Supreme Court of India
MAHESHWAR PERI & OTHERSversusHIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD THROUGH REGISTRAR GENERAL
- Citation
- 2016 INSC 480
- Decided
- 30 June 2016
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- KURIAN JOSEPH
Holding
Contempt proceedings, whether initiated suo motu or on a motion, must be commenced within one year of the alleged contempt, and the High Court’s suo motu action was barred by the limitation period.
Summary
The appellant challenged a criminal contempt proceeding initiated by the Allahabad High Court against several persons for an article published on 10 November 2008 that named judges. Two advocates filed an application on 18 November 2008 seeking suo motu contempt action, but the High Court only took suo motu action on 28 April 2015, more than six years later. The Supreme Court examined whether the one‑year limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 applied to suo motu proceedings and whether an application by private advocates without the Advocate General’s written consent could constitute a valid motion under Section 15. It held that contempt actions, whether initiated suo motu or on a motion, must be commenced within one year of the alleged contempt, and that the High Court’s action was therefore barred by limitation. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the High Court’s order set aside.
Issues considered
- Whether the one‑year limitation period under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 applies to suo motu contempt proceedings.
- Whether an application filed by private advocates without the Advocate General’s written consent can be treated as a valid motion under Section 15 of the Act.
Legislation cited
- Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 15, s. 20
Subjects
criminal contemptlimitation periodsuo motu actionSection 15Section 20Advocate General consentHigh Courtpublicationjudicial independence
Judgment
[2016] 3 S.C.R. 213 .
MAHESHWAR PERI & OTHERS A
v.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD THROUGH
REGISTRAR GENERAL
(Criminal Appeal No. 549of2016)
B
JUNE30.2016
[KURIAN JOSEPH AND ROHINTON FALi NARIMAN, JJ.]
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - s. 20 - Suo motu initiation of
contempt proceedings - Period of limitation - Publication of article
authored by the third appellant in a magazine wherein names of c
iudges allegedly involved in the case incorporated - Application
by advocate before the High Court for initiating contempt
proceedings on its own motion since the article caused insult to the
higher judiciary - Petition placed before the Single Judge and
thereafter, the Chief Justice - Four years later matter listed before D
the Division Bench of the High Court - High Court initiated suo
motu action, and name of the petitioner was not to be shown in the
cause list - On appeal, held: Article having been published in 2008 .
and the High Court having initiated the suo motu action only in
2015, the same is hit by the limitation of one year - Action uls. 15
was initiated suo motu by the High Court - It was said that the name E
of the petitioner is not to be shown in the cause list - Apparently, it
can only he suo motu because the application filed by the advocates,
is without the consent in writing of the Advocate General - Only
application other than by the Advocate General, contemplated uls.
15, is the motion made by any person with the consent in writing of F
the Advocate General - Constitution of India - Arts.129 and 215.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The criminal contempt of a court subordinate to
High Court can be initiated either suo motu or on a motion made
G
by the Advocate General. The suo motu action is set in motion on
a Reference made to it by the subordinate court. In view of the
process involved in making the Reference by the subordinate
court, in *Pal/av Sheth case, it has been held that the Reference
H
213
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 3 S.C.R.
A is the starting point of the process of initiation of the action for
contempt. Unless a court was to take s110 mot11 action, the
proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 would
normally commence with the filing of an application drawing the
attention of the court to the contempt having been committed.
The application is the motion provided under Section 15 of the
B
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Such a motion, by any person
other than Advocate General, can be made only with the consent
in writing of the Advocate General. In other words, any other
application made by a person without the consent of the Advocate
General, is not an application in the eyes of law. [Para 14] (218-
c H; 219-A-C]
1.2 The High Court is clear in its mind that the action under
Section 15 of the Act is initiated suo motu by the High Court. To
make it abundantly clear in the impugned order, it is said that the
name of the petitioner is not to be shown in the cause list.
D Apparently, it can only be s110 motu because the application filed
by the advocates, and which is referred to in the impugned order,
is without the consent in writing of the Advocate General. The
only application other than by the Advocate General,
contemplated under Section 15 of the Act, is the motion made by
any person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General.
E
Being a jurisdiction which, when exercised, is fraught with serious
consequences, the Parliament has thought it justifiably fit to
provide for such safeguards. Thus, the impugned article, having
been published on 10.11.2008 and the High Court having initiated
the suo motu action only on 28.04.2015, the same is hit by the
F limitation of one year prescribed under the Act. [Para 161 [219-
G-H; 220-A]]
*Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Others (2001) 7 SCC
549: 2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 387 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
G 2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 387 referred to Para 14
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 549 of 2016.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.04.2015 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Contempt Application (Criminal) No. 21 of
H 2008.
MAHESHWAR PERI v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT 215
ALLAHABAD THROUGH REGISTRAR GENERAL
A. J. Bhambhani, Sr. Adv., Ms. Sumita Hazarika, Adv. for the A
Appellants.
Sunny Choudhary, Adv. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KURIAN, J. 1. Leave granted. B
2. What is the period oflimitation for suo motu initiation of contempt
proceedings, is the short question for consideration in this case.
3. The Outlook Magazine, in its 10.11.2008 edition, published an
article authored by the third appellant, which mainly dealt with the
infamous Provident Fund Scam. The names of the Judges, \vho are C
allegedly involved in the case, were published.
4. On 18.11.2008, one Mr. Manoj Kumar Srivastava and Mr. Veer
Singh, Advocates practicing in the High Court of Allahabad, filed
Miscellaneous Application No. 21 of2008 with the following prayer:
D
"It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon 'ble Court
may graciously be pleased to proceed for initiating Criminal
Contempt proceedings on its own motion against aforesaid opposite
parties and they be punished accordingly under Article 215 of the
Constitution of India and or to pass any other order which this
Hon 'ble Court may deem fit and proper." E
5. According to them, the article "has caused great insult to the
Higher Judiciary. The remarks are derogatory and have lowered the
authority of the Higher Judiciary." Learned Counsel appearing for the
respondent/High Court of Al Iaha bad submits that the petition was placed
before a Single Judge of the High Court, and thereafter, before the Chief F
Justice. It appears, for about four years, nothing happened in the matter
until it was listed before the Division Bench of the High Court leading to
the impugned order dated 28.04.2015. It was held in the impugned order
that:
" ... The publication dated 10.11.2008 at page 56, 57, 58, 59 as G
mentioned above has caused great insult to the higher Judiciary.
The remarks are derogatory and lower the authority of the higher
Judiciary. 1lence, it is a fit case to take 'suo motu' action by this
Court. Accordingly, we take 'suo motu' action. Hence the name
of the petitioner is not to be shown in the cause list."
H
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 3 S.C.R.
A xxx xxx xxx xxx
"Let a notice be issued to contemnor opposite party no. 2,3,4,
namely, Mr. Maheshwer Peri, Mr. 8ishwadeep Moitra, Sushri
Chandrani Benerji through Chief Judicial Magistrate Ghaziabad
to show cause why the charges be not framed against them for
B committing contempt of this Court and to punish them in
accordance with law. They shall also appear in person on the ·
next date."
6. Aggrieved, appellants are before this Court.
· 7. Aswe propose to deal with the legal contention on limitation, it is
c not necessary for us to go into. the question as to whether the article
actually constitutes contempt.
8. The main contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the
appellants is that the High Court, having initiated action only after four
years of the alleged contempt, the whol.e proceedings are barred by
D Section 20 of The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred
to as 'the Act') which has prescribed the period of limitation of one year
for initiating any proceedings of contempt, be it suo motu or otherwise.
Section 20 of the Act reads as follows:
"20. Limitation for actions for contempt.-No court shall
E initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion ~r
otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date
·on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed."
9. Learned Counsel appearing for the High Court, however, contends
that being an action initiated by the High Court under Article 215 of the
F Constitution oflndia 1!nd since the genesis ofthe initiation of the contempt
is the application dated 18.11.2008 filed by Mr. Manoj Kumar Srivastava
and Mr. Veer Singh, Advocates, and since the High Court had considered
the application within one year aDd had taken action by issuing notice,
though after six years, it is within time. ·
G I 0. Our attention is invited to a three-Judge Bench decision of this
Court in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and others 1 and particular to
paragraphs-39 an.d 40. Paragraphs 39 and 40 reads as follows:.
"39. fo the case of criminal contempt of a subordinate court, the
H 1
(2001) 7 sec 549
MAHESHWAR PERI v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 217
THROUGH. REGISTRAR GENERAL [KURIAN, J.]
High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the A
subordinate com1 or on a motion made by the Advocate-General
or the Law Officer of the Central Government in the case of a
Union Territory. This reference or motion can conceivably
commence on an application being filed by a person whereupon
the subordinate court or the Advocate-General if it is so satisfied
B
may refer the matter to the High Court. Proceedings for civil
contempt normally commence with a person aggrieved bringing
to the notice of the court the wilful disobedience of any judgment,
decree, order etc. which could amount to the commission of the
offence. The attention of the court is drawn to such a contempt
being committed only by a person filing an application in that behalf. c
In other words, unless a court was to take a suo motu action, the
proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 would
normally commence with the filing ofan application drawing the
attention of the court to the contempt having been committed.
When the judicial procedure requires an application being filed
D
either before the court or consent being sought by a person from
the Advocate-General or a Law Officer, it must logically follow
that proceedings for contempt are initiated when the applications
are made.
40. In other words, the beginning of the action prescribed for
taking cognizance of criminal contempt under Section 15 would E
be initiating the proceedings for contempt and the subsequent action
taken thereon of refusal or issuance of a notice or punishment
thereafter are only steps following or succeeding such initiation.
Similarly, in the case of a civil contempt, filing of an application
drawing the attention of the court is necessary for further steps to F
be taken under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971."
11. We are afraid, the contentions adv~nced by the learned Counsel
for the appellants cannot be appreciated. Be it an action initiated for
contempt under Article 129 of the Constitution of India by the Supreme
Court or under Article 215 of the Constitution oflndia by the High Court, G
it is now settled law that the prosecution procedure should be in
consonance with the Act, as held by this Court in Pallav Sheth case
(supra).
12. And thus, the dispute boils down to the question of limitation
only. H
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 3 S.C.R.
A 13. Under the Act, the action for contempt is taken by only two
courts, either the Supreme Court or the High Court. The procedure is
prescribed under Section 15 of the Act, which reads as follows:
"15. Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases.-W
In the case of a criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred
B to in section 14, the Supreme Court or the High Court may take
action on its own motion or on a motion made by-
(fil the Advocate-General, or
OU any other person, with the consent in writing to (sic of) the
Advocate-General, or
c
(£}in relation to the High Court for the Union territory of Delhi,
such Law Officer as the Central Government may, by notification
in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf, or any other person,
with the consent in writing of such Law Officer.
ill In the case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate court,
D
the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the
subordinate court or on a motion made by the Advocate-General
or, in relation to a Union territory, by such Law Officer as the
Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
specify in this behalf.
E ill Every motion or reference made under this section shall specify
the contempt of which the person charged is alleged to be guilty.
Explanation .-In this section, the expression "Advocate-General"
means-
(fil in relation to the Supreme Court, the Attorney-General or the
F Solicitor-General;
OU in relation to the High Court, the Advocate-General of the
State or any of the States for which the High Court has been
established;
(£}in relation to the Court of a Judicial Commissioner, such Law
G Officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, specify in this behalf."
14. Criminal Contempt of com1 subordinate to High Court can be
initiated either suo motu or on a motion made by the Advocate General.
The suo motu action is set in motion on a Reference made to it by the
H
MAHESHWARPERI v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 219
THROUGH. REGISTRAR GENERAL [KURIAN, J.]
subordinate court. In view of the process involved in making the Reference A
by the subordinate court, in Pallav Sheth case (supra), it has been held
that the Reference is the starting point of the process of initiation of the
action for contempt. That is why in paragraph-39, which we have
extracted above, it has been clearly held that ... "unless a court was to
take suo motu action, the proceeding under The Contempt of Courts
B
Act, 1971 would normally commence with the filing of an application
drawing the attention of the court to the contempt having been committed.
"The application is the motion provided under Section 15 of The Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971. Such a motion, by any person other than Advocate
General, can be made only with the consent in writing of the Advocate
General. In other words, any other application made by a person without c
the consent of the Advocate General, is not an application in the eyes of
law."
15.This aspect has been succinctly discussed and subtly
distinguished in paragraph-44 of the Pallav Sheth case (supra). To quote
paragraph-44: D
"44. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely,
that initiated suo motu by the court and that instituted otherwise
than on the court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each
case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo
motu proceedings, it is the court itself which must initiate by issuing E
a notice, in the other cases initiation can only be by a party filing
an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction
to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated,
either by filing of an application or by the court issuing notice suo
motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the
contempt is alleged to have been committed." F
16. Coming to the factual matrix of the present case, the High
Court is clear in its mind that the action under Section 15 of the Act is
initiated suo 1110/U by the High Court. To make it abundantly clear in the
impugned order, it is said that the name of the petitioner is not to be
shown in the cause list. Apparently, it can only be suo motu because the G
application filed by the advocates, and which is referred to in the impugned
order, is without the consent in writing of the Advocate G~neral. The
only application other than by the Advocate General, contemplated under
Section 15 of the Act, is the motion made by any person with the consent
in writing of the Advocate General. Being a jurisdiction which, when H
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 3 S.C.R.
A exercised, is fraught with serious consequences, the Parliament has
thought it justifiably fit to provide for such safeguards. Thus, the impugned
article, having been published on I 0.11.2008 and the High Court having
initiated the suo motu action only on 28.04.2015, the same is hit by the
limitation of one year prescribed under the Act.
B 17. In that view of the matter, it has become unnecessary for us to
deal with the submissions on merits as to whether the contents of the
article would constitute criminal contempt or not.
18. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is
set aside.
c Nidhi Jain Appeal allowed.
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