Supreme Court of India
MANOHAR LAL (D) BY LRS.versusUGRASEN (D) BY LRS. & ORS.
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 341
- Decided
- 3 June 2010
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- B S CHAUHAN
Holding
A revisional authority cannot usurp the powers of a lower statutory authority; any order it issues in breach of an interim injunction is void, and a court cannot award relief not specifically prayed for.
Summary
The case concerned allotments of land acquired under the 1894 Land Acquisition Act and the applicability of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. The State Government, acting as a revisional authority, directed the Ghaziabad Development Authority (GDA) to allot land to both Manohar Lal and Ugrasen without hearing the other party, despite an interim injunction restraining any further allotment. The Supreme Court held that a revisional authority cannot usurp the functions of a lower statutory body, and any order issued in contravention of a court’s interim order is a nullity. It also ruled that a court may not grant relief that was not specifically prayed for. Consequently, the order directing allotment to Ugrasen was set aside, the appeal by GDA was allowed, and the appeal by Manohar Lal was dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether the State Government, as a revisional authority under the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, can assume the functions of a lower statutory authority such as the Development Authority.
- Whether an order or action taken by a statutory authority in violation of an interim court order is enforceable.
- Whether a court can grant relief that was not expressly prayed for in the writ petition.
Legislation cited
Subjects
urban developmentrevisional authoritystatutory authorityinterim ordernullityrelief not prayed forland policycolourable exercise of powerequity jurisdictionland acquisition
Judgment
(2010) 7 S.C.R. 346
A MANOHAR LAL (D) BY LRS.
v.
UGRASEN (D) BY LRS. & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 973 of 2007)
JUNE 3, 2010
B
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.]
Urban Development:
c U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973- s. 41
- Control by State Government - State Government-
revisional Authority under the Statute, if could take upon itself
the task of lower statutory authority - Held: Higher authority
in hierarchy or appellate or revisional authority cannot
0 exercise the power of statutory authority nor can direct
statutory authority to act in a particular manner - Such order
would be unenforceable - Aggrieved person can prefer
appeal before appellate authority and against the said order
he may file revision application before State Government -
E However, State Government cannot pass order without giving
opportunity of hearing to the person adversely affected - On
facts, State Government directly entertained application for
allotment of land without hearing the other party - Chief
Minister directed allotment of land in favour of one of the
applicants - Thus, order passed by State Government stood
F vitiated since it took the task of the Development Authority
upon itself - It was a case of colourable exercise of power -
Chief Minister had no competence to deal with the subject -
More so, land was allotted contrary to the Land Policy - Land
Acquisition Act, 1894.
G
Interim order- Order passed or action taken by statutory
authority in contravention of interim order - Enforceability of
- Held: Is a nullity - On facts, interim order passed by High
Cowt was in force and it restrained the Avthorities to make
H 346
MANOHAR LAL (D) BY LRS. v. UGRASEN (D) BY 34 7
LRS. & ORS.
allotment of land in dispute in favour of anyone elso - State A
Government as well as the Development Authority aware of
the factum of subsistence of interim order - Thus, allotment
of land in favour of other applicant by State Government, not
enforceable and remains inexecutable.
B
Pleadings -. Grant of relief not specifically prayed by
parties - Held: Cannot be granted - Issuance of direction by
High Court to make allotment of land in favour of petitioner,
when relief sought was limited only to quash the allotment of
land made in favour of other party, not permissible in law.
c
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 2261227 - Extra-
ordinary jurisdiction under - Held: When person approaches
Court of Equity in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 2261227, he should approach the Court not only
with clean hands but also with clean mind, clean heart and D
clean objective - On facts, litigant did not approach the court
with disclosure of true facts, thus his case stands vitiated -
Equity.
The predecessor-in-interest of the appellant-M and E
respondent-U owned certain lands. The said lands were
acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 and an award was passed. M and U filed
applications to claim the benefit of Land Policy. M was
allotted land as per the directions of the Chief Minister of
Uttar Pradesh. U filed writ petition challenging the F
allotment order. Thereafter, the land allotted to M was
changed. M filed a writ petition and the High Court
restrained the authorities from making allotment to
anyone else from the land allotted to M. On direction by
the State Government, Ghaziabad Development Authority G
allotted land in favour of U, though it was covered by the
interim order passed by the High Court. U refused to take
the plots. GOA allotted S()me other plots to M. U then filed
a writ petition seeking quashing of the allotment made in
H
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.
A favour of M. The High Court allowed the writ petition and
directed the allotment of land in favour of U. Hence these
appeals.
The questions which arose for consideration in these
appeals are whether the State Government-a Revisional
8
Authority under the Statute, could take upon itself the
task of a lower statutory authority; whether the order
passed or action taken by a statutory authority in
contravention of the interim order of the Court is
enforceable; and whether the Court could grant relief
C which had not been prayed for.
Allowing CA No. 974/2007 and dismissing CA No.
973/2007, the Court
0 HELD: 1. The State Government, being the revisional
authority, could not entertain directly the applications by
the applicants-U and M. The action of the State
Government smacks of arbitrariness and is nothing but
abuse of power as the State Government deprived the
E Ghaziabad Development Authority-GOA to exercise its
power under the Land Policy, and deprived the aggrieved
party to file appeal against the order of allotment. Thus,
orders passed by the State Government stood vitiated.
More so, it was a clear cut case of colourable exercise of
power. The case of allotment in favour of M is by no
F means better than the case of U as the initial allotment
had been made by GOA in his favour consequent to the
directions of the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh who had
no competence to deal with the subject under the Statute
and he has already been put in possession of a part of
G the allotted land in commercial area, contrary to the Land
Policy. [Paras 43 and 44] [372-B-C; 372-D-E]
2.1. No higher authority in the hierarchy or an
appellate or revisional authority can exercise the power
H of the statutory authority nor the superior authority can
MANOHAR LAL (D) BY LRS. v. UGRASEN (D) BY 349
LRS. & ORS.
mortgage its wisdom and direct the statutory authority to A
act in a particular manner. If the appellate or revisional
Authority takes upon itself the task of the statutory
authority and passes an order, it remains unenforceable
for the reason that it cannot be termed to be an order
passed under the Act. [Para 22] [365-D-E] B
Rakesh Ranjan Verma & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.
AIR 1992 SC 1348; U.P. State Electricity Board Vs. Ram
Autar and Anr. (1996) 8 SCC 506; Bangalore Development
Authority and Ors. Vs. R. Hanumaiah and Ors. (2005) 12 SCC
508; Bangalore Medical Trust Vs. B.S. Muddappa & Ors. AIR C
1991 SC 1902; Poonam Verma & Ors. Vs. Delhi
Development Authority AIR 2008 SC 870; State of U.P. Vs.
· Neeraj Awasthi and Ors. (2006) 1 SCC 667; The Purtabpore
Co., Ltd. Vs. Cane Commissioner of Bihar and Ors. AIR 1970
SC 1896; Chandrika Jha Vs. State of Bihar and Ors. AIR 1984 D
SC 322; Anirudhsinhji Karansinghji Jadeja & Anr. Vs. State
of Gujarat AIR 1995 SC 2390; K.K. Bhalla Vs. State of M.P.
& Ors. AIR 2006 SC 898; Indore Municipality vs. Niyamatul/a
(Dead through L.Rs.) AIR 1971 SC 97; Tarlochan Dev
Sharma Vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (2001) 6 SCC 260, relied E
on.
2.2. Section 41 Clause (1) of the U.P. Urban Planning
and Development Act, 1973 empowers the State
Government to issue general directions which are F
necessary to properly enforce the provisions of the Act.
Clause (3) thereof make it crystal clear that the State
Government is a revisional authority. Therefore, the
scheme of the Act makes it clear that if a person is
aggrieved by an order of the authority, he can prefer an G
appeal before the Appellate Authority-Divisional
Commissioner and the person aggrieved of that order
may file Revision Application before the State
Government. However, the State Government cannot
pass an order without giving opportunity of hearing to the H
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.
A person, who may be adversely affected. [Para 35] [368-
F-G]
2.3 In the instant case, it is the revisional authority
which has issued direction to GOA to make allotment in
favour of both the parties. Orders had been passed
8
without hearing the other party. The authority, i.e. GOA
did not have the opportunity to examine the case of either
of the said parties. The High Court erred in holding that
Clause (1) of Section 41 empowers the State Government
C to deal with the application of an individual. The State
Government can take only policy decisions as to how the
statutory provisions would be enforced but cannot deal
with an individual application. Revisional authority can
exercise its jurisdiction provided there is an order passed
by the lower authority under the Act as it can examine
D only legality or propriety of the order passed or direction
issued by the authority therein. In view thereof, there was
no occasion for the State Government to entertain the
applications of the said parties for allotment of land
directly and issue directions to GOA for allotment of land
E in their favour. [Paras 36 and 37) [368-H; 369-A-O]
3. Any order passed by any authority inspite of the
knowledge of the interim order of the court is of no
consequence as it remains a nullity. The interim order
F passed by the High Court in favour of appellant-M in Writ
Petition was in force and it restrained the Authorities to
make allotment of the land in dispute in favour of anyone
else. Indisputably, the State Government as well as the
GOA remained fully alive of the factum of subsistence of
G the said interim order as is evident from the
correspondence between them. The order passed by the
State Government in contravention of the interim order,
remains unenforceable and inexecutable. [Paras 28 and
38) [366-G-H; 369-0-F]
H
MANOHAR LAL (D) BY LRS. v. UGRASEN (D) BY 351
LRS. & ORS.
Mu/raj Vs. Murti Raghunathji Maharaj AIR 1967 SC . A
1386; Surjit Singh Vs. Harbans Singh AIR 1996 SC 135; All
Bengal Excise Licensees Association Vs. Raghabendra
Singh & Ors AIR 2007 SC 1386; Delhi Development
Authority Vs. Skipper Construction Co. (PJ Ltd. & Anr. AIR
1996 SC 2005; Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar Vs. Nagesh B
Siddappa Navalgund AIR 2008 SC 901, relied on.
4. The Court cannot grant a relief which has not been
specifically prayed by the parties. ·In the writ petition filed
by respondent-LI, relief sought was limited only to quash C
the allotment made in favour of M. No relief was sought
for making the allotment in favour of the writ. petitioner-
U. However, the High Court issued direction to make the
allotment in his favour. Thus, the issuance of such a
direction was not permissible in law. Even otherwise as
U's land had been acquired for roads, he could not make D
application for taking benefit of the Land Policy,
particularly, when the Land Policy was not declared to be
invalid or violative of equality clause enshrined in Article
14 of the Constitution. [Paras 33 and 38] [367-G; 369-G-
H; 370-A] . E
Messrs. Trojan & Co. Vs. RM.N.N. Nagappa Chettiar
AIR 1953 SC 235.; Krishna Priya Ganguly etc.etc. Vs.
University of Lucknow & Ors. etc. AIR 1984 SC 186; Om
Prakash & Ors. Vs. Ram Kumar & Ors. AIR 1991 SC 409;. F
Bharat Amratla/ Kothari Vs. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi &
Ors. AIR 2010 SC 475; Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. &
Anr. Vs. Sarat Chandra Rath & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 2744,
relied on.
5.1. The burden lies on the person, who alleges/ G
avers/pleads for existence of a fact. U was under an
obligation to establish the fact of submission of the
application in time. Entry in respect ofJtis application has
been made in Postal Receipt Register. As the said
application was sent by post, U could explain as to H
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.'
A whether the application was sent by Registered Post/
Ordinary Post or under Postal Certificate and as to
whether he could produce the receipt, if any, for the
same. In such a fact-situation, the application filed by U
could not have been entertained at all, even if he was
B entitled for the benefit of the Land Policy. [Para 40] [370-
F-H]
5.2. The High Court committed an error observing that
if the State Government had allowed the application filed
by U it was implicit that delay, if any, in making the claim
C stood condoned. Such an observation is not in
consonance with law for the reason that if there is a delay
in filing application, the question would arise as to
whether the authority has a right to condone the delay.
Even if, the delay can be condoned, the authority had to
D examine as to whether there was sufficient cause
preventing the applicant to approach the authority in time.
But, once the delay has been considered without
application of mind, in a fact-situation like in the instant
case, the question of deemed condonation would not
E arise. More so, the High Court could not examine the
question of fact as to whether the application was made
within time or not, particularly, in view of the fact that the
authority had been making the allotment though
application had not been made at all in time and it was
F only manipulation of the record of the authority with the
· collusion of its staff. In fact, such exercise by the State
amounts to colourable exercise of power. [Paras 41 and
421 [371-A-E]
G State of Punjab & Anr. Vs. Gurdial Singh & Ors. AIR
1980 SC 319, relied on.
5.3. Regarding the dates of Section 6 declaration,
taking of possession of land and of making Awards so
far as the land of M is concerned, none of the parties
H considered it proper to place the authentic documents
MANOHAR LAL (D) BY LRS. v. UGRASEN (D) BY 353
LRS. & ORS.
before the Court so that the real facts be determined. In A
such a fact situation, it cannot be decided as to whether
M's application was filed in time. However, one thing is
clea,rly evident from the affidavit filed by Vice Chairman,
GOA that the land allotted to both of these parties has
been part of commercial area and not of residential area. B
In view thereof, any allotment made in favour of M so far,
had been illegal as the application could not have been
entertained by the Chief Minister and further appellant
could not get allotment in commercial area. The Land
Policy provided only for allotment of land in residential c
area. [Para 45] [372-F-H; 373-A-C]
6.1. When a person approaches a Court of Equity in
exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226/
227 of the Constitution, he should approach the Court not
only with clean hands but also with Clean mind, clean D
heart and clean obj~tive. "Equally, the judicial process
should never become ·an instrument of appreciation or
abuse or a means in the process of the Court to subvert
justice."Who seeks equity must do equity. The legal
maxim "Jure naturaw aequum est neminum cum a/terius E
detrimento et injuria fieri /ocupletiorem'', means that it is a
law of nature that one should not be enriched by the loss
or injury to another. [Para 47] (373-G-H; 374-A".8]
6.2. The fact of illegal allotment of land in commercial
area has been brought to the notice of the Court first time F
by affidavit of the ViCe-Chairman, GOA dated 27.5.2010.
Thus, it is crystal clear that such facts had not been
brought on record before the High Court by GOA at any
stage in any of the writ petitions nor it had been pointed
out to the State Government when applications of both G
these parties had been entertained directly by the Chief
Minister and the State Gqvernment. Only explanation
furnished by the Vice-Chairman, GOA, in his affidavit is
that due to inadvertence it escaped the notice of GOA that
the plots had been categorized as commercial in the H
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.
A Master Plan and could not be allotted in favour of any ·
applicant. Even today, the said plots continue to be in
commercial area and not in residential area. The
appellal'lts had also not disclosed that land al·lotted to
them falls in commercial area. [Paras 46 and 47] [373-0-
B F]
6.3. M did not approach the Court with disclosure of
true facts, and particularly, that he had been allotted the
land in the commercial area by GOA on the instruction of
the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. [Para 51) [375-8)
c
The Ramjas Foundation & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.
AIR 1993 SC 852; K.P. Srinivas Vs. R.M. Premchand & ors.
(1994) 6 SCC 620; Nooruddin Vs. (Dr.) K.L. Anand (1995) 1
SCC 242; Ramniklal N. Bhutta & Anr. Vs. State of
D Maharashtra & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 1236; Mis Tilokchand
Motichand & Ors. Vs. H.B. Munshi & Anr. AIR 1970 SC 898;
State of Haryana Vs. Kamal Distillery AIR 1977 SC 781;
Sabia Khan & Ors. Vs. State of UP. & Ors. AIR 1999 SC
2284; Abdul Rahman Vs. Prasony Bai & Anr. AIR 2003 SC
E 718; S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar
& Ors. (2004) 7 SCC 166; Oswal Fats & Oils Ltd. Vs. Addi.
Commissioner (Admn}, Bareily Division, Bareily & Ors. JT
2010 (3) SC 510, relied on.
7. It is left open for the State Government and GOA
F to take decision in regard to these issues and as to
whether GOA wants to recover the possession of the
land already allotted to these applicants in commercial
area contrary to the Land Policy or value thereof
adjusting the amount. of compensation deposited by
G . them, if any. [Para 52J [375-E·F]
Case Law Reference:
AIR 1992 SC 1348 Relied on. Para 11
H (1996) 8 sec 506 Relied on. Para 11
MANOHAR LAL (D) BY LRS. v. UGRASEN (D) BY 355
LRS. & ORS.
(2005) 12 sec 508 ·Relied on. Para 12 A
AIR 1991 SC 1902 Relied on. Para 13
'' I
AIR 2008 SC 870 Relied on. Para 14
(2006) 1 sec 667 Relied on. Para 15
B
AIR 1970 SC 1896 Relied on. Para 16
AIR 1984 SC 322 Relied on. Para 17
AIR 1995 SC 2390 Relied" on. Para 18
AIR 2006 SC 898 Relied on. Para 19
c
AIR 1971 SC 97 .Relied on. Para 20
(2001) 6 sec 260 Relied on. P.ara 21
AIR 1967 SC 1386 Relied on. Para 23 D
AIR 1996 SC 135 Relied on. Para 24
AIR ·2007 SC 1386 Relied on. Para 25
AIR 1996 SC 2005 Relied on: Para 26 ' E
AIR 2008 SC 901 · Relied on. Para 27
AIR 1953 SC 235 Relied on. Para 29
AIR 1984 SC 186 Relied on. Para 30
F
AIR 1991 SC 409 Relied on. Para 30
AIR 2010 SC 475 Relied on. Para 31
AIR 1996 SC 2744 Relied on. Para 32
AIR 1980 SC 319 Reli~d on. Para 42. G
AIR 1~93 SC· 852 Relied on. Para 47
(1994) 6 sec 620 Relied on. Para 47
(1995) 1 sec 242 Relied on. Para 47 H
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.
A AIR 1997 SC 1236 Relied· on. Para 48
AIR 1970 SC 898 Relied on. Para 49
AIR 1977 SC 78.1 Relied on. Para 49
AIR 1999 SC 2284 Relied on. Para 49
B
AIR 2003 SC 718 Relied on. Para 50
(2004) 1 sec 166 Relied on. Para 50
JT 2010 (3) SC 510 . Relied on. Para 50
c
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 973
of 2007.
From the Judgment & Order dated 22.07.2003 of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in C.W.P. No. 6644of1989.
D
WITH
C.A. No. 974 of 2007.
R.P. Bhatt, Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Reena Singh, Dr. Vipin
E qupta, Arvind Kumar Gupta, Shailender Paul for the Appellants.
Debal Kumar Banerji, Pramod Swarup, Ruby Singh Ahuja,
Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, Kamlendra Mishra, Manoj Dwivedi,
Vandana Mishra, Gunnam Venkateswara Rao, Anuvrat Sharma
F for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. Both these appeals have been
preferred by the appellants being aggrieved of the judgment
G and order of the Allahabad High Court dated 22nd July, 2003
passed in C.M.W.P. No.6644of1989 by which the High Court
has allowed the Writ Petition filed by respondent No.1-Ugrasen
quashing the allotment of land made in favour of appellant-
Manohar Lal and further directed to make the allotment of land
H in favour of the said respondent-Ugrasen.
MANOHAR LAL (D) BY LRS. v. UGRASEN (D) BY 357
LRS. & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
2. In these appeals, three substantial questions of law for A
consideration of this Court are involved, they are, namely:
(a) As to whether the State Government - a Revisional
Authority under the Statute, could take upon itself
the task of a lower statutory authority?; B
(b) Whether the order passed or action taken by a
statutory authority in contravention of the interim
order of the Court is enforceable?; and
(c) ·Whether Court can grant relief which had not been C
asked for?
3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals
are that lands owned and possessed by predecessor-in-interest
of private appellant Manohar Lal and respondent Ugrasen were
acquired .under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 D
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). Notification under Section
4 of the Act was issued on 13.08.1962 covering about 32 acres
of land in the Revenue Estates of Kaila Pargana Loni Dist.
Meerut (now Ghaziabad). Declaration under Section 6 of the
Act in respect of the said land was made on 24.05.1965 along E
with Notification under Section 17(1) invoking the urgency
clause. P9ssession of the land except one acre was taken on
13.07.1965 and awatd under Section 11 of the Act was made
on 11.05.1970.
F
The Government of Uttar Pradesh had framed Land Policy
dated 30/31.07.1963 to the effect that where a big chunk of land
belonging to one person is acquired for planned development,
except the land covered by roads, he shall be entitled to the
extent of 40% of his total acquired land in a residential area G
after development in lieu of compensation. The High-Powered
Committee dealing with the issue laid down that applications
for that purpose be filed within a period of one month from the
date of taking the possession of the land which was
subsequently changed to within one month from the date of
completion of acquisition proceedings. H
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.
A 4. Both the private parties, i.e. Manohar Lal and Ugrasen
· claimed that they had made applications to claim the benefit
under the said policy within time. Shri Ugrasen claimed that he
had submitted the application on 31.12.1966 but no action was
taken on the said application. Therefore, he filed another
B application on 7 .9.1971. Manohar Lal-appellant claimed to
have filed application for the said purpose on 22.6.1969 and
was allotted land bearing plot Nos. 5, 7 to 16 and 25 to 33 in
Sector 3N vide order dated 27 .12.1979 as per the direction of
the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. Shri Ugrasen filed Writ
c Petition No. 1932 of 1980 before Allahabad High Court
challenging the said order dated 27.12.1979. Subsequently,
vide order dated 7.3.1980, the land allotted to Manohar Lal was
chan~1ed to Plot Nos. 25 to 33. At the time of consideration of
application of Ugrasen by the State Government, the
Ghaziabad Development Authority (hereinafter called GDA)
0
vide letter dated 18.3.1980 pointed out that submission of
application by Shri Ugrasen was surrounded by suspicious
circumstances as it was the last entry made on 31.12.1966 and
signature of the receiving clerk had been made by a person
E who joined service only in 1979. In the meanwhile, Shri Manohar
Lal filed Writ Petition No. 4159 of 1980 and the High Court
restrained the authorities from making allotment to anyone else
. from the land allotted to fiim as per letter dated 7.3.1980.
5. In spite of the said interim order in force, the State
F Government vide order dated 12.12.1980 directed GDA to
make the allotment of land in favour of Shri Ugrasen and thus,
in compliance of the same, GOA issued letter of allotment
dated 22.12.1980 in his favour. Shri Ugrasen submitted letter
dated 1.1.1981 to GOA to give an alternative land as the land
G covered by Plot Nos. 5 to 16 had been subject matter of the
interim order of the High Court in a writ petition filed by Shri
Manohar Lal.
6. Shri Ugrasen withdrew his Writ Petition No.1932 of
1980 on 6.3.1981 and deposited the compensation amount,
H
MANOHAR LAL (D) BY LRS. v. UGRASEN (D) BY 359
LRS. & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
i.e. Rs.32',010.60 on 3.3.1981. GDA allotted the land to Shri A
Ugrasen in Plot Nos. 36, 38, 39, 44, 46 and 47 vide order dated
02.01.1985, though it was also the land in dispute i.e. covered
by the interim order passed by the High Court. Shri Ugrasen
refused 'to take those plots as is evident from letter dated
7 .1.1985 as certain encroachment had been made upon the B·
said lands. GDA, vide letter dated 27.3.1989, allotted Plot Nos.
5, 7 to 16 to Shri. Manohar Lal. Thus, being aggrieved, Shri .
Ugrasen filed Writ Petition No. 6644 of 1989 before the High
Court for quashing of the said allotment in favour of Shri
Manohar Lal. ·
7. Parties exchanged the affidavits and after hearing the
parties and considering the 'material on record, the High Court
allowed the said Writ Petit1on vide judgment and order dated ·
22nd July, 2003. Hence, these appeals.
Q
8. Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior counsel appearing
for the appellant-Manohar Lal and Shri Vijay Hansaria, learned
Senior counsel appearing for GOA have contended that Shri
Ugrasen had never filed application for allotment in time. There
had been manipulation in registration of the said application . E
and ithas been surrounded with suspicious circumstances. The ·
application of Shri Ugrasen had been considered directly by
the State GovernmenHhe revisional authority, though the State
Government could not take the task of GDA upon itself. Land
of Shri Ugrasen had been acquired for road:>, thus, as per the F
Land Policy he was not entitled for any benefit of the same. Shri
Ugrasen in his writ petition had asked only for quashing the
allotment in favour of Manohar Lal and there was no prayer that
the said land be allotted to him. Therefore, while issuing a
direction for making the allotment in favour of Ugrasen, the High G
Court has exceeded its jurisdiction. Thus, appeals deserve to
be allowed.
9. On the other hand, Shri Debal Banerji, learned Senior
counsel appearing for the respondent-Ugrasen and Shri
Pramod Swarup, · learned Senior counsel appearing for the H
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.
A State of U.f?. have vehemently opposed the appeals contending
that once a decision has been taken as per the entitlement of
the respondent-Ugrasen and the High Court has examined
each and every fact, question of re-appreciation of evidence
etc. is not permissible in exercise of the discretionary
B jurisdiction by this Court. Manohar Lal had also been allotted
the land by the Chief Minister and not by GOA, thus no fault can
be found with allotment in favour of Shri Ugrasen. Appeals lack
merit and are liable to be dismissed.
10. We have considered the rival submissions made by
C learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.
11. In Rakesh Ranjan Verma & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar &
Ors., Al R 1992 SC 1348, the question arose as to whether the
State Government, in exercise of its statutory powers could
D issue any direction to the Electricity Board in respect of
appointment of its officers and employees. After examining the
statutory provisions, the Court came to the c;onclusion that the
State Government could only take the policy decisions as how
the Board will carry out its functions under the Act. So far as
E the directions issued in respect of appointment of its officers
was concerned, it fell within the exclusive domain of the Board
and the State Government had no competence to issue any
such direction. The said judgment has been approved and
followed by this Court in UP. State Electricity Board Vs. Ram
F Autar and Anr. (1996) 8 SCC 506.
12. In Bangalore Development Authority and Ors. Vs. R.
Hanumaiah and Ors. (2005) 12 SCC 508, this Court held that
the power of the Government under Section 65 of the
Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 was not
G unrestricted and the directions which could be issued were
those which were to carry out the objective of the Act and not
those which are contrary to the Act a.nd further held that the
directions issued by the Chief Minister to release the lands
were destructive of the purposes of the Act and.the purposes
H for which the BOA was created.
MANOHAR LAL (D) BY LRS. v. UGRASEN (D) BY 361
LRS. & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.)
13. In Bangalore Medical Trust Vs. B.S. Muddappa & ·A
. Ors. AIR 1991 SC 1902, this Court considered the provisions
of a similar Act, namely, Bangalore Development Authority Act,
1976 containing a similar provision and held that Government
was competent only to give such directions to the authority as
were in its opinion necessary or expedient and for carrying out B
the purposes of the Act. The Government could not have issued
any other direction for the reason that Government had not been
conferred upon unfettered powers in this regard. The object of
the direction must be only to carry out the object of the Act and
only such directions as were reasonably necessary or expedient c
for carrying out the object of the enactment were contemplated
. under the Act. Any other direction not covered by such powers
was illegal.
14. In Poonam Verma & Ors. Vs. Delhi Development
Authority, AIR 2008 SC 870, a similar view has been re- D
iterated by this Court dealing with the provisions of Delhi
Development Authority Act, 1957. In the 'said case, the Central
Government had issµed a direction to make allotment of flat out
of turn. The Court held as under:
E
" ...... Section 41 of the Act, only envisages that the
respondent would carry out such directions that may be
issued by the Central Government from time to time for the
efficient administration of the Act. The same does not take
within its fold an order which can be passed by the Central F
Government in the matter of allotment of flats by the
Authority. Section 41 speaks about policy decision. Any
direction issued must have a nexus with the efficient
administration of the Act. It has nothing to do with carrying
out of the plans of the authority in respect of a particular G
scheme .......... Evidently, the Central Government had no
say in the matter either on its own or under the Act. In terms
of the brochure, Section 41 of the Act does not clothe any
jurisdiction upon the Central Government to issue such a
direction."
H
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 7 S.C.R.
A 15. In State of UP. Vs. Neeraj Awasthi and Ors. (2006) 1
SCC 667, this Court held as follows in context of Government
directions:
"36. Such a decision on the part of the State Government
must be taken in terms of the constitutional scheme, i.e.,
B
upon compliance of the requirement of Article 162 r~ad
with Article 166 of the Constitution of India. In the instant
case, the directions were purported to have been issued
by an officer of the State. Such directions were not shown
to have been issued pursuant to any decision taken by a
c competent authority in terms of the Rules of Executive
Business of the State framed under Article 166 of the
Constitution of India."
16. In The Purtabpore Co., Ltd. Vs. Cane Commissioner
D of Bihar and Ors. AIR 1970 SC 1896, this Court has observed:
''The power exercisable by the Cane Commissioner under
Clause 6(1) is a statutory power. He alone could have
exercised that power. While exercising that power he
cannot abdicate his responsibility in favour of anyone - not
E
even in favourof the State Government or the Chief
Minister. It was not proper for the Chief Minister to have
interfered with the functions of the Cane Commissioner.
In this case what has happened is that the power of the
Cane Commissioner has been exercised by the Chief
F Minister, an authority not recognised by Clause (6) read
with Clause (11) but the responsibility for making those
orders was asked to be taken by the Cane. Commissioner.
The executive officers entrusted with statutory discretions
G may in some cases be obliged to take into account
considerations of public policy and in some context the
policy of a Minister or the Government as a whole when it
is a relevant factor in weighing the policy but this will not
absolve them from their duty to exercise their personal
H judgment in individual cases unless explicit statutory·
MANOHAR LAL {D) BY LRS.
v•• UGRASEN {D) BY 363
LRS. & ORS. [DR. B.S: CHAUHAN, J.] .
provision has been made for them to be given binding A
instructions by a superior. n
17. In C~andrika Jha Vs. State of Bihar and Ors. AIR 1984
SC 322, this Court while dealing with the provisions of Bihar
and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1935, held as under:
B
. · "The action of the then Chief Minister cannot also be
supported by the terms of Section 65A of the Act which
essentic:illy confers revisional power on the State
Government. There was no proceeding pending before the
Registrar in relation to any of the matters specified in C
Section 65A of the Act nor had the Registrar passed any
,order in respect thereto. In the absence of any such
i proceeding or such order, there was no occasion for the
State Government to invoke its powers u'nder Section 65A
of the Act. In our opinion, the State Government. cannot fOr "D
itself exercise the statutory functions of the Registrar under
the Act or the Rules."
18. In Anirudhsinhji Karansinghji Jadeja & Anr. Vs. State
of Gujarat AIR 1995 SC 2390, it was observed :
E
"This is a case of power conferred upon one authority
being really exercised by another. If a statutory authority
has been vested with jurisdiction, he has to exercise it
according to its own discretion. If the discretion is
exercised 1.,mefer the direction or in compliance with some F
higher authoritY's instruction, then it will be a case of failure
to exercise discretion altogether." (Emphasis added)
19. In K.K. Bhalla Vs. State of M.P. & Ors. AIR 2006 SC
· 898, this Court has de-lineated the functions of the State G
Government and the Development Authority, observing that:
· "59. Both the State and the JOA have been assigned
· specific functions under the statute. The JOA ·was
constituted for a specific purpose. It could not take action
contrary to the scheme framed by it nor take any action H
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.
A which could defeat such purpose. The State could not have
interfered with the day-to-day functioning of a statutory
authority. Section 72 of the 1973 Act authorizes the State
to exercise superintendence and control over the acts and
proceedings of the officers appointed under Section 3 and
B the authorities constituted under the Act but thereby the
State cannot usurp the jurisdiction of the Board itself. The
Act does not contemplate any independent function by the
I
State except as specifically provided therein .... the State
in exercise of its executive power could not have directed
c that lands meant for use for commercial purposes may be
used for industrial purposes ..... the power of the State
Government to issue direction to the officers appended
under Section 3 and the authorities constituted under the
Act is confined only to matters of policy and not any other.
Such matters of policy yet again must be in relation to
D
discharge of duties by the officers of the authority and not
in derogation thereof.... The direction of the Chief Minister
being de'hors the provisions of the Act is void and of no
effect."
E 20. In Indore Municipality Vs. Niyamatulla (Dead through
L.Rs.) AIR 1971 SC 97, this Court considered a case of
dismissal of an employee by an authority other than the
authority competent to pass such an order i.e. the Municipal
Commissioner, the order was held to be without jurisdiction and
F thus could be termed to have been passed under the relevant
Act. This Court held that "to such a case the Statute under
which action was purported to be taken could afford no
protection".
21. In Tarlochan Dev Sharma Vs. State of Punjab & Ors.
G (2001) 6 SCC 260, this Court, after placing reliance upon a
large number of its earlier judgments, observed as under:
"In the system of Indian democratic governance as
contemplated by the Constitution, senior officers occupying
H key positions such as Secretaries are not supposed to
MANOHAR LAL (D) BY LRS. v. UGRASEN (D) 8Y 365
LRS. & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] ·
mortgage their own discretion, volition and decision- A
making authority and be prepared to give way or being
pushed back or pressed ahead at the behest of
politicians for carrying out commands having no sanctity
· in law. The Conduct Rules of Central Government Services
command the civil servants to maintain at all times B
absolute integrity and devotion to duty and do nothing which
is unbecoming of a government servant. No government
servant shall in the performance of his official duties, or in
the exercise of power conferred on him, act otherwise than
in his best judgment except when he is acting under the c
direction of his official superior." (Emphasis added)
22. Therefore, the law on the question can be summarised
·to the effect that no higher authority in the hierarchy or an
appellate or revisional authority can exercise the power of the
statutory authority nor the superior authority can mortgage its D
wisdom and direct the statutory authority to act in a particular
manner. If the appellate or revisional Authority takes upon itself
the task of the statutory authority and passes an order, it
remains unenforceable for the reason that it cannot be termed
to be an order passed under the Act. E
23. In Mu/raj Vs. Murti Raghunathji Maharaj, AIR 1967
SC 1386, this Court considered the effect of action taken
subsequent to passing of an interim order in its disobedience
and held that any action taken in disobedience of the order F
passed by the Court would be illegal. Subsequent action would
be a nullity.
24. In Surjit Singh Vs. Harbans Singh, AIR 1996 SC 135,
this Court while dealing with the similar issue held as under:
G
"tn defiance of the restraint order, the alienation/
assignment was made. If we were to let it go as such, it
would defeat the ends of justice and the prevalent public
policy. When the Court intends a particular state of affairs
to exist while it is in seisin of a lis, that state of affairs is H
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 7 S.C.R.
A not only required to be maintained, but it is presumed to
exist till the Court orders otherwise. The Court, ·in these
circumstances has the duty, as also the right, to treat the
alienation/assignment as having not taken place at all for
'its purposes." ·
B
25. In All Bengal Excise Licensees Association Vs.
Raghabendra Singh & Ors, AIR 2007 SC 1386, this court held
as under:
"A party to the litigation cannot be allowed to take an unfair
c advantage by committing breach of an interim order and
escape the consequences thereof ..... the wrong
perpetrated by the respondents in utter disregard of the
order of the High Court should not be permitted to hold
good."
D
26. In Delhi Development Authority Vs. Skipper
Construction Co. (P) Ltd. & Anr. AIR 1996 SC 2005, this court
after making reference to many of the earlier judgments held:
"On principle that those who defy a prohibition ought not
E to be able to claim that the fruits of their defiance are good,
and not tainted by the illegality that produced them."
27. In Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar Vs. Nagesh Siddappa
Navalgund, "AIR 2008 SC 901, this Court while dealing with the
F similar issues held that even a Court in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, in the event of coming to the conclusion that a breach to
an order of restraint had taken place, may bring back the parties
to the same position as if the order of injunction has not been
G violated.
28. In view of the above, it is evident that any order passed
by any authority in spite of the knowledge of the interim order
of the court is of no coAsequence as it remains a nullity.
H 29. In Messrs. Trojan & Co. Vs. RM.N.N. Nagappa
MANOHAR LAL (D) BY LRS. v. UGRASEN (D) BY 367
LRS. & ORS. [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
Chettiar AIR 1953 SC 235, this Court considered the issue as A
to whether relief not asked for by a party could be granted and
that too without having proper pleadings. The Court held as
under:·
·"It is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be B
based on grounds outside the pl~adiRgs of the parties and
it is the case pleaded that has 'to be found. Without an
amendment of the plaint, the Court was not entitled to grant
the relief not asked for and no prayer was ever made to
amend the plaint so as to incorporate in it an alternative C
case."
, · 30, A similar view has been re-iterated by this Court in
Krishna Priya Ganguly etc.etc. Vs. University of Lucknow &
Ors. etc. AIR 1984 SC 186; and Om Prakash & Ors. Vs. Ram
Kumar & Ors., AIR 1991 SC 409, observing that a party cannot D
be granted a relief which is not claimed.
31. Dealing with the same issue, this Court in Bharat
Amratlal Kothari Vs. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi & Ors.,
AIR 2010 SC 475 held:
E
"Though the Court has very wide discretion in granting
relief, the court, however, cannot, ignoring and keeping
aside the norms and principles governing grant of relief,
grant a relief not even prayed for by the petitioner."
F
~2. In Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Saraf
Chandra Rath & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 2744, this Court held that
"the· High Court ought not to have granted reliefs to the
respondents
.,
which they had not even prayed for."
. 33. In view of the above, law on the issue can be G
summarised that the Court cannot grant a relief which has not
been specifically prayed by the parties.
, 34. The instant case requires to be examined in the light
of the aforesaid certain fegal propositions. H
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.
A Section 41 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development
Act. 1973 reads as under:
41. Control by State Government-(1) The Authority, the
Chairman or the Vice-Chairman shall carry out such
directions as may be issued to it from time to time by the
B
State Government for the efficient administration of this
Act.
(2) ......................................... .
c (3) The State Government may, at any time, either on its
own motion or on application made to it in this behalf, call
for the records of any case disposed of or order passed
by the authority or Chairman for the purpose of satisfying
itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed or
D direction issued and may pass such order or issue such
direction in relation thereto as it may think fit:
Provided that the State Government shall not pass
an order prejudicial to any person without affording such
person a reasonable opportunity cif being heard.
E
(4) ...................................... "
35. Clause (1) thereof empowers the State Government
to issue general directions which are necessary to properly
F enforce the provisions of the Act. Clause (3) thereof make it
crystal clear that the State Government is a revisional authority.
Therefore, the scheme of the Act makes it clear that if a person
is aggrieved by an order of the authority, he can prefer an
·appeal before the Appellate Authority i.e. Divisional
Commissioner and the person aggrieved of that order may file
G Revision Application before the State Government. However,
the State Government cannot pass an order without giving
opportunity of hearing to the person, who may be adversely
affected.
H 36 .. In the instant case, it is the revisional authority which
MANOHAR LAL (D) BY LRS. v. UGRASEN (D) BY 369
LRS. & ORS. [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
has issued direction to GOA to make allotment in favour of both A
the parties. Orders had be.en passed without hearing the other
party. The authority, i.e. GOA did not have the opportunity to
examine the case of either of the said parties. The High Court
erred in holding that Clause (1) of Section 41 empowers the
State Government to deal with the application of an individual. s
The State Government can take only policy decisions as to how
the statutory provisions would be enforced but cannot deal with
an individual application. Revisional authority can exercise its
jurisdiction provided there is an order passed by the Jower
authority under the Act as it can examine only legality or propriety c
of the order passed or direction issued by the authority therein.
37. In view thereof, we are of the considered opinion that
there was no occasion for the State-Qovernment to entertain
the applications of th~ said parties for allotment of land directly
and issue directions to GOA for allotment of land in their favour. D
38. Admittedly, the interim order passed by the High Court
in favour of Shri Manohar Lal in Writ Petition No. 4159 of 1980
was in force and it restrained the Authorities to make allotment
of the land in dispute in favour of anyone else. Indisputably, the E
State Government as well as the GOA remained fully alive of
the factum of subsistence of the said interim order as is evident
from the correspondence between therh. In view of the law
referred to hereinabove, order passed by the State Government
in contravention of the interim. order, remains unenforceable and F
inexecutable .
. More so, in the writ p_etition filed by Shri Ugrasen relief
sought was limited only to quash the allotment made in favour
of Shri Manohar Lal. No relief was sought for making the
allotment in favour of the writ petitioner/Shri Ugrasen. However, G
the Higt) Court vide impugned judgment and order has issued
direction to make the allotment in his favour. Thus, we are of
the view that issuance of such a direction was not permissible
in law. Even otherwise as Shri Ugrasen'.s land had been
acquired for roads, he could not make application for taking H
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 7 S.C.R.
A benefit of the Land Policy, particularly, when the Land Policy
was not declared to be invalid or violative of equality clause
enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.
39. The High Court failed to consider objections raised on
behalf of GOA in its letter dated 19.4.1980 to the State
8
Government pointing out as follows:
(a) Application of Ugrasen is entered on 31.12.1966
as the last entry in Postal Receipt register.
c (b) Entry is at SI. 15498.
(c) Entry is !n different ink.
(d) True copy of application now submitted bears the
date 13.12.1966.
D
(e) There is no signature on the cyclostyled copy.
(f) Application was made in 1971 and was rejected in
1977 by Shri Watal. Decision not challenged.
Ugrasen kept quiet till 1980.
E
(g) Clerk Mr. Jai Prakash was not working before
1979.
40. It is settled legal proposition that burden lies on the
F person, who alleges/avers/pleads for existence of a fact. Sh.
Ugrasen was under an obligation to establish the fact of
submission of the application in time. Entry in respect of his
application has been made in Postal Receipt Register. As said
application was sent by post, Sh. Ugrasen could explain as to
G whether the application was sent by Registered PosUOrdinary
Post or under Postal Certificate and as to whether he could
produce the receipt, if any, for the same. In such a fact-situation,
the application filed by Shri ~grasen could not have be.en
entertained at all, even if he was entitled for the benefit of the
Land Policy.
H
MANOHAR LAL (D) BY LRS. v. UGRASEN (D) BY 371
LRS. & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
41. The High Court committed an error observing that if A
the State Government had allowed the application filed by
Ugrasen it was implicit that delay, if any, in making the claim
stood condoned. Such an observation is not in consonance with
law for the reason that if there is a delay in filing application,
the question would arise as to whether the authority has a right B
to condone the delay. Even if, the delay can be condoned, the
authority had to examine as to whether there was sufficient
cause preventing the applicant to approach the authority in time.
But, once the delay has been considered without application
of mind, in a fact-situation like in the instant case, the questionc
of deemed condonation would not arise. More so, the High
Court could not examine the question of fact as to whether the
application was made within time or not, particularly, in view of
the fact that the authority had been making the allotment though
application had not been made at all in time and it was only
0
manipulation of the record of the authority with the collusion of
its staff. ·
42. In fact, such exercise by the State amounts to
colourable exercise of power. In State of Punjab & Anr. Vs.
Gurdial Singh & Ors. AIR 1980 SC 319, this Court dealing with E
such an issue observed as under:
"Legal malice is gibberish unless juristic clarity keeps it
separate from the popular concept of personal vice. Pithily
put, bad faith which invalidates the exercise of power - F
sometimes called colourable exercise or fraud on power
and oftentimes overlaps motives, passions and satisfaction
- is the attainment of ends beyond the sanctioned purposes
of power by simulation or pretension of gaining a
legitimate goal. If the use of the power is for the fulfilment G
of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation by
malice is not legicidal. The action is bad where the true
object is to reach an end different from the one for which
the power is entrusted, goaded by extraneous
considerations, good or bad, but irrelevant to the. H
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.
A entrustment. When the custodian qf power is influenced in .
its exercise by considerations outside those tpr·promotlon
of which the power is vested the cou'ft calls it·a cO!ourable
i:ixercise and is undeceived by i.llusion."
43. The State Government, being the r.evisional authority,
8
could not entertain directly the applications by the said
applicants, namely, Sh.Ugra$en and Sh. Manohar Lal. The
action of the State Government smacks of arbitrariness and is
nothing but abuse ofpower'as the State Government deprived
GOA to exerci~e its power· under the Act, and deprived the
C aggrieved party to file appeal against the order of allotment.
'- ' '
Thus, orders passed by the State Government stood vitiated.
More so, it was a clear. cut case of colourable exercise of
p·ower.
o 44. So far as the case of allotment in favour of Manohar
[<!I is concerned in more than one respect, it is by no means
better than the case of Ugrasen as the initial allotment had been
mad1~ by GOA in his faVl')Ur consequent to the directions of the
Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh who had no competence to
E deal with the subject under the Statute and he has already been
put in possession of a part of allotted land in commercial area,
contrary to the Land Policy.
45. There are claims and counter claims regarding the
dates of Section 6 declaration; takiAg of possession of land;
F and of making Awards so far as the land of Manohar Lal is
· concerned. As per the affidavit filed by the Vice-Chairman,
GOA, Section 6 declaration was made on 24.5.1965 invoking
the urgency clause under section 17(1); possession was taken
on 13.7.1965; and Award was made on 11.5.1970. Manohar
G · Lal preferred writ petition no.4159/1.980 before the Allahabad
High Court stating that Section 6 declaration in 'respect of his
land was made on 30.1.1969, possession was taken on
29.5.1969 and Award was made on 11.6.1971. None of the
parties considered it proper to place the authentic documents
H before the Court so that the real facts be-determined. In such
MANOHAR LAL (D) BY LRS. v. UGRASEN (D) BY 373
LRS. & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
a fact situation, we are not in a position to decide as to whether A
Manohar Lal's application was filed in time as he had claimed
in the said writ petition that he filed the First Application on
22.6.1969. However, one thing is clearly evident from the
affidavit filed by Vice Chairman, GOA that the land allotted to
both of these parties has been part of commercial area and B
not of residentiai area. In view thereof, any allotment made in
favour of Manohar Lal so far, had been illegal as the application
could not have been entertained by the Chief Minister and
further appellant could not get allotment in commercial area.
The Land Policy provided only for allotment of land in residential c
area.
46. The fact of illegal allotment of land in commercial area
has been brought to the notice of the Court first time vide
affidavit of the Vice-Chairman, GDA dated 27.5.2010. Thus, it
is. crystal clear that such facts had not been brought on record D
before the High Court by GOA at any stage in any of the writ
petitions nor it had been pointed out to the State Government
when applications of both these parties had been entertained
.directly· by the Chief Minister and the State Government. Only.
explanation furnished by the Vice-Chairman, GOA, in his E
affidavit is that due to inadvertence it escaped the notice of
GOA that the plots had been categorized as commercial in the
Master Plan and could not be allotted in favour of any applicant.
Even today, the said plots continue to be in commercial area
and not in residential area. F
47. The present appellants had also not disclosed that land
allotted to them falls in commercial area. When a person
approaches a Court of Equity in exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, he should G
approach the Court not only with clean hands but also with clean
mind, clean heart and clean objective. "Equally, the judicial
process should never become an instrument of appreciation
or abuse or a means in the process of the Court to subvert
justice." Who seeks equity must do equity. The legal maxim
H
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.
A "Jure naturaw aequum est neminum cum alterius detrimento et
injuria fieri locupletiorem", means that it is a law of nature that
one should not be enriched by the loss or injury to another. (vide
The Ramjas Foundation & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. AIR
1993 SC 852; K.P. Srinivas Vs. R.M. Premchand & ors.
B (1994) 6 SCC 620 and Nooruddin Vs. (Dr.) K.L. Anand (1995)
1 sec 242).
48. Similarly, in Ramniklal N. Bhutta & Anr. Vs. State of
Maharashtra & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 1236, this Court observed
as under:-
c
"The power under Article 226 is discretionary. It will be
exercised only in furtherance of interest of justice and not
merely on the making out of a legal point.. ... the interest of
justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often
D one and the same ...... The Courts have to weigh the
public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while·
-.exercising .... any of their discretionary powers (Emphasis
added).
E 49. In Mis Tilokchand Motichand & Ors. Vs. H.B. Munshi
& Anr. Al R 1970 SC 898; State of Haryana Vs. Karna/
Distillery, AIR 1977 SC 781; and Sabia Khan & Ors. Vs. State
of UP. & Ors. AIR 1999 SC 2284, this Court held that filing
totally misconceived petition amounts to abuse of the process
of the Court. Such a litigant is not required to be death with
F lightly, as petition containing misleading and inaccurate
statement, if filed, to achievean ulterior purpose amounts to
abuse of the process of the Court. A litigant is bound to make
"full and true disclosure of facts."
G 50. In Abdul Rahman Vs. Prasony Bai & Anr. AIR 2003
SC 718; S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. Vs. State of
Bihar & Ors. (2004) 7 SCC 166; and Oswal Fats & Oils Ltd.
Vs. Addi. Commissioner (Admn), Bareily Division, Bareily &
·Ors. JT 2010 (3) SC 510, this Ciourt held that whenever the
H Court comes to the conclusion that the process of the Court is
MANOHAR LAL (D) BY LRS. v. UGRASEN (D) BY 375
LRS. & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
being abused, the Court would be justified in refusing to A
proceed further and refuse relief to the party. This rule has been
evolved out of need of the Courts to deter a litigant from abusing
the process of the Court by deceiving it.
51. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion
B
that Shri Manohar Lal did not approach the Court with
disclosure of true facts, and particularly, that he had been allotted
the land in the commercial area by GOA on the instruction of
the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh.
52. It is a fit case for ordering enquiry or initiating C
proceedings for committing criminal contempt of the Court as
the parties succeeded in misleading the Court by not disclosing
the true facts. However, we are not inclined to waste court's time
further in these cases. Our experience has been that the so-
called administration is not likely to wake-up from its deep D
slumber and is never interested to redeem the limping society
from such hapless situations. We further apprehend that our
pious hope that administration may muster the courage one day
to initiate disciplinary/criminal proceedings against such
applicants/erring officers/employees of the authority, may not E
come true. However, we leave the course open for the State
Government and GOA to take decision in regard to these issues
and as to whether GOA wants to recover the possession of the
land already allotted to these applicants in commercial area
contrary to the Land Policy or value thereof adjusting the amount F
of compensation deposited by them, if any.
53. In view of the above, Civil Appeal No. 974 of 2007 filed
by GOA is allowed. The Judgment and order of the High Court
dated 22.7.2003 passed in Writ Petition No. 6644 of 1989 is.
hereby set aside. Civil Appeal No. 973 of 2007 filed by G
Manohar Lal is dismissed. No costs.
N.J. Appeals disposed of.
H
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