Holding

A person who remains in possession after a compromise decree is still a "tenant" under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act and is protected by Section 13, so execution of the decree is barred.

Summary

Mani Subrat Jain, an advocate, was a tenant of a building owned by Raja Ram Vohra. The landlord sued for possession and the parties entered a compromise whereby Jain agreed to vacate by a specified date, and a decree for possession was passed on 9‑Oct‑1972. The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 was extended to Chandigarh on 4‑Nov‑1972, and its Section 13 bars eviction of any "tenant" even in execution of a decree. The Supreme Court examined whether Jain, despite the compromise and decree, remained a "tenant" under the Act and whether Section 13 therefore prohibited execution. Interpreting Section 2(i) to include a tenant continuing in possession after termination of the tenancy, the Court held that Jain was still a tenant and enjoyed immunity under Section 13. Consequently, the execution proceedings could not proceed, and the appeal was dismissed after the parties settled the dispute by agreeing to a sale of the property.

Issues considered

Whether a person who has entered into a compromise decree and whose tenancy is terminated under general law continues to be a "tenant" within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
Whether Section 13(1) of the Act bars the execution of a decree for possession against such a person.
Whether the effect of a compromise decree terminates the tenancy for the purposes of the rent‑control legislation.

Legislation cited

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949s. 13(1), s. 2(i)
Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947

Subjects

rent controltenancyevictionexecution of decreecompromise decreedefinition of tenantlandlord‑tenant disputestatutory interpretation

Judgment

141

MANI SUBRAT JAJN
v.
RAJA RAM VOHRA
>
November 19, 1979
[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. PATHAK. JJ.] 8
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 Section 2(1), 3,-"Tenant"......
Meaninc of-Scope of.

The appellant, an Advocate, tenanted aJ building belonging to the respondent.
The i-espondent sued the oppellant for possession Of the premi!es and by ij
compromise, the Appellant •greed to vacate the premises by a certain date. . A C
decree in terms thereof was passed. Then the Act came into being which by
extension Of its opemtion applied to Chandigarh with effect from 4-11-1972.

·It was contended that (i) had the decree been passed but a few days later,
the Act would have admittedly interdicted the eviction because of Section 13
thereof; and had the decree been made and executed a day before the extension
of the Act, the years of Jitigative procrastination of eviction might have been D
impossible. The salvation of the appellant is certain if he be a '1enant" within
the meaning of the Act and his eviction is certain if the definition of tenant
doea not cover him in its amplitude and (ii)_ tb&t the effect of compromise
decree is that' the tenancy of the appellant has been terminated.

Accepting the appeal,

HELD : An adTocate, under this Act, enjoys special protection. It is too
platitudinous to preach and too entrenched to shake the proposition that rent
control legislation in a country of terrible accommodation shortage is a beneficial
measure whose construction must be liberal enough to fulfil the statutory purpose
and not frustrate it. So construed, the benefit of interpretative doubt belongs
to the potential evictee unless the language is plain and provides for eviction.
That intendment must, by interpretation, be effectuated. This is the essence Of F
'"'1t control jurisprudence. [143 E-GJ ·
'
The expression 'tenant includes a 'tenant' continuing in possession after the
termination of the tenancy in his favour'. It thus fucludes, by express provision,
a quondam tenant whose nexus with "the property is continuance in pmsession.
The fact that a decree or any other process extingnishes the tenancy under the
general law of real property does not terminate the status of a t~nant under G.
the Act having regard to the carefully drawn inclusive clause. Subudhi"s case
[1968) 2 S.C.R. 559 related to a statute wh<ll"e the definition in s. 2(5) of that
Act expressly included "any person against whom a suit for ejectment is pending
in a court of competent jurisdiction" and more pertinent to the point specially
excluded "a person against whom a decreei or order for eviction has- been made
by such a court." [144 E-G]
R
(ii) The text, reinforced by the context, especially of section 13, convincingly
includes ex·tenants against whom decrees for eviction might have been passed.

T
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 s.c.R·.

whether on compromise or otherwise.. Nobody has a case that the appellant is:
A
not continuously in possession. The conclusion is inevitable that he remains a.
tenant and enjoys immunity under section 13 ( 1) of the Act. The execu·tion
proceedings must therefore fall, because the statutory road-block cannot be
remo¥ed. [A conffict is best resolved by the parties as both sides in the present
case have produced an enlightened settlement by an agreement to sell the pro-
perty in dispute by the rei;pondent to the appellant.) [144 G-Hl •
B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 818 of 1978
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
10-4-1978 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Chi) Revision
No. 458 of 1978 (0 & H)
c G. L. Sanghi, B. Datta, K. K. Manchanda and Ishwar Chand lain
for the Appellant.
P. Govindan Nair and N. Sudhakaran for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J.-The Holmesian homily that the life of the Jaw
D is not logic but experience directs our humane attention, in this appeal
against an order ill execution for evictiO)l of an advocate in] Chandigarh,
affirmed by court after court, to a reading of the textual definiton of
'tenant' [s.2 (i)] in the context of the broad embargo on ejectment of
urban dwellings in s. 13 of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949
(hereinafter referred to as the Act).
E
Chandigarh, a blossom in the desert, has served as the capital of
two States; and, with explosive expansion, thanks to the marvellous
human resources of Punjab & Haryana, become a crowded, though not
yet chaotic, city with chronic accommodation scarcity. Consequently,
laissez faire law, in the matter of landlord's right to evict his tenant,
F was subject to the act with effect from 4-11-1972. From then on, no
tenant could be dispossessed except on the ground set out in s. 13. But
if a landlord had already obtained a decree for eviction earlier to this
dateline, was he to be restrained by s. 13 which forbade even execution
of decrees against tenants, or was he free from the statutory fetters
because the defendant had ceased to be a tenant on the passing of the
G
decree, having forfeited his status by the destructive effect of a com-
promise, as in this case? '
An advocate, under this Act, belongs to a 'scheduled' class of
tenants whose dwellings enjoy special protection. The appellant-
advocate tenanted a building belonging to the respondent. The latter
H sued for possession and the former, with refreshing realism, entered
into a compromise and agreed to vacate by a certain date on certain _.,._
tenru; regarding rent which do not bear upon the dispute before us.

- T
M. s. JAIN v. R. R. VOHRA (Krishna Iyer, J.) 143

A decree in terms thereof was passed on 9-10-1972. Then came the A
Act, which by extension of its operation, applied to Chandigarh with
effect from 4-11-1972. Had the decree been passed but a few days
later, the Act would have admittedly interdicted the eviction because
of s. 13, Had the decree been made and executed a day before the
extension of the Act, the years .of litigative procrastination of eviction
might have been impossible. These mystic 'might-have-beens' are B
gambles of time which spill beyond our jurisdiction and statutory cog-
nisance. The salvation of the appellant is certain if he be a 'tenant'
within the meaning of the Act. His eviction is certain if the definition
Of 'tenant' does not ensconce him in its amplitude.

Decisions of peripheral relevance, but of different kernel, have been c
cited on both sides, and the one which has tilted the scales in the Chan-
' digiirh jurisdiction in favour of decree-holder-landlord is Subudhi's
case(') Precedents are law's device to hold the Present prisoner of
the Past ~nd must bind only if squarely covered. Subudhi' s
case('') decided under the Orissa House-Rent Control Act, 1958, is
D
not one such. The key word is 'tenant' and if under the Act the
appellant fills the bill definitionally he is immune from eviction when
read with s. 13. Subudhi (supra) turns on a significantly different
definition which cuts down the wide connotation by a tail-end qualifi-
cation. The semantic sweep of s. 2 (i). in our Act, by clear contrast
takes in a wider group and we have no indication in that judgment
whether a provision like s. 13 which makes the restriction applicable
also to decrees was present in the Act there debated. Therefore, we
side-step those rulings and go straight to the two provisions and their
meaning in the statutory setting.
It is too platitudinous to preach and too entrenched to shake, the p
proposition that rent control legislation in a country of terrible accom-
modation shortage is a beneficial measure whose construction must be
• liberal enough to fulfil the statutory purpose and not frustrate it. So
construed, the benefit of interpretative doubt belong.~ to the potential
evictee unless the language is plain and provides for eviction. That
intendment must, by interpretation, be effectuated. This is the essence G
, of rent control jurisprudence.
,.,
Section 2(i) reads :
"tenant" means any person by whom or on whose ·
account rent is payable for a building or rented land and H
include1 a tenant continuing in possession after the termina-
(1) K.R. Suhudhi v. Gopinath [1968] 2 S.C.R. 559.
. 144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 s.c.R.

A tion of the tenancy in his favonr, bnt does not include a
person placed in occupation of a building or rented land by
its tenant, unless with the consent in writing of the land-
locd, or a person to whom the collection of rent or feea in a
public market, cart-stand or slaughter house or of rents for
shaps has been farmed out or leased by a municipal, town or
notified area committee; •
{empha.sis added)

In this context, we may also read s. 13 {1) which is integral to
and makes impact upon the meaning of s. 2{i) even if there be any
c marginal obscurity.
13. EYiction of tenants.-(1) A tenant in possession of a buiding
or rented land shall not be evicted therefrom in execution of a decree •
passed before or after the commencement of this Act or otherwise and
whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this Section, or in pursuance of an
0
order made under section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
Act, 1947, 3.! subsequently amended.
(emphasis added)
The expression 'tenant' includes 'a tenant continuing in possession
after the termination of the tenancy in his favour'. It thus includes,
E by express provision, a quondam tenant whose nexus with the property
is continuance in possession. The fact that a decree or ariy other
process extinguishes the tenancy under the general law of real property
does not terminate the status of a tenant under the Act having regard
to the carefully drawn inclusive clause. Even here, we may mention
F by way of contrast that Subudhi's case (supra) related to a statute
where the definition iu s. 2 (5) of that Act expressly included "any per-
son against whom a suit for ejectment is pending in a court of com-
petent jurisdiction" and more pertinent to the poirit specially excluded •
"a person against whom a decree or order for eviction ha·s been made
by such a court." We feel no difficulty in holding that the text, rein·
G forced by the context, especially s. 13, convincingly includes ex-tenants
against whom decrees or eviction might have been passed, whether
on compromise or otherwise. The effect of the compromise decree, '
in counsel's submission, is that the tenancy has been terminated. No- '··
body has a case that the appellant is not continuously in possession.
The conclusion is inevitable that he remains a tenant and enjoys
H immunity under s. 13 (1). The execution proceedings must, there-
fore, fail because the statutory road-block cannot be removed. Indeed,
an application under the Act was filed by the landlord-defendant which
M. s. .JAIN v. R.R. VOHRA (Krishna Iyer, 1.) . 145

was dismissed because the ground required by the Act was not made A
out.
We have been told by counsel, and supporting citations have been
brought to our notice, that the High Court at Chandigarh has taken
the contrary view for some time. It is better to be ultimately right
ratl!et than consistently wrong. The interpretation we have given in J
s. 2(i) is strengthened by our conviction that a beneficial statute in-
tended to quieten a burning issue affecting the economics of the human
conditlpn in India should be so interpreted as to subserve the social
justice purpose and not to subvert it. Even apart from this. value-
vision, the construction we have adopted is sustainable.
c
We have laid down the law on the disputed questions raised before
us, but we are not called upon to make any decree pursuant to our
decision because, taking the clue from certain observations of the
court in the course of the arguments, the parties have come together
and reached a fair solution of the Jl1'0blem revolving round the house
property. A conflict is best resolved by the parties pursuading them- D
, selves to see the futility of continued dispute and enlightened by the
law settled the controversy in a manner that promotes the interests of
both. We find that both sides in the present case have produced an
enlightened settlement and pnt in the court an agreement to sell the
property covered by the appeal by the landlord to the tenant. A copy
of the agreement has been put in the record which is annexed as E
appendix to this Judgment.
In this view we dispose of the appeal by formally dismissing it
~ because there is no longer any relief needed in this appeal.

ORDER F
The Judgment having been delivered counsel for the respondent
represented that the Agreement, which has been made and appendixed
to the Judwent be treated as an undertaking mutually between the
parties to the Court. Counsel on both sides have no objection to this
('.OUrse and so we record the Agreement incorporated in the judgment G
as an undertaking to the Court made by the parties in regard to their
respective obligations. ·
·-~ _,'."-·

N.K.A. Appeal dismissed
H