MATHEWS J. NEDUMPARA & ORS.versusUNION OF INDIA & ORS.

                 [2023] 13 S.C.R. 1181 : 2023 INSC 918



                             CASE DETAILS

                 MATHEWS J. NEDUMPARA & ORS.
                                      v.
                       UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
                    (Writ Petition (C) No. 320 of 2023)
                           OCTOBER 16, 2023
       [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, C.T. RAVIKUMAR AND
                SUDHANSHU DHULIA, JJ.]
                              HEADNOTES
      Issue for consideration: Designation of Advocates as Senior
Advocates u/ss.16 and 23(5), Advocates Act, 1961 as well as u/Or. IV,
r.2, Supreme Court Rules, 2013, if unconstitutional being violative of the
mandate of equality u/Artilce 14 and Right to Practice any Profession u/
Article 19 as well as Right to Life u/Article 21 of the Constitution of India,
as claimed.
      Advocates Act, 1961 – ss.16, 23(5) – Challenge to – Plea of the
petitioners inter alia that designation of senior Advocates has created
a class of Advocates with special rights, privileges and status and the
same has been seen as a result only for kith and kin of Judges, Senior
Advocates, politicians, Ministers, etc., resulting in the legal industry
being monopolised by a small group of designated Advocates:
        Held: Pleadings are reckless, completely devoid of merit and
justification, making allegations against all and sundry – The classification
of advocates as senior advocates and other advocates u/s.16 is a
classification made by the legislature – It has a broad discretion to make
such classifications, and while there must be a reason for classification, the
reason need not be a good one – The Court can only review the classification
if it is palpably discriminatory and arbitrary – The classification of advocates
u/s.16 is a tangible difference established by the practice advocates have
over decades, and the Court has devised a discernible and transparent
mechanism to adjudicate the seniority of advocates in the profession –
Designation as a Senior Advocate is a recognition of merit by the Court,
                                    1181
1182          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 13 S.C.R.


and the two judgments passed in Indira Jaising cases have endeavoured to
make the process more transparent – The challenge that the classification
is violative of Article 14 is untenable – Constitutional validity of a specific
provision cannot be challenged in abstract, but when the provisions violate
any fundamental rights or contravenes any provision of the Constitution,
or the legislature lacks law-making competence – The classification of
advocates and the mechanism to grant seniority to advocates is not based on
any arbitrary, artificial or evasive grounds – Such a classification is a creation
of the legislature, and there is a general presumption of constitutionality, and
the burden is on the petitioners to show that there is a clear transgression of
the constitutional principles, which they have miserably failed to discharge
– This rule is based on the assumption, judicially recognized and accepted,
that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of the
people – Present writ petition is a misadventure largely of petitioner No.1
in continuation of some of his past misadventures, dismissed– Constitution
of India – Articles 14, 19, 21, 32. [Paras 5, 13-15, 17, 18 and 21]
     Constitution of India – Article 14 – Designation of Advocates as
Senior Advocates – Violation of Article 14 alleged:
      Held: Not violated – Article 14 permits the reasonable classification
of people by the legislature – The seniority of advocates is premised on
a standardised metric of merit aimed at forwarding the standards of the
profession – Advocates Act, 1961 – ss.16, 23(5) – Supreme Court Rules,
2013 – Or. IV, r.2. [Para 18]

        LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES

      Indira Jaisingh v. Supreme Court of India, Through Secretary General
& Ors. (2017) 9 SCC 766 : [2017] 10 SCR 478; Indira Jaisingh v. Supreme
Court of India, Through Secretary General & Ors. (2023) 8 SCC 1; Public
Services Tribunal Bar Association v. State of U.P (2003) 4 SCC 104 : [2003]
1 SCR 666; Union of India v. Nitdip Textile Processors (P) Ltd. (2012) 1
SCC 226 : [2011] 13 SCR 26; R.K. Garg v. Union of India (1981) 4 SCC
675 : [1982] 1 SCR 947 – relied on.
       Mathews Nedumpara, In Re (2019) 19 SCC 454 – referred to.
             MATHEWS J. NEDUMPARA & ORS. v.                               1183
                 UNION OF INDIA & ORS


       OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
              ORDER AND APPEARANCES

     CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 320
of 2023.
     Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India.
     Appearances:
     Mathews J. Nedumpara, Petitioner-in-person
     Ms. Maria Nedumpara, Adv. for the Petitioners.

       JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

                                JUDGMENT
     SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
      1. The petitioners, practicing Advocates, have filed the present writ
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for a declaration that
the designation of Advocates as Senior Advocates under Sections 16 and
23(5) of the Advocates Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Act’) as
well as under Rule 2 of Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, creating
a special class of Advocates with special rights, privileges and status not
available to ordinary Advocates is unconstitutional being violative of the
mandate of equality under Artilce14 and Right to Practice any Profession
under Article 19 as well as Right to Life under Article 21 of the Constitution
of India. It is their say that such designation has created a class of Advocates
with special rights, and the same has been seen as a result only for kith and
kin of Judges, Senior Advocates, politicians, Ministers, etc., resulting in the
legal industry being monopolised by a small group of designated Advocates,
leaving the vast majority of meritorious law practitioners as ordinary plebians
receiving discriminatory treatment.
      2. We may notice that it is contended that this Court in Indira Jaisingh
vs. Supreme Court of India, Through Secretary General & Ors.1, upheld
the vires of the said Act providing for the designation of Advocates as


1   (2017) 9 SCC 766
1184         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 13 S.C.R.


Senior Advocates and illegally providing guidelines for such designation,
amounting to judicial legislation. We may here add that there have been
further modifications and formulations for designation by a subsequent
judgment rendered in Indira Jaisingh vs. Supreme Court of India,
Through Secretary General & Ors.2 in pursuance to the liberty reserved
in the aforesaid judgment.
      3. The say of petitioner no.1 is that we cannot borrow the concept
from Roman Law or England, which was feudal in character, as, in
England, the concept of Queen’s Counsel representing the crown came
into existence in the 18th Century. At the time when the Constitution
came into existence, there were admittedly different categories of legal
practitioners with varying degrees of the right to practice – Mukhtiyars,
Vakils and Pleaders practiced in the Muffasil Courts, while in High
Courts, Bar at Laws, Advocates and Solicitors practiced. The said Act was
brought into existence to streamline the process of working of the legal
system. Petitioner no.1, while lauding the objective behind the said Act,
seeks to challenge the provisions of Sections 16 and 23(5) of the said Act,
which is stated to have been ‘unwittingly’ incorporated and is stated to be
destroying the laudable purpose of the said Act, i.e., a single unified Bar
for the entire republic of India.
     4. A reference has also been made to the Advocates on Record in the
Supreme Court, who are entitled to do the filing in the Supreme Court,
while the Senior Advocates are the arguing counsels.
      5. We may note that the pleadings of petitioner no.1 are almost
reckless in character. The vast number of first-generation lawyers who
attained prominence and were designated as Senior Advocates are sought
to be ignored – something which has grown over a period of time. We
say the pleadings are reckless because it has sought to be made out as if
the legal profession in India has long been feudalistic and a monopoly of
certain higher castes and certain families. In fact, in the post-liberalisation
period, it is alleged that lawyers no longer come to be known for their
knowledge, values and erudition but for the manifestation of wealth and the
proximity to the Bench. These averments are contemptuous in character,


2   (2023) 8 SCC 1
          MATHEWS J. NEDUMPARA & ORS. v.                                   1185
    UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

and that too by Petitioner no.1, who already faced conviction for contempt
and debarment from this court to practice in Mathews Nedumpara, In Re3.
      6. The petitioner no.1 does not stop at this but alleges that the Bar has
lost all its independence and vitality. The allegations are not only against
the ordinary members of the Bar and designated Advocates but also against
Government Law Officers enjoying Constitutional stature. He has pleaded
that designation is insignia of superior status and title and promising
lawyers should not undertake the ignominy of applying for designation.
He goes as far as to say that the lawyers have lost faith in the system of
merit, character, knowledge and uprightness but realised that only a title
conferred by the Court as Senior Advocate alone can bring prosperity and
success in the profession. Not only that, the entire legal fraternity practicing
in subordinate Courts is stated to have been excluded from the zone of
consideration for designation, and no meaningful objective is to be achieved
by such classification.
      7. The dual system is stated to be causing ‘total destruction of a justice
delivery system’.
      8. The test of Constitutional validity of law is stated to be actual impact
and reality. Petitioner no.1 does not stop at blaming successful lawyers or,
for that matter, the Judges but seems to paint everybody with the same brush,
alleging even powerful politicians and high-ranking bureaucrats have the
clout to get their kith and kin appointed as Judges and Senior Advocates.
      9. In fact, during the course of arguments, petitioner no.1 sought to
submit that the petition filed for judicial transparency and reforms by an
NGO sought to hijack the proceedings initiated by the petitioner. This is in
reference to the petition of Mrs. Indira Jai Singh and even attributing motives
to her as it was said that what she sought was legislation.
     10. One may say that petitioner no.1 goes on and on ranting and raving
about these issues, completely ignoring the purpose of the provisions he
seeks to assail and the narrow compass of challenge to legislations. For
convenience of reference, the relevant provisions are reproduced as under:



3    (2019) 19 SCC 454
1186          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 13 S.C.R.


       “16. Senior and other advocates.—
       (1) There shall be two classes of advocates, namely, senior advocates
       and other advocates.
       (2) An advocate may, with his consent, be designated as senior advocate
       if the Supreme Court or a High Court is of opinion that by virtue of
       his ability [standing at the Bar or special knowledge or experience in
       law] he is deserving of such distinction.
       (3) Senior advocates shall, in the matter of their practice, be subject
       to such restrictions as the Bar Council of India may, in the interest of
       the legal profession, prescribe.
       (4) An advocate of the Supreme Court who was a senior advocate
       of that Court immediately before the appointed day shall, for
       the purposes of this section, be deemed to be a senior advocate:
       [Provided that where any such senior advocate makes an application
       before the 31st December, 1965, to the Bar Council maintaining the roll
       in which his name has been entered that he does not desire to continue
       as a senior advocate, the Bar Council may grant the application and
       the roll shall be altered accordingly.]
                  ….       ….      ….       ….      ….       ….
       23. Right of pre-audience.—
       (5) Subject as aforesaid— (i) senior advocates shall have pre-audience
       over other advocates, and (ii) the right of pre-audience of senior
       advocates inter se and other advocates inter se shall be determined by
       their respective seniority.”
      11. There are multifarious prayers seeking to strike down the provisions
mentioned aforesaid of the said Act and to declare the judgment in Indira
Jaising4 case as unconstitutional as also the relevant Supreme Court Rules
as they seek to provide an unjust classification including robes.
     12. There is no doubt that petitioner No.1 has had more than one brush
with the law, though he claims to have become an advocate in the pursuit


4   supra
          MATHEWS J. NEDUMPARA & ORS. v.                                 1187
    UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

of his own case. Petitioner No.1 obviously crossed boundaries where the
Court was compelled to take action under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
and debar petitioner No.1 from practicing in this Court.
      13. We find the pleadings completely devoid of merit and justification,
making allegations against all and sundry. This is more so in the conspectus
of the large growth in the legal profession where a large number of first-
generation lawyers have made their mark. These lawyers, some of them
young ones, have come from National Law Schools and other prominent
Law Schools. Instead of appreciating their contribution, petitioner No.1 has
used his usual style of making allegations against all and sundry.
      14. On what is a limited legal scrutiny, the rest being the opinion and
rantings of the petitioners, is the constitutional validity of the aforesaid
provisions of the said Act. Suffice to say that the constitutional validity of a
specific provision cannot be challenged in abstract, but when the provisions
violate any fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III or contravenes
any provision of the Constitution, or the legislature lacks law-making
competence. If a provision violates a fundamental right, such a violation
must directly and inevitably affect the people and cannot be premised on
an ostensible use of violation of the provision. We may usefully refer to
the observations in Public Services Tribunal Bar Association v. State of
U.P.5 as under:
     “26. The constitutional validity of an Act can be challenged only on
     two grounds viz. (i) lack of legislative competence; and (ii) violation of
     any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution
     or of any other constitutional provisions. In State of A.P. v. McDowell
     & Co. [(1996) 3 SCC 709] this Court has opined that except the above
     two grounds there is no third ground on the basis of which the law
     made by the competent legislature can be invalidated and that the
     ground of invalidation must necessarily fall within the four corners
     of the aforementioned two grounds.”
    15. The classification of advocates as senior advocates and other
advocates under Section 16 of the said Act is a classification made by


5    (2003) 4 SCC 104
1188           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 13 S.C.R.


the legislature. The legislature has a broad discretion to make such
classifications, and while there must be a reason for classification, the reason
need not be a good one. The Court can only review the classification if it
is palpably discriminatory and arbitrary.
     16. In Union of India v. Nitdip Textile Processors (P) Ltd.6 observed
as under:
       “47. It is now well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that
       a particular classification is proper if it is based on reason and not
       purely arbitrary, caprice or vindictive. On the other hand, while there
       must be a reason for the classification, the reason need not be a good
       one, and it is immaterial that the statute is unjust. The test is not
       wisdom but good faith in the classification. It is too late in the day to
       contend otherwise. It is time and again observed by this Court that
       the legislature has a broad discretion in the matter of classification. In
       taxation, “there is a broader power of classification than in some other
       exercises of legislation”. When the wisdom of the legislation while
       making classification is questioned, the role of the courts is very much
       limited. It is not reviewable by the courts unless palpably arbitrary. It
       is not the concern of the courts whether the classification is the wisest
       or the best that could be made.”
      17. The classification of advocates under Section 16 of the said Act
is a tangible difference established by the practice advocates have over
decades, and the Court has devised a discernible and transparent mechanism
to adjudicate the seniority of advocates in the profession. In order to be able
to file any matter in the Supreme Court, an extensive and strict examination
for an Advocates-on-Record has been provided. Not any advocate can walk
in to file a matter. The objective is the efficiency of the system and proper
assistance to the Bench as also to be in a better position to propagate the
case of the client. Expertise and merit are the criterion. A lot of advocates
prefer to remain as an Advocate-on-Record or advocates in the High Court
and District Courts as the designation as Senior Advocate carries many
inhibitions in the role that they can perform, i.e., they have to appear with
an instructing counsel, not draft and file pleadings, and not deal with the


6   (2012) 1 SCC 226
          MATHEWS J. NEDUMPARA & ORS. v.                                  1189
    UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

litigants, etc. Thus, a special entitlement to address the Court is coupled with
restrictions on many acts which they could otherwise perform as advocates.
The designation as a Senior Advocate is a recognition of merit by the Court,
and the two judgments passed in Indira Jaising7 cases referred to aforesaid
have endeavoured to make the process more transparent.
      18. The challenge that the aforesaid classification is violative of Article
14 of the Constitution is untenable since Article 14 permits the reasonable
classification of people by the legislature. The seniority of advocates is
premised on a standardised metric of merit aimed at forwarding the standards
of the profession. Thus, the classification of advocates and the mechanism
to grant seniority to advocates is not based on any arbitrary, artificial or
evasive grounds. Such a classification is a creation of the legislature, and
there is a general presumption of constitutionality, and the burden is on the
petitioners to show that there is a clear transgression of the constitutional
principles – something which they have miserably failed to discharge. This
rule is based on the assumption, judicially recognized and accepted, that the
legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of the people.
     19. In R.K. Garg v. Union of India8, it is observed as under:
     “7. Now while considering the constitutional validity of a statute said
     to be violative of Article 14, it is necessary to bear in mind certain
     well established principles which have been evolved by the courts as
     rules of guidance in discharge of its constitutional function of judicial
     review. The first rule is that there is always a presumption in favour of
     the constitutionality of a statute and the burden is upon him who attacks
     it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional
     principles. This rule is based on the assumption, judicially recognised
     and accepted, that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates
     the needs of its own people, its laws are directed to problems made
     manifest by experience and its discrimination are based on adequate
     grounds. The presumption of constitutionality is indeed so strong that
     in order to sustain it, the Court may take into consideration matters
     of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the


7    supra
8    (1981) 4 SCC 675
1190           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 13 S.C.R.


       times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived
       existing at the time of legislation.”
      20. If one may say the indulgence to the junior members of the Bar,
in a sense, is more than to the senior members because it is also part of the
duty of the Bench to help with the evolution of the Bar. The underlying
principle for ages has been that the credit should go to the junior counsel
without the discredit going to him, and through ages, many lawyers have
learnt in this process, including the persons who now form the Bench.
      21. We have, thus, not the slightest hesitation in coming to the
conclusion that this writ petition is a misadventure largely of petitioner
No.1 in continuation of some of his past misadventures. It appears that the
judgments and orders passed earlier do not seem to have had any salutary
or counselling effect on petitioner No.1 for any self-introspection, but he
seeks to carry on a vilification campaign against all and sundry. Obviously,
the system is not able to correct petitioner No.1 in his approach.
       22. We dismiss the petition with no order as to costs.




Headnotes prepared by:                                          Petition dismissed.
Divya Pandey