MANNAN SK & ORS.versusSTATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR.

                     (2014] 8 S.C.R. 155

                     MANNAN SK & ORS.                                 A
                                v.
             STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR.
             (Criminal Appeal No.1307 of 2014)
                         JULY 03, 2014
                                                                      B
[RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI AND N.V. RAMANA, JJ.]

       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.311 - Power under
- To recall a witness - Scope of - Held: The Court can recall
or re-examine a witness for just decision of the case - Since         C
the power uls. 311 is very wide, its exercise has to be done
with circumspection - The exercise of the power must be
guided by the object of arriving at a just decision - It should
not cause prejudice to the accused - Whether recall is for
filling-up a lacuna or it is for just decision, is to be determined   o
by the Court on the facts of each case - In the facts of the
present case, recalling is necessary and will not prejudice the
accused - Though the witness was already recalled once, but
that does not prevent his further recall - s. 311 does not put
such /imitation on the Court.                                         E
     In a criminal case, trying offences u/ss. 447, 326 r/w
s.34 and s.304 IPC and ss. 3 and 4 of the Explosive
Substances Act, the Investigating Officers (PW 15), in his
examination, stated that he had recorded statement of the
deceased at the scene of offence. He was cross-                       F
examined on behalf of the accused. However, this
statement was not brought on record.

     Prosecution moved an application u/s. 311 Cr.P.C.
for recalling the evidence of PW 15 because the                       G
prosecution wanted to bring on record that statement.
Trial court rejected the application. The High Court set
aside the order of trial court and granted permission to
recall PW 15.
     In appeal, the accusea 'contended that recalling                 H
    156      SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2014] 8 S,C.R.


A PW15 after 22 years from the incident is not permissible;
  it is an attempt to fill up the lacuna and would cause
  serious prejudice to the accused.
          Dismissing the appeal, the Court
         HELD: 1. The aim of every court is to discover truth.
8
    Section 311 Cr.P.C. is one of many such provisions of the
    Code which strengthens the arms of a court in its effort
    to ferret out the truth by procedure sanctioned by law. It
    is couched in very wide terms. It empowers the court at
    any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceedings under
C the Code to summon any person as a witness or examine
    any person in attendance, though not summoned as
    witness or recall and re-examine already examined
    witness. The second part of the Section uses the word
    'shall'. It says that the court shall summon and examine
D · or recall or re-examine any such person if his evidence
    appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the
    case. The words 'essential to the just decision of the .
    case' are the key words. The court must form an opinion
    that for the just decision of the case recall or re-
E examination of the witness is necessary. [Para 10] [162-
    B-D]
       2. Since the power u/s. 311 is wide, it's exercise has
  to be done with circumspection. It is trite that wider the
  power, greater is the responsibility on the courts which
F exercise it. The exercise of this power cannot be
  untrammeled and arbitrary but must be only guided by
                              a
  the object of arriving at just decision. of the case. It
  should not cause prejudice to the accused. It should not
  permit the prosecution to fill-up the lacuna. Whether recall
G of a witness is for filling-up of a lacuna or it is'for just
  decision of a case, depends on facts and· circumstances
  of each case. It is for the court to consider all the
  circumstances and decide whether the prayer for reca~I
  is genuine. [Para 10] [162-E-G]
H
 MANNAN SK & ORS. v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL 157
                  & ANR.
     3. In the present case, the Investigating Officer stated   A
in the court that he had recorded the statement of the
deceased. Thus, this fact was known to the defence. He
was cross-examined by the defence. Inadvertently, the
said statement was not brought on record. After the death
of the maker of the statement, said statement became            B
very vital to the prosecution. Though, the fact of the
recording of this statement is deposed by PW15, since
due to oversight it was not brought on record, application
was made under Section 311, praying for recall of PW 15.
This cannot be termed as an inherent weakness or a              c
latent wedge in the matrix of the prosecution case. No
material has been tried to be_ brought on record
surreptitiously to fill-up the lacuna. [Para 14] [165-D-G]

    4. It is true that PW15 was once recalled but that does
not matter. It does not prevent his further recall. Section     D
311 of the Code does not put any such limitation on the
court. He can still be recalled if his evidence appears to
the court to be essential to the just decision of the case.
[Para 15] [166-B]
                                                                E
     5. It is not correct to say that the application made
after a gap of 22 years must be rejected. PW15 was re-
examined on 17/5/2011 and application for his recall was
made just one month thereafter. It is true that the incident
is dated 13/12/1992 and the trial commenced in 2001. But        F
once the trial began and the Investigating Officer was re-
examined on 17/5/2011, the prosecution made an
application for recall just one month thereafter. There
was no delay at that stage. [Para 16] [166-F-H]

     6. Oversight of the prosecution is not appreciated by      G
this Court. But cause of justice must not be allowed to
suffer because of the oversight of the prosecution. It is
also clarified that whether the statement of deceased
recorded by PW15 is a dying declaration or not, what is
                                                                H
    158       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 8 S.C.R.


A   its evidentiary value are questions on which this Court
    has not expressed any opinion. [Para 20] [168-D-F]

      Mohan Lal Shamji Soni v. Union of India 1991 (1) SCR
  712:AIR 1991 SC 1346; Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell
B 1999 (3) SCR 818 : 1999(6) SCC 11 O; Zahira Habibulla H.
  Sheikh and anr. v. State of Gujarat and ors. 2004 (3) SCR
  1050 : (2004) 4 sec 158 - relied on.

       State of Rajasthan v. Dou/at Ram AIR 1980 SC 1314;
  Mishrilal and ors. v. State of M.P. and Ors. 2005 (1) Suppl.
C SCR 259: 2005 (10) SCC 701; Mir Mohammad Omar and
  ors. v. State of West Bengal 1989 (3) SCR 735 : 1989 (4) SCC
  436 - distinguished.

         Chandran v. State of Kera/a (1985) Cr L.J. 1288; P.
0   Sanjeeva Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2012 (6 ) SCR 787
    : 2012(7) sec 56; Hanuman Ram v. State of Rajasthan          &I
    Ors. 2008 (14) SCR 348 : 2008(15) SCC 652 - referred to.
                        Case Law Reference :

E         AIR 1980 SC 1314          distinguished Para 17
          1991 (1) SCR 712          relied on          Para 11
          (1985) Cr L.J. 1288       referred to        Para 8
          2005 (1) Suppl. SCR 259   distinguished Para 18
F
          1989 (3) SCR 735          distinguished Para 19
          2012 (6) SCR 787          referred to        Para 9
          2008 (14) SCR 348         referred to        Para 9
G         1999 (3) SCR 818          relied on          Para 15
          2004 (3) SCR 1050         relied .on         Para 13

      CRIMINAL APP ELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
H No. 1307 of 2014.
        MANNAN SK & ORS. v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL                      159
                         & ANR.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 11.05.2012 in CRR              A
        No. 2385/2011, of the High Court of Calcutta.

            Pijush K. Roy, Kakali Roy, Rajan K. Chourasia for the
        Appellants.

            Anip Sacthey, Kabir S. Bose for the Respondents.                 B

            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

            (SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. 1. Leave
        granted.
                                                                             c
             2. In this appeal order dated 11/5/2012 passed by the High
        Court of Calcutta is under challenge. By the impugned order
        the High Court reversed the trial court's order which had rejected
        the application filed by the prosecution under Section 311 of
        the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'the code') to      D
        recall the Investigating Officer.

        3. A petty altercation over a tape recorder resulted in a
  major incident in which bombs were hurled at Rupchand Sk -
  the father of PW8-Nurul Islam. Incident occurred on 13/12/1992.
  Rupchand Sk suffered grievous injuries. He was taken to a local
  hospital. From there he was shifted to Berhampore hospital
  where he breathed his last. On 14/12/1992 a complaint was
  lodged by the son of deceased Rupchand Sk - PW8-Nurul Islam
  with Raghunathpur Police Station on the basis of which FIR was
  registered. In the FIR PW8-Nurul Islam named nine persons.                 F
  Initially the case was registered under Sections 447, 326 read
  with Section 34 of the Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4 of
  the Explosives Substances Act. After the death of Rupchand
1 Sk, Section 304 of the Penal Code was added.
I
                                                                             G
             4. After the charges were framed the trial began. PW15-
        SI Dayal Mukherjee, the Investigating Officer, was examined on
        18/2/2011. He was re-examined on 17/5/2011. He stated in his
        evidence that he had recorded deceased Rupchand Sk's
    1
        statement at the scene of offence. In the cross-examination he       H
    160       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 8 S.C.R.


A   stated that he had recorded one page statement of deceased
    Rupchand Sk. This statement was not brought on record.

       5. One month thereafter on 16/6/2011 the prosecution
  moved an application for recalling PW15-SI Dayal Mukherjee
  because the prosecution wanted to bring on record statement
B of deceased Rupchand Sk which it had inadvertently omitted
  to do. Needless to say that it is the prosecution case that after
  death of Rupchand Sk the said statement became his dying
  declaration.

C       6. The trial court vide order dated 22/6/2011 rejected the
  said application. The trial court observed that the case was at
  the stage of argument and no explanation was given by the
  prosecution as to why the statement of deceased Rupchand
  Sk was not brought on record by the Investigating Officer. The
D trial court noted that PW15-SI Dayal Mukherjee was examined
  on 18/2/2011 and re-examined on 17/5/2011. According to the
  trial court if the prosecution is allowed to recall PW15-SI Dayal
  Mukherjee that would enable the prosecution to fill-up the
  lacuna. The trial court relied on State of Rajasthan v. Dou/at
E Ram 1 and Mohan Lal Shamji Soni v. Union of lndia 2 • The trial
  court observed that re-examination of PW15- SI Dayal
  Mukherjee is not essential for the just decision of the case.

       7. Being aggrieved by this order the complainant filed an
  application under Section 401 read with Section 482 of the
F Code in the High Court. The High Court reversed the trial
  court's order. The High Court observed that non-exhibiting of
  the statement of deceased Rupchand Sk was mistake of the
  prosecution and no advantage can flow from the said mistake
  to the accused. The High Court further observed that existence
G of the statement was known to the accused and, hence, no
  prejudice would be caused to them. The said order is
  challenged in this appeal by the appellants-accused.

    1.   AIR 1980 SC 1314.
H   2.   AIR 1991 SC 1346.
 MANNAN SK & ORS. v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL                     161
     & ANR. [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
        8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at some ·     A
  length. We have perused their written submissions. Mr. Pijush
  K. Roy, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the
  incident took place 22 years back. The statements of witnesses
  were recorded under Section 161 of the Code within a week
  from the date of incident. The Investigating Officer was             B
  examined and cross-examined. The case is set for final
  arguments and, therefore, it would be unjust and unfair to recall
  the Investigating Officer. His recall would cause serious
  prejudice to the appellants. This is clearly an attempt to fill-up
  the lacuna which should not be allowed. Counsel further              c
  submitted that PW15-SI Dayal Mukherjee has retired from the
  service in the year 2010 and he is presently about 68 years of
  age. He might have forgotten the entire episode. It will be easy
  for the complainant to tutor him. Counsel submitted that Section
  311 of the Code is not meant for putting the accused in a            D
  disadvantageous position. This would lead to miscarriage of
'justice. In support of his submissions counsel relied on
  Chandran v. State of Kerala 3 , State of Rajasthan v. Dau/at
  Ram, Mohan Lal Shamji Soni v. Union of India & Ors,
  Mishrilal and ors. v. State of M. P. and ors4 , Mir Mohammad         E
  Omar and ors. v. State. of West Benga/5 .
      9. Mr. Anip Sachthey, learned counsel appearing for the
 State of West Bengal on the other hand submitted that the
 application was made just one month after the re-examination
 of the Investigating Officer. Therefore, there is no delay in         F
 recalling him. Statement of deceased Rupchand Sk was not
 exhibited due to inadvertence and hence for just decision of the
 case it is essential to recall the Investigating Officer. Counsel
 S\Jbmitted that this would not amount to filling-up the lacuna. In
 support of his submissions counsel relied on P. Sanjeeva Rao          G
 v. State of Andhra Pradesh 6 , Hanuman Ram v. State of
 3.   (1985) Cr LJ. 1288.
 4.   2005 c1 o) sec 701.
 5.   1989 (4) sec 436.
 6.   2012 (7) sec 56.                                                 H
    162        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 8 S.C.R.


A   Rajasthan & Ors. 7, Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Ce/18 and
    Mohan/al Shamji Soni

         ' 10. The aim of every court is to discover truth. Section 311
    of the Code is one of many such provisions of the Code which
    strengthen the arms of a court in its effort to ferret out the truth
8
    by procedure sanctioned by law. It is couched in very wide
    terms. It empowers the court at any stage of any inquiry, trial
    or other proceedings under the Code to summon any person
    as a witness or examine any person in attendance, though not
    summoned as witness or recall and re-examine already
C   examined witness. The second part of the Section uses the
    word 'shall'. It says that the court shall summon and examine
    or recall or re-examine any such person if his evidence
    appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case.
    The words 'essential to the just decision of the case' are the
D   key words. The court must form an opinion that for the just
    decision of the case recall or re-examination of the witness is
    necessary. Since the power is wide it's exercise has to be done
    with circumspection. It is trite that wider the power greater is
    the responsibility on the courts which exercise it. The exercise
E   of this power cannot be untrammeled and arbitrary but must be
    only guided by the object of arriving at a just decision of the
    case. It should not cause prejudice to the accused. It should not
    permit the prosecution to fill-up the lacuna. Whether recall of a
    witoe'ss is for filling-up of a lacuna or it is for just decision of a
F   c~e depends on facts and circumstances of each case. In all
    cases it is likely to be argued that the prosecution is trying to
    fill-up a lacuna because the line of demarcation is thin. It is for
    the court to consider all the circumstances and decide whether
    thet prayer for recall is genuine.
                                                          ,/
G        11. Rather than referring to all the judgments which are
    cited before us, we would concentrate on Mohan/al Soni which
    takes into consideration relevant judgments on the scope of

    7.   2008 (15) sec 652.
H   8.   1999 (6) sec 11 o.
MANNAN SK & ORS. v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL                    163
   & ANR. [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
Section 311 and lays down the principles. Mohan/al Soni is          A
followed in all subsequent judgments. In Mohan/al Soni this
Court was considered the scope of Section 540 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (the old code) which is similar to
Section 311 of the Code. This Court observed that it is a
cardinal rule in the law of evidence that the best available        B
evidence should be brought before the court to prove a fact or
the points in issue. The relevant observations of this Court are
as under:

    "........ .In order to enable the court to find out the truth   C
    and render a just decision, the salutary provisions of
    Section 540 of the Code (Section 311 of the new Code)
    are enacted whereunder any court by exercising its
    discretionary authority at any stage of enquiry, trial or
    other proceeding can summon any person as a witness
    or examine any person in attendance though not                  D
    summoned as a witness or recall or re-examine any
    person in attendance though not summoned as a witness
    or recall and re-examine any person already examined
    who are expected to be able to throw light upon the
    matter in dispute; because if judgments happen to be            E
    rendered on inchoate, inconclusive and speculative
    presentation of facts, the ends of justice would be
    defeated."

     This Court further observed as under:                          F
    "... . . . . .. Though Section 540 (Section 311 of the new
    Code) is, in the widest possible terms and calls for no
    limitation, either with regard to the stage at which the
    powers of the court should be exercised, or with regard
    to the manner in which they should be exercised, that           G
    power is circumscribed by the principle that underlines
    Section 540, namely, evidence to be obtained should
    appear to the court essential to a just decision of the case
    by getting at the truth by all lawful means. Therefore, it
                                                                    H
    164       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 8 S.C.R.


A         should be borne in mind that the aid of the section should
          be invoked only with the object of discovering relevant
          facts or obtaining proper proof of such facts for a just
          decision of the case and it must be used judicially and
          not capriciously or arbitrarily because any improper or
B         capricious exercise of the power may lead to undesirable
          results. Further it is incumbent that due care should be
          taken by the court while exercising the power under this
          section and it should not be used for filling up the lacuna
          left by the prosecution or by the defence or to the
c         disadvantage of the accused or to cause serious
          prejudice to the defence of the accused or to give an
          unfair advantage to the rival side and further the
          additional evidence should not be received as a disguise
          for a retrial or to change the nature of the case against
0         either of the parties."

        12. While dealing with Section 311 of the Code in
    Rajendra Prasad this Court explained what is lacuna in the
    prosecution as under:

E         "Lacuna in the prosecution must be understood as the
          inherent weakness or a latent wedge in the matrix of the ·
          prosecution case. The advantage of it should normally
          go to the accused in the trial of the case, but an oversight
          in the management of the prosecution cannot be treated
F         as irreparable lacuna. No party in a trial can be
          foreclosed from correcting errors. If proper evidence was
          not adduced or a relevant material was not brought on
          record due to any inadvertence, the court should be
          magnanimous in permitting such mistakes to be rectified.
G         After all, function of the criminal court is administration
          of criminal justice and not to count errors committed by
          the parties or to find out and declare who among the
          parties performed better."

       13. Reference must also be made to the observations of
H this Court in Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh and anr. v. State of
  MANNAN SK & ORS. v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL 165
     & ANR. [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]

 Gujarat and ors 9 where this Court described the scope of              A
 Section 311 of the Code as under:

      "Object of the Section is to enable the court to arrive at
      the truth irrespective of the fac.t that the prosecution or the
      defence has failed to produce some evidence which is              8
      necessary for a just and proper disposal of the case. The
      power is exercised and the evidence is examined neither
      to help the prosecution nor the defence, if the court feels
      that there is necessity to act in terms of Section 311 but
      only to subserve the cause of justice and public inlj:Jrest.      C
      It is done with an object of getting the evidence in aid of
      a just decision and to uphold the truth."

       14. If we view the present case in light of the above
  judgments, we will have to sustain the High Court's order. PW15-
  SI Dayal Mukherjee stated in the court that he had recorded           D
  the statement of deceased Rupchand Sk. Thus, this fact was
  known to the defence. He was cross-examined by the defence.
  Inadvertently, the said statement was not brought on record
  through PW15-SI Dayal Mukherjee. Rupchand Sk died after the
. said statement was recorded. The said statement, therefore,           E
  became very vital to the prosecution. It is obvious that the
  prosecution wants to treat it as a dying declaration.
  Undoubtedly, therefore, it is an essential material to the just
  decision of the case. Though, the fact of the recording of this
  statement is deposed to by PW15-SI Dayal Mukherjee, since             F
  due to oversight it was not brought on record, application was
  made under Section 311 of the Code praying for recall of
  PW15-SI Dayal Mukherjee. This cannot be termed as an
  inherent weakness or a latent wedge in the matrix of the
  prosecution case. No material is tried to be brought on record        G
  surreptitiously to fill-up the lacuna. Since the accused knew that
  such a statement was recorded by PW15-SI Dayal Mukherjee,
  no prejudice can be said to have been caused to the accused,


 9.   (2004) 4 sec 1ss.                                                 H
    166       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 8 S.C.R.


A who will undoubtedly get a chance to cross-examine PW15-SI
  Dayal Mukherjee.

       15. It is true that PW15-SI Dayal Mukherjee was once
  recalled but that does not matter. It does not prevent his further
  recall. Section 311 of the Code does not put any such limitation
8
  on the court. He can still be recalled if his evidence appears to
  the court to be essential to the just decision of the case. In this
  connection we must revisit Rajendra Prasad where this Court
  has clarified that the court can exercise power of re-summoning
C any witness even if it has exercised the said power earlier.
  Relevant observations of this Court run as under:

          "We cannot therefore accept the contention of the
          appellant as a legal proposition that the court cannot
          exercise power of resummoning any witness if once that
D         power was exercised, nor can the power be whittled down
          merely on the ground that the prosecution discovered
          /aches only when the defence highlighted them during
          final arguments. The power of the court is plenary to
          summon or even recall any witness at any stage of the
E         case if the court considers it necessary for a just
          decision. The steps which the trial court permitted in this
          case for resummoning certain witnesses cannot therefore
          be spurned down or frowned at."

        16. It was strenuously contended that the incident had
F taken place on 13/12/1992 and, therefore, the application
  made after a gap of 22 years must be rejected. This
  submission must be rejected because PW15-SI Dayal
  Mukherjee was re-examined on 17/5/2011 and application for
  his recall was made just one month thereafter. It is true that the
G incident is dated 13/12/1992 and the trial commenced in 2001.
  These are systemic delays which are indeed distressing. But
  once the trial began and the Investigating Officer was re-
  examined on 17/5/2011, the prosecution made an application
  for recall just one month thereafter. There was no delay at that
H stage. The submissions that PW15-SI Dayal Mukherjee has
 MANNAN SK & ORS. v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL 167
     & ANR. [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
grown old; that his memory must.not be serving him right; that       A
he can be tutored are conjectural in nature. In any case, the
accused have a right to cross-examine PW15-SI Dayal
Mukherjee. The accused are, therefore, not placed in a
disadvantageous position.
                                                                     B
     17. We must now turn to the judgmenfs cited by the
appellants. In State of Rajasthan v. Dau/at Ram this Court was
dealing with an appeal from an order of acquittal. The
prosecution had not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
opium seized was the opium which was sent to the public
analyst. At th.e trial the prosecution had made an application       C
under Section 540 of the old Code (Section 311 of the Code)
for summoning three persons under whose custody the seized
sar:nples were kept. It was rejected by the trial court. An
application was made before the High Court for additional
evidence which was later withdrawn. This Court commented on          D
the vacillating approach of the State and observed that the
prosecution should not be allowed to fill-up the lacunae left at
the trial, at the appellate or revisional stage. This case turns
on its own facts and has no application to the present case.
                                                                     E
     18. Mishrilal, on which reliance is placed by the appellants,
has also no application to this case. In Mishrilal a witness was
examined and cross-examined in a murder trial on the same
day. In Juvenile Court where some of the juveniles were tried,
he gave evidence subsequently. He stated that he was not             F
aware as to who attacked him. He was recalled by the Sessions
Court and confronted with the statement given by him before
the Juvenile Court on the basis of which the accused were
acquitted. This Court did not approve of the procedure adopted
by the Sessions Court. This Court observed that a witness
could be confronted only with a previous statement made by           G
him. The day on which he was first examined in the Sessions
Court, there was no such previous statement. This Court
observed that the witness must have given some other version
before Juvenile Court for some extraneous reasons. He should
                                                                     H
    168       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014} 8 S.C.R.


A not have been given an opportunity at a later stage to
  completely efface the evidence already given by him under
  oath. It is the wrong procedure and attempt to efface evidence
  which persuaded this Court to observe that once the witness
  was examined in-chief and cross-examined fully such witness
B should not have been -recalled and re-examined to deny the
                          "
  evidence which he had already given in the court even though
  he had given an inconsistent statement before any other court
  subsequently. It is pertinent to note that this Court did not
  discuss Section 311 of the Code.
c        19. Mir Mohd. Omar has no application to this case as it
    deals with a totally different fact situation. In that case this Court
    has not considered Section 311 at all.

        20. In the ultimate analysis we must record that the
D impugned order merits no interference. We must, however,
  clarify that oversight of the prosecution is not appreciated by
  us. But cause of justice must not be allowed to suffer because
  of the oversight of the prosecution. We also make it clear that
  whether deceased Rupchand Sk's statement recorded by
E PW15-SI Dayal Mukherjee is a dying declaration or not, what
  is its evidentiary value are questions on which we have- not
  expressed any opinion. If any observation of ours directly or
  indirectly touches upon this aspect, we make it clear that it is
  not our final opinion. The trial court seized of the case shall deal
F with it independently.

       21. In the result the appeal is dismissed. Needless to say
  that the interim orders passed by this Court on 15/10/2012, 03/
  05/2013 and 27/01/2014 staying the impugned order dated 11/
  05/2012 passed by the Calcutta High Court in CRR No. 2385
G of 2011 are vacated. The trial court shall proceed with the case
  and ensure that it is concluded at the earliest.
    Kalpana K. Tripathy                                 Appeal dismissed.