Supreme Court of India
MANDALI RANGANNA & ORS. ETC.versusT. RAMACHANDRA & ORS.
- Citation
- 2008 INSC 560
- Decided
- 30 April 2008
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- S B SINHA
Holding
The Court held that injunctions are equitable relief and, considering the defendants' long possession, the plaintiffs' inaction, and the substantial construction already undertaken, the injunction was not warranted; construction may proceed subject to the suit’s ultimate determination.
Summary
The appellants filed a suit seeking a declaration that certain Bangalore properties were joint family assets, along with a preliminary decree of partition and a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from constructing or alienating the land. The defendants contended that the properties had been partitioned in 1924 and that they had been in exclusive possession, having executed leases and undertaken large‑scale construction during the pendency of the suit. The trial court granted interim injunctions; the Karnataka High Court set them aside, allowing construction subject to the final suit outcome. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether an injunction should be granted, emphasizing that such relief is equitable and must consider prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury, and the conduct of the parties. Finding that the defendants had long possession, the plaintiffs never exercised possession, and substantial construction had already been undertaken, the Court refused to restrain the construction, permitting it to continue subject to the suit’s final decision and requiring any third‑party interests to be conditional on that outcome. The appeals were dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether a temporary or permanent injunction can be granted in a suit for declaration and partition where the defendants have long possession and have commenced substantial construction.
- Whether the conduct of the parties, including the plaintiff's failure to assert possession, affects the grant of injunction.
- Whether the mere value of the property justifies an injunction absent other equitable considerations.
- Whether third‑party interests created during the pendency of the suit can be allowed subject to the suit’s final decision.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 39 Rule 1, s. Order 39 Rule 2
Subjects
injunctionequitable reliefpartitionjoint family propertytemporary injunctionbalance of convenienceirreparable injuryconstructionthird party interest
Judgment
[2008] 6 S.C.R. 264
y~
A MANDALI RANGANNA & ORS. ETC.
V.
T. RAMACHANDRA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 3128-29 of 2008)
APRIL 30, 2008
B
[S.8. SINHA AND V.S. SIRPURKAR, JJ.]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:
Or. 39 rr. 1and 2 - Temporary injunction/interim order -
c Suit for declaration and possession of suit properties -
Applications for interim injunction and orders to restrain
defendants from raising any construction on or creating any
third party interests in suit property - Held: Grant of injunction
is an equitable relief - Besides existence of basic elements
D
in relation to granting injunction, conduct of parties must also
be taken into consideration - On facts, prima facie, defendants
had been in possession of suit properties for a long time and
plaintiffs never exercised any act of possession -
E Constructions involving crores of rupees cannot be directed
to be stopped - Therefore, in the interest of justice defendants
are allowed to carry out the constructions which would be
subject to the ultimate decision of the suit - Any third party
interests, if created, would also be subject to the decision of .,.
F the suit - Equity.
The appellants filed a suit for declaration that the suit
properties were the joint family properties of the parties.
It was stated that the partition which had taken place
earlier between the parties was only a partial one. A
G
preliminary decree for partition and possession of suit I'
property according to the share of the parties was prayed
for. A consequential decree for permanent injunction
restraining the defendant-respondents from alienating the
H 264
MANDALI RANGANNA & ORS. ETC. v. 265
T. RAMACHANDRA & ORS.
~-)
suit properties or raising any constructions thereon was A
also sought. The stand of the defendants was that the
properties had already been partitioned as far back as the
year 1924 and they were enjoying their rights over their
respective shares uninterruptedly since then. During the
~·
pendency of the suit the defendants-respondents B
executed a registered deed of lease on 15.12.2004 in
favour of respondent no. 12. The plaintiffs filed an
application for interim injunction against the defendants
and respondent no.12 restraining them from digging pits,
putting up construction etc. on the suit land. They filed
c
another application restraining the defendants from
changing the nature of the property or transferring or
alienating any right therein in favour of third parties. The
trial court granted the prayer in both the applications.
D
~ However, the High Court allowing the appeal of the
· defendants, set aside the orders of the trial court and
ordered that any construction put up in the suit properties
and any alienation thereof and creation of any interests
therein by the defendants would be subject to. the E
decision of the suit.
In the instant appeals filed by the plaintiffs, it was
,, contended for the appellants, inter alia, that the property
having not been partitioned fully and possession of a co-
~ owner being possession of the other co-owners also,
F
creation of third party interests in a situation of this nature
or allowing parties to carry on constructions would cause
irreparable loss to the appellants and the Court should
direct stoppage of such construction.
G
.., Dismissing the appeals, the Court
/
HELD: 1.1 It is true that grant or refusal of injunction
has serious consequence depending upon the nature
. thereof, and the courts dealing with such matters must H
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R.
y-,
-,
,
A make all endeavours to protect the interest of the parties;
for the said purpose, application of mind on the part of
the courts is imperative, and pleas raised by the parties
must be determined objectively. However, grant of
injunction is an equitable relief. A person who had kept
B quiet for a long time and allowed another to deal with the
properties exclusively, ordinarily, would not be entitled to
an order of injunction. The court will not interfere only
because the property is a very valuable one. [para 18) [275-
C-E]
c
1.2 While considering an application for grant of
injunction, the court will not only take into consideration
the basic elements in relation thereto, viz., existence of a
prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable
D injury, it must also take into consideration the conduct of
the parties. [para 18) [275-B-C]
M. Gurudas and Others v. Rasaranjan and Others (2006)
8 SCC 367; Seema Arshad Zaheer and Others v. Municipal
Corpn. Of Greater Mumbai and Others (2006) 5 SCC 282 and
E
Transmission Corpn. of A.P Ltd. v. Lanco Kondapalli Power
(P) Ltd. (2006) 1 sec 540 - relied on.
2.1 In the instant case, prima facie it appears that the
respondents had been in possession of the properties in
F suit for a long time and had admittedly been dealing with
the properties exclusively. Appellants never exercised any
act of possession. [Para 15] [273-H; 274-A]
2.2 Rightly or wrongly constructions have come up.
G The same cannot be directed to be demolished, at least
at this stage. Respondent No. 7 is said to have spent three
crores of rupees. If that be so, it would not be proper to 'r '
stop further constructions. Therefore, interest of justice
would be sub-served if, while allowing the respondents
H to carry out constructions of the buildings, the same is
MANDALI RANGANNA & ORS. ETC. v. 267
T. RAMACHANDRA & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
made subject to the ultimate decision of the suit. The trial A
court would dispose of the suit as early as possible. If
any third party interests are created upon completion of
the constructions, the relevant deeds shall clearly
stipulate that the matter is subjudice and all sales shall
~
be subject to the ultimate decision of the si.iit. [Para 23 B
and 24) [277-8-D]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
3128-3129 of 2008.
From the Final Common Order dated 6.3.2007 of the High c
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in M.F.A. Nos. 11783 and
11785 of 2006.
Arun Jaitley, Mukul Rohatgi, K.K. Venugopal, Nalini
Chidambraam, R.F. Nariman, M. Shanmukhappa, S. Balaji, S.R. D
,,-i.. Sharma, Madhusmita Bora, S. Srinivasan, Solomon Francis,
Sunieta Ojha, Shashi M. Kapila, Gopal Shan Karnarayanan,
Kunal Tandon, D.S. Jayaraj, L. Prem Kumar, Vikas Mehta, Shri
Narain, Sandeep Narain, Navkesh Batra (for Mis. S. Narain &
Co.) and K.V. Vijay Kumar for the appearing parties. E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Appellants herein are aggrieved by and dissatisfied with F
a judgment and order dated 6.3.2007 passed by the High Court
of Karnataka whereby and whereunder the private respondents
herein were allowed to make constructions on the lands in suit,
subject to the final decision therein. It was furthermore directed
<:
that any alienation or creation of an interest by the defendants G
would be subject to the decision of the suit.
"' 3. With a view to appreciate the fact involved in the matter,
we may notice the genealogical table of the parties.
H
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 7 S.C.R.
A
IMandi Madalappa
I
IChikkaranganna I T.M.Thimmaiah jMuniswamappa
'
Puttathyamma M. Ramachandra
B
IR. Ranganna I (Def.1)
Padma W/o
(Def. 2)
I
I I I
c Shekhar Harish Rekha
(Def. 3) (Def.4) (Def.5)
I I I
Mandali Ranganna Munianna R. Thimmaiah Puttanna Mandal
(Plf. 1) (Plf. 2) (Plf. 3) (Plf. 4)
D
4. The suit properties were acquired in the year 1912 by a
deed of sale dated 22.1.1912. Allegedly, the predecessor in
interest of the respondents being the original defendant No. 1
(M. Ramachandra) was adopted by Puttathyamma, widow of
E late T.M. Thimmaiah. A deed of adoption, therefor, was executed
on 13.12.1937. Allegedly, a partition in the family properties took
place in the year 1924.
One of the questions which arose for consideration in the
suit was as to whether the said partition was in respect of all the
F properties or a partial partition. Appellants contend that even
assuming that Puttathyamma adopted M. Ramachandra, from
a perusal of a deed of adoption, it will appear that some
properties were still been jointly possessed.
G 5. On 23.5.1938, upon the death of· Sri T.M.
Chikkaranganna his legal representatives partitioned his self-
acqu ired properties, both moveable and immovable. On
22.2.1954, the children of Muniswamappa executed a registered
Partition Deed, by which his share in the properties came to be
H partitioned. From 1957-1969, a number of transactions mainly
MAN!(ALI RANGANNA & ORS. ETC. v. 269
~;·,,,
T. RAMACHANDRA & ORS. [S.S. SINHA, J.]
in the nature of grant of lease took place in respect of the suit A
properties. No title came to be created in favour of third parties.
On 20: 12.1971 for the first time, the first respondent
entered into a partition deed, with the members of his family in
which the suit schedule property was set out in the deed.
Between 2002-2003, the petitioners called upon the defendants B
to partition the said properties which was refused by the
defendants.
6. Appellants herein filed original suit No. 7039 of 2003 in
the City Civil Court, Bangalore in September, 2003 inter alia c
contending that the partition which had taken place earlier
between the parties was only a partial one. They merely prayed
for a declaration that the suit schedule properties are the joint
family properties of the appellants and respondents herein.
~' 7. They also prayed for a preliminary decree for partition D
and possession of the property in Schedules A and B according
to the shares of parties. A consequential decree for permanent
injunction restraining the respondents from alienating or
constructing on the said properties was also sought.
8. During pendency of the said suit, original defendants E
executed a registered deed of lease on 15.12.2004 in favour of
respondent No. 12 herein. Possession of the property, in
question, was handed over to him. A deed of rectification was
'-1' also executed on 12.12.2005. Appellants herein, thereafter filed
an application (I.A. No. 9) for grant of injunction against the F
• defendant/respondent for restraining them from digging pits,
putting up constructions etc. during pendency of the suit.
Respondent No. 12 was also impleaded as party therein.
Another application (I.A. No. 12) for injunction was also
.., G
filed for restraining the defendants and in particular the defendant
No. 7 from changing the nature of property or transferring or
alienating the right in respect of the properties described in
Schedule "A" of the plaint in favour of the third parties.
9. By an order dated 24.4.2006, the learned Trial Judge H
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R.
't ..,
A directed maintenance of status quo. However, by reason of an
ord~r dated 12.9.2006, both the I.As. were allowed. The orders
of injunction as prayed for were passed therein. On an appeal
having been preferred therefrom by the respondents herein
before the High Court, the same was allowed by reason of the
B impugned judgment directing;
"17. For the above said reasons, both the appeals are
allowed and setting aside the impugned order, I.As. 9 and
12 filed before the Trial Court are dismissed. However, it
is made clear that any construction that is going to be put
c up in suit properties shall be subject to the decision in the
suit and any alienation or creation of interest by the
defendants, shall be subject to the decision of the suit. If
any alienation is made or any interest is created in the suit
property during the pendency of suit, the defendants shall
D intimate transferees or concerned person about the
transaction being subject to the decision of the suit and
shall mention in the concerned document that transaction
will be subject to the decision in the suit. Any creation of
interest shall be intimated by the defendants to the Trial
E Court."
10. Mr. Arun Jaitley, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant submitted;
(i) From a perusal of the deed of adoption dated .,,,
F 13.12.1937, it would appear that the properties, in
question, had not been partitioned fully.
(ii) Possession of a co-owner would be possession of
the others and in that view of the matter, the
respondents must be held to have been possessing
G the lands for the benefits of all the co-sharers. The
fact that no mutation of the land has been effected is
,.
also a pointer to show that there was no final partition
between the parties.
(iii) It may be that a lease was created in respect of 113rd
H
MANDALI RANGANNA & ORS. ETC. v. 271
__;-...,. T. RAMACHANDRA & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
of the property, but thereby the right of the plaintiffs A
had not come to an end and in that view of the matter,
r
-t
so long the co-sharers were managing the properties
in a manner which was not detrimental to the interest
of the appellants, it was not necessary for them to file
I any suit. Creation of a third party interest, in a situation B
of this nature, or allowing the parties to carry on
constructions would cause irreparable injuries to the
appellants.
(iv) Respondents having started constructions despite
knowledge of the special leave petition, this Court c
should direct stoppage of such ~onstructions in view
of their conduct.
11. Mr. K.K. Venugopal, Mrs. Nalini Chidambram and Mr.
R.F. Nariman, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
D
,J. the respondents, on the other hand, submitted:
(i) The partition having been effected as far back in
1924, and the principal respondents having been in
possession of the properties from 1956 till 2003 when
they granted lease in respect of 113rd of the property, E
the impugned judgment should not be interfered with.
Even an advertisement was issued for sale of 113rd
of the land in the year 1985 and the deed of sale was
executed on 25.07.1989.
(ii) Admittedly, as would appear from the photographs F
appended to the counter-affidavit, huge constructions
have come up on the lands in question and as such
there was no reason as to why the appellants had
kept quiet for so long.
G
(iii) A large number of documents have been filed before
-; the court below before the courts below not only
showing dealings with the properties but also
showing execution of the deeds of lease, payment of
corporation tax, income tax, capital gains tax, etc.
H
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R.
A which clearly point out separate possession of the
'f""
properties by the defendants.
(iv) In view of the fact that they have been collecting rent I-
~
from the tenants themselves would show that the
appellants have no prima facie case. These t
B documents having been filed before the learned Trial
Judge, it committed a serious error in not taking the
same into consideration and, thus, the High Court
has rightly interfered therewith by reason of the
impugned judgment.
c
(v) Respondents, keeping in view the escalation of the
costs of the building materials, would suffer
irreparable injury, if they are not permitted to carry
out the constructions.
D (vi) The Trial Court proceeded to consider the matter
).__
only from the angle as to whether the appellants would
suffer irreparable injury or not without considering
the other factors relevant for grant of injunction, viz.,
prima facie case and balance of convenience.
E
(vii) In any event, as the respondent No. 7 has spent about
three crores of rupees as a developer, the impugned
judgment should not be interfered with.
12. The property in question is indisputably a valuable
F property. It is situated in the heart of the commercial area of the ,.
town of Bangalore. The land in question admeasures 1 lakh 70
thousand sq. feet.
13. The principal question which arises for consideration
is as to whether the properties in question were the subject
G matter of partition purported to have taken place in 1924 or
subsequently or not? ,.
14. Mr. Jaitley has taken us through various documents
filed by the parties to show that the respondents had been tak.ing
contradictory stand with regard to the date of oral partition among
H
MANDALI RANGANNA & ORS. ETC. v. 273
~.,. T. RAMACHANDRA & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
T.M. Muniswamapa, T.M. Thimmaiah & T.M. Chikkaranganna, A
sons of Mandi Madalappa. It was pointed out that even in the
deed of partition, a stand was taken by Puttathayamma that her
husband and his brothers have effected partition on 30.06.1924
and the properties fallen to the respective shares are being
enjoyed by the respective owners, but in the purported deed of B
partition dated 22.02.1954 between M.M. Madalappa and M.M.
Thimmaiah, the date of partition is mentioned as 24.06.1924.
However, in the sale deed dated 30.09.1987 executed between
M.M.T. Muniswamappa@ M.M.T. Navin and Mr. Ziaulla Sheriff,
Mis. Alexander Apartment Development Corporation,
Bangalore, it was stated that the three brothers entered into an
c
oral partition on 26.04.1924. Whereas, in the synopsis, it was
stated that the family properties were partitioned on 30.06.1924
and the properties in question fell into the share of T.M.
Thimmaiah which was succeeded by Smt. T. Puttathayamma
D
and T. Ramachandra and thereafter by his family members, in .
the writ petition filed on behalf ofT.M. Ramachandra, T.R. Harish,
T.R. Shekar, Smt. Padma, Smt. T.R. Rekha and Smt. TR. Nadini
being W.P. No. 29853 of 2002, it was stated that Mandi
Madalappa was said to have been put in possession pursuant
to the sale transaction and after his death the same was E
succeeded by T.M. Thimmaiah who had beeh in enjoyment of
the property during his life time and he had let out the property
in favour of Garrison Engineers. In the W.P. No. 31865 of 2002,
it was stated that Mandi Madalappa was put in possession and
enjoyment of the property pursuant to the said transaction and F
after his death the property was succeeded by his son Shri T.M.
Thimmaiah who had been in possession and enjoyment of the
property during his life time and he had let out the property in
favour of Garrison Engineers.
G
15. We have taken note of the aforementioned contentions
/
"t
of Mr. Jaitley only to highlight with issue in regard to the factum
of partition but the same by itself, in our opinion, for the purpose
of determining the issues herein, would not be conclusive. Prima
facie it appears that the respondents had been in possession
H
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R.
A of the properties in suit for a long time. The heirs of Thimmaiah
had admittedly been dealing with the properties exclusively.
Appellants never exercised any act of possession. The learned
Trial Judge in his judgment itself observed:
"41 ... No doubt, there is no reference to the suit properties
B as belonging to the joint family property. This may be a
point in favour of the defendants in support of their
contention thafthe suit property was already divided in the
year 1924 and, therefore, these documents do not contain
reference to the suit properties ...
c
42. Similarly, the other documents furnished by the counsel
for the defendants 1 to 6 in page No. 75 to 293 may
establish their contention about their exclusive possession.
But, I am afraid that this fact itself will be sufficient to throw
away the suit at the threshold." >-.
0
16. A large number of documents were produced by the
respondents to substantiate that the property in question was in
exclusive enjoyment ofT.M. Thimmaiah being the adopted father
of T. Ramachandra from 1924 to 1936. The properties were in
E possession of T. Puttathaiamma, widow of Thimmaiah from
1937 to 1955 and thereafter the other respondents.
17. Respondents contend that the adoption deed must be
read as a whole. The translation of the deed of adoption does
not appear to be correct. The deed of adoption categorically
F establishes that the properties were to belong to T.
Puttathyamma during her life time, and thereafter the same was
to vest in the adoptive son T. Ramachandra. Although no
reference to the suit properties might have been made in the
deed of adoption but they had all along been in possession of
G T. Puttathyamma. Apart therefrom evidently the deed of lease
~
was executed in the year 1963 in respect of 113rd of the suit
schedule property. It was renewed in the year 1969. The property
was developed and the nature and character thereof was
changed from time to time. A registered deed of lease was
H executed in the year 1968 between Killik Nixon and T.
MANDALI RANGANNA & ORS. ETC. v. 275
....Jy T. RAMACHANDRA & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
Ramachandra. A deed of partition was also executed on A
20.12.1971. A deed of lease was executed in the year 1977
between Respondent No. 6 and Classic Automobiles. A public
notice was also issued in the year 1985 whereafter a deed of
sale was executed on 25.07.1989.
18. While considering an application for grant of injunction, B
the court will not only take into consideration the basic elements
in relation thereto, viz., existence of a prima facie case, balance
of convenience and irreparable injury, it must also take into
consideration the conduct of the parties.
c
Grant of injunction is an equitable relief. A person who had
kept quiet for a long time and allowed another to deal with the
properties exclusively, ordinarily would not be entitled to an order
of injunction. The court will not interfere only because the property
is a very valuable one. We are not however, oblivious of the fact
D
-A that grant or refusal of injunction has serious consequence
depending upon the nature thereof. The courts dealing with such
matters must make all endeavours to protect the interest of the
parties. For the said purpose, application of mind on the part of
the courts is imperative. Contentions raised by the parties must
be determined objectively. E
19. This Court in M. Gurudas and Others v. Rasaranjan
and Others [(2006) 8 SCC 367) noticed:
., "19. A finding on "prima facie case" would be a finding of
fact. However, while arriving at such a finding of fact, the F
court not only must arrive at a conclusion that a case for
trial has been made out but also other factors requisite for
grant of injunction exist. There may be a debate as has
been sought to be raised by Dr. Rajeev Dhavan that the
decision of the House of Lords in American Cyanamid G
.... ~
Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. would have no application in a case of
this nature as was opined by this Court in Colgate
Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. and S.M.
Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury (India) Ltd. but we are not
persuaded to delve thereinto." H
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S. C.R.
A 20. Therein, however, the question in regard to valid
adoption of a daughter was in issue. This Court held that Nirmala
was not a validly adopted daughter. This Court wondered:
"34. The properties may be valuable but would it be proper
to issue an order of injunction restraining the appellants
B herein from dealing with the properties in any manner
whatsoever is the core question. They have not been able
to enjoy the fruits of the development agreements. The
properties have not been sold for a long time. The
commercial property has not been put to any use. The
c condition of the properties remaining wholly unused could
deteriorate. These issues are relevant. The courts below
did not pose these questions unto themselves and, thus,
misdirected themselves in law."
21. Emphasis was also laid on the conduct of the parties
0
while granting an order of injunction.
22. In Seema Arshad Zaheer and Others v. Municipal
Corpn. Of Greater Mumbai and Others [(2006) 5 SCC 282],
this Court held:
E "30. The discretion of the court is exercised to grant a
temporary injunction only when the following requirements
are made out by the plaintiff: (i) existence of a prima facie
case as pleaded, necessitating protection of the plaintiff's
rights by issue of a temporary injunction; (ii) when the
F need for protection of the plaintiffs rights is compared ' .
with or weighed against the need for protection of the
defendant's rights or likely infringement of the defendant's
rights, the balance of convenience tilting in favour of the
plaintiff; and (iii) clear possibility of irreparable injury being
G caused to the plaintiff if the temporary injunction is not
granted. In addition, temporary injunction being an
equitable relief, the discretion to grant such relief will be
·exercised only when the plaintiffs conduct is free from
blame and he approaches the court with clean hands."
H
MANDALI RANGANNA & ORS. ETC. v. 277
T. RAMACHANDRA & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
[See also Transmission Corpn. of A. P Ltd. v. Lanco A
Kondapalli Power (P) Ltd. (2006) 1 SCC 540]
23. Rightly or wrongly constructions have come up. They
cannot be directed to be demolished, at least at this stage.
Respondent No. 7 is said to have spent three crores of rupees.
If that be so, in our opinion, it would not be proper to stop further 8
constructions.
24. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of
justice would be subserved if while allowing the respondents to
carry out constructions of the buildings, the same is made subject c
to the ultimate decision of the suit. The Trial Court is requested
to hear out and dispose of the suit as early as possible. If any
third party interest is created upon completion of the
constructions, the deeds in question shall clearly stipulate that
the matter is subjudice and all sales shall be subject to the D
ultimate decision of the suit. All parties must cooperate in the
early hearing and disposal of the suit. Respondents must also
furnish sufficient security before the learned Trial Judge within
four weeks from the date which, for the time being, is assessed
at Rupees One Crore.
E
25. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeals are. ·
dismissed subject to the observations and directions made ·
hereinbefore. However, in the facts and Circumstances of the
case, there shall be no order as to costs.
R.P. Appeals dismissed. F
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