MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULEversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR

                         [2012) 12 S.C.R. 850


A              MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE .
                                   v.
               STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR.
                  (Civil Appeal No. 9095 of 2012)
                        DECEMBER 13, 2012
B
      [SWATANTER KUMAR AND MADAN B. LOKUR, JJ.]

         Right to Information Act, 2005:
c        s.20 - Powers of the State Information Commission to .
  impose penalty and take disciplinary action against the
  employees - Scope and ambit of - Held: State Information
  Commissions exercise quasi judicial powers - They are
  vested with wide powers including imposition of penalty or
D taking of disciplinary action against the employees -
  Provisions relating to penalty or to penal consequences have
  to be construed strictly.
        s.20(2) - Recommending disciplinary action against the
   Central/State Public Information Officer u/s. 20(2) -
E Applicability of principle of natural justice - Held: Power to
  recommend disciplinary action is a power, exercise of which
  may impose penal consequences - Recommendation itself
  vests the delinquent Public Information Officer with
  consequences which are of serious nature and can ultimately
F produce prejudicial results and invite minor and/or major
  penalty - Thus, principles of natural justice have to be read
  into the provisions of s.20(2) - Right of hearing, even if not
  provided under a specific statute, the rules of1natural justice
  shall so demand, unless by specific law, it is excluded -
G Natural justice.
          s.20(2) - Disciplinary action against the Public
    Information Officer- Validity- In the instant case, appeal was
    filed before the State Commission by the aggrieved applicant
H                               850
MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 851
             MAHARASHTRA
that he was not provided information sought for by the A
appellant, the Public Information Officer - Appellant was
informed about the hearing of appeal before the State
Commission - Appellant sent a fax requesting for
adjournment on account of official reasons - On the date of
hearing, another officer represented the appellant, however, B
 State Commission did not adjourn the case and rather
decided .the appeal and also ordered disciplinary action
 against the appellant uls.20(2) - High Court upheld the order
 of State Commission - On appeal, held: The appellant was
 entitled to a hearing before an order could be passed against C
 him u/s.20(2) - If the appellant was given an opportunity and
 had appeared before the Commission, he might have been
 able to explain that there was reasonable cause and he had
 taken all reasonable steps within his power to comply with the
 provisions - None of the grounds stated uls.20(2) were
 satisfied which justified the recommendation by the D
 Commission of taking disciplinary action against the appellant
 - Order of State Commission and High Court set aside.
      s.20(2) - Requirement and scope of- Held: Central or
the State Commission have no jurisdiction to add to the E
exhaustive grounds of default mentioned in the provisions of
s.20(2) - The case of default must strictly fall within the
specified grounds of the provisions of s. 20(2) - This provision
has to be construed and applied strictly - /ts ambit cannot be
permitted to be enlarged at the whims of the Commission - F
All the attributable defaults of a Central or State Public
Information Officer have to be without any reasonable cause
and persistently- Burden of forming an opinion in accordance
with the provisions of s.20(2) and principles of natural justice
 lies upon the Commission - Interpretation of Statute.           G
     The appellant was working as Superintendent In the
 State Excise Department. He was nominated under
 Section 5 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 and
 designated as the Public Information Officer. On 3rd
                                                                H
    852     SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2012] 12 S.C.R.


A January, 2007, respondent no.2 fifed an application under
   Section 6(1) of the Act seeking certain information. The
   appellant forwarded the said application to the concerned
  Department for collecting the information and on 19th
  January, 2007 informed respondent no.2 that his
8 application was under process. As respondent no.2 did
  not receive information in furtherance to his application,
  he filed an appeal before the Collector, Nanded on 1st
  March, 2007, under Section 19(1) of the Act. By letter
  dated 11th April, 2007, another officer of the department
C further wrote to respondent No.2 that since he had not
  mentioned the period for which the information was
  sought, it was not possible to supply the Information and
  requested him to furnish the period for which such
  information was required. However respondent No.2 did
  not reply back. Meanwhile on 4th April, 2007, the appellant
D was transferred from Nanded to Akola District.
       Respondent No.2, without waiting for the decision of
  the Collector fifed an appeal before the State Information
  Commission. The Commission directed Issuance of the
E notice to the office of the State Excise at Nanded. The
  Nanded office informed the appellant of the notice and
  that the hearing was kept for 26th February, 2008 before
  the State Information Commission. On 25th February,
  2008, the appellant Informed the office of the State
F Information Commissioner that for official reasons he was
  unable to appear before the Commissioner on that date
  and requested for grant of extension of time for that
  purpose. The State Information Commission, without
  considering the application and the request made by the
G Officer present before the State Information Commission
  at the time of hearing, allowed the appeal on 26th
  February, 2008, directing the Commissioner for State
  Excise to initiate action against the appellant as per the
  Service Rules and asked for compliance report.
H
MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 853
             MAHARASHTRA

Aggrieved, the appellant filed writ petition the High Court. A
The High Court dismissed the writ petition, and therefore
the instant appeal.
    Allowing the appeal, the Court
                                                                8
     HELD: 1.1. State Information Commissions exercise
very wide and certainly quasi judicial powers. In fact their
functioning is akin to the judicial system rather than the
executive decision making process. Adherence to the
principles of natural justice is mandatory for such
Tribunal or bodies discharging such functions. The State C
Information Commission has been vested with wide
powers including imposition of penalty or taking of
disciplinary action against the employees. Exercise of
such power is bound to adversely affect or bring civil
 consequences to the delinquent. Thus, the provisions D
 relating to penalty or to penal consequences have to be
 construed strictly. It will not be open to the Court to give
 them such liberal construction that it would be beyond
 the specific language of the statute or would be in
 violation to 'the principles of natural justice. [Paras 14-16] E
 [866-D·G]
      1.2. The State Information Commission is performing
 adjudicatory functions where two parties raise their
 respective issues to which the State Information F
 Commission Is expected to apply its mind and pass an
 order directing disclosure of the information asked for or
 declining the same. Either way, It affects the rights of the
 parties who have raised rival contentions before the
 Commission. The adjudicatory .process essentially has G
 to be in consonance with the principles of natural justice,
 including the doctrine of audi alteram partem. Hearing the
  parties, application of mind and recording of reasoned
 decision are the basic elements of natural j1,1stlce. It is
  not expected of the Commission to breach ariy of these
                                                              . H,
     854     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 12 S.C.R.

 A principles, particularly when its orders are open to judicial
   review. [Para 17] [866-H; 867-A·D]
          1.3. The proviso to Section 20(1) of the Act
      specifically contemplates that before imposing the
 B penalty contemplated under Section 20(1 ), the
     Commission shall give a reasonable opportunity of being
     heard to the concerned officer. However, there is no
     such specific provision in relation to the matters covered
     under Section 20(2). Section 20(2) empowers the Central
     or the State Information Commission, as the case may be,
 C at the time of deciding a complaint or appeal for the
     reasons stated in that section, to recommend for
     disciplinary action to be taken against the Central Public
     Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer,
    as the case may be, under the relevant service rules.
D Power to recommend disciplinary action is a power
    exercise of which may impose penal consequences.
    When such a recommendation is received, the
    disciplinary authority would conduct the disciplinary
    proceedings in accordance with law and subject to
E satisfaction of the requirements of law. It is a
    'recommendation' and not a 'mandate' to conduct an
   enquiry.        'Recommendation' must be seen in
   contradistinction to 'direction' or 'mandate'. But
   recommendation Itself vests the delinquent Publlc
F Information Officer or State Public Information Officer with
   consequences which are of serious nature and can
   ultimately produce prejudicial results including
   misconduct within the relevant service rules and invite
   minor and/or major penalty. Thus, the principles of
G natural justice have to be read Into the provisions of
   Section 20(2). It Is a settled canon of clvll jurisprudence
   Including service jurisprudence that no person be
   condemned unheard. Directing disciplinary action Is an
   order In the form of recommendation which has far
H reaching clvli consequences. It will not be permissible
 MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 855
              MAHARASHTRA

to take the view that compliance with principles of natural A
justice is not a condition precedent to passing of a
recommendation under Section 20(2). Thus, the principle
is clear and settled that right of hearing, even if not
provided under a specific statute, the principles of natural
justice shall so demand, unless by specific law, it is B
excluded. It is more so when exercise of authority is likely
to vest the person with consequences of civil nature.
[Paras 21-23] [872-C-H; 873-A-B; 874-C]

     A.K. Kraipak & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1969) 2 c
SCC 262: 1970 (1) SCR 457; Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. &
Ors: v. Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors. (2010) 9 SCC 496: 2010
(10) SCR 1070; Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election
Commissioner (1978) 1 SCC 405: 1978 (2) SCR 272 and
Namit Sharma v. Union of India 2012 (8) SCALE 593 and
Udit Narain Singh Malpharia v. Additional Member, Board of D
Revenue, Bihar AIR 1963 SC 786: 1963 Suppl. SCR 676 -
relied on.
    2.1. ltwas not that the appellant had been avoiding
appearance before the State Information Commission. It E
was the first date of hearing and in the letter dated 25th
February, 2008, he had given a reasonable cause for his
absence before the Commission on 25th February, 2008.
However, on 26th February, 2008, the Impugned order
was passed. The appellant was entitled to a hearing F
before an order could be passed against him under the
provisions of Section 20(2) of the Act. He was granted
no such hearing. The State Information Commission not
only recommended but directed Initiation of departmental
proceedings against the appellant and even asked for the G
compliance report. If such a harsh order was to be
passed against the appellant, the least that was expected
of the Commission was to grant him a hearing/
reasonable opportunity to put forward his case. The
State Information Commission should have granted an H
    856     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 12 S.C.R.


A adjournment and heard the appellant before passing an
   order Section under 20(2) of the Act. On that ground itself,
   the impugned order is liable to be set aside. The appellant
   had a genuine case to explain before the State
   Information Commission and to establish that his case
B did not call for any action within the provisions of Section
  20(2). It is clear from language of Section 20(2) that first
  of all an opinion has to be formed by the Commission.
  This opinion is to be formed at the time of deciding any
  complaint or appeal after hearing the person concerned.
C The opinion formed has to have basis or reasons and
  must be relatable to any of the defaults of the provision.
  The grounds stated in the Section are exhaustive and it
  is not for the Commission to add other grounds which
  are not specifically stated in the language of Section
o 20(2). The Central or the State Commission have no
  jurisdiction to add to the exhaustive grounds of default
  mentioned in the provisions of Section 20(2). The case
  of default must strictly fall within the specified grounds
  of the provisions of Section 20(2). This provision has to
E be construed and applied strictly. Its ambit cannot be
  permitted to be enlarged at the whims of the
  Commission. [Para 25-26) [874-F-H; 875-A-C; 876-B-G-H;
  877-A]

       2.2. If the appellant was given an opportunity and had
F appeared before the Commission, he might have been
  able to explain that there was reasonable cause and he
  had taken all reasonable steps within his power to
  comply with the provisions. It appears that the facts have
  not been correctly noticed and, in any case, not in their
G entirety by the State Information Commission. It had
  formed an opinion that the appellant was negligent and
  had not performed the duty cast upon him. 'Negligence'
  per se is not a ground on which proceedings under
  Section 20(2) of the Act can be invoked. The Commission
H must return a finding that such negligence, delay or
  MANOHAR S/0 MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 857
               MAHARASHTRA
  default is persistent and without reasonable cause. The A
  Commission, in the present case, has erred in not
  recording such definite finding. The appellant had not
, failed to receive any application, had not failed to act
  within the period of 30 days (as he had written a letter
  calling for information), had not malafidely denied the B
  request for information, had not furnished any incorrect
  or misleading information, had not destroyed any
  information and had not obstructed the furnishing of the
  information. On the contrary, he had taken steps to
  facilitate the providing of information by writing the stated c
  letters. May be the letter dated 11th April, 2007 was not
  written within the period of 30 days requiring respondent
  No.2 to furnish details of the period for which such
  information was required but the fact remained that such
  letter was written and respondent No.2 did not even 0
  bother to respond to the said enquiry. He just kept on
  filing appeal after appeal. After April 4, 2007, the date
  when the appellant was transferred to Akola, he was not
   responsible for the acts of omissions and/or commission
   of the office at Nanded. [Paras 27, 28] [877-G-H; 878-C, E
   E-H; 876-A·B]
      3. Another aspect of this case is that the appeal itself
 was not decided though it was so recorded in the
 impugned order. The entire impugned order did not
 direct furnishing of the information asked for by F
 respondent No.1. It did not say whether such information
 was required to be furnished or not or whether in the facts
 of the case, it was required of respondent No.2 to
 respond to the letter dated 11th April, 2007 written by the
 Department to him. All these matters were requiring G
 decision of the Commission before it could recommend
 the disciplinary action against the appellant, particularly,
 in the facts of the present case. [Para 29] [879-8-D]
    4. All the attributable defaults of a Central or State
 Public Information Officer have to be without any             H
    858     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 12 S.C.R.


A reasonable cause and persistently. There could be cases
   where there is reasonable cause shown and the officer
   is able to demonstrate that there was no persistent
   default on his part either in receiving the application or
   furnishing the requested information. In such
B circumstances, the law does not require recommendation
   for disciplinary proceedings to be made. It is not the
   legislative mandate that irrespective of the facts and
  circumstances of a given case, whether reasonable cause
   is shown or not, the Commission must recommend
c disciplinary action merely because the application was
   not responded to within 30 days. Every case has to be
  examined on its own facts. The burden of forming an
  opinion in accordance with the provisions of Section
  20(2) and principles of natural justice lies upon the
0 Commission. [Para 30] [879-E, G-H; 880-A-C]
       5. In the case at hand, the appellant had shown that
  the default, if any on his part, was not without reasonable
  cause or result of a persistent default on his part. On the
  contrary, he had taken steps within his power and
E authority to provide information to respondent No.2. It
  was for the department concerned to react and provide
  the information asked for. In the present case, some
  default itself is attributable to respondent No.2 who did
  not even care to respond to the letter of the department
F dated 11th April, 2007. The order passed by the State
  Information Commission dated 26th February, 2008 and
  the judgment of the High Court are set aside. It is further
  directed that the disciplinary action, if any, initiated by the
  department against the appellant shall be withdrawn
G forthwith. Further, the State Information Commission is
  directed to decide the appeal filed by respondent No.2
  before it on merits and in accordance with law. It will also
  be open to the Commission to hear the appellant and
  pass any orders as contemplated under Section 20(2), in
  furtherance to the notice issued to the appellant. [Paras
H 31-32] [880-D-G]
MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 859
             MAHARASHTRA

                     Case Law Reference:                          A

    1970 (1) SCR 457          relied on             Para 17
    2010 (10) SCR 1070        relied on             Para 18
    1978 (2) SCR 272          relied on             Para 19       B
    2012 (8) SCALE 593        relied on             Para 20
    1963 Suppl. SCR 676 relied on                   Para 22
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
9095 of 2012.                                                     c
    From the Judgment & Order dated 18.12.2008 of the High
Court of Bombay at Aurangabad in WP No. 5262 of 2008.
    Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, for the Appellant.
    Asha Gopalan Nair for the Respondent.                         D
    The Judgment of the Court was delivered' by
    SWATANTER KUMAR, J. 1. Leave granted.
     2. The present appeal is directed against the judgment
dated 18th December, 2008 of the High Court of Bombay at          E
Aurangabad vide which the High Court declined to interfere with
the order dated 26th February, 2008 passed by the State
Information Commissioner under the provisions of the Right to
Information Act, 2005 (for short 'the Act').
      3. We may notice the facts in brief giving rise to the F
present appeal. One Shri Ram Narayan, respondent No.2, a
political person belonging to the Nationalist Congress Party,
Nanded filed an application on 3rd January, 2007, before the
appellant who was a nominated a11thority under Section 5 of
the Act and was responsible for providing the information G
sought by the applicants. This application was moved under
Section 6(1) of the Act.
     4. In the application, the said respondent No.2 sought the
following information:
                                                                  H
    860         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2012] 12 S.C.R.


A         "a.    The persons those who are appointed/selected
                 through a reservation category, their names, when
                 they have appointed on the said post.
          b.     When they have joined the said post.
B         c.     The report of the Caste Verification Committee of
                 the persons those who are/were selected from the
                 reserved category.
          d.     The persons whose caste certificate is/was
                 forwarded for the verification to the caste
C                verification committee after due date. Whether any
                 action is taken against those persons? If any action
                 is taken, then the detail information should be given
                 within 30 days."
          5. The appellant, at the relevant time, was working as
D   Superintendent in the State Excise Department and was
    designated as the Public Information Officer. Thus, he was
    discharging the functions required under the provisions of the
    Act. After receiving the application from Respondent No.2, the
    appellant forwarded the application to the concerned
E   Department for collecting the information. Vide letter dated 19th
    January, 2007, the appellant had informed respondent No.2 that
    action on his application has been taken and the information
    asked for has been called from the concerned department and
    as and when the information is received, the application could
F   be answered accordingly. As respondent No.2 did not receive
    the information in furtherance to his application dated 3rd
    January, 2007, he filed an appeal within the prescribed period
    before the Collector, Nanded on 1st March, 2007, under
    Section 19(1) of the Act. In the appeal, respondent No.2 sought
G   the information for which he hctd submitted the application. This
    appeal was forwarded to the office of the appellant along with
    the application given by respondent No.2. No hearing was
    conducted by the office of the Collector at Nanded. Vide letter
    dated 11th April, 2007, the then Superintendent, State Excise,
H   Nanded, also designated as Public Information Officer, further
 MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 861
    MAHARASHTRA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
wrote to respondent No.2 that since he had not mentioned the A
period for which the information is sought, it was not possible
to supply the information and requested him to furnish the period
for which such information was required. The letter dated 11th
April, 2007 reads as under :
    "... you have not mentioned the period of the information      B
    which is sought by you. Therefore, ii is not possible to
    supply the information. Therefore, you should mention the
    period of information in your application so that it will be
    convenient to supply the information."
     6. As already noticed there was no hearing before the
                                                                   c
Collector and the appeal before the Collector had not been
decided. It is the case of the appellant that the communication
from the Collector's office dated 4th March, 2007 had not been
received in the office of the appellant. Despite issuance of the
letter dated 11th April, 2007, no information was received from D
respondent No.2 and, thus, the information could not be
furnished by the appellant. On 4th April, 2007, the appellant was
transferred from Nanded to Akola District and thus was not
responsible for performance of the functions of the post that he
was earlier holding at Nanded and so also the functions of E
Designated Public Information Officer.
      7. Respondent No.2, without awaiting the decision of the
First Appellate Authority (the Collector), filed an appeal before
the State Information Commission at Aurangabad regarding
non-providing of the information asked for. The said appeal F
came up for hearing before the Commission at Aurangabad
who directed issuance of the notice to the office of the State
Excise at Nanded. The Nanded office informed the appellant
of the notice and that the hearing was kept for 26th February,
2008 before the State Information Commission at Aurangabad. G
This was informed to the appellant vide letter dated 12th
February, 2008. On 25th February, 2008, the applicant
forwarded an application through fax to the office of the State
 Information Commissioner bringing to their notice that for official
 reasons he was unable to appear before the Commissioner on H
    862       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2012] 12 S.C.R.

A that date and requested for grant of extension of time for that
  purpose. Relevant part of the letter dated 25th February 2008
  reads as under:
          "... hearing is fixed before the Hon'ble Minister, State
          Excise M.S.Mumbai in respect of licence of CL-3 of
B         Shivani Tq. and Dist. Akola. For that purpose it is
          necessary for the Superintendent, State Excise, Akola for
          the said hearing. Therefore, it is not possible for him to
          remain present for hearing on 26.2.2008 before the
          Hon'ble Commissioner, State Information Commission,
c         Aurangabad. Therefore, it is requested that next date be
          given for the said hearing."
        8. The State Information Commission, without considering
  the application and even the request made by the Officer who
  was present before the State Information Commission at the
D time of hearing, allowed the appeal vide its order dated 26th
  February, 2008, directing the Commissioner for State Excise
  to initiate action against the appellant as per the Service Rules
  and that the action should be taken within two months and the
  same would be reported within one month thereafter to the State
E Information Commission. It will be useful to reproduce the
  relevant part of the order dated 26th February, 2008, passed
  by the State Information Commissioner:
          "The applicant has prefer First appeal before the Collector
          on 1.3.2007, the said application was received to the State
F         Excise Office on 4.3.2007 and on 11.4.2007 it was
          informed to the applicant, that he has not mentioned the
          specific period regarding the information. The Public
          Information Officer, ought to have been informed to the
          applicant after receiving his first application regarding the
G         specific period of information but, here the public
          information officer has not consider positively, the
          application of the applicant and not taken any decision. On
          the application given by the applicant, the public information
          officer ought to have been informed to the applicant on or
H         before 28.1.2007 and as per the said Act, 2005 there is
MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 863
   MAHARASHTRA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.)
  delay 73 days for informing the applicant and this shows A
  that, the Public Information Officer has not perform his duty
  which is casted upon him and he is negligent it reveals
  after going through the documents by the State
  Commission. Therefore, it is order that, while considering
  above said matter, the concerned Public Information B
  Officer, has made delay of 73 days for informing to the
  applicant and therefore he has shown the negligence while
  performing his duty. Therefore, it is ordered to the
  Commissioner of State Excise Maharashtra State to take
  appropriate action as per the Service Rules and c
   Regulation against the concerned Public Information
  Officer within the two months from this order and thereafter,
   the compliance report will be submitted within one month
   in the office of State Commission. As the applicant has
   not mentioned the specific period for information in his
                                                                 0
   original application and therefore, the Public Information
   Officer was unable to supply him information. There is no
   order to the Public Information Officer to give information
   to the applicant as per his application. It is necessary for
   all the applicant those who want the information under the E
   said Act, he should fill up the form properly and it is
   confirmed that, whether he has given detail information
   while submitting the application as per the proforma and
   this would be confirm while making the application,
   otherwise the Public Information Officer will not in position
   to give expected information to the applicant. At the time F
   of filing the application, it is necessary for the applicant,
   to fill-up the form properly and it was the prime duty of the
   applicant.
   As per the above mentioned, the second appeal filed by G
   the applicant is hereby decided as follows:
                        ORDER
    1.   The appeal is decided.
    2.   As the concern Public Information Officer has
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    864       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 12 S.C.R.


A               shown his negligence while performing his duty,
                therefore, the Commissioner of State Excise, State
                of Maharashtra has to take appropriate action as
                per the service rules within two months from the
                date of order and thereafter, within one month they
B               should submit their compliance report to the State
                Commission."
       9. The legality and correctness of the above order was
  challenged by the appellant before the High Court by filing the
C writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The
  appellant had taken various grounds challenging the
  correctness of this order. However, the High Court, vide its
  order dated 18th December, 2008, dismissed the writ petition
  observing that the appellant ought to have passed the
  appropriate orders in the matter rather than keeping respondent
D No.2 waiting. II also noticed the contention that the application
  was so general and vague in nature that the information sought
  for could not be provided. However, it did not accept the same.
        10. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the order
E of the State Information Commission, as affirmed by the High
  Court, is in violation of the principles of natural justice and is
  contrary to the very basic provisions of Section 20 of the Act.
  The order does not satisfy any of the ingredients spelt out in
  the provisions of Section 20(2) of the Act. The State Information
F Commission did not decide the appeal, it only directed action
  to be taken against the appellant though the appeal as recorded
  in the order had been decided. It can, therefore, be inferred that
  there is apparent non-application of mind.
        11. The impugned orders do not take the basic facts of
G the case into consideration that after a short duration the
  appellant was transferred from the post in question and had
  acted upon the application seeking information within the
  prescribed time. Thus, no default, much less a negligence, was
  attributable to the appellant.
H         12. Despite service, nobody appeared on behalf of the
 MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 865
    MAHARASHTRA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.].

State Information Commission. The State filed no counter A
affidavit.
     13. Since the primary controversy in the case revolves
around the interpretation of the provisions of Section 20 of the
Act, it will be necessary for us to refer to the provisions of     8
Section 20 of the Act at this stage itself. Section 20 reads as
under:
    "Section 20: Penalties:-(1) Where the Central Information
    Commission or the State Information Commission, as the
    case may be, at the time of deciding any complaint or c
    appeal is of the opinion that the Central Public Information
    Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case
    may be, has, without any reasonable cause, refused to
    receive an application for information or has not furnished
    information within the time specified under sub-section (1) 0
    of section 7 or malafidely denied the request for
    information or knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or
    misleading information or destroyed information which was
    the subject of the request or obstructed in any manner in
    furnishing the information, it shall impose a penalty of two E
    hundred and fifty rupees each day till application is
    received or information is furnished, so however, the total
    amount of such penalty shall not exceed twenty-five
    thousand rupees:
     Provided that the Central Public Information Officer or the   F
     State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, shall
     be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before
     any penalty is imposed on him:
     Provided further that the burden of proving that he acted
     reasonably and diligently shall be on the Central Public . G
     Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer,
     as the case may be.
     (2) Where the Central Information Commission or the State
     Information Commission, as the case may be, at the time
                                                                   H
    866       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 12 S.C.R.

A         of deciding any complaint or appeal is of the opinion that
          the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public
          Information Officer, as the case may be, has without any
          reasonable cause and persistently, failed to receive an
          application for information or has not furnished information
B         within the time specified under sub-section (1) of Section
          7 or malafidely denied the request for information or
          knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or misleading
          information or destroyed information which was the subject
          of the request or obstructed in any manner in, furnishing
c         the information, it shall recommend for disciplinary action
          against the Central Public Information Officer or the State
          Public Information Officer, as the case may be, under the
          service rules applicable to him."
       14. State Information Commissions exercise very wide
D and certainly quasi judicial powers. In fact their functioning is
  akin to the judicial system rather than the executive decision
  making process.
       15. It is a settled principle of law and does not require us
  to discuss this principle with any elaboration that adherence to
E the principles of natural justice is mandatory for such Tribunal
  or bodies discharging such functions.
       16. The State Information Commission has been vested
  with wide powers including imposition of penalty or taking of
  disciplinary action against the employees. Exercise of such
F power is bound to adversely affect or bring civil consequences
  to the delinquent. Thus, the provisions relating to penalty or to
  penal consequences have to be construed strictly. It will not be
  open to the Court to give them such liberal construction that it
  would be beyond the specific language of the statute or would
G be in violation to the principles of natural justice.
       17. The State Information Commission is performing
  adjudicatory functions where two parties raise their respective
  issues to which the State Information Commission is expected
H to apply its mind and pass an order directing disclosure of the
  MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 867
     MAHARASHTRA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
  information asked for or declining the same. Either way, it A
  affects the rights of the parties who have raised rival
  contentions before the Commission. If there were no rival
  contentions, the matter would rest at the level of the designated
  Public Information Officer or immediately thereafter. It comes
  to the State Information Commission only at the appellate stage B
· when rights and contentions require adjudication. The
  adjudicatory process essentially has to be in consonance with
  the principles of natural justice, including the doctrine of audi
  a/teram partem. Hearing the parties, application of mind and
  recording of reasoned decision are the basic elements of c
  natural justice. It is not expected of the Commission to breach     -;
  any of these principles, particularly when its. orders are open
. to judicial review. Much less to Tribunals or such Commissions,
  the Courts have even made compliance to the principle of rule
  of natural justice obligatory in the class of administrative
                                                                    0
  matters as well. In the case of A.K. Kraipak & Ors. v. Union of
  India & Ors. [(1969) 2 SCC 262], the Court held as under:
      "17 .... It is not necessary to examine those decisions as
      there is a great deal of fresh thinking on the subject. The
      horizon of natural justice is constantly expanding...          E
      The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice
      or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice.
      These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any
      law validly made. In other words they d9 not supplant the
      law of the land but supplement it. ... The concept of natural F
      justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent
      years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules
      namely: (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo
      debet esse judex propn"a causa) and (2) no decision shall
      be given against a party without affording him a reasonable G
      hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a
      third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial
      enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not
      arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many
      more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of H
    868       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2012] 12 S.C.R.


A         natural justice. Tiii very recently it was the opinion of the
          courts that unless the authority concerned was required by
          the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was
          no room for the application of the rules of natural justice.
          The validity of that limitation is now questioned~ If the
B         purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent
          miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules
          should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries.
          Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates
          administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries.
c         Enquiries which were considered administrative at one
          time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in
          character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both
          quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries.
          An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have
          more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial
D
          enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy
          George v. University of Kera/a the rules of natural justice
          are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural
          justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great
          extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the
E         framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and
          the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons
          appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made
          before a court that some principle of natural justice had
          been contravened the court has to decide whether the
F         observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision
          on the facts of that case.
       18. In the case of Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. & Ors. v.
  Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors. ((2010) 9 SCC 496], the Court
  dealt with the question of demarcation between the
G administrative orders and quasi-judicial orders and the
  requirement of adherence to natural justice. The Court held as
  under:
          "47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:
H
MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 869
   MAHARASHTRA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

   (a)   In India the judicial trend has always been to record    A
         reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such
         decisions affect anyone prejudicially.
   (b)   A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in
         support of its conclusions.
                                                                  B
   (c)   Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to
         serve the wider principle of justice that justice must
         not only be done it must also appear to be done
         as well.
   (d)   Recording of reasons also operates as a valid            c
         restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of
         judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative
         power.
   (e)   Reasons reassure that discretion has been
         exercised by the decision-maker on relevant              D
         grounds and by ·disregarding extraneous
         considerations.
   (I)   Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a
         component of a decision-making process as
         observing principles of natural justice by judicial,     E
         quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.
   (g)   Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by
         superior courts.
   (h)   The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed    F
         to rule of law and constitutional governance is in
         favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant
         facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial
         decision-making justifying the principle that reason
         is the soul of justice.
                                                                  G
   (1)   Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days
         can be as different as the judges and authorities
         who deliver them. All these decisions serve one
         common purpose which is to demonstrate by
         reason that the relevant factors have been               H
    870         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 12 S.C.R.


A                objectively considered. This is important for
                 sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery
                 system.
          (J)    Insistence on reason is a requirement for both
                 judicial accountability and transparency.
B         (k)    If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid
                 enough about his/her decision-making process
                 then it is impossible to know whether the person
                 deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or
                 to principles of incrementalism.
c         (I)    Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent,
                 clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or
                 "rubber-stamp reasons• is not to be equated with
                 a valid decision-making process.
D         (m)    It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine
                 qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers.
                 Transparency in decision-making not only makes
                 the judges and decision-makers less prone to
                 errors but also makes them subject to broader
E                scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial
                 Candor.)
          (n)    Since the requirement to record reasons emanates
                 from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-
                 making, the said requirement is now virtually a
F                component of human rights and was considered
                 part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija
                 v. Spain EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v.
                 University of Oxford, wherein the Court referred to
                 Article 6 of the European Convention of Human
G                Rights which requires,
                 "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for
                 judicial decisions".
          (o)    In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a
                 vital role in setting up precedents for the future.
H
 MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 871
    MAHARASHTRA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
            Therefore, for development of law, requirement of          A
            giving reasons for the decision is of the essence
            and is virtually a part of 'due process'."
     19. The Court has also taken the view that even if
cancellation of the poll were an administrative act that per se
does not repel the application of the principles of natural justice.   B
The Court further said that classification of functions as judicial
or administrative is a stultifying shibboleth discarded in India
as in England. Today, in our jurisprudence, the advances made
by the natural justice far exceed old frontiers and if judicial
creativity blights penumbra! areas, it is also for improving the       c
quality of Government in injecting fair play into its wheels.
Reference in this regard can be made to Mohinder Singh Gil/
v. Chief Election Commissioner [(1978) 1 SCC 405].
     20. Referring to the requirement of adherence to principles
of natural justice in adjudicatory process, this Court in the case     D
of Namit Sharma v. Union of India [2012 (8) SCALE 593],
held as under:
     "97. It is not only appropriate but is a solemn duty of every
     adjudicatory body, including the tribunals, to state the
     reasons in support of its decisions. Reasoning is the soul        E
     of a judgment and embodies one of the three pillars on
     which the very foundation of natural justice jurisprudence
     rests. It is informative to the claimant of the basis for
     rejection of his claim, as well as provides the grounds for
     challenging the order before the higher authority/                F
     constitutional court. The reasons, therefore, enable the
     authorities, before whom an order is challenged, to test the
     veracity and correctness of the impugned order. In the
     presenttimes, since the fine line of distinction between the
     functioning of the administrative and quasi-judicial bodies       G
     is gradually becoming faint, even the administrative bodies
     are required to pass reasoned orders. In this regard,
     reference can be made to the judgments of this Court in
     the cases of Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co.
                                                                       H
     872       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 12 S.C.R.


A          of India Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr. [(1976) 2 SCC 981];
           and Assistant Commissioner, Commrcia/ Tax
           Department Works Contract and Leasing, Kofa v. Shukla
           & Brothers [(2010) 4 sec 785]."
           21. We may notice that proviso to Section 20(1)
B    specifically contemplates that before imposing the penalty
     contemplated under Section 20(1), the Commission shall give
     a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the concerned
     officer. However, there is no such specific provision in relation
     to the matters covered under Section 20(2). Section 20(2)
.c   empowers the Central or the State Information Commission, as
     the case may be, at the time of deciding a complaint or appeal
     for the reasons stated in that section, to recommend for
     disciplinary action to be taken against the Central Public
     Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as
0    the case may be, under the relevant service rules. Power to
     recommend disciplinary action is a power exercise of which
     may impose penal consequences. When such a
     recommendation is received, the disciplinary authority would
     conduct the disciplinary proceedings in accordance with law
E    and subject to satisfaction of the requirements of law. It is a
     'recommendation' and not a 'mandate' to conduct an enquiry.
     'Recommendation' must be seen in contradistinction to
     'direction' or 'mandate'. But recommendation itself vests the
     delinquent Public Information Officer or State Public Information
     Officer with consequences which are of serious nature and can
F    ultimately produce prejudicial results including misconduct within
     the relevant service rules and invite minor and/or major penalty.
        22. Thus, the principles of natural justice have to be read
  into the provisions of Section 20(2). It is a settled canon of civil
G jurisprudence including service jurisprudence that no person be
  condemned unheard. Directing disciplinary action is an order
  in the form of recommendation which has far reaching civil
  consequences. It will not be permissible to take the view that
  compliance with principles of natural justice is not a condition
H precedent to passing of a recommendation under Section
 MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 873
    MAHARASHTRA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
20(2). In the case of Udit Narain Singh Ma/pharia v.                   A
Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar [AIR 1963 SC
786], the Court stressed upon compliance with the principles
of natural justice in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.
Absence of such specific requirement would invalidate the
order. The Court, reiterating the principles stated in the English     B
Law in the case of King v. Electricity Commissioner, held as
under:
     "The following classic test laid down by Lord Justice Atkin,
     as he then was, in King v. Electricity Commissioners and
     followed by this Court in more than one decision clearly          C
     brings out the meaning of the concept of judicial act:
            "Wherever anybody of persons having legal
            authority to determine questions affecting the rights
            of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act
            in excess of their legal authority they are subject to     D
            the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench
            Division exercised in these writs."
     Lord Justice Slesser in King v. London County Council
     dissected the concept of judicial act laid down by Atkin,
     L.J., into the following heads in his judgment: "Wherever         E
     any body of persons ( 1) having legal authority (2) to
     determine questions affecting rights of subjects and (3)
     having the duty to act judicially (4) act in excess of their
     legal authority - a writ of certiorari may issue." It will be
     seen from the ingredients of judicial act that there must be      F
     a duty to act judicially. A tribunal, therefore, exercising a
     judicial or quasi-judicial act cannot decide against the
     rights of a party without giving him a hearing or an
     opportunity to represent his case in the manner known to
     law. If the provisions of a particular statute or rules made      G
     thereunder do not provide for ii, principles of natural justice
     demand it. Any such order mace without hearing the
     affected parties would be void. As a writ of certiorari will
      be granted to remove the record of proceedings of an
                                                                       H
    874       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 12 S.C.R.


A         inferior tribunal or authority exercising judicial or quasi-
          judicial acts, ex hypothhesi it follows that the High Court
          in exercising its jurisdiction shall also act judicially in
          disposing of the proceedings before it."
        23. Thus, the principle is clear and settled that right of
B hearing, even if not provided under a specific statute, the
  principles of natural justice shall so demand, unless by specific
  law, it is excluded. It is more so when exercise of authority is
  likely to vest the person with consequences of civil nature.
       24. In light of the above principles, now we will examine
C whether there is any violation of principles of natural justice in
  the present case.
         25. Vide letter dated 12th February, 2008, the appellant
   was informed by the Excise Department, Nanded, when he was
D posted at Akola that hearing was fixed for 25th February, 2008.
   He submitted a request for adjournment which, admittedly, was
   received and placed before the office of the State Information .
  Commission. In addition thereto, another officer of the
   Department had appeared, intimated the State Information
  Commission and requested for adjournment, which was
E declined. It was not that the appellant had been avoiding
  appearance before the State Information Commission. It was
  the first date of hearing and in the letter dated 25th February,
  2008, he had given a reasonable cause for his absence before
  the Commission on 25th February, 2008. However, on 26th
F February, 2008, the impugned order was passed. The
  appellant was entitled to a hearing before an order could be
  passed against him under the provisions of Section 20(2) of
  the Act. He was granted no such hearing. The State
  Information Commission not only recommended but directed
G initiation of departmental proceedings against the appellant and
  even asked for the compliance report. If such a harsh order
  was to be passed again.st the appellant, the least that was
  expected of the Commission was to grant him a hearing/
  reasonable opportunity to put forward his case. We are of the
H considered view that the State Information Commission should
 MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 875
    MAHARASHTRA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
have granted an adjournment and heard the appellant before A
passing an order Section under 20(2) of the Act. On that
ground itself, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. It
may be usefully noticed at this stage that the appellant had a
genuine case to explain before the State Information
Commission and to establish that his case did not call for any B
action within the provisions of Section 20(2). Now, we would
deal with the other contention on behalf of the appellant that the
order itself does not satisfy the requirements of Section 20(2)
and, thus, is unsustainable in law. For this purpose, it is
necessary for the Court to analyse the requirement and scope c
of Section 20(2) of the Act. Section 20(2) empowers a Central
Information Commission or the State Information Commission

      (a)   at the time of deciding any complaint or appeal;
     (b)    if it is of the opinion that the Central Public D
            Information Officer or the State Public Information
            Officer, as the case may be, has without any
            reasonable cause and persistently, failed to receive
            an application for information or has not furnished
            information within the time specified under sub- E
            section (1) of Section 7 (i.e. 30 days);
     (c)    malafidely denied the request for information or
            intentionally given incorrect, incomplete or
            misleading information; or
                                                                   F
      (d)   destroyed information which was the subject ofthe
            request or obstructed· in any manner in furnishing
            the information;
      (e)   then it shall recommend for disciplinary action
            against the stated persons under the relevant G
            servicerules.
      26. From the above dissected language of the pro·•ision,
it is clear that first of all an opinion has to be formed by the
Commission. This opinion is to be formed at the time of
                                                                   H
    876       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 12 S.C.R.


A deciding any complaint or appeal after hearing the person
  concerned. The opinion formed has to have basis or reasons
  and must be relatable to any of the defaults of the provision. It
  is a penal provision as it vests the delinquent with civil
  consequences of initiation of and/or even punishment in
B disciplinary proceedings. The grounds stated in the Section
  are exhaustive and it is not for the Commission to add other
  grounds which are not specifically stated in the language of
  Section 20(2). The section deals with two different
  proceedings. Firstly, the appeal or complaint filed before the
c Commission is to be decided and, secondly, ifthe Commission
  forms such opinion, as contemplated under the provisions, then
  it can recommend that disciplinary proceedings be taken
  against the said delinquent Central Public Information Officer
  or State Public Information Officer. The purpose of the
  legislation in requiring both these proceedings to be taken
0
  together is obvious not only from the language of the section
  but even by applying the mischief rule wherein the provision is
  examined from the very purpose for which the provision has
  been enacted. While deciding the complaint or the appeal, if
  the Commission finds that the appeal is without merit or the
E complaint is without substance, the information need not be
  furnished for reasons to be recorded. If such be the decision,
  the question of recommending disciplinary action under Section
  20(2) may not arise. Still, there may be another situation that
  upon perusing the records of the appeal or the complaint, the
F Commission may be of the opinion that none of the defaults
  contemplated under Section 20(2) is satisfied and, therefore,
  no action is called for. To put it simply, the Central or the State
  Commission have no jurisdiction to add to the exhaustive
  grounds of default mentioned in the provisions of Section 20(2).
G The case of default must strictly fall within the specified grounds
  of the provisions of Section 20(2). This provision has to be
  construed and applied strictly. Its ambit cannot be permitted
  to be enlarged at the whims of the Commission.
          27. Now, let us examine if any one or more of the stated
H
 MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 877
    MAHARASHTRA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
grounds under Section 20(2) were satisfied in the present case A
which would justify the recommendation by the Commission of
taking disciplinary action against the appellant. The appellant
had received the application from respondent No.2 requiring
the information sought for on 3rd January, 2007. He had, much
within the period of 30 days (specified under Section 7), sent B
the application to the concerned department requiring them to
furnish the requisite information. The information had not been
received. May be after the expiry of the prescribed period,
another letter was written by the department to respondent No.2
to state the period for which the information was asked for. This C
letter was written on 11th April, 2007. To this letter, respondent
No.2 did not respond at all. In fact, he made no further query
to the office of the designated Public Information Officer as to
the fate of his application and instead preferred an appeal
before the Collector and thereafter appeal before the State
 Information Commission. In the meanwhile, the appellant had D
 been transferred in the Excise Department from Nanded to
Akola. At this stage, we may recapitulate the relevant dates.
 The application was filed on 3rd January, 2007, upon which the
 appellant had acted and vide his letter dated 19th January, 2007
 had forwarded the application for requisite information to the E
concerned department. The appeal was filed by respondent
 no.2 under Section 19(1) of the Act before the Collector,
 Nanded on 1st March, 2007. On 4th March, 2007, the appeal
 was forwarded to the office of the Excise Department. On 4th
 April, 2007, the appellant had been transferred from Nanded F
 to Akola. On 11th April, 2007, other officer from the Department
 had asked respondent no.2 to specify the period for which the
 information was required. If the appellant was given an
 opportunity and had appeared before the Commission, he
 might have been able to explain that there was reasonable G          \
 cause and he had taken all reasonable steps within his power
 to comply with the provisions. The Commission is expected
 to formulate an opinion that must specifically record the finding
 as to which part of Section 20(2) the case falls in. For instance,
                                                                 H
       878       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 12 S.C.R.

    A in relation to failure to receive an application for information or
      failure to furnish the information within the period specified in
      Section 7(1), it should also record the opinion if such default
      was persistent and without reasonable cause.
               28. It appears that the facts have not been correctly noticed
    B and, in any case, not in their entirety by the State Information
        Commission. It had formed an opinion that the appellant was
         negligent and had not performed the duty cast upon him. The
      · Commission noticed that there was 73 days delay in informing
        the applicant and. thus, there was negligence while performing
    C duties. If one examines the provisions of Section 20(2) in their
        entirety then it becomes obvious that every default on the part
        -Of the concerned officer may not result in issuance of a
        recommendation for disciplinary action. The case must fall in
        any of the specified defaults and reasoned finding has to be
    o recorded by the Commission while making such
         recommendations. 'Negligence' per se is not a ground on
         which proceedings under Section 20(2) of the Act can be
        invoked. The Commission must return a finding that such
        negligence, delay or default is persistent and without
    E reasonable cause. In our considered view, the Commission,
         in the present case, has erred in not recording such definite
         finding. The appellant herein had not failed to receive any
        application, had not failed to act within the period of 30 days
         (as he had written a letter calling for information), had not
    F malafidely denied the request for information, had not furnished
         any incorrect or misleading information, had not destroyed any
         information and had not obstructed the furnishing of the
         information. On the contrary, he had taken steps to facilitate
         the providing of information by writing the stated letters. May
         be the letter dated 11th April, 2007 was not written within the
    G period of 30 days requiring respondent No.2 to furnish details
         of the period for which such information was required but the
I        fact remained that such letter was written and respondent No.2
        did not even bother to respond to the said enquiry. He just kept,
         on filing appeal after appeal. After April 4, 2007, the date when
    H
  MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 879
     MAHARASHTRA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
the appellant was transferred to Akola, he was not responsible A
for the acts of omissions and/or commission of the office at
Nanded.
     29. Another aspect of this case which needs to be
examined by the Court is that the appeal itself has not been
decided though it has so been recorded in the impugned order. B
The entire impugned order does not direct furnishing of the
information asked for by respondent No.1. It does not say
whether such information was required to be furnished or not
or whether in the facts of the case, it was required of respondent
No.2 to respond to the letter dated 11th April, 2007 written by C
the Department to him. All these matters were requiring
decision of the Commission before it could recommend the
disciplinary action against the appellant, particularly, in the facts
of the present case.
      30. All the attributable defaults of a Central or State Public D
 Information Officer have to be without any reasonable cause
and persistently. In other words, besides finding that any of the
stated defaults have been committed by such officer, the
Commission has to further record its opinion that such default
in relation to receiving of an application or not furnishing the E
information within the specified time was committed
persistently and without a reasonable cause. Use of such
language by the Legislature clearly shows that the expression
'shall' appearing before 'recommend' has to be read and
constr11ed as 'may'. There could be cases where there is F
reasonable cause shown and the officer is able to demonstrate
that there was no persistent default on his part either in receiving
the application or furnishing the requested information. In such
circumstances, the law does not require recommendation for
disciplinary proceedings to be made. It is not the legislative G
mandate that irrespective of the facts and circumstances of a
given case, whether reasonable cause is shown or not, the
Commission must recommend disciplinary action merely
because the application was not responded to within 30 days.
Every case has to be examined on its own facts. We would H
   880       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 12 S.C.R.


A hasten to add here that wherever reasonable cause is not
  shown to the satisfaction of the Commission and the
  Commission is of the opinion that there is default in terms of
  the Section it must send the recommendation for disciplinary
  action in accordance with law to the concerned authority. In
e such circumstances, it will have no choice but to send
  recommendatory report. The burden of forming an opinion in
  accordance with the provisions of Section 20(2) and principles
  of natural justice lies upon the Commission.
       31. We are of the considered opinion that the appellant
C had shown that the default, if any on his part, was not without
  reasonable cause or result of a persistent default on his part.
  On the contrary, he had taken steps within his power and
  authority to provide information to respondent No.2. It was for
  the department concerned to react and provide the information
o asked for. In the present case, some default itself is attributable
  to respondent No.2 who did not even care to respond to the
  letter of the department dated 11th April, 2007. The cumulative
  effect of the above discussion is that we are unable to sustain
  the order passed by the State Information Commission dated
E 26th February, 2008 and the judgment of the High Court under
  appeal. Both the judgments are set aside and we further direct
  that the disciplinary action, if any, initiated by the department
  against the appellant shall be withdrawn forthwith.
       32. Further, we direct the State Information Commission
F to decide the appeal filed by respondent No.2 before it on
  merits and in accordance with law. It will also be open to the
  Commission to hear the appellant and pass any orders as
  contemplated under Section 20(2), in furtherance to the notice
  issued to the appellant. However, in the facts and
G circumstances of the case, there shall be no orders as to costs.
    B.B.B.                                         Appeal allowed.