to set out the punishment proposed to be imposed on a candidate.
Clause 5(b) gives an opportunity to the candidates to inspect the rele-
vant documents proposed to be relied upon at the enquiry. Clause 6
gives opportunity to the delinquent to submit an explanation; to.pro-
duce his witnesses as well as documentary evidence and to be heard in
person, if he/she so desires, but shall not be entitled to be represented B
~Yan Advocate or any other persons. The delinquent shall be bound
to answer truthfully to all questions relevant to the subject of enquiry
that may be put to him/her by the Enquiry Officer. Clause ( 10) pro-
vides that the concerned Enquiry Officer shall submit the report in
writing including the findings and the proposed punishment. Clause 11
provides thus:
c
"The Standing Committee shall consider the report and
decide the case as it may deem fit. The Standing Commit-
tee will take the decision in the same meeting."

Clause (12) states thus: D

"The Standing Committee shall not be bound to give
detailed reasons in support of its order or decision but shall
record its reasons if it disagrees with the findings of recom-
.~·- mendations of the inquiry officer and under such circums-
tances the Standing Committee need not give hearing to E

- the delinquent concerned."

Other clauses are not relevant for the purpose of this case. Hence
omitted. The Board also in its meeting held on October 26, 1985
framed rules in Appendix 'A' providing under different heads the
nature of the offence and the quantum of punishment, the relevant F
~em 16 reads thus:

"Tampering with the Secondary/Higher Secondary School
Certificate and/or statement of marks or their copies and
any other documents issued by the Board."
G
Cancellation of performance of the Examination and
debarring the candidate for five more examinations and/or
to lodge complaint by the concerned institution/ Authority
to Police Department.

Thus a conspectus of these relevant provisions of the· Act, regulations H
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] l S.C.R.

A and resolutions clearly cover the entire field of operation regarding the ,..,,.._.
use of unfair means at the final examinations specified the comperent
authorities and the procedure to deal with the same. The Divisional
Board undoubtedly has been empowered under Sec. 19 of the Act to
deal with the use of unfair means at the final examination. It may be
made clear at this juncture that the Standing Committee consists of six
B members of the Divisional Board and none of them associated with the
enquiry. Enquiry Officers are also the members of the DivisionaJ ~
Board. The regulations provide the procedure in this regard. It is
undoubtedly true as contended by Shri Chidambaram, that the Act
empowers the Divisional Board to deal with the use of unfair means at
the final examination. But to give acceptance to the contention that -----<· :.,
the Standing Committee is an alien body to the Divisional Board is to
c do violence to the scheme of the Act and Regulations. It is seen that
under the scheme of the Act and Regulations the State Board is
empowered to constitute the Standing Committee. Equally the Divi- 'r-
sional Board is empowered to constitute the committees which include
the Examination Committee. The members thereof are only members
D of the Divisional Board. Equally the Inquiry Officers are also the
members of the Divisional Board, other than the members of the
Education Standing Committee. The Standing Committee is an execu-
tive arm of the Divisional Board for the efficient and expeditious
fun_ctioning of the Board as adumbrated under the Act itself. It is not a ~
foreign body. Therefore, when the Divisional Board is acting in con-
E ducting the examinations and dealing with the use of unfair means at
the final Examination, it is acting on behalf of the State Board as its
agent. When the enquiry was conducted by some members and the
Standing Committee was taking the decision thereon, it is acting on
behalf of the Divisional Board. There is no dichotomy but distribution
-
of the functions. Therefore, when the Standing Education Committee
F takes the decision its decision is on behalf of the Divisional Board to~
which they are members and the decision of the Divisional Board in - ·
turn is on behalf of tfie State Board. This is the integral scheme woven
by the Act and Regulations. Thus under the scheme of the Act, for the
efficient and expeditious functioning of the concerned Boards; imp-
lementation of the provisions of the Act, and to prevent use of unfair
G means at the final examination including tampering the result of the
examination, the Standing Committee is clearly within its power to~
take final decision. On a fair and harmonious reading of the relevant
provisions and given their due scope and operational efficiency, we are
of the considered view that the Examination Standing Committee of
the Divisional Board itself a statutory, body acted on behalf of the
H Divisional Board and is not a delegate of the Divisional Board.
M.B.O.E. v. K.S. GANDHI [RAMASWAMY, J.] 787

......(, In State of U. P. v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi & Anr., ]1978- 2 SCC
A
102 the respondent was appointed as a Munsif in the State Judicial
Service and was later promoted as a District Judge. The Administra-
tive Committee of the High Court reviewed the service and the
Committee recommended to the State Government and communi-
cated to all the Judges of the recommendation to compulsorily retire
the respondent' from service. The Govt. accordingly retired the B
~~espondent compulsorily which_ was challenged in a writ_ pe~ition. A
' -Pull Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the Distnct Judge
cannot be retired from service on the opinion formed by the
Administrative Committee and all the Judges should have considered
- --- and made recommendation. Accordingly, the order was set aside. On
appeal, the Constitution Bench of this Court held that Art. 235 of the
Constitution provides control over the District Judges and the Court c
subordinate thereto shall be vested in the High Court. It is open to the
-~- High Court to make rules to exercise the power of control feasible,
convenient and effective. Accordingly the High Court regulated the
manner of appointment of a Committee to screen the service record.
Thus, the rules framed prescribed the manner in which the power has D
to be exercised. Truely, it is regulatory in character and the powers
were exercised by the Committee and recommended to the State
Govt. to compulsorily retire the respondent and it amounts to taking a
~ decision on behalf of the High Court. In Khargram Panchayat Samiti
& Anr. v. State of West Bengal &.Ors., l198T 3 SCC 82 at p. 84 the
facts were that the Panchayat Samiti passed a resolution on April 12, E

- 1985 specifying that the c;attle fairs run by the two rival organisations
would be held on specified different dates which were impugned in the
writ petition contending that the Samiti was devoid of power and
jurisdiction to pass such a resolution. The High Court held that the
Samiti was vested with power to grant licence to hold the fair under
Sec. 117 of West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973. In the absence of any F
W-rules framed in that regard it had no power to specify dates on which
such Hat or fair shall be held. While reversing the High Court's judg-
ment, this Court held that the general administration of the local area
vested in the Samiti which had power to grant licences to held fair or
hat under Sec. 117 of the Act. Necessarily it carries with it the power
to supervise, control and manage such a hat or fair within its territorial G
\ Jurisdiction. The c~n~erment of the power to gran~ a .licence for hold-
( mg of a hat or a fair includes the power to make mc1dental or conse-
quential order for specification of a date on·which such a Hat or fair
shall be held. Accordingly, the resolution of the Sarniti was upheld.
In Baradakanta Misra v. High Court of Orissa & Anr., ]1976- Suppl.
SCR 561 relied on by Sri Chidambaram, the facts were that the appel- H
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 1 S.C.R.

lant while acting·as a District Judge, an enquiry into certain charges ~
A was held against him, and was reduced to Addi. District Magistrate
(Judicial). He refused to join the duty. Fres~ proceedings were
initiated against him and after enquiry the High Court dismissed him
on the ground that he was convicted on a charge of a criminal attempt.
An appeal was filed to the Governor and a writ petition followed
B thereafter filed in the High Court were dismissed, while allowing the
appeal filed under Article 136. The scope of the words "control" and ~
''deal" used in Article 235 were interpreted at page 576 P & G and-
held that the word 'control' includes something in addition to the
disciplinary jurisdiction. The control is with regard to conduct and
discipline of the District Judges and Subordinate Courts and includes --~ -
right to appeal against the order of the High Court in accordance with
c the condition or service includes an order passed thereon. The word
·deal' also includes the control over disciplinary and not mere
administrative jurisdiction. The control which is vested in the High '7--
Court is complete control subject only to the power of the Governor in
the matter of appointment including initial posting and promotion of
D the District Judge and dismissal, removal and reduction in rank of the
District Judges within the exercise of the control vested in the High
Court. The High Court can hold enquiries, impose punishments other
than dismissal or removal subject, however, to the conditions of
service to a right of appeal, if granted by the conditions of service, and _...J...
to the giving of an opportunity of showing cause as required by Clause
E (2) of Art. 311 unless such an opportunity is dispensed with by the
Governor acting under the provisos (b) and (c) to that clause. The
High Court alone could make enquiries into disciplinary conduct. lt
was held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to dismiss the District
Judge. Accordingly it was quashed. That ratio has no application to
the facts in this case since the Act, Regulations and the Resolutions
F empowered the Divisional Board and its Standing Committee·to deal
with use of unfair means at final examinat10ns including fabrication of~
documents issued by the Board as an integral part of the power of the
Divisional Board. Similarly, the ratio in Taj Pal Singh (dead) through
Lrs. v. State of U.P.' & Anr., (1986] 3 SCR 429 also is inapplicable to
the facts of this case. In that case, the facts were that while the appel-
G !ant was working as the District and Sessions Judge, the State Govt.
moved the High Court to his premature retirement. The Administra- )
tive Judge agreed with Government's proposal to retire the appellant~
after giving him three months' notice, the Governor passed the
impugned order compulsorily retiring the appellant. Three days there-
after the Administrative Committee had approved the opinion of the
H Administrative Judge which was transmitted to the Government.
M.B.O.E. v. K.S. GANDHI [RAMASWAMY, J.] 789

-( Assailing the action of the Government the writ petition was filed
A
which was dismissed by the High Court, but on appeal this court held -
that the Administrative Judge was oat competent to recommend to the
Governor to compulsorily retire the District and Sessions Judge and .
the order of the Government made persuant thereto was declared
illegal. This Court reiterated that the High Court has power under
Art. 235 to make rules for its administrative convenience, but since B
the impugned action was not in pursuance of that rule, the action was
~ot upheld. That ratio also renders little assistance to the respondents
for the reasons that the Standing Committee, as stated earlier is an
integral part of while exercising the powers, under Art. 226 or Art. 136
of the Constitution, by the High Court or of this Court, are not sitting
as a court of appeal on the findings of facts recorded by the Standing
Committees (domestic enquiry body), nor have power to evaluate the c
evidence as an appellate court and to come to its own conclusions. If
_---< the conclusions reached by the Board can be fairly supported by the
evidence on record then the High Court or this Court has to uphold the
decision, though as appellate court of facts, may be inclined to take a
different view. D

The contention of M/s. Chidambaram, Jaitley, Salve and Cama,
the learned counsel for the students, is that the students were minors;
neither the parents nor anybody like an Advocate was permitted to
~ assist the students. Answers to the questionnaire were extracted from
the students to confess their guilt. No adequate opportunity was given E
to the students at the enquiry. No-one on behalf of the Board
· acquainted with the Divisional Board and its acts are for and on behalf
of the Divisional Board. Accordingly the Board must be deemed to
have passed the impugned notification as per the scheme of the provi-
sions of the Act and the Regulations. Therefore, the finding of the
learned Judge Sugla, J. that the Standing Committee had no power to F
-'-'...--take the impugned decision, etc. without approval of the Divisional
Board is clearly illegal and cannot be sustained.

The question then is whether the candidates or their parents or
guardians are privy to the fradulent fabrication. Since we are informed
that investigation in this regard by the Police is in progress, we refrain G
to express any final opinion in this regard. Suffice to state that the
)..._records clearly establish that there was a fraudulent fabrication of the
moderators' marks-sheets of 283 candidates including the respon-
dents herein. The question, therefore, emerges whether the conclu-
sion reached by the Standing Committee that the fabrication was done
at the behest of either the candidate or the parents or the guardians to H
790 SUPREME COUR,T REPORTS [ 1991] 1 S.C.R.

their advantage is based on records,. We remind ourselves that the ).r-
A facts was examined to explain as to how the moderators"sheets were
dealt with after the board screened the marks, but before taking to
Pune to 'feed the computer,· nor an. opportunity was given to cross
examine them. The evidence without sub_jecting it to cross-examination
is of no value. Enquiry ieport"is not a report in the eye of law. It does
B not contain any· statement of facts, ·n9r reasons recorded. It merely
records conclusions~ When seven members were appointed it is not
expected that all of them would submit uniform stereo typed reports to___.___
the Standing Committee. The Standing Committee did not apply its
mind to the facts, nor recorded reasons in support of its conclusions
that the examinees/parents/guardians were parties to the fabrication ---;: _
and the fabrication was done at their behest. Sri Chidambaram further
c contended that the Board should establish the guilt of the examinees
beyond all reasonable doubts. Shri Jaitley, Sri Cama and Sri Salve
though did not support Sri Chidambaram that the standard of proof ',...--
must be beyond all reasonable doubt, they argued that Standard of f
proof must be a high degree akin to trial in a criminal case. The Board
D· did not discharge its duty, on the other hand the Board had presumed
that fabrication was done for the benefit of the examjnees. The test of
benefit to an examinee is preposterous. There is no presumption that
the fabrication was done at the behest of either the examinees/parents/
guardians. It must be established by the Board as of fact that the
examinees/parents/guardians were responsible for fabricating the ~
E Moderators' mark-sheets. Thus no evidence was placed on record, nor
wait proved; that, therefore, the findings of the Standing Committee
are clearly based on no evidence. The learned Judges of the High ·
Court were justified in reaching the conclusion thatthe Board had not
established that the fabrication was done at the behest of the
examinees/parents/guardians. This was resisted by Sri T.R. Andh-
F yarujana, learned counsel appearing for the Board. It was his conten-
tion that all the examinees admitted in answers to the questionnaire --::_~
that tampering was done and it was to their advantage. In view of the
admission, the need to examine any person from the concerned section
was obviated. Fabrication cannot be done except to benefit the
examinees. The fabricator had done it for reward in concert with out-
G side agencies. Therefore, the inference from these facts drawn by the
Standing Committee that the examinees/parents/guardians were res- ;
ponsible to fabricate the moderators' marks-sheets is based on evi'-'~
dence. Proper enquiry was conducted giying reasonable opportunity to
the candidates. Show cause notices set out the material facts on which
the Board intends to place reliance. The examinees submitted their
H explanations and also answered the questionnaire. On consideration
M.B.O.E. v. K.S. GANDHI [RAMASWAMY, J.) 791

~thereof the Standing Committee had reached the conclusions of the
guilt of the examinees/parents/guardians. This is based on record. It is A
not open to the High Court to evaluate the evidence to come to its own
conclusions. Thereby the High Court has committed manifest error of
law warranting interference by this Court.

Art. 5 lA of the Constitution enjoins every citizen, as a fundamen- B
~l duty, to promote harmony and spirit of common brotherhood
among the people, to develop th~ scientific temper, humanism and the
spirit of inquiry and reform; to strive towards excellence in all spheres
of individual and collective activity so that the nation constantly rises

- ,-- to higher levels of endeavour and achievement. Art. 29(2) declares
education as fundamental right. The native endowments of men are by
no means equal. Education means a process which .provides for
intellectual, moral and physical development of a child for good
c
~ character formation; mobility to social status; an opportunity to scale
equality and a powerful instrument to bring about social· change
including necessary awakening among the people. According to
Bharat Ratna Dr. Ambedkar education is the means to promote D
intellectual, moral and social democracy. In D.M.K. Public School v.
Regional Joint Director of Hyderabad, AIR 1936 (A.P.) 204 one.of us
(K. Ramaswamy, J.) held that education lays foundation of good citi-
). zenship and a principal instrument to awaken the child to intellectual
-and cultural pursuits and values in preparing the child for latter profes-
sional training and help him to adjust to the environment; E

- In nation building activities, education is a powerful lever to
uplift the poor. Education should, therefore, be co-related to the
social, political or economic needs of our developing nation fostering
secular values breaking the barriers of castims, linguism, religious
bigotry and it should act as an instrument of social change. Education F
I- :: system should be so devised as to meet these realities of life. Educa-
tion nourishes intellectual advancement to develop dignity of person
without which there is neither intellectual excellence nor pursuit of
happiness. Education thus kindless its flames for pursuit of excellence,
enables and ennobles the young mind to sharpen his/her intellect more
with reasoning than blind faith to reach intellectual heights and G
~nculcate in him or her to strive for social equality and dignity of
person.

Teacher occupies pride of place next below the parents as he/she
imparts education and disciple the students. On receiving salary from
public exchequer he/she owes social responsibility and accountability H
792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 1 S.C.R.

to disciple the. students by total dedication and sincere teaching. It ).-
A would appear that their fallen standards and rectitude is also a con··
tributory factor to the indicipline among the students. The students,
too, instead of devoting his or her precious time to character building
and to pursue courses of study studiously and diligently in the pursuit
of knowledge and exceIJence, dissipate their precious time and many
B indulge in mass copying at the final examinations or use unfair means.
Some even do not hesitate to threaten the dutiful invigilators with dire~
consequences.

In G.B.S. Omkar v. Shri Venkateswara University, AIR 1981
A.P. 163 P.A. Choudhary, J., in the context of finding the student , --,. ·-
guilty of mal-practices held, that "I regretfully note that standards of .-.
c discipline and education presently detaining in many Universities in
our country leave a good lot to be desired. They are low and falling
lower every day. The fall-out of these low standards of University r
education on liberal profession is proving to be nearly catastrophic
..... It is no wonder that some of our Universities have ceased to be
D centres of learning and have grown into battle-fields for warring Caste
groups." It was heid that what the Writ Court under Art. 226 need to
consider is whether fair opportunity had been given to a petitioner and
he had been treated squarely and whether the student had a fair deal
with the University. Once the procedural formalities are complied
with, in the absence of any allegation of malafide, it must be presumed
E that the University had acted bona fide and honestly so Jong as there is
the evidence justifying the inference arrived at without there being a
serious procedural irregularity. The Writ Court would not interfere
with an order of educational institution. Therefore, what the writ court
needs to do is to find whether fair and reasonable opportunity has been
given to the students in the given facts.
F
From this background the question emerges whether the ~,--1-
. impugned notification is vitiated by any procedural irregularity under
the provisions of the Act, regulations and the Resolutions referred
hereinbefore or violative of the principles of natural justice.

G The students involved at the examination of secondary education
are by and large minors but that by itself would not be a factor to hold J
that the students were unfairly treated at an inquiry conducted during~
the domestic inquiry. Assistance of an Advocate to the delinquent at
a domestic enquiry is not a part of the principles of natural ·justice. It
depends on the nature of the inquiry and the peculiar circumstances
H and facts of a particular case. The regulations and the rules of enquiry
M.B.0.E. v. K.S. GANDHI [RAMASWAMY, J.] 793

~specifically excluded the assistance of an Advocate at the inquiry. A
. Therefore, the omission to provide the assistance of a counsel at the
inquiry is not violative of the principles of natural justice. The show
cause notice furnished wealth of material particulars on which the
tampering was alleged to be founded and given the opportunity to each
student to submit the explanation and also to adduce evidence, oral or
B
documentary at the inquiry. Each student submitted the explan\J.tion
denying the allegation. At the inquiry the questionnaire in the pro-
~rma was given to each student. It is undoubted that the allegation of
fabrication was stated to have been done at the behest of either the
student/parents or guardians and the parents or guardians were not
_._,permitted to participate in the inquiry. Inspection of documents was
~· given. Their answer-sheets and marks secured were perused by the c
students and were asked to testify whether the answer-books belonges
to him or her and to identify the marks awarded by the examiner to
. each answer to the question and the total marks awarded. It was also
----(asked to verify and state whether the moderator's marks-sheets were
tampered in the concerned subject or subjects as the case may be. The
D
student could easily identify and in fact identified his or her answer
books and verified the marks awarded and answered positively that the.
marks were fabricated in the moderators' mark-sheets. The question-
naire was also given to indicate their educational background in the
previous school years and also the marks they expected at the final
~xaminations. The need of the assistance of the parents/guardians was
E
thus absolutely nil. Further question in the proforma was to ascertain
from the students, due to tampering, whether or not the marks were

-- increased to his or her advantage. It could be answered by a mere look
at the marks. No outside assistance is needed. All the students have
admitted that the answer books belong to them. They also admitted
the marks initially awarded by the examiner or added or subtracted, if p
any, by the moderators. They also admitted that the fabrication in the
~tn'foderators' marks-sheets in the subject· or su.l:>jects and the marks
\ were increased to their advantage. They also denied the complicity of
him or her or of parents or guardians. It is not the case of the respon-
, dents that they were coerced to answer the questions in a particular
manner. It is obvious from the record that they had prior consultations
with the counsel. Thus it could be seen that the procedure adopted at
G
the inquiry is fair and just and it is not vitiated by any procedural
~gularity nor is violative of the principles of natural justice. The
absence of opportunity to the parents or guardians, in this background
does not vitiate the legality or validity of the inquiry conducted or
decision of the Committee. • ·
794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 1 S.C.R.

It is true, as contended by Sri Chidambaram and reiterated by;>--
A other counsel, that the· Inquiry Report does contain only conclusions
bereft of the statement of facts and reasons in support thereof. As
pointed out by Sri Cama that in some of the reports, the body was
written in the hand writing of one or other person and it was signed by
the Inquiry Officer concerned. But when an inquiry against 283
B students was conducted, it is not. expected that each Inquiry Officer
alone should write the report under his/her hand. In the circumstances .
the Inquiry Officer obviously had the assistance of the staff in th~
office to write the body or the conclusions to his/her dictation and
he/she signed the report. The reports cannot be jettisoned on the
ground that the Inquiry Officer mechanically drew the conclusions in , /-w.:
the reports without applying his/her mind to the facts. The Enqu:iry '.:.
c Reports are not, therefore, bad in law.

In Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor & Ors., [1973] 2 SCC)--
836 this court speaking through M.M. Beg, J., for a Bench of two
Judges held in paragraph 28 at page 854 that the reasons are the links
D between the materials on which certain conclusions are based to the
actual conclusions. They disclose how mind is applied to the subject
matter for a decision, whether it is purely administrative .or quashi-
judicial. They would reveal nexus between the facts considered and
the conclusions reached. This view was reiterated in Gurdial Singh
1
Fijji v. State of Punjab & Ors., (1979] 2 SCC 368. Those two cases-"""\
E relied on by Sri Chidambaram, the rules/regulations required record-
ing of reasons in support of the conclusion as mandatory.

Unless the rule expressly or by necessary implications, excludes
recording of reasons, it is implicit that the principles of natural justice
---
or fair play does require recording of reasons as a part of fair procedure. In
F an administrative decision, its order/decision itself may not contain
reasons. It may not be the requirement of the rules, but at the least,~
the record should disclose reasons. It may not be like a judgment. But f
the reasons may be precise. In S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, J.T~
1990 (3) SC 630 the Constitution Bench of this Court survey~d the entire
case law in this regard, and we need not burden the Judgment· to
G reiterate them once over and at page 643 in paragraph 40 it.held that
except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with ex- }
pressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exer-4\
cising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the
reasons for its decision. In para 36 it was further held that recording of
reasons excludes changes of arbitrariness and ensure a degree of fair-
H ness in the process of decision making. The said principle would apply
M.B.O.E. v. K.S. GANDHI (RAMASWAMY, J.] 795

-...( equally to all decisions and its applications cannot be confined to deci-
A
sions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. "It is not
required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a
Court of law." The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on
particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the
reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has
given the consideration to the points in controversy. The need for
recording reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the
~riginal stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such
an order, need not give separate reasons. If the appellate or revisional

- authority disagrees, the reasons must be contained in the order under
-... challenge. Thus it is settled law that the reasons are harbinger between
the mind of the maker of the order to the controversy in question and
c.
the decision or conclusion arrived at. It also exclude the chances to
reach arbitrary, whimsical or capricious decision or conclusion. The
reasons assure an inbuilt support to the conclusion/decision reached.
----..'
The order when it effects the right of a citizen or a person, irrespective
of the fact, whether it is quasi-judicial or administrative fair play
requires recording of germane and relevant precise reasons. The D
recording of reasons is also an assurance that the authority concerned
consciously applied its mind to the facts on record. It also aids the
appellate or revisional authority or the supervisory jurisdiction of the
1
High Court under Art. 226 or the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court
~- under Art. 136 to see whether the authority concerned acted fairly and
justly to meet out justice to the aggrieved person. E

- From this perspective, the question is whether om1ss10n to
record reasons vitiates the impugned order or is in violation of the
principles of natural justice. The omipresence and omniscience of the
principle of natural justice acts as deterrence to arrive at arbitrary
decision in flagrant infraction of fair play. But the applicability of the F
· ~principles of natural justice is not a rule of thumb or a straight jacket
tormula as an abstract proposition of law. It depends on the facts of
the case nature of the inquiry and the effect of the order/decision on
the rights of the person and attendant circumstances. It is seen from
the record and is not disputed, that all the students admitted, the
factum of fabrication and it was to his or her advantage and that the G
\ ~ubject/subjects in which fabrication was committed belong to him or
~er. In view of these admissions the Inquiry Officer obviously did not
find it expedient to reiterate all the admissions made. If the facts are
disputed, necessarily the authority or the Inquiry Officer, on consi-
deration of the material on record, should record reasons in support of
the conclusion reached. Since the facts are admitted, the need to their H
796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 1 S.C.R.

A
reiteration was obviated and so only conclusions have been stated in >--
the reports. The omission to record reasons in the present case is
neither illegal, nor is violative of the principles of natural justice.
Whether the conclusions are proved or not is yet another question and
would need detailed consideration.

B In Khardah Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, [1964] 3 SCR 506 at
p. 514 the ratio that the Enquiry Report must contain reasons in sup-
port of the findings drawn neatly and briefly is of no assistance for the -~
aforestated facts of this case. The ratio in A. K. Roy, etc. etc. v. Union of

c
India & Ors., [ 1982] 1 SCC 271 that the aid of friend could be taken to
assist the detenue and in Pett v. Grehound Racing Association Ltd.,
[1968] 2 All Eng. Reports 545 the right to appoint an Agent to repre-
-
sent the case of the petitioner are also of no assistance since the rule
expressly excluded such a representation. The ratio in Union of India
v. H.C. Goel, [1964] 4 SCR 718 also does not help the respondents for
the reason that it is not a case of no evidence and the conclusions were
reached on the basis of the admission made by the respondents. The
D ratio in M/s. Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen &
Ors., [1971] 2 SCC 617 also does not apply to the facts of this case for
the reasons that the need to examine the witnesses on behalf of the
Board was obviated by the· admissions made by the examinees. The
ratio in Shanti Prasad Jain v. The Director of Enforcement, [1963] 3
SCR 297 is equally of no assistance to the respondents since the
E contention that the circumstances under which the fabrication of the
moderators' mark-sheets came to be made is not a relevant fact.
Therefore, there is no need to examine the concerned officials in the
State Board .to explain as to how and who dealt with the papers from
the time recounting was done in the office till the moderators' mark-
sheets were sent to Pune to feed the computer. The ratio in Merla
--
F Ramanne v. Nallaparaju & Ors., [1955] 2 SCR 941 and Kashinath
Dikshita v. Union of India & Ors., [1986] 3 SCC 229 also do not assist ~.
the respondents for the reason that the answer books of the concerned
students, the marks awarded by the examiners or addition or altera-
tion, if any, made by the moderators and fabrication of the modera··
tors' mark-sheets were admittedly given for personal inspection to the
G concerned students and given them an opportunity to inspect the
record and thereafter they made admission. The further contention of
Sri Cama that the Standing Committee did not deal individually the ___...(_
.answers given by each student and the decision was not based on
evidence is without force as tlie conclusions are based on the admis-
sions. Equally the need to consider each case on merits is obviated by
H the admission made by every student. The ratio in Government Medi-
M.B.O.E. v. K.S. GANDHI [RAMASWAMY, J.] 797

~ cal Store Depot, Karna! v. State of Haryana & Anr., [1986] 3 SCR 450
A
at p. 454 that the charges are vague is also of no assistance to the facts
of this case. The ratio in M/s. Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Gangadhar
& Ors., [1964] 2 SCR 809 at p. 825 that the documents must be sup-
plied at lea.st 48 hours in advance is also of no help to the respondents
in, view of the admissions made by the respondents. The ratio in Tej
Pa[ Singh's case (supra) that mere inspection of the documents will not B
;,......._ cure the def-c~t of procedure or violation of principles of natural justice
also does not apply to the facts of this case. The ratio in State of Punjab
v. Bhagat Ram, [1975] 2 SCR 370 that the supply of synopsis of the
material is not s~fficient compliance with the principle of natural
n
, ..-- . justice, also does Jt render any assistance to the respondents. The
- ratio in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor
Sabha, [1980] 2 SCR 146 at p. 202 that the conclusion and the findings c
are in different hand-writings, which would show the non-application
-----..{ of the mind to the facts and it violates the principle of natural justice
also does not apply to the facts of this case. The ratio in Union of India
& Ors. v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, JT 1990 (4) SC 456 also does not apply
to the facts in this case as the report is solely based on the admission D
made by the examinees and no new material has been relied upon by
the Enquiry Officers. Undoubtedly, it is settled law that the right to
life includes right to reputation and livelihood and that the individual
')._____as an entity is entitled to the protection of Art. 21, but in view of the
facts of this case the ratio in Vishwa Nath v. State of Jammu & Kash-
mir, [1983] 1 SCC 215 and Olga Tellis & Ors., etc. v. Bombay Munici- E
pal Corporation & Ors., etc., [1985] 3 sec 545 also do not help the
- respondents. The further contention of Sri Salve that the order must
be a speaking order preceded by a fair enquiry and the report must be
based on cogent evidence, and in this case all the requirements are
lacking is also an argument of despair. Therefore, for the reasons
given earlier, the argument stands rejected. F
4...:.:"'-
.._
The next contention that the notification is vitiated for the
reasons that the Standing Committee itself did not record any reason
in support of its conclusion that the examinees or the parents or the
guardians are parties to the fabrication cannot be sustained for the
reason that the regulation itself postulates that if the Committee disag- G
)..._ rees with the Inquiry Officer then only it is obligatory to record
reasons. Since the Committee agreed with the report, there is no need,
on their part, to record the reasons. The impugned notification, there-
fore, is not vitiated by violation of the rules of natural justice.

The crucial question, therefore, is whether the conclusions H
. I
798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19911 1 s.c.R.

A reached by the authorities that the examinees, their parents or guar-
dians were parties to the fabrication. antl·whether their complicity was
established from record and whether the evidence was sufficient to
support such conclusion reached by the Standing Committee or the
Enquiry Officer.

B Counsel· cm· either side generated considerable debate~~
standard of proof' in- a domestic enquiry. Mr. Jaitlerypla,d reliance ~
on paragraph 18 of Vol. 17 of Halsbury's Law of En ,1and, Fourth - "-
Edition, at page 16, which reads thus: :

"To succeed on any issue the partyt~earing the legal ..... ~
burden of proof must ( 1) satisfy a judge or jury of the _...
c likelihood of the truth of his case by adducing a greater
weight of evidence than his opponent, and (2) adduce evi-
dence sufficient to satisfy them to the required standard or ~
degree of proof. The standard differs in criminal and civil
cases. In civil cases the standard of proof is satisfied on a
D· balance of probabilities. However, even within this
formula variations in subject matter or in allegations will
affect the standard required; the more serious the allega-
tion, for example fraud, crime or professional misconduct,
the higher will be the required degree of proof, although it
will not reach the criminal standard. In criminal cases, the ---'.,_
E standard required of the prosecution is proof beyond
reasonbale doubt. This standard is also requisite in case of
cominittal ·for contempt, and in pension claims cases. In
matrimonal cases it seems that proof on balance of pro·
babilities is sufficient. Once a matter is established beyond
reasonable doubt it must be taken for all purposes of law to
F be a fact, as there is no room for a distinction between what
is found by inference from the evidence and what is found ~
as a positive fact."

and contended that the standard of proof of fabrication of record in a
domestic inquiry does not differ from criminal charge and it must be of
G a higher degree. In the Board of High School and Intermediate Educa-
tion U. P. v. Bagleshar Persad & Ors., [ 1967] 3 SCR 767 relied on by
Sri Andhyarjuna the facts were that the appellant Board accepting the
findings of the committee that the respondent used unfair means in
answering the subjects, cancelled the declaration of the results of the
respondent in the High School Certificate Examination held in 1960.
H The charges were based on the facts that in the Hindi paper the
M.B.O.E. v. K.S. GANDHI [RAMASWAMY, J.] 799

respondent gave wrong answers to a particular question in the same
way in which the answers have been given by another candidate who
was having consecutive number. The High Court held that .the findings
of the Committee were based on no evidence and.quashed the cancel-
lation of the results. On appeal, this Court held that the respondent
admitted that the mistakes in answers in the two papers were identical
and he pleaded that he could not say anything as to why this happened.
The proof of charges was inferred that as either the respondent copied
from the answer book of the candidate with the consecutive number or·
that it was conveyed by the said candidate or that both of them had
copied from any other source. It was accordingly held that it would
amount to the adoption of unfair means. The High Court, therefore,
committed error in assuming that there is no evidence in proof of it. At
page 774 this Court further held that in dealing with question as to
whether the Committee was justified in arriving at its conclusion
against the respondent it would not be reasonable to exclude from the
consideration of the circumstances on which the whole enquiry came
to be held and the general background of the atmosphere in the exami-
nation hall. It was also further held at page 775 that educational D
institutions like the universities set up enquiry committees to deal with
the problem of adoption of unfair means by candidate and normally it
is within the jurisdiction of such domestic tribunals to decide all rele-
vant que,stions in the light of the evidence adduced before them. In the
matter of the adoption of unfair means direct evidence may sometime
be available but cases may arise where direct evidence is not available E
and the question will have to be considered in the light of the pro-
babilities and circumstantial evidence. This is the problem with the
educational-institution. How to face it, is a serious problem and unless
there is justification to do so, court should be slow to interfere with the
decisions of domestic tribunal appointed by the education body like
universities. In dealing with the validity of the impugned order passed F
- -:w.:-- by the universities under Art. 226 the High Court is not sitting in an
appeal over the decision on this question. Its jurisdiction is limited and
though it is true that if the impugned order is not supported by any
evidence, the High Court may .be justified to quash the order. But the
conclusion that the impugned order is not supported by any evidence
must be reached after considering the question as to whether the pro- G
babilitie~and circumstantial evidence do not justify the said conclu-
sion. The enquiry held by domestic tribunals in such cases must, no
·doubt be fair. and the students must be given adequate opportunity to
defend themselves and holding such enquiries, the tribunal must fol·
low the rules of natural justice. Accordingly, it was held that the
appeal was allowed and the order of the High Court was set aside and H
800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] ·1 S.C.R.

A that of the domestic tribunal was confirmed.

In Bihar School Examination Board v. Sub has Chandra Sinha &
Ors., [1970] 3 SCR 963 this Court emphasised that the essence of an
examination is that the worth of every person is appraised without any
B assistance from an outside source. The academic standards require
that the authority's appreciation of the problem must be respected. A
full-fledged judicial inquiry was not required. It is not necessary to
conduct an inquiry in each individual case to satisfy itself who are the
candidates that have adopted unfair means when the examination as a

..
whole had to go. It was further held at p. 968 E to H that "while we do
not wish to whittle down the requirement of natural justice and fair-
e play in cases where such requirement may be said to arise, we do not
w~nt that this court should be understood as having stated that an
enquiry with a right to representation must always precede in every
case, however, different. The universities are responsible for their
standard and conduct of the examination. The essence of the examina-
D tion is that the worth of every person is appraised without any assis-
tance from an outside source. It cannot be held that a detailed quasi-
judicial enquiry with right to its alumini to plead and lead evidence etc.
is preceded before the result are withheld or examinations cancelled.
If there is sufficient material on which it could be demonstrated that
the Authority was right in its conclusion that the examination ought to J
be cancelled then academic standards require that the Authority's ~
E
appreciation of the problem must be respected. It would not be for the
courts to say that we should have examined all the candidates or even
their representatives with a view to ascertaining whether they had
received assistance or not. To do this, would encourage indiscipline, if
not also perjury. It is true as stated by Sri Chidambaram that the above
ratio was laid in the context of the cancellation of examination of the
F
entire centre. But the general principles must be kept in view while
dealing with the problem faced by the academic institutions. ~ - _,.

In Seth Gulabchand v. Seth Kudilal and Ors., (1966] 3 SCR 623
this Court held that there is no difference between cases in which
charges of a fradulent or criminal character are made and cases in
G
which such charges are not made. While striking the balance of proba-
bility, the court would keep in mind the presumption of hoq~sty and
innocence or the nature of the crime or fraud charged. The rules . ~.
applicable to circumstantial evidence in criminal cases would not apply
to civil cases. The ordinary rules governing civil cases of balance of
H probabilities will continue to apply.
M.B.O.E.· v. K.S. GANDHI [RAMASWAMY, J.] 801

In Ghazanfar Rashid v. Board, H.S. & I. Edn., U.P. & Ors., , A
AIR 1970 Allahabad 209 a full Bench, speaking through ours learned
brother K.N. Singh, J. (as he then was) dealing with the standard or
proof of the charge of use of unfair means at the examination, it was
held that it was the duty of the Examination Committee etc., to main-
tain purity of examination and if examinee is found to have used unfair
means at the examination, it is the duty of the Examination Committee ,B
,>-__ . to take action against the erring examinees to maintain the educational
standard. Direct evidence is available in some cases but in a large
number of cases, direct evidence is not available. In that situation the
Examination Committee as of necessity to rely on circumstantial evi-
- - - dence which may include the answer given by the examinee, the report
of the Superintendent of the centre, the invigilator and the report of
the experts and other attending circumstances. The Examination Com- c
mittee, if relies upon such evidence to come to the conclusion that the
----...: examinee has used unfair means in answering questions then it is not
open to the High Court to interfere with that decision, merely,
because the High Court may take a different view on re-assessment of
those circumstances. While it is open to the High Court to interfere D
with the order of the quasi-judicial authority, if it is not supported by
any evidence or if the order as passed in contravention of the statutory
provisions of the law or in violation of the principles of natural justice,
)...__ the court has no jurisdiction to quash the order merely on the ground
that the evidence available on record is insufficient or inadequate or
on the ground that different view could possibly be taken on the evi- E
dence available on the record. The Examination Committee has
_.. jurisdiction to take decision in the matter of use of unfair means not
only on direct evidence but also on probabilities and circumstantial
evidence. There is no scope for importing the principles of criminal
trial while considering the probative value of probabilities and circum-
-~ stantial evidence. The Examination Committee is not bound by techni- F
-· cal rules of evidence and procedure as are applicable to Courts. We
respectfully agree with the ratio.

In Miller v. Minister of Pensions, [1947] All Eng. Law Reports
372 at p. 374 Denning J., as he then was, reiterated that the evidence
against the petitioner must have the same degree of cogency as is G
required to discharg~ a burden in a civil case. It must carry a reason-
able degree of probability, but not so high as is required in a criminal
case. If the evidence is such that the tribunal can say: "We think it
more probable than not, the burden is discharged but, if the pro-
babilities are equal, it is not."
H
802 SUPREME COURT REPOKr:s [1991] 1 S.C.R.

In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Chet Ram & Ors., [1989] 2 SCC 425 ~
A relied on by Sri Chidambaram, this Court dealt with the proof of guilt
of the accused at a criminal trial. This Court held that when two views
are plausible, the view being taken must have soi:ne content of plausi-
bility in it and without the same, the other view cannot be countenance
in law as a plausible alternative. It must be remembered that at a
B criminal trial the burden of proof is always on the prosecution. It must
establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. If there . ~
exist a plausible alternative view, its benefit must be extended only to
the accused and not to the prosecution. Therefore, the ratio therein is
inapplicable to a proceeding either in the civil case or in an enquiry
before a domestic tribunal. State of t!.P. v. Krishna Gopal & Anr.,
[ 1988] 4 SCC 302 at p. 314 also relates to criminal trial. In paragraph
c 26 in assessing the evidence adduced by the prosecution, this Court
laid that the concept of probability, and the degrees of it, cannot
obviously be expressed in terms of units to be mathematically
enumerated as to how :inany of such units constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable subjective element in the
D evaluation of the degree of probability and the quantum of proof.
Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on the robust
common sense and, ultimately, on the trained intitutions of the
Judge. In evaluating the circumstantial evidence in Hanumant v. The
State of Madhya Pradesh, [1952] SCR 1091 at p. 1097 the Court
approved the statement of Baron Alderman in Reg v. Hodge, [198S] 2
E Law, 227 that:

"The mind was apt to take a pleasure in adapting circums-
tances to one another, and even in straining them a little, if
need be, to force them to form parts, of one connected
whole; and the more ingenious the mind of the individual,
F the more likely was it, considering such matters, to over
reach and mislead itself, to supply some little link that is ~
wanting, to take for granted some fact consistent with its
previous theories and necessary to render them complete."

It was held that in evaluating the evidence of circumstantial
G nature it is the duty of the prosecution that all the circumstances must
be fully ~stabf lished circumsfances shdouTldh'be condsistent only with the -~
b ypothes1s o the gui 1t of the accuse . is stan ards of proof also .is
not relevant not to be extended to c;onsider the evidence in an inquiry
by the domestic tribunal. The ratio in Bank of India v. J.A.H.
Chinoy, AIR 1950 PC 90 that the appellate court would be reluctant to
H differ from conclusion of the trial Judge if his conclusion is based on
M.B.O.E. v. K.S. GANDHI [RAMASWAMY, J.] 803
•'

~ the impression made by a person in the .witness box is also not germane
A
for the purpose of this case. It was laid therein that inferences and
assumptions founded on a variety of facts and circumstances which, in
themselves, offer no direct or positive support for the conclusion
reached, the right of the appellate court to review this inferential
process cannot be denied. While dealing with proof of fraud it was held
that speculation is not enough to bring home a charge of fraudulent B
conspiracy.
~
In Khwaja v. Secretary of State, [1983] 1 All Eng. Law Reports 785
(H. L.) dealing with the functions of the Immigration Authorities and

--
of the Courts, Lord Wilberforce at p. 7877, laid the law that the allega-
'· ----- tion that permission to enter into the country by an immigrant was
obtained by fraud or deceit being of a serious character and involving
c
issues of personal liberty requires a corresponding degree of satis~
-~ factory evidence. If the Court is not satisfied with any part of the
evidence, it may remit the matter for reconsideration or itself receive
further evidence. It should quash the detention order where the evi-
dence was not such as the authority should have relied on or when: the D
evidence received does not justify the decision reached or, of course,
for any serious procedural irregularity. At p. 784 Lord Scarman held
that it is not necessary to import in the civil proceedings of judicial
review the formula devised by Judges for the guidance of juries in
)._ _ criminal cases. The reviewing court will, therefore, require to be
satisfied that the facts which are required for the justification of the E
restraint put on liberty do exist. The flexibility of the civil standard of
proof suffices to ensure that the court will require the high degree of
probability which is appropriate to what is at stake. The nature and
gravity of an issue necessarily determines the manner of attaining
reasonable satisfaction of the truth of the issue. Therefore, the civil
standard of flexibility be applied to deal with immigration cases. F
-V-
In Sodhi Transport Co. & Anr. etc. v. State of U.P. & Anr. etc.,
[ 1986] 1 SCR 939 at p. 954 this Court dealing with rebutable presump-
tion held that:

- ~
"A presumption is not in itself evidence but only makes a
prima facies case for party in whose favour it exists. It is a
rule concerning evidence. It indicates the person on whom
the burden of proof lies. When presumption is conclusive,
G

it obviates the production of any other evidence to dislodge
the conclusion to be drawn on proof of certain facts. But
when it is rebuttable it only points out the party on whom H
804 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 1 S.C.R.

lies the duty of going forward with evidence on the facts
A presumed, and when that party has produced evidence
fairly and reasonably tending to show that the real fact is
not as presumed, the purpose of presumption is over. Then
the evidence will determine the true nature of the fact to be
established, the rules of presumption are reduced from
B enlightened human knowledge and experience and are
drawn from the connection, relation and coincidence of
facts and circumstances."

Bhandari v. Advocates Committee, (1956] All Eng. Law Reports 742
(PC) is also a case concerning the professional rµisconduct. In proof of the
charge it was held that it is the duty of the professional domestic
c tribunal investigating the allegation to apply a high standard of proof
and not to condemn on a mere balance of probabilities. In Glynn v.
Keele University & Anr., (1971] 2 All Eng. Law Reports, 89 (Chancery
Division) relied on by Sri Salve, the question arose whether failure to
give an opportunity to the students before the suspension is violative
D of the principles of natural justice. It was held that the student did not
deny commission of the offence, therefore, it was held that the student
suffered no injustice by reason of the breach of the rules. Further
while dealing with the scope of the inquiry by the domestic tribunal, it
was held that the society is charged with the supervision and upbring-
ing of the pupil under tu ti on, be the society, a university or college or a
E school. Where this relationship exists it is quite plain that on .the one
hand in certain circumstances the body or individual acting on behalf
of the society must be regarded as acting in a quasi-judicial capacity-
expulsion from the society is the obvious example. On the other hand,
there exists a wide range of circumstances in which the body or indi-
vidual is concerned to impose penalties by a way of domestic disci-
F pline. In those circumstances the body or individual is not acting in a
quasi-judicial capacity at all but in a ministerial capacity, i.e. in the
performance of the rights and duties vested in the society as to the
upbrining and supervision of the members of the society. No doubt
there is a moral obligation to act fairly, but this moral obligation does
not, lie within the purview of the court in its control over quasi-judicial
G acts. The ratio relied on by Shri Salve, far from helping the respon-
dents, is consistent with our view. The ratio in In Re: An Advocate,
AIR 1989 SC 245 also concerned with professional misconduct of an
Advocate and higher standard of proof of the charge of misconduct
was insisted upon. Equally so in Shri Krishan v. The Kurukshetra
University, Kurukshetra., AIR 1976 SC 376. These decisions relied on
H by Sri Jaitley also do not assist us.
M.B.O.E. v. K.S. GANDHI [RAMASWAMY, J.] 805
,.

The contention of Sri Cama placing any reliance on Shivajirao
A
Nilangekar Patil v. Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi & Ors. and vice versa,
[ 1967] 1 SCR 458 that the Vice-Chancellor would not have done what
he did except with the instructions of the Chief Minister who was to be
benefitted by getting his daughter passed in M.D. was not accepted by
this Court and that it was further contended that the benefit test is a
preposterous one and the preponderence of probabilities is not possi- B
ble to be deduced from the test, does not appear to be sound. This
Court noted that the Chief Minister was:not prepared, as suggested by
the Division Bench, to face an inquiry and that, therfore, substituted
to the findings of the Division Bench, in the penultimate paragraph of

- the judgment that the court would be cognizant of the steep decline of
public standards, public moral and public morale which have been con- C
taminating the social environment and emphasised that "where such
situation cry out the Court should not and cannot remain mute and
dumb" and it is necessary to cleanse public life.

· It is thus well settled law that strict rules of the Evidence Act,
and the standard of proof envisaged therein do not apply to depart~ D
mental. proceedings or domestic tribunal. It is open to the authorities
to receive and place on record all the necessary, relevant, cogent and
acceptable material facts though not proved strictly in conformity with
the Evidence Act. The material must be germane and relevant to the
facts in issue. In grave cases like forgery, fraud, conspiracy, misap-
propriation, etc. seldom direct evidence would be available. Only the E

-
circumstantial evidence would furnish the proof. In our considered
view inference from the evidence and circumstances must be carefully
distinguished from conjectures or speculation. The mind is prone to
take pleasure to adapt circumstances to one another and even in
straining them a little to force them to form parts of one connected
,•
.v
-- whole. There must be evidence direct or circumstances to deduce · F
necessary inferences in proof of the facts in issue. There can be no
inferences unless there are objective facts, direct or circumstantial
from which to infer the other fact which it is sought to establish. In
some cases the other facts can be inferred with as much practical as if
they had been actually observed. In other cases the inferences do not
go beyond reasonable probability. If there are no positive proved G
:>--- facts, oral, documentary or circumstantial from which the inferences
can be made the method of inference fails and what is left is mere
speculation or conjecture. Therefore, when an inference of proof that
a fact in dispute has been held established there must be some material
facts or circumstances on record from which such an inference could be
drawn. The standard of proof is not proof beyond reasonable doubt H
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 1 S.C.It ....__
"but" the preponderance of probabilities tending to draw ah inferetlce ~
A that the fact must be more probable. Standard of proof cannot be put
ih a straight Jacket formula. No mathematical formule could be laid ort
degree of proof. The probative value could be guaged from facts and
circumstances in a given case. The standard of proof is the same bo'th
in civil cases and domestic enquiries.

From this iegal setting we have to consider whether the inferertce ~
deduced by the Education Standing Committee that the fabrication of
moderators' mark-sheets was done at the behest of either the
examinee or the parent or guardian is based on the evidence on record.
It is already found that the examinees admitted the forgery of their '"--~ -
concerned moderators' mark-sheets resulting the increase of marks to ·-
c their advantage. The fabrication of the moderators 'mark-sheets was
done after the scrutiny by the concerned officials in the office of the
State Board at Bombay and before the moderators' mark-sheets were y
taken out to Pune to feed the computer. Why one is expected or
interested to wade through eighty thousand moderators' marks-sheets
to locate only the 283 examinees mark-sheets and add marks by fabri-
cation? Unless either the examinee or parent or guardian approached
the fabricator; given the number and instructed him/them to fabricate
the marks, it would not be possible to know their number to fabricate.
The act of fabrication is an offence. Merely it was done in one subject -~
or more than one makes little difference. Its gravity is not mitigated if
E it is commiitted in one subject alone. This l.s not an innocent act or a
casual mistake during the course of performance of the official duty as
is sought to be made out. It was obviously done as a concerted action.
In view of the admitted facts and above circumstances the necessary
conclusion that could unerringly be drawn would be that either the
examihee or the parent or guardian obviously was a privy to the fabri-
F cation ahd that the forgery was committed at his o'r her or partent's or
guardian's behest. It is, therefore, clear that the conclusion reached by -~
the Education Standing Committee that the fabrication was done at
the instance of either the examinees or their parents or guardians is
amply borne out from the record. The High Court in our view over-
stepped its supervisory jurisdiction and trenched into the arena of
G appreciation of evidence to arrive its own conclusions on the specious
plea of satisfying 'conscience of the court'. -~

The question then is whether the rules relating to mode of
punishment indicated in the Appendix 'A' to the resolution are
invalid. We have given our anxious thought to the contention and to
H the view of the High Court. In our view the punishments indicated in
•

M.B.O.E. v. K.S. GANDHI [RAMASWAMY, J.] 807 ,

. --ia:::: the last column is only the maxilpUm from which it cannot be inferred
th~t it left no discretion to the disciplinary authority. No axiomatic rule
c<m be laid that the rule making authority intended that under no
circumstances, the· examination Committee could award lesser
penalty. It depends on the natuer and gravity of the misconduct to be
!;ie~lt with by the disciplinary authority. In a given case, depending on ,
the nature and gravity of the misconduct lesser punishment may be
I.. meted out. So by mere prescription of maximum penalty rules do not
,,,.---.-. pepome invalid.

We have no hesitation to conclude that when the evidence
justified the examination Standing Committee to record the finding
that the examinees, parents or guardians are parties to the fabrication,
it is not open to the High Court under Art. 225 to itself evaluate the c
evidence and to interfere with the finding and to quash the impugned
notification. This Court under Art. 136 has to correct the illegalities
committed by the High Court when it exceeded its supervisory juris-
dii;tion under Art. 226. In view of the fair attitude adopted by the
q:mpsel for the Board, it is not necessary to go into the question of D
qµan tum of punishment.
In the light of the above finding, normally the appeals are to be
\ allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the impugned
_,,,.....__ notification dated August 31, 1990 upheld in toto. But we modify the
Iiigh Court's order as per the directions given in our order dated E
January 30, 1991, wherein we accepted the signed statement by the

- counsel for the Board without prejudice to their contention and
directed the Board (a) to allow all the candidates referred to in the
Notification of August 31, 1990 to appear at the S.S.C. examination to
be conducted in March, 1991 by the Board; and (b) to declare the
411tampered results of nine named candidates therein. The failed F
-V- candidates covered by the .notification and willing to appear in the
ensuing examination of March 1991, their applications will be accepted
if the same are submitted on or before 13th February, 1991 through
Heads of their respective schools. So far as the other candidates are
concerned, their results shall not be declared, but they will be permit-
ted to appear in the ensuing examination of the Board to be held in G
\ March, 1991 in case their applications are received before 13th
~February, 1991, through Heads of their respective schools. In this
regard the Board shall inform all the concerned schools and will also
give due publicity in the two lbcal newspapers within 3 days. The
Board was fllrther directed to consider the cases of such candidates out
of 283 who are similar to the nine named candidates other than respon- H
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 1 S.C.R.

A dent No. 17, Deepa V. Agarwal and in their cases also the untampered
result shall be declared on or before 6th February, 1991 and we are
informed that results of 18 more candidates were declared.

The notification dated August 31, 1990 is upheld subject to above
modification and shall be operative between the parties. Before part-
B ing with the case we impress upon the appellant to have indepth
investigation made expeditiously, if need be, with the assistance of
C.B.C.I.D., of the racket of fabrication and bring the culprit to
justice.

The appeals are allowed accordingly, but in the circumstances ----~- _,
c parties are directed to bear their own costs.

R.S.S. Appeals allowed.