MANAGEMENT OF MIS. INDIAN IRON AND STEEL CO. LTD.versusPRAHLAD SINGH

  MANAGEMENT OF MIS. INDIAN IRON AND STEEL CO. LTD.                               A
                         v.
                  PRAHLAD SINGH

                           NOVEMBER 3, 2000

         [S. RAJENDRA BABU AND SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, JJ.]                            B

     Labour Laws :

     Industries Disputes Act, 1947:

      Termination of service-Standing Orders-Provided for loss of lien on
                                                                                  c
appointment in case of over stayal of leave-Services of workman terminated
as he did not resume duty after expiry of leave-No satisfactory explanation
given-Held: Industrial Tribunal rightly upheld the termination of service in
the light of the standing orders which is neither untenable nor perverse.
                                                                                  D
      The respondent-workman did not resume duty after expiry of leave
granted to him. The appellant-company terminated the services of the
respondent workman under the provisions of the company's standing orders
lO(t) and (h).

      The respondent-workman raised an industrial dispute before the              E
Industrial Tribunal after a period of 13 years. The Tribunal held that the
respondent-workman lost his lien on the appointment in view of Orders lO(f)
and (h) of the Company's Standing Orders. The Tribunal also held that the
dispute after a period of about 13 years from the date of termination was too
stale to grant relief. The High Court allowed the writ petition challenging       F
the aforesaid award. Hence this appeal.

      Allowing the appeal, the Court

      HELD : 1. Whether relief can be declined on the ground of delay and
laches, depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In this case         G
claim was made almost after a period of 13 years without any reasonable or
justifying ground and there was nothing on record to explain this delay as
held by the Tribunal. When the respondent did not make claim for 13 years
without any justification and on merits also he had no case, the Tribunal did
not rightly grant him any relief. Even otherwise the findings of facts recorded
                                     357
                                                                                  H
     358                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A    by the Tribunal in the light of Orders lO(t) and (h) of the Company's Standing
     Orders cannot be said to be untenable or perverse. [361-G-H)

           Uptron India Ltd. v. Shamim Bhan, AIR (1998) SC 1681 and Delhi
     Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, AIR (1991) SC 101,
     held inapplicable.
B
             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6175 of
     2000.

           From the Judgment and Order dated 12.1 l. 99 of the Patna High Court
C    in L.P.A. No. 205of1999.

             Dhruv Mehta, Ms. Shobha and S.K. Mehta for the Appellant.

         P.S. Mishra, Mohan Pandey, Ali Ahmed, Tanveer Ahmed and Ms. Kirti
    Sinha for the Respondent.

D            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

             SHIV ARAJ V. PATIL, J. Leave granted.

          In this appeal the appellant is assailing the order made on 29.5.1999 by .
E   the learned single Judge of the High Court in CWJC No. 1458of1997(R) as
    well as the order of the Division Bench of the High Court confirming the same.

           At the instance of sponsoring union a dispute was referred for
    adjudication to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, No. 1, Dhanbad
    (for short 'Tribunal'). The dispute was "whether the management of M/s.
F   IISCO Ltd., Chasnalla Colliery, P.O. Chasnalla, Distt. Dhanbad was justified in
    terminating the services of Shri Prahlad Singh, Magazine Clerk vide their letter
    No. 28 (IV)/2008 dated 8. l 0.1974. Ifnot, to what relief the workman concerned
    is entitled."

G          The Tribunal, after considering the material placed before it and taking
    into consideration the submissions made, recorded findings that the
    respondent-workman lost his lien on the appointment in view of the orders
    I O(f) and (h) of the Standing Orders having regard to the facts of the case
    either admitted or found established. The Tribunal based on records also toak
    note of the fact that the claim of the respondent-workman in raising the
H   dispute after a period of about l 3 years from the date of termination was too
     MANAGEMENT OF INDIAN IRON AND STEEL CO.LTD 1•. PRAHLADSINGH (PATIL, J.)   359
stale to grant any relief. In this view the Tribunal held that order of termination   A
of services of the respondent was justified and he was not entitled to any
relief. It is this award which was assailed by the respondent before the learned
single Judge of the High Court in the writ petition. The writ petition was
allowed quashing the award of the Tribunal, directing the appellant to reinstate
the respondent in service with full back wages from the date when the dispute
was referred by the appropriate Government to the Tribunal for adjudication.          B
The appellant unsuccessfully challenged this order of the learned single
Judge before the Division Bench of the High Court. In these circumstances
appellant has approached this Court.

       Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the impugned orders           C
could not be sustained at all; the learned single Judge was not right in
quashing the award passed by the Tribunal without even stating as to how
the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal were wrong; the learned single
Judge did not also find that the findings of facts recorded by the Tribunal
were either perverse or unreasonable. Similarly the Division Bench of the High
Court committed an error in dismissing the appeal without examining the               D
questions raised in the appeal.

       Learned counsel for the respondent argued in support and justification
of the impugned orders stating that even if the claim had become stale the
relief could be moulded appropriately.
                                                                                      E
       We have carefully examined the submissions made by the learned counsel
for the parties. The respondent was granted leave from 1.7.1974 to 20.9.1974.
He did not resume duty after expiry of the said period of leave. After waiting
for more than two weeks the appellant issued notice dated 8.10.1974 terminating
the services of the respondent with effect from 21.9.1974. On the basis of
material placed on record the Tribunal found that after receiving the letter          F
dated 8.10.1974 terminating his services the respondent slept over for a period
of about 13 years. It is only in April, 1987 the respondent wrote letters to the
appellant that too without making any reference to his alleged illness. Orders
IO(t) and (h) of the Standing Orders read ~s follows: -

        "IO(t) Ifa workman remains absent beyond the period of leave originally
                                                                                      G
        granted subsequently extended, he shall lose lien on his appointment
        unless he:

        (a)   returns within ten days of expiry of his leave and
        (b)   explains to the satisfaction of the manager his inability to return     H
     360                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A                  on the expiry of his leave."
             xxx                            xxx                        xxx

             "(h) Notwithsta1Jding anything mentioned above, any workman who
             over-stays his sanctioned leave or remains absent without reasonable
B            cause will render himself liable for disciplinary action."

                 Referring to these Standing Orders and applying them to the
             admitted facts of the case the Tribunal in paragraph 25 of the order
             has held thus: -

             "25. There is nothing on the record to show that. after the year 1974,
c            when the workman was informed of the loss of lien on his appointment
             through Ext.-4 anything was done ir. this regard by or on behalf of
             the workman till October, 1986. From Ext.-2 it will appear that it was
             in December 1987 that the management had received letter from the
             Asstt. Labour Commissioner (Central), Dhanbad about raising of this
D            dispute to which the management replied by its letter dated 12.4.88.
             Thus the dispute appears to have been raised in the year 1987, about
             13 years after the intimation was sent to the workman through Ext.-
             4. This would make the claim to be too stale to grant any relief to the
             workman at this stage.

E                 Even without it, I have already held that the workman had lost
            his lien on his appointment on his inability to return on the expiry of
            the leave. That loss of lien being automatic, the workman thereafter
            did not remain in service and there was nothing illegal about that. The
            automatic termination was in accordance with the provisions contained
            in the Standing Orders which was binding both on the management,
F           as well on the workman."

           The learned single Judge without discussing the material on record and
     the findings recorded by the Tribunal proceeded to hold that the order dated
     8.10.1974 issued by the appellant terminating the services of the respondent
G    was illegal, arbitrary and violative of the principles of natural justice saying
    that it was issued without holding a domestic inquiry. The learned single
    Judge referred to the cases of Uptron India Ltd v. Shamim Bhan, AIR (I 998)
    SC 1681 and Delhi Transport Corporation v. D. T. C. Mazdoor Congress and
    another, AIR ( 1991) SC IO 1 and took a view that it helped the cause of the
    respondent. In the first case the Tribunal itself in the award held that the
H   termination of services of the workman amounted to retrenchment within the
      MANAGEMENT OF INDIAN IRON ANDSTEELCO.LTD1•. PRAHLADSINGH(PATIL,J.) 36)


 meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the other        A
 legal requirements had not been followed the order of termination was bad.
 In the second case the condition of appointment of service regulations of the
  Delhi Transport Corporation empowering the management for removal of the
 workmen from service without assigning any reason was considered. It is
 stated that "Regulation 9(b) does not expressly exclude the application of the     B
 audi alteram partem rule and as such the order of termination of service of
 a permanent employee cannot be passed by simply issuing a month's notice
 under Regulation 9(b) or pay in lieu thereof without recording any reason in
 the order and without giving any hearing to the employee to controvert the
 allegation on the basis of which the purported order is made".
                                                                                    c
       In our view on the facts of the case in hand the aforementioned two
 decisions were of no avail to support the case of the respondent. The learned
 single Judge also found fault with the Tribunal as to the finding that the claim
 of the respondent was too stale to grant any relief when parties had not raised
 such a plea. When the Tribunal on proper and objective appreciation of the         D
 material on record found that the claim was made by the respondent after 13
 years, it was open to it to refuse relief to the respondent. Moreover, the
 Tribunal did not refuse relief merely on the ground of delay and !aches as is
 evident from paragraph 25 of the order extracted above inasmuch as the
 Tribunal has .recorded that even without considering the question of delay
 the respondent had lost his lien on his appointment.                               E

        The learned single Judge has acted as a court of appeal in exercising
' jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, that too
  without finding that the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal were either
  perverse or unreasonable. The Division Bench of the High Court simply
  dismissed the appeal saying that no reason was found to interfere with the        F
  order of the learned single Judge.

        Whether relief can be declined on the ground of delay and !aches,
 depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In this case claim was
 made almost after a period of 13 years without any reasonable or justifying        G
 ground and there was nothing on record to explain this delay as held by the
 Tribunal. When the respondent did not make claim for 13 years without any
 justification and on merits also he had no case, the Tribunal did not rightly
 grant him any relief. Even otherwise the findings of facts recorded by the
 Tribunal in the light of the Standing Orders aforementioned cannot be said
 to be untenable or perverse.                                                       H
    362                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A         Thus we find merit in the appeal. Hence it is allowed for the reasons
    stated above. The order of the learned single Judge and that of the Division
    Bench affirming the same impugned in this appeal are set aside and the award
    of the Tribunal is restored. Parties to bear their own costs in this appeal.

    v.s.s.                                                     Appeal allowed.




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