Holding

The Court did not decide the Article 30(1) question but ordered payment of compensation and upheld the termination on the basis of the seriousness of the allegations.

Summary

The case concerns N.I. Khan, a teacher at Nirmala Senior Secondary School, who was alleged to have assaulted the principal and later threatened to burn the school. The school suspended him without prior approval from the State Education Department, leading the State to revoke the suspension and order a separate enquiry. The school proceeded with its own disciplinary inquiry, which the teacher did not attend, and subsequently dismissed him. The High Court initially quashed the dismissal and ordered back wages, but the Division Bench later dismissed the school’s appeal and upheld the dismissal. The Supreme Court, without deciding the applicability of Article 30(1) to the aided school, observed the seriousness of the allegations and ordered the State to pay Rs.4,00,000 and the school Rs.0,50,000 to the teacher, after which the termination would become operative. The appeals were disposed of without any order as to costs.

Issues considered

Whether Article 30(1) of the Constitution applies to an aided school in disciplining a teacher without State approval.
Whether the disciplinary procedure adopted by the school complied with the Delhi Education Code, 1965.
Whether the dismissal of the teacher was valid in the absence of prior State sanction.
Whether the teacher is entitled to back wages and other relief following the High Court's orders.

Subjects

Article 30Delhi Education Codeteacher misconductdisciplinary proceedingstermination of serviceaided schoolback wagesprocedural fairness

Judgment

MANAGER, NIRMALA SENIOR SECONDARY A
SCHOOL, PORT BLAIR
.,
v.
N.I. KHAN AND ORS.

NOVEMBER 21, 2003
B
(SHIVARAJ V. PATIL AND ARIJIT PASAYAT. JJ.]

Constitution of India-Article 30 {I)-Suspension of teacher by
management for misconduct-State disapproving the suspension on ground
of not obtaining itNlr(or approval-Termination of the teacher by school C
after conducting discipl~nr;ry p,1:0,ceedings-Validity of-Held, on facts,
without going into the all~gg~~<wiand considering the welfare of the school
and the teacher, order of termination to become operative on payment of
Rs.4,50,000 to the teacher jointly by the State and the School-Delhi
Education Code, 1965. D
Respondent No.1-teacMr allegedly abused and attempted to as-
sault lady principal of appellant's school. The teacher was suspended
from the school on the same day. After a few days, the teacher allegedly
picked up a quarrel again with the management and threatened to E
burn the school. The respondent-State revoked the suspension order
issued by the appellant and indicated that a separate enquiry will be
conducted by the State against the teacher. The appellant objected to
the proposed enquiry by the State being infringement of constitutional
protection under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. The State
did not respond to the permission sought by the appellant for sanction- F
ing the suspension of the teacher. A fresh order of suspension was
issued by the appellant to the teacher framing charges against him. The
State reversed the order of suspension of the appellant since no prior
approval was obtained. An Inquiry Officer was appointed by the
appellant to inquire into the charges framed. The teacher refused to G
attend the inquiry. The appellant held the teacher guilty of charges
framed against him since he did not attend the inquiry despite granting
several opportunities to him. The appellant constituted a punishing
.,,,/
authority for initiating disciplinary proceedings against the teacher
and requested the State to nominate its representative for the proceed- H
75
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

•.\ ings. The State refused to send its nominee since the suspension order
was passed by the appellant without prior approval of the State. By
a majority decision, the teacher was dismissed from the school. The
teacher filed a Writ Petition before High Court challenging the order
of dismissal issued by the appellant. Single Judge of the High Court
B quashed the order of dismissal and directed payment of back wag<'s
to the teacher. The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the
appeal and the review petition filed by the appellant.

In appeal, the appellant-School contended that the respondent
C State cannot apply the Delhi Education Code, 1965 in contravention
to the_ constitutional protection guaranteed to it under Article 30(1) of
the Constitution of India; that a fair and transparent procedure was
adopted in conducting the inquiry and adequate opportunity was given
to respondent no. 1 before issuing the order of dismissal; and that the
continuance of respondent no. 1 in the school was undesirable and
D would have adverse effects since the allegations are of a serious nature.

The respondents contended that the Delhi EducatiQn Code, 1965
is applicable in following the procedure of termination of a teacher;
that constitutional protection under Article 30(1) of the Constitution
E is not available to the school being an aided school; and that the
proceedings was initiated by the appellant with bias.

Disposing of the appeals with certain directions, the Court

HELD : 1.1. This Court does not propose to go into the question of
F constitutional protection under Article 30(1) of the Constitution oflndia. ...
t
The allegation made against the respondent no. I-teacher are of a
serious nature and certainly, if proved, do not befit a teacher. The clay
like mind of young children are shaped into beautiful moulds by teachers.
They shape future course of the students. To a great measure, their
G behaviour, character, reputation leave imprints in the minds of the young
children. If their conduct, behaviour and reputation is full of blemish 'I,
I
that would not be for the interest and in the welfare of the students. It
is not necessary to opine on the allegations one way or the other. This
litigation has continued unabated for long years. It would neither be in
H the interest of the teacher nor the school, if he is continued in the school.
MANAGER. NIRMALA SENIOR SECONDARY SCHOOL v. 1-i.I. KHAN 77
"'_,, By making this observation, it is not to be construed as if the allegations A
were found to be true. On the contrary, the welfare of the school and the
reputation of the teacher has been considered in the proper perspective.
If an act or omission of an employee reflects upon his character,
reputation, integrity or devotion to duty or is an unbecoming act, certainly
the employer can take action against him. [82-B-C, F-H; 83-A-BJ B

... Union of India & Ors. v. K.K. Dhawan, AIR (1993) SC 1478; Indian
Railway Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar, (2003) 4 SCC 579; TMA.
Pai Foundation and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors., [2002} 8 SCC
481; The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society and Anr. etc. v. State of
Gujarat and Anr., (1975) I SCR 173 and Islamic Academy of Education C
& Anr. v. State of Karnataka and Ors., (20031 6 SCC 697, referred to.

Pearce v. Foster, (1866) 17 QBD 536, referred to.

1.2. However, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, D
the following directions are issued: [83-FJ

(i) A sum of Rs. 4,50,000 shall be paid within four months from
date of the order to respondent-teacher out of which Rs.4,00,000 shall
be paid by the respondent-State directly to the teacher and the balance
amount shall be paid by the appellant's school to the teacher within E
the said time. (83-GJ

(ii) The teacher would not be entitled to any other sum in respect
of his service with in the Institution. On payment being made, the order
of termination of his service shall become operative not on the ground F
indicated therein, but because of the present order. (83-H; 84-AJ

(iii) The order shall not stand on the way of the teacher seeking
employment elsewhere. (84-A-B)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. 5337- G
5339 of 1999.

From the Judgment and Order dated 11.11.98, 19.8.98 and 5.6.98 of
. the Calcutta High Court Circuit Bench at Port Blair in C.A. No. 8/98,
F .M.A.T. No. 8/98 and C.O. No. 19 of 1998.
H
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A WITH ·-
W.P. (C) No. 189/1999.

Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Dr. M.P. Raju, Ashwani Bhardaj, S.P. Sharma
B and Abhishek Atrey for the Appellant.
Kailash Vasudev, Uday U. Lalit, Yatendra Sharma, S. Sharma,
Prashant Kumar, Ms. Varuna Bhandari and D.S. Mahra forthe Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court were delivered by
c
ARJJIT PASA YAT, J. A teacher affects the eternity. He can never
tell where his influence stops; said Henry Adam. Any educational institution
for its growth and acceptability to a large measure depends upon the quality
of teachers.

D Educational institutions are temples of learning. The virtues of
human intelligence are mastered and harmonised by education. Where
there is complete harmony between the teacher and the taught, where the
teacher impaiis and the student receives, where there is complete dedication
E of the teacher and the taught in learning, where there is discipline between
the teacher and the taught, where both are worshipers of learning, no
discord or challenge will arise. An educational institution runs smoothly
when the teacher and the taught are engaged in the common ideal of pursuit
of knowledge. It is, therefore, manifest th~t the appointment of teachers
is an impo1iant part in educational institutions. The qualifications and the
F character of the teachers are really important.

The case at hand has some unfortunate shades as it involves alleged
misconduct of a teacher and the purported desire of the management of
an educational institution to keep him out of the institution to maintain the
G purity in educational sphere and serene atmosphere of the institution. The
whole unsavoury episode started on 21.12.1995 when respoP-dent-N.I.
Khan allegedly abused and attempted to assault a lady Principal of the
appellant's educational institution in front of the school. That led to lodging
of a First Information Report. Khan was placed under suspension on the
H same day. Subsistence allowance was sanctioned on 29.12.1995. A few
MANAGER, NIRMALA SENIOR SECONDARY SCHOOL"· N.I. KHAN [PASA YAT, J.) 79

days thereafter in a second incident, Khan allegedly picked up quarrel A
again and threatened to burn the school down. Again complaint was lodged
at the Police Station. Thereafter began a legal battle involving not only the
factual controversies, but also assertion of rights guaranteed and protected
under Article 30( I) of the Constitution of India, 1950 (for short the
'Constitution') and the legal battle has continued unabated and reached this B
Court in these appeals.

To continue the factual narration, on 9.2.1996 Director of Education
(in short the 'Director') revoked the suspension order and indicated that
a separate enquiry will be conducted by the Directorate. In response C
thereto, started the controversies regarding applicability of Article 30(1) of
the Constitution to the Institution. On 12.2.1996 the school wrote to the
Director stating that he should not come to the picture as Article 30(1) of
the·Constitution authorized the Institution to adopt its own procedure. Few
days thereafter, the Institution again wrote to the Director. Charges were
issued. But on 6.3.1996 respondent-Khan claimed that he was governed D
by the Delhi Education Code, 1965 (in short the 'Code') which was made
applicable to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands with effect from 25. l 0.1968.
On 24.6.1996, the Assistant Secretary of Education called the school
authorities to attend a meeting where the school requested that suspension
may be sanctioned by the Director. Permission to sanction suspension was E
sought for by the Institution on 2.7.1996. For about three months the
Director did not respond, but threatened punitive action if the school did
not settle issues positively. This was again the turning point of the
controversy, because the school felt that the governmental authorities were
trying to scuttle its effo1ts to enforce discipline and an undisciplined teacher F
who was undesirable in the Institution had been imposed on it.

On 29.10.1996, a fresh letter of suspension was issued on the
ground that suspension was approved. Copy of the charges was served on
respondent-Khan on 29.10.1996. He denied the charges on 8.11.1996. On G
25.11.1996 one Shri Ram Lal was appointed as the Inquiry Officer but he
declined to conduct the inquiry. On 26.12.1996 the Director issued
instructions to the Institution to permit Khan to report on duty and reversed
the school's order of suspension as according to him the prior approval had
not been obtained to take action in the matter. On 22.1.1997 the School H
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. ~. "
;..
A again referred to Article 30( 1) of the Constitution and requested the
Director to re-consider the matter. On 27.2.1997 one M. Alphonse was
appointed as the Inquiry Officer. The date of inquiry was fixed on
15.4.1997 but respondent-Khan did not attend. On 25.5.1997 according to
the Institution, the Director approved p~yment of subsistence allowance
and, therefore, , approved suspension. This stand was however, being
B
disputed by respondent-Khan and we shall deal with this aspect later. On
13.6.1997, the School wrote to respondent-Khan that subsistence allowance
will be paid for the period from December 1995 to 31st May, 1997 as per
Director's order and he should not delay the inquiry. On 13.6.1997 Khan
objected to the appointment of Shri Alphonse as Inquiry Officer. On
c 9.7.1997 the School rejected Khan's objections about the appointment and
sent to Khan the details of disciplinary inquiry invoking Article 30( 1) of
the Constitution. On 19.9.1997 Khan was intimated that several oppottunities
had been granted to him but he did not appear and was therefore guilty
of the charges. On the punishment aspect, intimation was given to
D respondent-Khan on 6.10.1997 and he was granted opportunity. Though
Khan did not respond on the issue of punishment his stand was that all the
charges were to be dropped. On 25.11.1997 the School requested the
Director to nominate his representative for the disciplinary proceedings.
The request was re-iterated on 12.12.1997. The Director on 15.12.1997
E wrote back stating that since the suspension was without prior permission,
necessarily no one would be sent for the disciplinary proceedings. On
22.1.1998, the School again requested the Director to send someone for
the disciplinary proceedings which was scheduled to be taken out on 2nd
February 1998. As no one appeared from the Director's office, by majority,
it was decided that dismissal was a proper course to be adopted and order
F of dismissal was communicated to Khan on 20.2.1998. A writ application
was filed by respondent-Khan on 25.2.1998 before the Calcutta High
Court. The Director's stand was that since an order of termination was
passed without prior approval same was not legal. The school explained
its purported stand that prior approval was not required. By judgment dated
G 5.6.1998 learned Single Judge quashed its order of dismissal. An appeal
was filed before a Division Bench, initially it granted stay on the direction
for payment of back wages. On 13.7.1998, Khan reported for duty. The ...
Division Bench, by judgment dated 19.8.1998 dismissed the appeal and the
review filed by the Institution met a similar fate' of dBWiissal by judgment
H dated 11.11.1998.
..
MANAGER, NIRMALA SENIOR SECONDARY SCHOOL r. N.1. KHAN [PASA YAT. J.] 8J

These appeals have been filed by the management questioning A
legality of the judgments passed by the High Coutt.

In support of the appeals Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, leaned senior counsel
submitted that the approach of the Government has been clearly erroneous.
The Director proceeded on the basis as if the Code applied to the B
Institution, unmindful of the constitutional protection afforded by Article
30(1) of the Constitution. The procedure adopted by the Institution was
fair, transparent and adequate opportunity was granted to respondent-Khan
to have his say in the matter. The allegations were of a very serious nature,
unbecoming of a teacher. The good name of the Institution had suffered C
because of the obnoxious conduct of the respondent and the gravity of the
allegations can be seen from the fact that he had threatened to burn the
institution itself. Nothing can be more shameful or objectionable for a
teacher. Even if the approval for sanction is conceded for the sake of
arguments, that has no ·relevance for the proceedings which were initiated D
for awarding punishment. Same stood on a different footing. Even Clause
242 prescribes constitution of punishing authority, where nominee of the
Director is required to be a member. Notwithstanding the stand relating to
Artide 30(1) of the Constitution, the Institution requested the Director to
send his nominee which was not responded. Ultimately, the Director E
rendered the provision odious by not sending the nominee and thereby
frustrating the very purpose of constituting the punishing authority. The
continuance of respondent-Khan in the Institution was undesirable and was
having adverse affects. Therefore, the procedure- was adopted by the
Institution which was fair, transparent and in letters and spirit in line with
the desirability of providing fair opportunity and thereafter taking a F
decision in the matter. Residually, it was submitted that when teacht'.r has
lost confidence of the Institution by his conduct, it would be unfair,
unreasonable and inequitable to force his continuance in the institution. It
would be detrimental to the interest of the Institution and the management.
G
In response, learned counsel for the respondent-Khan and the State
submitted that Article 30(1) has no application to the tacts of the case, more
paiticularly, when the Institution is an aided one. On trumped up allegatio11s,
proceedings were initiated, and bias of the management is apparent from
the actions taken. The Code is clearly applicable and there is no scope for H
82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.,::R.

A taking a departure from the prescribed prncedures. Judgments of the High
Court do not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference.

Learned counsel for the parties referred to several decisions of this
Court, more particularly, Elev'en-Judge Bench decision in TMA. Pai
B Foundation and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors., [2002] 8. SCC 481;
The Ahl11f!dabad St. Xaviers College Society and Anr. etc. v. State of
Gujarat and Anr., [1975] I SCR 173 and Islamic Academy of Education
and Anr. v. Sta_te of Karnataka and Ors., [2003] 6 SCC 697. Though
0

complex iss'ties of law relating to ever baffling question cente ring round
C A1ticle 30( I) of the Constitution has been pressed into service by learned
counsel for the appellant, and non-applicability thereof emphasized by
learned counsel for tire respondents, we do not propose to go into that
question. It is relevant to note that at some stages during hearing on earlier
occasions, it was suggested that to give a decent burial to the controversies
D involving a teacher and the management and a reasonable settlement
should be arrived at. Prima facie, learned counsel for the State and the
appellant agreed that some amount as may be fixed may be paid in full
and final settlement of the claims of the respondent-Khan and his continuance
in his establishment would be put to an end. Though, there appeared to be
E no controversy on the amount to be paid to respondent-Khan, he insisted
that the State Government should consider him for appointment in some
other institution. This was not found acceptable by learned counsel for the
State as according to him it is for the Institution to select the candidate and
send the name for approval by the Government. Therefore, no final say
could be given to the proposal.
F
The allegations made against respondent-Khan are no doubt of a
very serious nature and certainly if proved do not befit a teacher. The clay
like mind of young children are shaped into beautiful moulds by teachers.
They. shape the future course of the students. To a great measure their
G behaviour, character, reputation leave imprints in the minds of the young
children. If their conduct, behaviour and reputation is full of blemish that
would not be for the interest and in the welfare of the students. Respondent-
Khan has denied the allegations and has alleged bias. But we do not think
it necessary to opine one way or the other. Whatever be the truth, the
H undisputed fact is that the litigation has continued unabated for long years.
....

--~ ...

MANAGER, NIRMALA SENIOR SECONDARY SCHOOL.-. N.I. KHAN [PASAYAT. J.) 83

It would be neither in the interest of respondent-Kh~n nor the Institution A
if respondent-Khan is continued in the Institution. By making this
observation, it is not to be construed as if we have found the allegations
to be true. On the contrary, the welfare of the Institution, the reputation
of respondent-Khan has been considered cy us in the proper perspective.
Ifan act or omission of an employee reflects upon his character, reputation, B
integrity or devotion to duty or is an unbecoming act, certainly the
employer can take action. ,aga,inst him. In this context, reference may be
made to the following ob'sZSations of Lopes C.J. in Pearce v. Foster,
[1866] 17 QBD 536, p. 542:

"If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with the
c
faithful discharge of his duty in the service, it is misconduct which
justifies immediate dismissal. That misconduct, according to my
view, need not be misconduct in the carrying on of the service
of the business. It is sufficient if it is conduct which is prejudicial D
or is likely to be prejudicial to the interests or to the reputation
Of the master, and the master will be justified, not only if he
discovers it at the time, but also if he discovers it afterwards, in
dismissing that servant."

This view was re-iterated by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in
E
Union of India and Ors. v. K.K. Dhawan, AIR (1993) SC 1478 and Indian
Raiiway Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar, [2003) 4 SCC 579.

Without therefore deciding the contentjltus pleas raised by learned F
counsel for the parties, we direct as follows-:

(I) A sum of Rs. 4,50,000 shall be paid w_ithin four months from
today to respondent-Khan out of which R.s. 4,00,000 shall be paid by the
State Gove1nment directly to respondent-Khan and the balance amount
shall be paid by the Institution to respondent-Khan within the indicated G
time.

(2) The inte1·im order passed by this Court shall continue till payment is
made. The respondent-Khan woui"d not be entitled tO 'iny other sum in
, respect of his service with the Institution. On payment bei~~~ made, the H
84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A order of termination of his service shall become operative not on the
ground indicated therein, but because of the present order.

(3) This order shall not stand on the way of the respondent-Khan seeking
employment elsewhere.

B The appeals are disposed of accordingly, without any order as to
costs.

WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 18911999

C In view of the order passed in Civil Appeal Nos. 5337-5339/1999,
no further order is necessary to be passed in the writ petition.

B.S. Appeals disposed of.