MARGRET ALMEIDA & ORS. ETC. ETC.versusTHE BOMBAY CATHOLIC CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. & ORS. ETC. ETC.

                          (2012] 2 S.C.R. 366


A             MARGRET ALMEIDA & ORS. ETC. ETC.
                                    v.
       THE BOMBAY CATHOLIC CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING
               SOCIETY LTD. & ORS. ETC. ETC.
             (Civil Appeal Nos. 1175-1177 of 2012)
B                         JANUARY 30, 2012

         [P. SATHASIVAM AND J. CHELAMESWAR, JJ.]

       · Co-operative Socieites:
c
            Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 - ss. 91
     and 163 - Maintainability of suits - Initiation of proceedings
     for the division of the Co-operative Society by tenant
    members (including appellant) - Meanwhile, resolution
0 passed by General Body of the Society in favour of
    respondents (3rd party) - Dispute arising out of a decision of
     the society to alienate the property of the society - Suits filed
     by appellants and others before the High Court - High Court
    holding the suits not maintainable on the ground that the
E dispute was amenable to the exclusive jurisdiction u/s. 91 to
     the Co-operative Court - Sustainability of - Held: Not
    sustainable - s. 94 (3)(a) does not enable a person other than
     enumerated persons (specified under clauses (a) to (e) to sub
  · section (1) of s. 91) to refer a dispute to Co-operative Court-
     Property in which the 3rd party acquired interest must bear
F some relationship with the dispute pending before the tribunal
    - To hold otherwise would be to enable the Co-operative Court
     to examine questions unconnected with the dispute pending
    before it and wholly unconnected with the. affairs of the Society
    ...,. From the language of the sub section (3)(a}to Section 94
G it is clear that the legislature intended the Co-operative Court
     to deal with only the cases of acquisition of interest in the
    propE~rty during the pendency of the litigation before it - If any.
    party such as the appellants disputes the validity of the title
     conveyed thereunder, necessarily such a dispute would have
H                                  366
  MARGRET ALMEIDA & ORS., ETC. v. BOMBAY CATHOLIC           367
           COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD.

  to be adjudicated by a competent court u/s. 9 CPC wherein,       A
· necessarily, the question whether a valid title was conveyed
  in favour of 3rd party by the society would arise for
  determination - Thus, the ordP.r passed by the High Court set
  aside - Suits are maintainable and are to be tried by the High
  Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction - Code of Civil   B
  Procedure, 1908 - s. 9.

      First respondent is a Housing Co-operative Society.
 The society has different classes of members known as
 owners, lessees, alottees, tenants etc. Some of the tenant
 members including appellants of the Society initiated C
 proceedings for the division of the Society, invoking
 Section 18 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies
 Act, 1960 by making an application to the Registrar.
 Me while, the General Body of the Society passed a
 resolution to sell the said land in favour of respondent D
 Nos. 22 and 23. Thereafter, a sale deed/conveyance was
 executed. The appellants filed two suits seeking
 declarations that a resolution of first respondent Society
 and Conveyance executed on behalf of the first
 respondent Society in favour of respondent Nos. 22 and E
 23 is illegal and void ab initio in the alternative voidable
 against the plaintiffs of whom some are appellants
 (tenant members). The plaintiffs also filed an interlocutory
 application seeking an interim order. The defendants
 raised a preliminary objection regarding the F
 maintainability of the suits in view of Sections 91 and 163
 of the Act. The High Court held that the two suits are not
 maintainable in view of the provisions of Sections 91 and
 163 of the Act. Therefore, the appellants filed the instant
 appeals.                                                     G

      Disposing of the appeals, the Court

      HELD: 1.1. The Civil Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate
 civil disputes is unlimited, subject only to the limitations
 imposed by law either expressly or by necessary                   H
    368      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 2 S.C.R.


A implications. Section 163 of the Maharashtra Co-operative
  Societies Act, 1960 bars the jurisdiction of Civil and
  Revenue Courts. Section 163(1)(b) and Section 91(3) are
  complimentary to each other. Section 163 only excludes
  the jurisdiction of the Civil Court with reference to the
B disputes arising out of the registration. A dispute arising
  out of a decision of the society to alienate the property
  of the society is not expressly covered under Section 163
  of the Act. [Paras 16, 17, 18 and 19] [380-G-H; 382-B-E-F]

         1.2. Section 91 makes it mandatory that certain
C   disputes, the nature of which is specified in the said sub-
    section, be referred to the 'Co-operative Court' as defined
    under Section 2(10-a ii). Such reference is required to be
    made by "any of the parties to the dispute". The Section
    also specifies the nature/subject matter of dispute which
D   is required to be referred to the Co-operative Courts.
    They are "disputes touching" the (1) Constitution of the
    society; (2) Elections of the "Committee or its officers";
    (3) Conduct General Meetings; (4) Management of the
    society or (5) Business of the society. Section 91 also
E   stipul.ates that the disputes which are mandatorily
    required to referred to the Co-operative Court for an
    adjudication must also be disputes arising between the
    parties to the dispute who should belong to one or the
    other categories specified under clauses (a) to (e) to sub-
F   section (1) (enumerated persons). It can be seen from the
    scheme of Section 91, to confer exclusive jurisdiction on
    the Co-operative Court, the dispute must satisfy two
    requirements. Both the subject matter as well as the
    parties to the dispute must be those specified under the
G   Section. If either of the two requirements is not satisfied
    then the dispute cannot be adjudicated by the Co-
    operative Court. If one of the parties to the dispute is not
    an enumerated person, the question whether the subject
    matter of the dispute is one which falls exclusively withln
H   the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court need not be
 MARGRET ALMEIDA & ORS., ETC. v. BOMBAY CATHOLIC        369
          COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY l TD.

examined. Similarly, if it is found in a given case that the   A
subject matter of dispute is not covered by Section 91,
an enquiry into the question whether the parties to the
dispute fall under any of the categories enumerated
under Section 91 would become irrelevant. [Paras 21 and
22] [384-A-F; 385-B-C]                                         B

    Marine Times Publications (P) Ltd. vs. Shriram Transport
&Finance Co. Ltd. (1991) 1 SCC 469: 1990 (2) Suppl. SCR
466 - referred to.

    1.3. When Section 91 (1 )(c) stipulates that persons       C
other than the members of the society with whom the
society has any transaction as one of the classes of
persons who could be parties to a dispute amenable
exclusively to the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court,
such a class is not an unqualified class. The said sub-        D
section further qualifies the said class by expressly
mentioning that the transactions of such persons with a
society should be a transactions "in respect of which
restrictions and Regulations have been made or
prescribed under Sections 43, 44, or 45 of the Act". [Para     E
24] [385-H; 386-A-C]

    1.4. Where Section 91 (1) (c) speaks of persons other
than the members of the society, it is actually referring
to persons other than the members of the society who
have deposited money with the society or who have              F
either lent or borrowed money from the society in
accordance with the provisions of Sections 43 and 44
and subject to the conditions and limitations if any
prescribed with reference to such lending to or borrowing
from the society. [Para 29] [387-G-H; 388-A]                   G

    1.5. Section 94 (1) enumerates the powers of the
Cooperative Court. The substance of sub-section (3)(a)
is that if the Co-operative Court in the course of
adjudication of a dispute is satisfied that any person         H
   370      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2012] 2 S.C.R.


A other than a party to the dispute "has acquired any
  interest in the property of a party to a dispute", then the
  Co-operative Court is empowered to implead such a 3rd
  party as a party to the dispute. Such a 3rd party may or
  may •not even be a member of the society. The sub-
B section further declares such an impleaded 3rd party to
  be bound by the decision of the Co-operative Court.
  [Para 30] [388-8-F-G]

       1.6. The submission that the scheme and language
  of Section 94(3)(a) makes it beyond doubt that the Co-
e operative Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute is
  not ponfined only to the disputes between the various
  classes of persons enumerated under Section 91 alone
  but extends to others also if such a 3rd party (even in a
  case where he happen to be a non-member) acquires
D some interest in the property of either the society or the
  members 9r any other person enumerated in Section 91
  cannot be accepted. If really the legislature intended that
  the Co-operative Court should have jurisdiction in all the
  disputes irrespective of the nature of the dispute arising
E between the various classes of persons enumerated in
  Section 91 and non-member 3rd parties who acquire any
  interest in the property of such enumerated persons, the
  Legislature could have clearly indicated the same in
  Section 91 itself. Section 94(3)(a) does not enable a
F person other than an enumerated person to refer a
  dispute to the Co-operative Court. [Para 32] [389-C-D]

      Marine Times Publications (P} Ltd. vs. Shriram Transport
  & Finance Co. Ltd. (1991) 1 SCC 469: 1990 (2) Suppl. SCR
G 466 - referred to.
       1.7. Accepting the submission would lead to a
  situation that while on one hand it is the settled position
  of law that the Act does not permit a person other than
  the one enumerated under Section 91 to seek
H adjudication of his dispute with 'enumerated persons' in
 MARGRET ALMEIDA & ORS., ETC. v. BOMBAY CATHOLIC       371
          COOP HOUSING SOCIETY LTD.

a Co-operative Court, such a Court would be authorised        A
by virtue of Section 94(3)(a) to adjudicate a dispute
between an enumerated person and a non-member 3rd
party, if raised by an enumerated person. On the other
hand, from the language of the said sub-section, it
appears that the only circumstance which enables the          8
Co-operative Court to exercise its jurisdiction against
such a 3rd party is that while adjudicating a dispute which
is otherwise amenable to its jurisdiction, the Co-operative
Court reaches the conclusion that a 3rd party acquired
some interest in the property of one of the parties to the    C
dispute. [Para 33] [389-G-H; 390-A-B]

     1.8. As regards the question whether the property
referred to in the sub-section is any property of one of
the parties to the dispute or should such property bear
any relationship to the dispute, the property in which the    D
3rd party acquired interest must bear some relationship
with the dispute pending before the tribunal. To hold
otherwise would be to enable the Co-operative Court to
examine questions unconnected with the dispute
pending before it and wholly unconnected with the affairs     E
of the Society. An illogical result to be normally avoided
unless compelled by the express language of the Act.
[Para 34] [390-A-B; D-E]

      1.9. As regards the second question whether the
                                                              F
acquisition of the interest referred to should be anterior
to the reference of the dispute to the Co-operative Court
or on acquisition made during the pendency of the
litigation, having regard to the language of Section 94,
sub-section (3)(a), more specifically "has acquired any
interest", the acquisition of the interest contemplated is    G
only an acquisition made during the pendency of the
dispute before the Co-operative Court. For the reason that
such an acquisition of interest is qualified by the words,
"in the property of a person who is a party to the
                                                              H
   372      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 2 S.C.R.


A dispute", it is held so for another reason also. [Paras 35
  & 36] [390-F-H; 391-A]
        1.10. To hold otherwise would lead to a situation
  where a dispute between an enumerated person and a
  3rd party would become amenable to the jurisdiction of
B the Co-operative Court at the instance of the persons
  enumerated under Section 91 but not at the instance of
  a 3rd party. An absurd situation, ex facie violative of
  Article 14, in as much as such a construction would lead
  to a situation that with reference to a dispute, the affected
C parties are compelled to approach different fora for the
  adjudicatio11 of the same dispute depending upon the
  fact which party is seeking a relief. Such a construction,
  being inconsistent with a constitutional mandate, is
  impermissible. [Para 37] [391-B-D]
D
        1.11. For coming to the conclusion that the suits in
  question are not maintainable and the dispute could be
  examined exclusively by the Co-operative Court, the High
  Court proceeded on the basis that it is possible to
  challenge the resolution and the conveyance
E independently. Starting from such a premise, the High
  Court opined that challenge alone to the resolution
  without challenging the conveyance is possible but not
  vice-versa. It is presumed that it is possible for the
  plaintiffs, appellants to challenge only the general body
F resolution; that the conclusion arrived at by the High
  Court that if the general body resolution is set aside, the
  same would impair the validity of the conveyance even
  without an appropriate declaration by a competent
  judicial body. If the resolution alone is challenged before
G the Co-operative Court, the respondents 22 and 23 (the
  beneficiaries of the resolution) could not be made parties
  before the Co-operative Court. !n such a situation, even
  if the Co-operative Court came to the conclusion that the
  resolution is illegal, it would always be open for the
H respondents 22 and 23 to ignore such a determination as
 MARGRET ALMEIDA & ORS., ETC. v. BOMBAY CATHOLIC     373
          COOP HOUSING SOCIETY LTD.

they are not parties to the proceedings and assert their A
title on the basis of the conveyance. If any party such as
the plaintiffs (the appellants) disputes the validity of the
title conveyed thereunder, necessarily such a dispute
would have to be adjudicated by a competent Court under
Section S of the Code of Civil Procedure wherein, B
necessarily, the question whether a valid title was
conveyed in favour of respondents 22 and 23 by the
society would arise for determination. The legality of the
resolution would still have to be gone into again.
Therefore, the premise in which the High Court c
commenced its enquiry itself is wrong. [Para 38] [3S1-F;
3S2-C-H]

    1.12. The conclusion of the High Court that the suits
in question are not maintainable on the ground that the .
dispute is amenable to the exclusive jurisdiction under D
Section S1 of the Act to the Co-operative Court cannot
be sustained and is set aside. [Para 3S] [393-A-B]

     1.13. As regards the question whether the High Court
was right in going into the maintainability of the suits, it E
was submitted that in view of the provisions contained
in Section SA of the Code of Civil Procedure which was
introduced by local amendment of the Maharashtra
Legislature to the Code by Maharashtra Act No.65of1S77,
the course of action followed by the High Court is not F
only justified. but also the court is obliged to follow such
a course of action. The language of Section SA is self-
explanatory. The submission is accepted. [Para 40] [3S3-
C-D; 3S4-B]

     1.14. As regards the interim order, the suits are G
maintainable and having regard to the fact that the suits
are to be tried by the High Court in exercise of its original
jurisdiction, no interim order is passed and it is left open
to the High Court to consider the applications filed by the
plaintiffs for interim orders in accordance with law and H
    374       SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 2 S.C.R.


A pass appropriate orders. The principles governing the
  · grant of interim orders are well settled. However, on the
    question of the existence of a prima facie case in favour
    of the plaintiffs, the following factors are germane and
    require to be examined. Having regard to the content of
B the plaint, the nature of the legal right, the plaintiffs claim
    for seeking the relief such as the one sought in the suits
    necessarily depends upon the byelaws of the Society, the
    rights and obligations of the various classes of its
    members with respect to the property in dispute. The
c High Court may examine the said aspects before passing
    an appropriate interim order. All the parties are directed
    to maintain status quo to enable the High Court to
    examine the applications of the plaintiffs for interim
    orders and pass appropriate orders in accordance with
D law. [Paras 41 and 42) (394-C-G]
                         Case Law Reference:
          1990 (2) Suppl. SCR 466      Referred to      Para 22

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
E   1175-1176 of 2012.

         From the Judgment & Order dated 29.8.2011 of the High
    Court of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal Nos. 413, 489, 573
    of 2011 in Notice of Motion No. 172 of 2010 in Suit No. 144 of
F   2010.

                                WITH
          C.A. Nos. 1178 & 1179-1180 of 2012.

G       H.N. Salve, Mukul Rohtagi, Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Jaibeer
    Shergill, Shally Bhasin Maheshwari for the Appellants.
        K.K. Venugopal, L.N. Rao, Shyam Dewan, C.A. Sundaram,
    Abhinav Vashist, Chetan Kapadia, Vatsal Merchant, Pratap
    Venugopal, Purushottham Kumar Jha, Gaurav Nair, Namrata
H
 MARGRET ALMEIDA & ORS., ETC. v. BOMBAY CATHOLIC 375
          COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD.             .

Soud, Prerna Kumari, Sumer Associates & Robin, K.J. John             A
& Co, P.S. Sudheer, Rishi Maheshwari, C.D. Mehta, Vineet B.
Nair, Nikhil Nayyar, TVS Raghavendra, Sreyas, P. Srikumar,
Lalan Gupta, J.P. Sen Savitri Daditch, Garima, Prasahad, E.C.
Agrawala for the Respondent.
                                                                     B
    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    CHELAMESWAR, J. 1. Leave granted.

    2. These appeals arise out of a common order dated 29th
August, 2011 of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court          c
passed in three writ petitions and two suits, 144 and 145 of
2010.

     3. By the said common order, it was held, among other
things, that the two suits are not maintainable in view of the
                                                                     D
provisions of Sections 91 and 163 of the Maharashtra Co-
operative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter 'the Act', for short).
We are not concerned with the remaining part of the Division
Bench's judgment as the instant special leave petitions are
preferred only against that part of the Division Bench's
judgment. The brief factual background of this litigation is as      E
follows.

     4. The first respondent is a Society which was originally
incorporated in the year 1914. The full particulars of such
incorporation are not available at this juncture on record and       F
are also not necessary for the present purpose. It is sufficient
to state that it is admitted on all hands that it is a housing
cooperative society and the Act governs the affairs of the said
Society.
                                                                     G
     5. It is also an admitted fact on all hands that the said
Society has different classes of members known as owners,
lessees, allottees, tenants, etc. It is also an admitted fact that
the total membership is 762 out of which 69 members fall under
the classification of tenant members. However, the exact rights
and obligations of these various classes of members, vis-a-vis       H
    376       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 2 S.C.R.


A the first respondent Society or these various classes of
  members inter se are also not available on record.

       6. It appears from the record that, as on today, the first
  respondent Society owns an extent of approximately 21,774.10
B sq. mts. of land in the city of Mumbai alongwith structures
  popularly known as Wellingdon Catholic Colony. It appears that
  the said property was part of a larger parcel of land earlier
  owned by the first respondent Society but is not owned by the
  Society now. Some of the 'tenant members' (including the
  appellants herein) of the Society initiated proceedings for the
C division of the Society sometime in the year 1970 invoking
  Section 18 of the Act by making an application to the Registrar.
  The said application has a very long and chequered history, the
  details of which are not necessary for the present purpose
  except to state that by virtue of the judgment under appeal, the
D application is still open and pending.

       7. In the meanwhile, in a resolution came to be passed on
  the 6th December, 2009 by the General Body of the Society
  to sell the above mentioned land in favour of respondents
E No.22 and 23. In furtherance of the said resolution, a sale deed/
  conveyance came to be executed on 7th December, 2009.
  Aggrieved by the said resolution and the sale, two suits 144
  and 145/2010 came to be filed invoking the original jurisdiction
  of the Bombay High Court. A copy of the plaint in the suit
F No.145/2010 is placed on record in these SLPs. The principal
  prayer in both the civil suits is

         "(a) for a declaration that the said Resolution dated 6th
         December, 2009 (Exhibit 'K' hereto) and the said
         Conveyance dated 7th December, 2009 (Exhibit 'M'
G        hereto) are invalid, illegal and void ab initio and/or the
       · samE. are voidable as against the Plaintiffs and the Tenant
         members of Defendant No.17 Association;

          (a-i) That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to pass Order
H         declaring Section 164 of Maharashtra Co-operative
 MARGRET ALMEIDA & ORS., ETC. v. BOMBAY CATHOLIC              377
 COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]

     Societies Act, 12 Violation of Article 14 of the Constitution   A
     of India and the same ought to be struck down."

      It can be seen from prayer (a) extracted above that the
plaintiffs seek in effect two declarations - (i) that a resolution
dated 6th November, 2009 of the first respondent Society, and
                                                                      8
(ii) a Conveyance dated 7th December, 2009 executed on
behalf of the first respondent Society in favour of respondents
22 and 23, are either illegal, void ab initio or in the alternative
that they are voidable as against the plaintiffs (of whom at least
some) are the appellants herein and claim to be the tenant C
members of the respondent society (we may state here that
there is a dispute regarding the membership of some of the
appellants herein but, for the present case, we do not go into
the dispute but refer the appellants, only for the sake of
convenience, as 'tenant members'). The substance of the
factual and legal basis (asserted in the plaint) on which the D
plaintiffs seek the two declarations (referred to earlier) in the
civil suits, and argued at the Bar is that the 'tenant members'
alone have the right, title and interest over the property sought
to be sold by the impugned conveyance dated 7th December,
2009 and that the other members of the Society have no right, E
title or interest in the property in dispute. The plaintiffs expect
an order of bifurcation of the respondent No.1 Society and also
to get a declaration in their favour of the right, title and interest
in the property in dispute. The plaintiffs also therefore claimed
appropriate interim orders regarding the property during the F
pendency of the suits.

     8. The defendants raised a preliminary objection regarding
the maintainability of the suits in view of Sections 91 and 163
of the Act which was rejected by a learned single judge but          G
found favour with the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court
resulting in that part of the judgment which is under appeal now.

     9. By the judgment under appeal it is held that:

     "In our opinion, therefore, what is principally challenged in   H
    378       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2012] 2 S.C.R.

          the Civil Suit is the resolution of the general body. And
          challenge to the conveyance is ancillary"

    And therefore opined:

          "That the Plaintiffs could have filed the dispute before the
B         Co-operative Court challenging the resolution of the
          General Body and the consequent execution of
          conveyance in favour of M/s. Sumer associates and could
          have joined M/s. Sumer associates as a Defendant in that
          dispute. In our opinion thus the entire subject matter of the
c         Civil Suit could have been the subject matter of the dispute
          filed under Section 91."

          10. Shri Mukul Rohtagi and Dr. Abhishek M. Singhvi,
    learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants argued that
D   irrespective of the fact whether a declaration regarding illegality
    of the impugned resolution dated 6th December, 2009 could
    be granted by the ordinary civil courts in view of Section 91 of
    the Act, a declaration regarding the voidness of the impugned
    conveyance dated 7th December, 2009 could only be given by
E   a competent civil court contemplated under Section 9 of the
    Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter 'the Code' for short)
    because such conveyance is in favour of a person who is not
    a member of the Society. It is submitted that the ultimate dispute
    and grievance of the plaintiffs is against the alienation of the
    property in favour of the respondents 22 and 23 herein by the
F   impugned conveyance which has the effect of depriving the
    plaintiffs of their right, title and interest in the property in dispute.
    Such a conveyance could only be declared illegal and void ab
    initio by a competent civil court contemplated under Section 9 ·
    of the Code. The impugned resolution, which purportedly
G   authorises the sale of the property covered by the impugned
    conveyance, by itself does not transfer or create any interest
    in the property adverse to the interest of the plaintiffs. Therefore,
    even if it is assumed that the legality of the impugned resolution
    is amenable to the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court
H
  MARGRET ALMEIDA & ORS:, ETC. v. BOMBAY CATHOLIC             379
  COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]

 functioning under Section 91, the suits in question could not        A
 have been held to be not maintainable as the jurisdiction to
·adjudicate upon the incidental question regarding the impugned
 resolution dated 6th December, 2009 would stand subsumed
 by the jurisdiction of the competent civil court which alone is
 competent to decide the legality of the impugned conveyance          B
 dated 7th December, 2009. The learned counsel further argued
 that the ouster of the jurisdiction conferred on the Civil Courts
 under Section 9 of the Code is to be conceded only where there
 is an express exclusion by the language of the Statute or if such
 an ouster arises by a necessary implication from the Scheme          c
 of a particular Statute. It is argued that there is nothing either
 in the language of Section 91 or the Scheme of the Act which
 would lead to a conclusion that the jurisdiction conferred under
  Section 9 of the Code is excluded to adjudicate the suits in
 question.                                                            D

     11. On the question of interim order during the pendency
of the suits, the learned counsel argued that in view pl the
pendency of the claim of the plaintiff for the bifurcation of the
respondent society (and according to the appellants, they have
a very strong case), the disputed property must be preserved E
as it is and the balance of convenience is in favour of the ·
appellants. The learned counsel argued that the High Court
grossly erred in examining the maintainability of the suits in the
interlocutory application filed by the plaintiff seeking interim
o~e~                                                               F

      12. On the other hand, lea.med senior counsel Shri C.A.
 Sundaram appearing for the respondents argued that the
 language of Section 91, sub-section 1(c) of the Act clearly
 indicates that the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court            G
 contemplated under Section 91 is not confined only to the
 adjudication of the disputes between the society and its
 members or servants etc. enumerated in Section 91 (1 )(a), (b),
 (d) and (e) but also extends to the disputes where one of the
                                                                      H
    380       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 2 S.C.R.


A parties to the dispute is a person other than a member of the
  society.

          13. According to the learned counsel, such conclusion is
    irresistible from the language of Section 91 (1) (c) and Section
    94 (3) (a). Hence, the judgment under appeal does not call for
8
    any interference.

        14. Shri K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel submitted
  that the course adopted by the Bombay High Court in examining
  the maintainability of the suits in the Interlocutory Application
C filed by the plaintiffs is not only justified but also mandatory in
  view of the language of Section 9A of the Civil P~ocedure Code
  inserted by the State Legislation of Maharashtra.

        15. On the question of interim arrangement to be made
0 during   the pendency of the suit, learned counsel for the
  respondent submitted that the suit itself is based on the
  expectancy that the tenant Members would succeed in their
  application for the bifurcation of the society, and upon
  bifurcation, the tenant members would be entitled for the
E exclusive title and possession of the disputed property. Even
  if the above mentioned understanding of the plaintiffs is right
  since the plaintiffs are only some of the tenant members of the
  society, they would not be entitled for the title and possession
  of the entire disputed property, but only a part of it. It is argued
  that since other tenant members have no objection to the
F alienation of the property in dispute in favour of the respondent
  no. 22 and 23, impeding of conveyance dated 7th December,
  2009 would not be justified as the impugned resolution and the
  conveyance have made adequate provisions for safeguarding
  the interest (if any) of the appellants.
G
       16. We shall now examine the issue of maintainability of
  the suits. As rightly contended by the learned couns~I for the
  appellants the Civil Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate Civil
  disputes is unlimited, subject only to the limitations imposed by
H law either expressly or by necessary implications. The law in
 MARGRET ALMEIDA & ORS., ETC. v. BOMBAY CATHOLIC               381
 COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. [J. CHE:LAMESWAR. J.]
this regard is well settled and needs no elaboration. Therefore,       A
it becomes necessary for us to examine whether there is
anything in the language of Section 91 or Section 163 which
expressly excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in the
context of the suits in question. Section 163 of the Act bars the
jurisdiction of Civil and Revenue Courts reads as follows:             B

     "163. Bar of jurisdiction of Courts.

     (1) Save as expressly provided in this Act, no Civil or
     Revenue Court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of
                                                                       c
             (a) the registration of a society or its by-laws or the
           . amendments of its by-laws or the dissolution of the
             committee of a society, or the management of the
             society on dissolution thereof: or

            (b) any dispute required to be referred to the Co-         D
            operative Court for decision.

            (c) any matter concerned with the winding up and
            dissolution of a society.
                                                                       E
     (2) while a society is being wound up, no suit or other legal
     proceeding relating to the business of such society shall
     be proceeded with or instituted against the society or any
     member thereof, or any matter touching the affairs of the
     society, except by the leave of the Registrar, and subject
                                                                       F
     to such terms as he may impose.

     (3) all orders, decisions or awards passed in accordance
     with the Act or the Rules shall, subject to the provisions for
     appeal or revision in this Act be final; and no such order,
     decision or award shall be liable to be challenged, set           G
     aside, modified, revised or declared void in any Court
     upon the merits or upon any other ground whatsoever."

   17. Section 163 (1)(b) and Section 91 (3) are
complimentary to each other. Section 91 (3) reads as follows:          H
    382       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 2 S.C.R.

A         "Save as otherwise provided under "sub-section (2) to
          section 93, no Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any
          suit or other proceedings in respect of any dispute referred
          to in sub-section (1 )"

          18. It can be seen that the Section 163 only excludes the
8
    jurisdiction of the Civil Court with reference to the disputes
    arising out of the registration:-

          (1) Registration of the society;

c         (2) Disputes relating to the bye-laws of the society;

          (3) Dissolution of the Committee of the society;

          (4) Management of the society on dissolution of the
          society;
D
          (5) Any disputes which is required to be referred to the Co-
          operative Court under Section 91.;

          (6) Any matter concerned with the winding up and
          dissolution of the society etc.
E
       19. A dispute arising out of a decision of the society to
  alienate the property of the society, in our opinion, is not
  expressly covered under Section 163 of the Act. It is to be
  examined whether it is a matter which is required to be
F resolved by the Co-operative Court by virtue of the provisions
  under Section 91 of the Act. In view of the conclusion of the High
  Court that "the entire subject matter of the civil suit could have
  been the subject matter of dispute filed under Section 91."

G       20. It is necessary to examine the scope of Section 91 (1 ),
    which reads as follows

          "(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law
          for the time being in force any dispute touching the
          Constitution, (Election of Committee or its Officers) other
H         than the elections of the committees of the specified
MARGRET ALMEIDA & ORS., ETC. v. BOMBAY CATHOLIC            383
COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.)

  societies including its officers), Conduct of general            A
  meetings, management or business or a society shall be
  referred by any of the parties to the disputes, or by federal
  society to which the society is affiliated or by a creditor of
  the society, ( in the Co-operative Court) If both the parties
  there·to are one or other of the following;-                     B

   (a)    a society, its committee, any past committee, any
          past or present officer, any past or present agent,
          any past and present servant or nominee, heir or
          legal representative of any deceased officer,            c
          deceased agent or deceased.servant of the society
          or the liquidator of the society (or the official
          Assignee of a De-Registered Society),

   (b)    a member, past member of a person claiming
          through a member, past member of a deceased              D
          member of society, or a society which is a member
          of the society ( or a persons who claims to be a
          member of the society;)

    (c)   a person other than a member of the society, with        E
          whom the society has any transactions in respect
          of which any restrictions or regulations have been
          imposed, made or prescribed under sections 43,44
          or 45 and any person claiming through ~uch
          person:                                                  F

   (d)    a surety of a member, past member or deceased
          member, or surety of a person other than a
          member with whom the society has any
          transactions in respect of which restrictions have
          been prescribed under section 45, whether such           G
          surety or person is or is not a member of the
          society:

   (e)     any other society , or the Liquidator of such a
          society or de-registered society or the official         H
    384          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2012] 2 S.C.R.


A                 Assignee of such a de-registered society."

       21. It can be seen from the above extract that the Section
  makes it mandatory that certain disputes, the nature of which
  is specified in the said sub-section, be referred to the 'Co-
B operative Court•· - as defined under Section 2(10-a ii). Such
  reference is required to be made by "any of the parties to the
  dispute". The Section also specifies the nature/subject matter
  of dispute which is required to be referred to the Co-operative
  Courts. They are "disputes touching" the

C          (1)    Constitution of th_e society

           (2)    Elections of the "Committee or its officers"

           (3)    Conduct General Meetings

D          (4)    Management of the society or

           (5)    Business of the society.

       22. Section 91 also stipulates that the disputes which are
E mandatorily required to referred to the Co-operative Court for
  an adjudication must also be disputes arising between the
  parties to the dispute who should belong to one or the other
  categories specified under clauses (a) to (e) to sub-section (1),
  hereinafter referred to as 'enumerated persons', for the sake
  of convenience. It can be seen from the scheme of Section 91,
F to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Co-operative Court, the
  dispute must satisfy two requirements. It was held so in Marine
  Times Publications (P) Ltd. Vs. Shriram Transport & Finance
  Co. Ltd., (1991) 1 SCC 469 at para 11:
G         "11. Before a dispute can be referred to a Cooperative
          Court under the provisions of Section 91 (1) of the said Act
          it is not only essential that the dispute should be of a kind
          described in sub-section (1) of Section 91 but it is also
    *   'Co-operative Court' means a court constituted under this Act to decide
H       disputes referred to it under any of the provisions of the Act.
 MARGRET ALMEIDA & ORS., ETC. v. BOMBAY CATHOLIC              385
  COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]

     essential that the parties to the said dispute must belong       A
     to any of the categories specified in clauses (a) to (e) of
     sub-section (1) of the said section.'' .

Both the subject matter as well as the parties to the dispute must
be those specified under the section. In other words if either of
                                                                      8
the above mentioned two requirements is not satisfied then the
dispute cannot be adjudicated by the Co-operative Court. If one
of the parties to the dispute is not an enumerated person, the
question whether the subject matter of the dispute is one which
falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court   C
need not be examined. Similarly, if it is found in a given case
that the subject matter of dispute is not covered by Section 91,
an enquiry into the question whether the parties to the dispute
fall under any of the categories enumerated under Section 91
would become irrelevant.
                                                                      D
     23. However, learned counsel for the respondent argued
that in view of the language of Section 91(1) (c) and Section
94(3) the various classes of persons contemplated under
Section 91 to bring the dispute within the jurisdiction of the Co-
operative Court (if the subject matter of the dispute is otherwise    E
exclusively amenable to the jurisdiction of the Co-operative
Court), includes persons other than the members of the society
though not covered by clauses (a), (b), (d) and (e) of Section
91(1). The leaned counsel laid emphasis on the clause
"persons other than a member of the society" occurring under          F
Section 91(1) (c) and the clause "whether he be a member of
the society or not has acquired any interest in the property of a
person who is a party to a dispute" occurring under Section
94(3)(a) clearly demonstrate that the jurisdiction of the Co-
operative Court is not confined only to those cases where both        G
the parties are either members or officers etc. specified in
clauses (a), (b), (d) and (e) of Section 91 (1 ).

    24. To examine the correctness of the submissions made
by Shri C.A. Sundaram, it requires an analysis of Section
91(1)(c) and 94 (3). When Section 91(1)(c) stipulates that            H
    386       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 2 S.C.R.


A persons other than the members of the society with whom the
  society has any transaction as one of the classes of persons
  who could be parties to a dispute amenable exclusively to the
  jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court, such a class is not an
  unqualified c!ass. The said sub-section further qualifies the said ,
B class by expressly mentioning that the transactions of such
  persons with a society should be a transactions "in respect of
  which restrictions and Regulations have been made or
  prescribed under Sections 43, 44, or 45 of the Act". Therefore,
  to understand the exact nature of the above mentioned class,
c an examination of the scheme of Sections 43, 44 is necessary.
          25. Section 43 (1) reads as follows:

         "43. (1) A society shall receive Cleposits and loans from
       · members and other persons, only to such extent, and
D        under such conditions, as may be prescribed, or specified
         by the by-laws of the society."

  The said provision recognises the legal authority of a co-
  operative society to receive deposits and loans either from the
E members or other persons. It further stipulates that the receipt
  of deposits and loans is permissible only to the extent and
  subject lo such conditions as may be prescribed.

      26. Section 44 on the other hand deals with the legal
  authority of the co-operative society to make a loan/lend
F money. Section 44 in so far as it is relevant reads as follows.

          "44.(1) No society shall make a loan to any person other
          than a member or on the security of its own shares, or on.
          the security of any person who is not a member.
G          Provided that with the special sanction of the Registrar,
          a society may make loans to another society.

           (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing
          sub-section, a society may make a loan to a depositor on
H
   MARGRET ALMEIDA & ORS., ETC. v. BOMBAY CATHOLIC 387
   COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]

      the security of his deposit.                                   A

            (3) ***************************"

 It can be seen from sub-section (1) that it prohibits a society
 from lending money to a person other than a member. It also
 prohibits lending of money by the society even to a member B
 on the security of the shares of the same society. Further it also
 prohibits lending of money to a member on security to a person
 who is not a member. However, the proviso to sub-section (1)
 authorises a society to lend money to any other society with the
 special sanction of the Registrar.                                 . C

       27. Sub-section (2) expressly authorises the society to lend
  money to a depositor on the security of his deposits. Such an
  authorisation is declared to be notwithstanding anything
  contained in sub-section. (1). In other words, the restriction
                                                                    0
  contained in sub-section (1) that a society shall not lend money
  to a person other than a member is relaxed with reference to a
  depositor, who is not a member of the society, as we have
  already noticed under Section 43 that the deposits or loans can
. be received by a society not only from its members but also E
  from persons other than members.

     · 28. Section 45 makes a general declaration that the
 transactions of the society with persons other than its members
 shall be subject to such restrictions as may be prescribed.
 Section 45 reads as follows:-                                   F

      "45. Save as is provided in this Act, the transactions of a
      society with persons other than members shall be subject
      to such restrictions, if any, as may be prescribed."

     29. Therefore, where Section 91 (1) (c) speaks of persons G
 other than the members of the society, it is actually referring to
 persons other than the members of the society who have
 deposited money with the society or who have either lent or
 borrowed money from the society in accordance with the
 provisions of Sections 43 and 44 and subject to the conditions H
     388         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 2 S.C.R.


l\   and limitations if any prescribed with reference to such lending
     to or borrowing from the society.

          30. Coming to the language and Scheme of Section 94(3).
     Section 94(1) enumerates the powers of the Cooperative Court
     such as the power of summoning the witness and documents
8
     etc. Sub-section (3)(a) reads as follows:

           94. Procedure for settlement of disputes and power of Co-
           operative Court                       ·

c          xxx   )()()(                xxx                xxx
           (3)(a) If the Co-operative Court is satisfied that a person
           whether he be a member of the society or not has
           acquired any interest in the property of a person who is
           a party to a dispute it may order that the person who has
D          acquired the interest in the property may join as a party to
           the dispute; and any decision that may be passed on the
           reference by the Co-operative Court shall be binding on .
           the party so joined in the same manner as if he were an
           original party to the dispute."
E
                                                 [emphasis supplied]

     The substance of sub-section (3)(a) is that if the Co-operative
     Court in the course of adjudication of a dispute is satisfied that
F    any person other than a party to the dispute "has acquired any
     interest in the property of a party to a dispute", then the Co-
     operative Court is empowered to implead such a 3rd party as
     a party to the dispute. Such a 3rd party may or may not even
     be a member of the society. The sub-section further declares
     such an impleaded 3rd party to be bound by the decision of
G    the Co-operative Court.

          31. It is argued by Shri C.A. Sundaram, learned senior
     counsel for the respondents that the scheme and language of
     Section 94(3)(a) makes it beyond doubt that the Co-operative
H    Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute is not confined only
 MARGRET ALMEIDA & ORS., ETC. v. BOMBAY CATHOLIC               389
 COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
to the disputes between the various classes of persons                A
enumerated under Section 91 alone but extends to others also
if such a 3rd party (even in a case where he happen to be a
non-member) acquires some interest in the property of either
the society or the members or any other person enumerated
in Section 91.                                                        B

     32. We find it difficult to accept the submissions of Shri
Sundaram for the reason if really the Legislature intended that
the Co-operative Court should have jurisdiction in all the
disputes irrespective of the nature of the dispute arising            C
between the various classes of persons enumerated in Section
91 and non-member 3rd parties who acquire any interest in the
property of such enumerated persons, the Legislature could
have clearly indicated the same in Section 91 itself. It must be
remembered that Section 94(3)(a) does not enable a person
other than an enumerated person to refer a dispute to the Co-         D
operative Court. The said legal position is made clear in Marine
Times (supra). It was a case where a member of a housing
society occupying a part of the building owned by the society
agreed to sell that property to a 3rd party subject to the approval
of the society. The society declined approval. The 3rd party          E
raised a dispute against the society as well as the member
before the Co-operative Court. Dealing with the question
whether the Co-operative Court would have jurisdiction to             ,
adjudicate the dispute, this Court answered the question in
the negative.                                                         F

     33. Accepting the submission of Shri Sundaram would lead
to a situation that while on one hand it is the settled position of
law that the Act does not permit a person other than the one
enumerated under Section 91 to seek adjudication of his               G
dispute with 'enumerated persons' in a Co-operative Court,
such a Court would be authorised by virtue of Section 94(3)(a)
to adjudicate a dispute between an enumerated person and a
non-member 3rd party, if raised by an enumerated person. On
the other hand, from the language of the said sub-section, it         H
appears that the only circumstance which enables the Co-
   390       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012) 2 S.C.R.

A operative Court to exercise its jurisdiction against such a 3rd
  party is that while adjudicating a dispute which is otherwise
  amenable to its jurisdiction, the Co-operative Court reaches the
  conclusion that a 3rd party acquired some interest in the
  property of one of the parties to the dispute. Necessarily the
B following two questions must be examined to understand the
  exact scope of the said sub-section. (1) Whether the property
  referred to in the sub-section is any property of one of the
  parties to the dispute or should such property bear any
  relationship to the dispute? (2) Whether the acquisition of the
c dispute referred
  interest          to should be anterior to the reference of the
           to the Co-operative Court or on acquisition made
  during the pendency of the litigation?

        34. The answer to the first question to our mind is plain.
  The property in which the 3rd party acquired interest must bear
D some relationship with the dispute pending before the tribunal.
  To .hold otherwise would be to enable the Co-operative Court
  to examine questions unconnected with the dispute pending
  before it and wholly unconnected with the affairs of the Society.
  An illogical result to be normally avoided unless compelled by
E the express language of the Act.

        35. Coming to the second question, learned counsel for
  the appellant argued that the intention of the Legislature is to
  be gathered from the language of the sub-section (3)(a) and
F the employment of the present perfect tense (has acquired any
  interest) must only lead to a conclusion that the Legislature
  intended the Co-operative Court to deal with only the cases of
  acquisition of interest in the property during the pendency of
  the litigation before it. On the 'other hand, Shri Sundaram argued
G that there is no warrant for such an inference in the language
  of sub-section. (3)(a).
      36. We are of the opinion that having regard to the·
  language of Section 94, sub-section (3)(a), more specifically
  "has acquired any interest", the acquisition of the interest
H contemplated is only an acquisition made during the pendency
 MARGRET ALMEIDA & ORS., ETC. v. BOMBAY CATHOLIC             391
 COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]

of the dispute before the Co-operative Court. For the reason         A
that such an acquisition of interest is qualified by the words,
"in the property of a person who is a party to the dispute", we
hold so for another reason also.

     37. To hold otherwise, would lead to a situation where a
                                                                     B
dispute between an enumerated person and a 3rd party would
become amenable to the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court
at the instance of the persons enumerated under Section 91
but not at the instance of a 3rd party in view of the judgment of
this Court in (1991) 1 SCC 469. An absurd situation, ex facie
violative of Article 14, in as much as such a construction would     C
lead to a situation that with reference to a dispute, the affected
parties are compelled to approach different fora for the
adjudication of the same dispute depending upon the fact
which party is seeking a relief. Such a construction, being
inconsistent with a constitutional mandate, is impermissible.        D

     38. For coming to the conclusion that the suits in question
are not maintainable and the dispute could be examined
exclusively by the Co-operative Court, the High Court
proceeded on the basis that it is possible to challenge the          E
resolution and the conveyance independently. Starting from such
a premise, the High Court opined that challenge alone to the
resolution without challenging the conveyance is possible but
not vice,versa. The reason given by the High Court for the same
is as follows:-                                                      F
     "If Court passes a decree or order setting aside the
     resolution of the general body, the validity of the
     conveyance will not be intact, but if a decree or order is
     made merely setting aside the conveyance, the resolution
     of the General body will remain intact. By the conveyance       G
     land owned by the Society is transferred. The society is a
     body corporate. The person or persons who have signed
     the cqnveyance on behalf of the Society derive the
     authority to do so from resolution of the General Body. If
     the resolution is set aside or is declared invalid the act of   H
    392        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 2 S.C.R.


A         the person of executing the conveyance would become
          unauthorised. Such an order in relation to the validity of the
          General Body resolution will impair the validity of the
          conveyance. Consequently, if the resolution remains intact
          but the conveyance is set aside for some reason the
B         Society may be in a position to execute another
          conveyance pursuant to the resolution of the general body."

          We do not propose to examine the correctness of the legal
    premise that the general body resolution and the conveyance
    could be segregated in a dispute such as one on the hand. For
·C the sake of argument, we presume that it is possible for the
    plaintiffs, appellants herein, to challenge only the general body
    resolution. We also presume that the conclusion arrived at by
    the High Court that if the general body resolution is set aside,
    the same will impair the validity of the conveyance even without
 D an appropriate declaration by a competent judicial body. (We
    emphasise that we only presume so without examining to the
    said conclusion for the limited purpose) If the resolution dated
    6th December, 2009 alone is challenged before the Co-
    operative Court, in view of our conclusion recorded earlier, the
 E .respondents 22 and 23 (the beneficiaries of the resolution)
    could not be made parties before the Co-operative Court. In
    such a situation, even if the Co-operative Court came to the
    conclusion that the resolution is illegal, it would always be open
    for the respondents 22 and 23 to ignore such a determination
 F as they are not parties to the proceedings and assert their title
    on the basis of the conveyance dated 7th December, 2009. If
    any party such as the plaintiffs (the appellants herein) disputes
    the validity of the title conveyed thereunder, necessarily such a
    dispute would have to be adjudicated by a competent Court
 G under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure wherein,
    necessarily, the question whether a valid title was conveyed in
    favour of respondents 22 and 23 by the society would arise for
    determination. The legality of the resolution would still have to
    be gone into again. Therefore, in our opinion, the premise in
 H which the High Court commenced its enquiry itself is wrong.
 MARGRET ALMEIDA & ORS., ETC. v. BOMBAY CATHOLIC                393
 COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]

     39. For all the above-mentioned reasons, we are of the             A
opinion that the conclusion of the High Court that the suits in
question are not maintainable on the ground that the dispute
is amenable to the exclusive jurisdiction under Section 91 of
the Act to the Co-operative Court cannot be sustained and the
same is required to be set aside.                                       B

     40. That takes us to the next question raised in these
appeals - whether the High Court was right in going into the
maintainability of the suits in question. Shri Venugopal, learned
senior counsel appearing for some of the respondents
submitted that in view of the provisions contained in Section           C
9A of the Code, which was introduced by local amendment of
the Maharashtra Legislature to the Code by Maharashtra Act
No.65of1977, the course of action followed by the High Court
is not only justified but also the Court is obliged to follow such
a course of action. Section 9A reads as follows:                        D

     "9A. Whereof the hearing of application relating to interim
     relief in a suit, objection to jurisdiction is taken, such issue
     to be decided by the Court as a preliminary issue.-

     (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code or any         E
     other law for the time beiong in force, if, at the hearing of
     any application for granting or setting aside an order
     granting any interim relief, whether by way of stay,
     injunction, appointment of a receiver or otherwise, made
     in any suit, an objection to the jurisdiction of th~ Court to      F
     entertain such a suit is taken by any of the parties to the
     suit, the Court shall proceed to determine at the hearing
     of such application the issue as to the jurisdiction as a
     preliminary issue before granting or setting aside the order
     granting the interim relief. Any such application shall be         G
     heard and disposed of by the Court as expeditiously as
     possible and shall not in any case. be adjourned to the
     hearing of the suit.
     (2) Notwithstanding anything contained ion sub-section (1),        H
    394        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 2 S.C.R.


A          at the hearing of any such application, the Court may grant
           such interim relief as it may consider necessary, pending
           determination by it of the preliminary issue as to the
           jurisdiction."

  The language of Section 9A is self-explanatory. We accept the
8 submission made by Shri Venugopal in toto.

        41. Coming to the question of the interim order in view of
  our conclusion that.the suits in question are maintainable and
  having regard to the fact that the suits are to be tried by the
c High Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction, we do not
  propose to pass any interim order and leave it open to the High
  Court to consider the applications filed by the plaintiffs for
  interim orders in accordance with law and pass appropriate
  orders. The principles governing the grant of interim orders are
o too well settled and we need not expound the same once again.
  However, we would like to indicate that on the question of the
  existence of a prima facie case in .favour of the plaintiffs, the
  following factors are germane and require to be examined.
  Having regard to the content of the plaint, we are of the opinion
E that the nature of the legal right, the plaintiffs claim for seeking
  the relief such as the one sought in the suits necessarily
  depends upon the byelaws of the Society, the rights and
  obligations of the various classes of its members with respect
  to the property in dispute. The High Court may examine the
F above aspects before passing an appropriate interim order.

        42. In view of the above, we also deem it proper to direct
  all the parties to maintain status quo as on today for a period
  of two weeks to enable the Bombay High Court to examine the
  applications of the plaintiffs for interim orders and pass
G appropriate orders in accordance with law.
           43. The appeals are, accordingly, disposed of.

    N.J.                                      Appeals disposed of.
H