Supreme Court of India

MANGAT MAL (DEAD) AND ANOTHERversusSMT. PUNNI DEVI (DEAD) AND OTHERS

Citation: 1995 INSC 542
Decided: 7 September 1995
Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
Bench: S P BHARUCHAS B MAJMUDAR

Holding

Property allotted to a Hindu widow in lieu of her pre‑existing right to maintenance is an acquisition of ownership that, under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, converts her limited interest into full ownership, making her sale of the property valid.

Summary

In 1934 a widow, Sukh Devi, was awarded specific immovable property and a lump‑sum by arbitration as compensation for her pre‑existing right to maintenance from her father‑in‑law’s joint family. After the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force, the widow sold the property in 1960, and the sale was challenged on the ground that she only possessed a life‑estate and not full ownership. The Supreme Court examined whether a grant of property in lieu of maintenance constitutes an acquisition of ownership within the ambit of Section 14(1) of the Act and whether Section 14(2) excludes such acquisition. It held that the award satisfied the widow’s pre‑existing right to maintenance, thereby effecting an acquisition of limited ownership that, under Section 14(1), automatically blossomed into full ownership, rendering the sale valid. Consequently, the High Court’s decision was set aside and the trial court’s judgment upholding the sale was restored.

Issues considered

Whether property allotted to a Hindu widow in lieu of her right to maintenance is an acquisition of ownership or merely a right of residence.
Whether such acquisition falls within Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, thereby converting her limited interest into full ownership.
Whether Section 14(2) excludes property acquired in lieu of maintenance from the operation of Section 14(1).
Whether maintenance under Hindu law necessarily includes provision for residence.
Whether the sale of the property by the widow is legally valid.

Legislation cited

Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1959s. 3(d)
Hindu Succession Act, 1956s. 14(1), s. 14(2)

Subjects

Section 14 Hindu Succession Actmaintenanceright to residencewidow's rightslimited estatefull ownershipproperty acquisitionpre‑existing rightarbitration awardHindu joint family

Judgment

MANGAT MAL (DEAD) AND ANOTHER A
v.
SMT. PUNNI DEVI (DEAD) AND OTHERS

SEPTEMBER 7, 1995

[S.P. BHARUCHA, S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.) B

Hindu Succession Act 1956-Section 14(1)-Rights of a Female
Hindu-' Maintenance'-Meaning of-Whether or not the maintenance given
to a fem ale Hindu would necessarily encompass a provision for her residence.

Specific property allotted to a widow, of a co-parcener in a Hindu joint
c
family, in lieu of her claim for maintenance-Wltether said allotment is by
virtue of a pre-existing right-Can such claim be equated with a right of
ownership.

Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act-Scope of. D
Object of legislature-To wipe out the disabilities suffered by a Hindu
woman, under the old Shastric Law, in regard to ownership of property-To
recognise her status as an independent and absolute owner of her property.

Sub Sec. (1) of Sec. 14-Large enough in its amplitude to cover every E
kind of acquisition of property by a female Hindu, including acquisition in
lieu of maintenance-Sub Sec. (2) Sec. 14-Confined only to cases where
property was acquired for the first time by a Hindu woman without any
·pre-existing right.

Right to receive maintenance-A pre-existing right-Possession of F
property pursuant to or in recognition of such a right-Sufficient title to enable
ripening of possession into full ownership.

Legal position prior to enactment of the Act-Right of a fem ale Hindu,
in the property-only a limited interest-Disability imposed by law, wiped out G
and limited interest enlarged to a full and absolute interest under Sec. 14(1)
of the Act.

Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1959-Sec. 3(d)-Definition
of'Maintenance'-lncludes in all cases-Among other things, provision for
residence. H
369
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A In the year 1934 , as a result of arbitration proceedings, between one
S widow of a co-parcerner in a Hindu joint family and her father-in-law,
A certain immovable properties, belonging to the joint family and a lump
sum amount of RI\. 38000 was allotted to said S. The terms of the award ·~
made it abundantly clear that the said property was allotted to her for her
life time, for the purpose of residence and maintenance and upon her death
B
would revert back to, A his heirs and legal representatives.

Said A expired in 1945 and in 1956 the Hindu Succession Act came
into force. By virtue of Sec. 14(1) of the said Act, property held by a female
Hindu immediately, prior to the commencement of the Act was made her
C absolute property.

In April 1960 said S sold the properties in her possession to the
predecessor in title of the AppellantsNendees. Consequently a suit was
filed by the legatees under A's will challenging the validity of the said sale.

D The Trial Court, dismissed the suit, holding that S had become, by
reason of the Act, the full owner of the disputed property and hence the
sale was valid. The High Court, in appeal however took a contrary view
and set aside the sale, holding that S had only restricted life estate in the
property and therefore, had not become the full owner of the said property.
E The Vendees, in appeal, before this Court, contended that : (a) S had
a pre-existing right to maintenance. (b) that the disputed properties
having been allotted to her in lieu of that right, she had acquired a limited
ownership of the properties under the award in 1934. (c) That on coming
into force of the Hindu Succession Act, her limited ownership had blos-
F somed into a full ownership.

The Respondents resisted the said appeal on the grounds that : (a)
For the application of Sec. 14(1), it was requisite that the property should
have been 'acquired' and that the acquisition was of ownership rights,
comparable to those a limited estate holder under the old Hindu Law (b)
G Since S had been conceded only the right of residence in the disputed
property, she had not acquired any right thereto. (c) Sub Sec. (1) of Sec.
14, presupposed the existence of a limited ownership before the same could
be converted into a full ownership. (d) Modes of acquisition contemplated
in the Explanation to Section 14(1) suggested that it was the right of
H ownership that was insisted upon and a right in the nature of a right of
MANGATMALv. PUNNIDEVI 371

residence could not be t;quated with a right of ownership. (e) The fact that A
even during the life time of S the reversioners to whom the disputed
property belonged as legatees under A's will could create a mortgage
thereof without her permission, indicated that they continued to be owners
of the disputed property. (1) The concession in the award of the right of
residence in the disputed property to S was over and above the provisions
B
for her maintenance in terms of money. (t) Even if the award conferred a
title to the property for the purpose of Sec. 14(1), it did not come from any
pre-existing right.

Allowing the appeal this Court
c
HELD : 1.1. When specific property was allotted to a widow in lieu of
her claim for maintenance, the allotment was in satisfaction of her right to
be maintained out of the joint family property. It was not a grant for the
first time without any pre-existing right in the widow. The widow got the
property by virtue of pre-existing right, the instrument giving the property
being merely a document effectuating such pre-existing right. [378-D] D

1.2. Sec.14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act was large in its amplitude
and covered every kind of acquisition of property by a female Hindu,
including acquisition in lieu of maintenance. Where such property was
possessed by her at the date of commencement of the Act, she became its E
full owner. [378-E]

13. Where property was acquired by a Hindu woman in lieu of her
right to maintenance, it was by virtue of a pre-existing right and such
acquisition was not within the scope and ambit of Sub- Sec. (2) of Sec. 14,
even if the instrument allotting the property prescribed a restricted estate F
in it. Under the law as it stood prior to the enactment of the Act, a Hindu
woman had no more than a limited interest in the property, and the
restriction on her interest, being a disability imposed by law, was wiped
out and her limited interest enlarged under Sub Sec. (1) of Sec. 14 of the
Hindu Succession Act 1956. [378-H; 379-A-B] G

V. Tulsamma and Ors. v. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by Lrs., [1977] 3 SCR
261, relied on.

2. Sec. 14, was aimed at removing restrictions or limitations on the
right of Hindu woman to enjoy, as a full owner property possessed by her, H
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A so long as her possession was traceable to a lawful origin. It made no
difference as to how property was acquired. [379-D]

The Explanation to Sec. 14(1) expressly refers to property acquired
in lieu of maintenance. Therefore, in respect of property given to a widow
and possession by her in lieu of maintenance, there is no further title that
B she must establish before claiming full ownership under Sec. 14(1). [379-E]

Gu/want Kaur and Another v. Mohinder Singh and Ors., [1987] 3 SCR
576, relied on.

3. If a Hindu woman was put in possession of property pursuant to
c or in recognition of a right to maintenance., it could not be denied that she
had acquired a limited right or interest in the property and once that
position was accepted it followed that the right got enlarged into full
ownership under Sec. 14(1). [379-H; 380-A]

4. The word 'acquired' in Sec. 14(1) is to be given the widest possible
D
meaning. Sub Sec. (2) of Sec 14 was more in nature of a proviso to Sub
Sec.(l). It could come into operation only if acquisition by any of the
methods indicated therein was made for the first time without there being
any pre-existing right in the Hindu woman who was in possession of the
property. [380-C]
E
Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi, [1970] 2 SCR 95, relied on.

5. The relevant date on which the Hindu woman should be possessed
of the property, ought to be the date on which the question of applying the
provisions of section 14(1) arise. If on that date the property was possessed
F by a Hindu woman, it would be held that she was a full owner of it and not
merely a limited owner. [380-B] ·

Mangat Singh & Others v. Smt. Rattno (dead), [1967] 3 S.C.R. 45
referred to.
G 6. Sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act was a step in the direction of
practical recognition of the equality of the sexes and also a step calculated
to ensure uniformity in the law relating to the nature of ownership of
'Stridhana'. This dual purpose underlying the Explanation to Sec. 14(1)
had to be borne in mind and given etTect to when the Section is subjected
H to analysis and interpretation. Sub Sec. (2) was not to be given a meaning
MANGAT MAL v. PUNNI DEVi 373

which would defeat that purpose and negative the legislative intent and did A
not operate to take in properties acquired by a Hindu woman in lieu of
maintenance or arrears of maintenance. [382-F-H; 383-A]

Bai Vijiya v. 17wkorbhai Chelabhai, [1979) 3 SCR 291, referred to.

7. Maintenance necessarily must encompass a provision for B
residence. Maintenance is given so that the lady can live in the manner,
more or less, to which she is accustomed. Where provision for her
residence is made by giving a life interest in property, that provision is
made in lieu of a pre existing right to maintenance and the Hindu lady
acquires far more than the vestige of title which is deemed sufficient to C
attract Sec. 14(1) the Act. [383-H; 384-B]

7.1. Even the position in law as it stood prior to the Act was that a
widow who does not succeed to the estate of her husband as his heir is
entitled to maintenance out of his separate ·property as well as out of
property in which he was a co-parcerner at the time of his death. She is D
entitled to reside in the family dwelling house in which she lived with her
husband. A widow who is entitled to maintenance may sue, inter alia, for a
charge on a specific portion of her husband's estate for her maintenance
and residence. [385-A-B]

Mu/la's Hindu Law (Sixth Edition), referred to. E
8. In the present case, perusal of the terms of the reference and the
award, it is clear that S acquired the disputed property and the sum of Rs.
38,000 in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintenance. Family disputes had
made the continuance of joint lodging and boarding impossible and there-
fore an arbitrator was appointed "to allot property and cost" to her for her F
life, for residence and maintenance. There was, therefore, a clear recogni-
tion of her pre-existing right to maintenance, because of which she ac-
quired, limited ownership rights in the disputed property and upon the
coming into force of the act in 1956, the said limited right acquired by her
in 1934 blossomed into full ownership. She was therefore entitled to sell G
the said property. The sale was thus a valid sale. [383-F; B-C]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1304 of
1972.

From the Judgment and Order dated 8.5.70 of the Rajasthan High H
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Court in D.B. Civil Regular First Appeal No. 83 of 1962.

S.K. Bagga Ms. Tanuj Bagga, Seeraj Bagga, Mrs. S. Shureshta Bagga,
for the Appellants

D.D. Thakur, P.K. Mukherjee and R.K. Maheshwari, for the Respor
B dents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BHARUCHA, J. This appeal by special leave impugns the judgment
and order dated 8th May, 1970 of the High Court of Rajasthan. The issue
c in the appeal relates to the application of Section 14(1) of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956. It stands outside the line of cases decided by this
Court in that it is argued that, in giving maintenance, provision for
residence is not to be made.

D One Karam Chand had two sons, Dhanraj and Askaran. Dhanraj
died in 1891 leaving no issue. Askaran had two sons, J ohri Mal and Bhikam
Chand. In 1905 Johri Mal was taken in adoption by Dhanraj's widow. After
the adoption of Johri Mal, Askaran and Bhikam Chand remained co-par-
ceners until the death in 1911 of Bhikam Chand. Bhikam Chand left behind
his wife Sukh Devi and a daughter. On 7th February, 1928, Askaran
executed a will bequeathing his estate to Johri Mal. Sukh Devi, who had
been living with her father-in-law Askaran, protested; being the widow of
a co-parcener she was entitled to be maintained out of joint family proper-
ty. An agreement was then entered into between Askaran and Sukh Devi.
It was dated 26th June, 1934. It recited that Sukh Devi had been boarding
F and lodging with Askaran, and that family disputes had arisen. To put an
end to the family disputes, Askaran and Sukh Devi, by the agreement,
appointed one Moo! Chand as arbitrator to "allot property and cost for
executant number 2 for her life for residence and maintenance". The
arbitrator Mool Chand entered upon the reference and made an award on
9th July, 1934. He set out the particulars of properties belonging to
G Askaran at Bidasar and Ladnu and gave the choice of selecting one to Sukh
Devi to "reside till her life time in them or in it and she can use it in any
way she likes. On necessity she will get its repairs done with her own
money. She will have no right to sell, mortgage of transfer in any other way.
After her death, the properties stated in para No. 1 or 2 (whichever she
H might take) will revert to Askaran, His Heirs and legal representatives. Her
MANGATMALv. PUNNIDEVI 375

right will be only in her lifetime. She is authorised to undertake construe- A
tion for necessity and convenience. She may increase or decrease apart-
ments with her money. But she will not be authorised to destroy,
deteriorate its usefulness and condition, etc.

4. For the maintenance of Smt. Sukh Devi, I give my finding that it
is better to give a lumpsum instead of giving monthly or annually because B
she wants to receive money in lump sum. By giving lump sum, the disputes,
which might arise from time to time at the time of demand and payment,
might be avoided. Therefore I give may finding that Askaran will pay a sum
of Rs. 45,000 (rupees forty five thousand only) to Smt. Sukh Devi for
maintenance in case she accepts the house at Ladnu and in case she takes c
the house and the Nohra at Bidasar, she will be given Rs. 37,000 (rupees
thirty seven thousand only). Since there is no apartment in the Nohra,
Askaran will pay a sum of Rs .. 1000 (rupees one thousand only) more
besides Rs. 37,000 (rupees thirty seven thousand only) for constructing
Dhalia, room for keeping grass and fodder and a Hauz............. .
D
(5) The money which will be given to her for maintenance will be her
personal money and she can use it as she likes

(8) After the execution of the aforesaid terms, Askaran will be free
from all kinds of litigations or compensation of Smt. Sukh Devi and she
E
will have no right in the ancestral or personal properties of Askaran or his
heirs or legal representatives. Further, Askaran, his heirs or legal repre-
sentatives will also have no right in Smt. Sukh Devi's any property or her
Shtridhan except noted in Para No.3 .................... 11

On 10th July, 1934, Sukh Devi executed a document wherein she F
stated that she had accepted the property at Bidasar under the terms of
Mool Chand's award. She would "have right in the house and Nohra at
Bidasar in the manner that I will go on residing in the said )louse at Bidasar
till my life time and go on using the Nohra. I will keep the house and Nohra
in my possession and use them in the manner I like and on necessity, I will G
get it repaired with my money. I will be authorised to effect minor changes
etc. by way of construction for my convenience, but I will not be authorised
to waste or damage the said Haveli and Nohra. After my death the house
will again revert to Askaran, his surviving sons and grandsons or other heirs
and successors or legal representatives. My heirs and successors or legal
representative will have no right of possession or ownership over the said H
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A property...... .

3. The arbitrator has allowed me Rs. 37,000 in case I take the house ....
and Nohra at Bidasar (Nohra with Rs. 1000 for constructing rooms). I
agree to take.this amount for my maintenance etc. over which I will have
absolute right... ................ .
B
7. In the end it is clearly stated that now I shall have no concern of
any ~ind in the movable and immovable properties and the cash of Askaran
which might be existing in this state or in British India or at any other
place ........."
c Askaran died on 24th April, 1945.

Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, reads thus :

"Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property - (1) Any
property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before
D
or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full
owner thereof and not as a limited owner.

Explanation-In this sub-section, "property" includes both movable
and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by in-
E heritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or
arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a
relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill
or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other
manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as
stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.
F
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property
acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or
under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where
the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order
G or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property."

On 11th April, 1960, Sukh Devi executed sale deeds relating to the
'Nohra' in the Bidasar property in favour of one Mangat Mal, in respect
of its Western side, and one Trilok Chand, in respect of its Eastern side.

H On 17th May, 1960, J ohari Mal and his sons filed a suit challenging
MANGATMALv. PUNNIDEVI 377

the validity of the sale. The vendees were made parties. The trial court A
dismissed the suit holding that Sukh Devi had become, by reason of the
Act, the full owner of the property at Bidasar. The plaintiffs appealed to
the High Court. The High Court Court took the view that the words "in
lieu of maintenance" in the explanation to Section 14(1) applied to property
specifically allotted to a widow for her maintenance while the words "or in
B
any other manner whatsoever" covered specific property allotted to her or
her residence. It held that Sukh Devi had not become the full owner of the
property at Bidasar on the coming into· force of the Act because she had
only a restricted life-estate therein. The appeal was, accordingly, allowed.
The sale deeds were held to be void and the plaintiffs to be entitled to
possession of the Nohra upon the death of Sukh Devi. C

This appeal is by the vendees of the 'Nohra', Mangat Mal and Trilok
Chand.

Mr. Bagga, learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that Sukh D
Devi had a pre-existing right to maintenance and that under the award she
was given a life interest in the Bidasar property along with a sum of Rs.
37,000 in lieu of that right. She, therefore, acquired limited ownership of
the Bidasar property under the award in 1934 and that limited ownership
blossomed into full ownership on the coming into force of the Act.
E
Mr. Thakur, learned counsel for the respondents, submitted that, for
the application of Section 14(1), it was requisite that the property should
have been 'acquired' and that the acquisition was of ownership rights
comparable to those of a limited estate holder under the old Hindu law.
Since Sukh Devi had been conceded only the right of residence in the F
Bidasar Property, she had not acquired any right thereto. Hence, Section
14(1) did not apply. The use of the two expressions "limited owner" and
"full owner" in Section 14(1) presupposed the existence of a limited owner-
ship right before the same could be converted into full ownership. The
modes of acquisition contemplated in the Explanation to Section 14(1)
suggestPrl that it was the right of ownership which was insisted upon. A G
right in the nature of a right of residence could not be equated with a right
of ownership. Even during the life time of Sukh Devi, the reversioners, to
whom the Bidasar property belonged as legatees under Askaran's will,
could create a mortgage thereof without her permission because they
continued to be the owners of Bidasar property. The concession in the H
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A award of the right of residence in the Bidasar property to Sukh Devi was
over and above the provision for maintenance in terms of money. Even if
it were to be held that the award conferred a title to the property for the
purposes of Section 14(1), it did not not come from any pre-existing right.

B In the leading case on the subject of Section 14, V. Tulasanuna &
Ors. v. V. Sesha Reddi (Dead) by L.Rs., [1977] 3 S.C.R. 261, it was held that
under the Sastric Hindu Law a Hindu widow had a right to be maintained
out of joint family property and this right .ripened into a charge if the
widow took the necessary steps for having her maintenance ascertained and
specifically charged on the joint family property. Even if no specific charge
c were created, this right was enforceable against joint family property in the
hands of a volunteer or a purchaser taking it with notice of her claim. When
Specific property was allotted to the widow in lieu of her claim for
maintenance, the allotment was in satisfaction of her right to be maintained
out of the joint family property. It was not a grant for the first time without
D any pre-existing right in the widow. The widow got the property by virtue
of her pre-existing right, the instrument giving the property being merely a
document effectuating such pre-existing right. Section 14(1) was large in
its amplitude and covered every kind of acquisition of property by a female
Hindu including acquisition in lieu of maintenance. Where such property
was possessed by her at the date of commencement of the Act, she became
E its full owner. The words "any property" were large enough to cover any
and every kind of property but in order to expend the reach and ambit of
the Section and make it all comprehensive the Explanation thereto had
been enacted. Whatever be the kind of property, movable or immovable,
and whichever be the mode of acquisition, it would be covered by Section
F 14(1). The object of the Legislature was to wipe out the disabilities from
which a Hindu woman suffered in regard to the ownership of property
under the old Sastric Law and to recognise her status as an independent
and absolute owner of property. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 was in the
nature of a proviso to sub-section (1). It had to be read in the context of
G sub-section (1) to leave as large a scope for the operation of sub-section
(1) as possible. So read, sub- section (2) had to be confined to cases where
property was acquired by a Hindu woman without any pre-existing right
for the first time under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the
terms of which prescribed a restricted estate in the property. Where
property was acquired by a Hi~du woman in lieu of her right to main-
H tenance it was by virtue of a pre-existing right and such acquisition was not
MANGAT MAL v. PUNNI DEVI 379

within the scope and ambit of sub-section (2) even if the instrument A
allotting the property prescribed a restricted estate in it. Where property
was acquired by a Hindu woman under an instrument by virtue of a
pre-existing right to maintenance and, under the law as it stood prior to
the enactment of the Act, she would have had no more than a limited
interest in the property, a provision in the instrument giving her limited
B
interest in the property was merely by way of recognition of the legal
position as it existing and the restriction on her interest, being a disability
imposed by law, was wiped out and her limited interest enlarged under
sub-section (1).

In Smt. Gu/want Kaur and Anr. v. Mohinder Singh and 01:~., {1987) 3 c
S.C.R. 576, it was argued that even if the land in question had been given
to the appellant in lieu of maintenance, it had to be established that what
was given to her was a limited estate in the sense of ownership without the
right of alienation and that under Section 14 of the Act only such a limited
estate would blossom into her absolute estate. This Court rejected the D
argument. It said that it was obvious that Section 14 was aimed at removing
restrictions or limitations on the right of a Hindu woman to enjoy, as a full
owner, property possessed by her so long as her possession was traceable
to a lawful origin, that is to say, if she had a vestige of a title. It made no
difference whether the property was acquired by inheritance or devise or
at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift E
or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription or in any
other manner whatsoever. The Explanation to Section 14(1) expressly
referred to property acquired in lieu of maintenance and the Court could
not see what further title the widow was required to establish before she
could claim full ownership under Section 14(1) in respect of property given
to her and possessed by her in lieu of maintenance. The very right to F
receive maintenance was sufficient title to enable the ripening of possession
into full ownership if she was in possession of the property in lieu of
maintenance. The Court added that it did not understand that in the case
of Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai, [1979] 3 S.C.R. 291, it had been laid
down that what was enlarged by Section 14(1) into a full estate was the G
Hindu ...,...'Dan's estate known to Hindu Law. When the Court had used the
words "limited estate", they were used to connote a right in the property
to which the possession of the Hindu woman could legitimately be traced,
but it was not a full right of ownership. If a Hindu woman was put in
possession of property pursuant to or in recognition of a right to main-
tenance, it could not be denied that she had acquired a limited right or H
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A interest in the property and once that position was accepted it followed
that the right got enlarged to full ownership under Section 14(1).

The property acquired by a Hindu widow under an award for parti-
tion of her late husband's estate was the subject-matter of the decision of
this Court in Bad1i Persad v. Smt. Kanso Devi, [1970) 2 S.C.R. 95. The word
B "acquired" in Section 14(1) had , the Court said, to be given the widest
possible meaning. This was so because of the language of the Explanation
which made sub-section (1) applicable to acquisition of property by in-
heritance or devise or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears
of maintenance or by gift or by a female's own skill or exertion or by
c purchase or prescription or in any manner whatsoever. Sub-section (2) of
Section 14 was more in the nature of a proviso to sub-section (1). It could
come into operation only if acquisition by any of the methods indicated
therein was made for the first time without there being any pre- existing
right in the Hindu woman who was in possession of the property. The mere
D fact that there had been a partition by means of arbitration which resulted
in an award and a decree based on it did not bring the matter within
sub-section (2) as the provisions of sub-section (1) became fully applicable
in view of the terms of the Explanation.

Mr. Thakur drew our attention to Eramma v. Veempana and Ors.,
E [1966] 2 S.C.R. 626, and he emphasised a passage which reads thus :

"(7) It is triJe that the appellant was in possession of Eran Gowda's
properties but that fact alone is not sufficient to attract the opera-
tion of s.14. The property possessed by a female Hindu, as con-
F templated in the section is clearly property to which she has
acquired some kind of title whether before or after the commen-
cement of the Act. It may be noticed that the Explanation· to
S.14(1) sets out the various modes of acquisition of the property
by a female Hindu and indicates that the section applies only to
property to which the female Hindu has acquired some kind of
G title, however restricted the nature of her interest may be. The
words "as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner" as given
in the last portion of sub-section (1) of S.14 clearly suggest that
the legislature intended that the limited ownership of a Hindu
female should be changed into full ownership. In other words,
H S.14(1) of the Act contemplates that a Hindu female who, in the
MANGATMALv. PUNNIDEVI 381

absence of .this provision, would have been limited owner of the A
proper:ty, will now become full owner of the same by virtue of this
section. The object of the section is to extinguish the estate called
'limited estate' or 'widow's estate' in Hindu Law and to make a
Hindu woman, who under the old law would have been only a
limited owner a full owner of the property will all powers of B
disposition and to make the estate heritable by her own heirs and
not revertible to the heirs of the last male holder. The Explanation
to sub-section (1) of Section 14 defines the word 'property' as
including "both movable and immovable property acquired by a
female Hindu by inheritance or devise ...:.". Sub-section (2) of S.14
also refers to acquisition of property. It is true that the Explanation C
has not given any exhaustive connotation of the word "property "
but the word 'acquired used in the Explanation and also in sub-
section (2) of s.14 clearly indicates that the object of the section
is to make a Hindu female a full owner of the property which she
has already acquired or which she acquired after the enforcement D
of the Act. It does not in any way confer a title on the female
Hindu where she did not in fact pvssess any vestige or title. It
follows, therefore, that the section cannot be interprete<;l so as to
validate the illegal possession of a female Hindu and it does not
confer any title on a mere trespasser. In other words, the provisions
of section 14(1) of the Act cannot be attracted in the case of a E
Hindu female who is in possession of the iJroperty of the last male
holder on the date of the commencement of the Act when she is
only a trespasser without any right to property."

It is difficult to see how this judgment can assist the respondents' case. The F
Court did not intend to mean that the object of Section 14 was only to
extinguish the estate called 'limited estate' or widow's estate' under the
Hindu Law. That is clear from the passage quoted when it refers to "some
kind of title" and "any vestige of title". It is clear also from what the Court
held in the last sentence quoted above, namely, that the provisions of
Section 14(1) are not attracted in the case of a Hindu woman who is in G
possession of property only as a trespasser and without any right thereto.

The next case which Mr. Thakur cited was Mangal Singh and Ors. v.
Smt. Rattno (dead), [1967) 3 S.C.R. 454. Mr. Thakur stressed that it was
there stated that the expression "possessed by" in Section 14(1) was not H
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A intended to apply to a case of mere possession without title and the
Legislature intended this provision for cases where the Hindu woman
possessed a right of ownership in the property in question. In paragraph 9
of the same judgment the Court said that it appeared that the relevant date
on Which the Hindu woman should be possessed of the property in dispute
should be the date on which the question of applying the provisions of
B Section 14(1) arose. If, on that date, when the provisions of this Section
were sought to be applied, the property was possessed by a Hindu women,
it would be held that she was full owner of it and not merely a limited
owner.

c The next judgment upon which Mr. Thakur placed reliance was that
of this Court in Bai Vijia v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai, [1979] 3 S.C.R. 291, to
which reference has already been made. It was pointed out that the Court
had said that a plain reading of Section 14(1) made it clear that the
concerned Hindu woman should have limited ownership in the property,
D which limited ownership would get enlarged by the operation of that
sub-section. It was intended to enlarge any sort of a right which in no sense
could be described as ownership. The expression "and not as a limited
owner' would, than, not have been used at all. Now, in this case it was also
said that limited ownership in the Hindu woman was a sine qua non for
the applicability of Section 14(1) and this requirement stood fully satisfied
E in the case of a widow to whom property was made over in lieu of
maintenance with full rights of enjoyment thereof minus the power of
alienation. These were precisely the incidents of limited ownership. It was
also said that the enactment of Section 14 was a step in the direction of
practical recognition of the equality of the sexes and was meant to elevate
F women from a subservient position in the economic filed to .a pedestal
where they could exercise full powers of enjoyment and disposal of proper-
ty held by them as owners, untrammelled by artificial limitations placed on
their rights of ownership by a society in which the will of the dominant
male prevailed to bring about a subjugation of the opposite sex. it was also
a step calculated to ensure uniformity in the law relating to the nature of
G ownership of 'stridhana'. This dual purpose underlying the Explanation to
Section 14(1) had to be borne in mind and given effect to when the
selection was subjected to analysis and interpretation and sub-section (2)
was not to be given a meaning which would defeat that purpose and
negative the legislative intent, if the language used so warranted. A com-
H bined reading of the two sub-sections and the Explanation left no room for
MANGATMALv. PUNNIDEVI 383

doubt that sub-section (2) did not not operate to take in property acquired A
by a Hindu woman in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance (which
was property specifically included in the enumeration contained in the
Explanation) out of the purview of sub-section (1).

The reference made by Askaran and Sukh Devi to the arbitration of
Mool Chand records that Sukh Devi was the widow of Askaran's son and B
had been boarding and lodging with Askaran. Family disputes had made
the continuance of joint lodging and boarding impossible and Mool Chand
was appointed arbitrator "to allot property and cost" to Sukh Devi "for her
life for residence and maintenance". There was, therefore, clearly, recog-
nition of Sukh Devi's pre- existing right to maintenance. The award that C
Moo! Chand made gave Sukh Devi an alternative in respect of the property
in which she desired to reside, one at Bidasar and one at Ladnu. The award
stated that if she chose the property at Ladnu she would receive Rs.45,000
in addition, and if she chose the property at Bidasar she would receive Rs.
37,000 in addition (as also Rs. 1,000 for constructing certain apartments). D
The award entitled Sukh Devi to use the property she chos1< for residence
for life and "she can use in any way she likes". She was entitled to undertake
construction for necessity and convenience, to increase and decrease apart-
ments with her money and to get repairs done. The only limitation was that
she should not destroy or damage the property. Sukh Devi chose the
property at Bidasar for residence and in the deed she executed in that E
behalf she stated that she would "keep the house and Nohra in my posses-
sion and use them in the manner I like".

In our view, on a perusal of the terms of reference, the award and
the document executed by Sukh Devi indicating her preference for the F
Bidasar property, there is no doubt that Sukh Devi acquired the Bidasar
property and the sum of Rs. 38,000 in lieu of her pre-existing right to
maintenance. That the award of the property and the money was linked is
clear from the fact that the quantum of the money depended upon whether
Sukh Devi chose the Bidasar property or the Ladnu property. The award
of both property and money was in lieu of her pre-existing right to main- G
tenance.

Maintenance, as we see it, necessarily must encompas a provision for
residence. Maintenance is given so that the lady can live in the manner,
more or less, to which she was accustomed. The concept of maintenance H
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP, 3 S.C.R.

A must, therefore, include provisions for food and clothing and the like and
take into account the pasic need for a roof over the head. Provision for
•
residence may be made either by giving a lump sum in money, or property
in lieu thereof. It may also be made by providing, for the course of the
lady's life, a residence and money for other necessary expenditure. Where
provision is made in this manner, by giving a life interest in property for
B
the purposes of residence, that provision is made in lieu of a pre-existing
right to maintenance and the Hiii,du lady acquires far more than the vestige
of title which is deemed sufficient to attract Section 14(1).

We are supported in the view that we take by Mulla's Hindu Law
C (Sixteenth Edition) which sets out the position in law prior to the Act. The
Manager of a joint Mitakshara family is under a legal obligation to maintain
all male members of the family, their wives and their children. On the death
of any one of the male members he is bound to maintain his widow and
his children. The obligation to maintain these persons arises from the fact
D that the Manager is in possession of the family property (para 543). An
heir is legally bound to provide, out of the estate which descends to him,
maintenance for those persons whom the late proprietor was legally or
morally bound to maintain (para 544). A wife is entitled to be maintained
by her husband, whether he possesses property or not. When a man with
his eyes open marries a girl accustomed to a certain style of living, he
E undertakes the obligation of maintaining her in that style (para 554). A
widow who does not succeed to the estate of her husband as his heir is
entitled to maintenance out bf his separate property as well as out of
property in which he was a co-parcener at the time cif his death (para 559).
A Hindu widow is,· in the absence of special circumstances, entitled to
F reside in th~ family dwelling house in which she lived with her husband
(para 562). The maintenance to be allowed to a widow should be such an
amount as will enable her to live consistently with her position as a widow,
with the same degree of comfort and reasonable luxury as she had in her
husband's house, unless there are circumstances which affect, one way or
the other, her mode of living there. In determining the amount of main-
G tenance the Court should have regard, inter alia, to the provision and status
of the deceased husband ·and of the widow and the reasonable wants of the
widow, including not only the ordinary expenses of living, but what she
might reasonably expend for religious and other duties incidental to her
station in life (para 566). Where an undivided family consists of two or
H more males, related as father and son or otherwise, and one of them dies
MANGATMALv. PUNNIDEVI 385

leaving a widow, she is entitled to reside in the family dwelling house in A
which she lived with her husband. If the house is sold by the surviving
coparceners without necessity, the sale does not affect her right, and the
purchaser cannot evict her until another suitable residence is found for her
(para 573). A widow who is entitled to maintenance may sue, inter alia, for
a charge on a specific portion her husband's estate for her maintenance
B
and residence (para 579).

The Hindu Adoption & Maintenance Act, 1959, was enacted to
amend and codify the law relating to adoptions and maintenance among
Hindus, and it defines maintenance in Section 3( d) to include "(i) in all
cases, provision for food, clothing, residence, education and medical atten- C
dance and treatment." (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the award provision was made, in lieu of Sukh Devi's pre-
existing right to maintenance, of money and interest for life in the Bidasar
property. Sukh Devi, therefore, acquired limited ownership rights in the
Bidasar property in recognition of her pre-existing right to maintenance. D
Upon the coming into force of the Act the limited rights acquired by Sukh
Devi in 1934 blossomed into full ownership of the Bidasar property, and
she became entitled to sell its 'nohra'. In our view, therefore, the High
Court was in error in the view that it took.

The appeal is allowed. The judgment and order under appeal is set E
aside the judgment and order of the Sr. Civil Judge, Churu is restored.

In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as
to costs.

T.W. Appeal allowed.

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