Holding

The Industrial Tribunal’s exercise of power under Section 11‑A to re‑appreciate evidence and adjust the punishment is valid, and the writ appeal is maintainable; the Tribunal’s award is affirmed.

Summary

Mavji C. Lakum, a long‑serving peon of Central Bank of India, was repeatedly disciplined and eventually discharged for alleged misconduct. The Industrial Tribunal, exercising its power under Section 11‑A of the Industrial Disputes Act, held that the departmental inquiry was fair but the punishment of discharge was disproportionate, reducing it to withholding one increment. The Bank challenged the Tribunal’s award in a writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution; the Single Judge allowed the petition, offering a non‑binding recommendation of 50% back wages. The Division Bench dismissed the bank’s writ appeal, treating it as non‑maintainable under Article 227. The Supreme Court held that the writ appeal was maintainable because the petition invoked both Articles 226 and 227, and affirmed that the Tribunal’s power under Section 11‑A includes re‑appreciation of evidence and alteration of the quantum of punishment even when the inquiry is fair. Consequently, the Court set aside the Single Judge’s order, restored the Tribunal’s award, and allowed the appeal.

Issues considered

The writ appeal under the Letters Patent is maintainable when the writ petition is filed under both Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
Whether an Industrial Tribunal, under Section 11‑A of the Industrial Disputes Act, may re‑appreciate evidence and modify the quantum of punishment despite a fair departmental inquiry.
Whether the Single Judge exceeded his jurisdiction by interfering with the Tribunal’s findings and by issuing recommendations that amount to directions under Article 227.

Legislation cited

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 11-A

Subjects

Industrial Disputes ActSection 11-Adepartmental inquiryproportionalitywrit petitionArticles 226 and 227Letters Patent appealpunishment of dischargetribunal jurisdictionre‑appreciation of evidence

Judgment

[2008] 5 S.C.R. 1001
-,
MAVJI C LAKUM A
v.
CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA
(Civil Appeal No. 2385 of 2008)
APRIL 2, 2008
8
[S.8. SINHA AND V.S. SIRPURKAR, JJ.)

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - s. 11-A - Departmental
inquiry - Punishment of discharge - Industrial Tribunal held
that the inquiry was proper, but finding the punishment c
disproportionate to the misconduct, reduced the punishment
to withholding of one increment - Writ petition - Dismissal of
by Single Judge of High Court- Writ appeal dismissed- On
appeal, held: The Industrial Tribunal, by reappreciating the
judgment, in exercise of its jurisdiction u/s 11-A, was justified
D
in interfering with the quantum of punishment - Even if
" departmental inquiry is found to be fair, the Tribunal would still
be justified in re-appreciating the evidence and/or interfering
with the quantum of punishment.
Letters· Patent Appeal - Order passed in writ petition E
challenged in writ appeal - Maintainability of - Held: Since, in
the facts of the case, writ petition was filed under Article 226 as
w.ell as 227, the writ appeal was maintainable against the order
passed therein - Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 226
and 227. F
. '
Appellant was employed with the respondent Bank .
He was found guilty of few charges. On two accounts he
was given punishment of discharge and on other proved
charges, punishment of stopping of increments was
given. Disciplinary Authority inflicted a composite G
punishment of discharge. Departmental appeal was
dismissed. industrial Disputes Tribunal held that the
inquiry was just and proper, but the punishment was
found to be disproportionate. Setting aside the
1001 H
1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

A punishment of discharge, punishment of withholding of
one increment with future effect was imposed. The order
of the tribunal was challenged by the respondent-Bank
in writ petition before High Court. Single Judge of the High
Court allowed the petition. Writ appeal thereagainst was
B dismissed by Division Bench of High Court.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The writ appeal was maintainable.
Division Bench of High court erred in treating the matter
C falling only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
In the present matter apart from the fact that the petition
is labeled under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it ·
is clear that the grounds raised in the petition suggest
that the petition is not only under Article 227 but also under
Article 226 of the Constitution. After- reading the writ
D petition it is clear that the contentions raised and the facts
stated in the petition justify the respondent to file an
application both under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India. [Paras 12 and 15] [1013-D; 1010-B;
1009-F-G]
E
Sushilabai Laxminarayan Mud/iyar and Ors. V.
Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha and Ors. (1993) Supp. 1
SCC 11; Umaji Keshao Meshram and Ors. V Radhikabai,
Widow of Anandrao Banapurkar and Anr. 1986 (Supp) SCC
F 401; Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. V Shankar Prasad 1999
(6) SCC 275; Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and Ors. . .
2003 (6) sec 675 - relled on.
1.2 It is not correct to say that the Single Judge at the
end of his judgment had given certain directions which
G were in the nature of the directions given under Article
227 of the Constitution of India. The Judge himself has
clearly stated that his suggestion to the bank to award
50% of the back-wages, in view of the long service of the
appellant, was merely a recommendation and not a
H direction and that it was for the bank to take the decision
MAVJI C LAKUM v. CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA 1003

in this behalf. Therefore, this is not a case where any A
direction as such is issued under Article 227 of the
Constitution. The recommendation made by the Single
Judge, as has been stated in the judgment itself, cannot
amount to a direction made under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. Such directions are not made to the B
parties, the directions contemplated under Article 227 are
to the concerned authorities against whose order the writ
petition is filed. [Para 13] [1010-B, C, D, E]
2.1 The Tribunal was justified in appreciating the fact
that the charges were not only trivial and were not so C
serious as to entail the extreme punishment of disctiarge.
Here the evidence was of a most general nature and the
charges were also not such as would have invited the
extreme punishment. It was not as if the appellant had
abused or had done any physical altercation with his D
superiors or colleagues. What was complained was of his
absence on some days and his argumentative nature.
[Para 20] [1018-A, B]
Life Insurance Corporation of India v. R. Dhandapani
2006 (13) SCC 613; Mahindra. Ltd. \/. N.B. Narawade 2005 E
(3) SCC 331; M.P Electricity Board v. Jagdish Chandra
Sharma 2005 (3) SCC 401; L and_ T Komatsu Ltd. V. N.
Uadayakumar 2008 (1) SCC 224 - distinguished.
Mis.Firestone Tyre ahd Rubber Co. of India P Ltd. \/. The F
Management AIR 1973 SC 1227 - referred to.
2.2 Even if the inquiry is found to be fair, that would
be only a finding certifying that all possible opportunities
were given to the delinquent and the principles of natural
justice and fair play were observed. That does not mean G

- that the findings arrived at were essentially the correct
findings. If the Industrial Tribunal comes to the conclusion
that the findings could not be su.pported on the basis of
the evidence given or further comes to the conclusion
that the punishment given is sJiockingly disproportionate, H
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

A the Industrial Tribunal would still be justified in re-
appreciating the evidence and/or interfering with the
quantum of punishment. [Para 20] [1017-C-E]
2.3 There can be no dispute that power under Section
11-A has to be exercised judiciously and the interference
8 is possible only when the Tribunal is not satisfied with
the findings and further concludes that punishment
imposed by the Management is highly disproportionate
to the degree of guilt of the workman concerned. Besides,
the Tribunal has to give reasons as to why it is not satisfied
C either with the findings or with the quantum of
punishment and that such reason should not be fanciful
or whimsical but there should be good reasons. The
reasons given by the Tribunal were correct and the
treatment given by the Tribunal to the evidence was
D perfectly justified. [Para 20] [1017-E, F, G]
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2385
of 2008.

From the final Judgment and Order dated 27.09.2004 of
E the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Letters Patent Appeal
No. 547 of 2003.

P.V. Yogeswaran and M.A. Krishna Moorthy for the
Appellant.

F Sunil Morarka, Dinesh Mathur, Saurabh Jain and
Rameshwar Prasad Goyal for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. 1. Leave granted.
G 2. The appellant herein challenges Division Bench
judgment of the High Court of Gujarat dismissing his Writ Appeal.
The said Writ Appeal was filed against the orders of the learned
Single Judge of that court whereby the Writ Petition filed by the
Respondent-bank was allowed setting aside the order passed
H by the Industrial Tribunal. The Industrial Tribunal had answered
MAVJI C LAKUM v. CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA 1005
[V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

the Reference in favour of the appellant and had set aside the A
punishment of discharge as also the other punishments and
restricted the said punishment to stoppage of one year's
increment.
3. Following facts will highlight the controversy involved.
B
4. Appellant Mavji C. Lakum had joined the services of the
Respondent-bank as a Peon on 1.9.1951. He was promoted
~

as a Head Peon in the year 1963. While in service, two charge-
sheets came to be served upon the appellant and an inquiry
was held against him and he came to be discharged from the
service by an order dated 22.5.1984. This order was challenged
c
by the appellant by filing a Regular Suit No.99 of 1984 in the
Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Anjar, Kutch-Bhuj. The
said suit was dismissed. In the appeal, though the District Court
directed reinstatement but denied the back-wages. The
appellate court also permitted the Respondent-bank to hold fresh D
enquiry. The appellate judgment was challenged before the High
,,\
Court by way of Second Appeal by the appellant where he was
awarded 75% back-wages from the date of filing the suit.
5. As the order of reinstatement became final, the appellant E
was reinstated. However, since the permission was granted by
the District Court to the respondent-bank to start inquiry afresh,
that inquiry was initiated in accordance with law and in that inquiry
the appellant was found guilty of few charges whereby he was
given the punishment of discharge on two charges. He was given
the punishment of stopping his increments in respect of other F
> •
charges for which he was found guilty. A show cause notice dated
7.2.1991 was issued to the appellant calling upon him to show
cause why the punishment of dismissal should not be imposed
upon him. A reply was submitted by the appellant dated
18.3.1991 wherein he contended that looking into the nature of G
the charges, the punishment of dismissal was very harsh. He
. also offered explanation regarding the charges and the findings.
_, However, the Disciplinary Authority, after considering the reply
inflicted a composite punishment of discharge. The appellant.
thereafter filed a Departmental Appeal which was dismissed. H
1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

A He, therefore, raised a dispute with regard to punishment of his
discharge and on that basis a Reference came to be made to
Industrial Tribunal (Central}, Rajkot which was registered as ITC
No.1 of 1993.
6. The Industrial Tribunal firstly came to the conclusion that
B the Departmental Inquiry was just and proper. However, in so
far as the merits of the allegations were concerned, the Tribunal
came to the conclusion that there was no evidence supporting
major charges, though there was some misconduct on the part
of the appellant. Again the Tribunal specifically held that the
c proved misconduct was not so serious as to invite the extreme
punishment of discharge. Reference was thus partly allowed
and the order of discharge was set aside. The Tribunal imposed
the punishment of withholding one increment with future effect.
In the meanwhile the appellant retired from the services of the
D respondent with effect from 3rd September, 1994.
7. The respondent challenged the Award passed by the
Industrial Tribunal by way of a Writ Petition which came to be
allowed by the learned Single Judge who concluded his
judgment as follows:
E
"Considering the fact that respondent has been working
with the petitioner bank right from the year 1951 and he
had put in 30 years of service before he was discharged
from the service and that now he has retired and reached
F at the age of 70 years, it is recommended that the petitioner
may consider his case for payment of back wages for the
period in question at the rate of 50%. This is merely a • <

recommendation and not direction and it is for the bank to
take the decision in this behalf. With this observation, this
petition stands allowed. Rule made absolute with no order
G
as to costs."
8. The judgment of the learned Single Judge was appealed
against by way of a Writ Appeal and as has been stated earlier, r
the Writ Appeal was also dismissed, necessitating the present
H appeal before us.
MAVJI C LAKUM v. CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA 1007
[VS. SIRPURKAR, J.]
-,
9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant A
contended that the order of learned Single Judge as also the
confirming order in the Letters Patent Appeal by the Division
Bench are patently erroneous. As regards the order of the
learned Single Judge, the learned counsel contended that the
learned Judge had totally traveled beyond his jurisdiction and B
went on to interfere with the findings of fact on re-appreciation
of the evidence which was not permissible. According to the
learned counsel, it was impermissible for the learned Judge to
.
disturb the findings recorded by Tribunal. According to the
learned counsel the Tribunal had a complete jurisdiction under c
Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 not only to
consider the factor of quantum of punishment but also to re-
appreciate the findings reached during the disciplinary inquiry.
Learned counsel has taken us through the order of the Tribunal
and has pointed out that the Tribunal had very carefully
D
appreciated the evidence and had come to the conclusion that
>
the misconduct proved against the appellant was insignificant
and not so serious so as to invite the extreme punishment of
discharge. According to the learned counsel, once the Tribunal
had exercised its jurisdiction under Section 11-A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, there was no question of interference much less E
after re-appreciating the findings given by fhe Tribunal.
10. As regards the appellate order, the learned counsel
criticized that the Division Bench did not apply its mind and
erroneously dismissed the appeal treating it to be not F
> • maintainable.
11. As against this, however, the learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the Respondent-bank supported the order of the
learned Single Judge and contended that since that order was
passed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the appeal G
itself was not maintainable. Learned counsel also urged that on
merits also the order of the learned Single Judge was absolutely
correct.
12. At the outset we shall consider the contention as to
H
1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 5 $.C.R.

A whether the Letters Patent Appeal was maintainable against
the order of the learned Single Judge. It was contended by the
counsel for the respondent-bank that the appeal was not
maintainable since the learned Single Judge had exercised his
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and,
B therefore, there was no question of Letters Patent Appeal being
maintainable against the same. We, therefore, went through the .,.
Special Civil Application, a copy of which is the part of the
paperbook. The said writ petition clearly mentions on the very
first page that the writ petition was being filed under Article 226
c of the Constitution of India. Again para 10 of the writ petition
mentions as under:
"Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Industrial
Tribunal, the petitioner begs to approach this Hon'ble court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging
D the award on the following amongst other grounds ... ."
Ground (iv) on the same page says:
..
"That the order passed by the Tribunal is arbitrary,
unreasonable, unjust and perverse."
E Even prayer clause in para 15 is as under:
"That by appropriate writ, direction and order, the impugned
order of Industrial Tribunal (Central) Rajkot atAnnexure B
be quashed and/or set aside."
F All this suggests that the writ petition was not only under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India but there is a specific
mention of Article 226. In a reported decision of this Court in
Sushilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar & Ors. V. Nihalchand
Waghajibhai Shaha and others [(1993) Supp. 1 SCC 11] a
G similar question fell for consideration. In para 4 of the said
judgment this Court observed:
"The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly
understood the above Umaji Kesha Meshram case. In
Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify
H
MAVJI C LAKUM v. CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA 1009
[V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.)
-. a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or A
227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to
file his application under both these articles in fairness of
. justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable
right of appeal the court ought to treat the application as
being made under Article 226, and if in deciding the matter, B
--< in the final order the court gives ancillary directions which
may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to
deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of
the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order
sought to be appealed against is under Article 226.. Rule c
18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read
with clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to
the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of
the learned Single Judge passed on a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the
D
Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal
.• was not maintainable against the order of the learned
Single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the
impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the
.Letters Patent Appeal filed again sf the judgment of the
learned Single Judge would not be heard and decided on E
merits ... ."
These observations were made by this Court after taking
into consideration the observations made in Umaji Keshao
Meshram & Ors. V. Radhikabai, Widow of Anandrao F
Banapurkar & Anr. [1986 (Supp) SCC 401). In the present
, .
matter apart from the fact that the petition is labeled under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, it is clear that the grounds raised
in the petition suggest that the petition is not only under Article
227 but also under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is to be
G
seen that in the grounds raised against the order of the Tribunal,
it is specifically suggested that the order passed by the Tribunal
was arbitrary, unreasonable, unjust and perverse. The further
-,.
complaint made against the Tribunal's order pertain to failure
on the part of the Tribunal to appreciate certain facts and
H
1010 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

A eventualities thereby complaining non application of mind on
the part of the Tribunal. Complaint has also been made against
the approach of the Tribunal and it is suggested that the said
approach was perverse. After reading the writ petition we are
convinced that the contentions raised and the facts stated in
B the petition justify the respondent herein to file an application
both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution oflndia.

13. Learned counsel, however, pointed out that the learned
Judge at the end of his judgment had given certain directions
which were in the nature of the directions given under Article
C 227 of the Constitution of India. We do not agree with this
contention. In the first place the learned Judge himself has clearly
stated that his suggestion to the bank to award 50% of the back-
wages, in view of the long service of the appellant, was merely
a recommendation and not a direction and that it was for the
D bank to take the decision in this behalf. Therefore, this is not a
case where any direction as such is issued under Article 227 of
the Constitution. The recommendation made by the learned
Judge, as has been stated in the judgment itself, cannot amount
to a direction made under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
E It is to be remembered that such directions are not made to the
parties, the directions contemplated under Article 227 are to
the concerned authorities against whose order the writ petition
is filed. In this behalf we must further point out that in Lokmat
Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. V. Shankar Prasad [(1999) 6 SCC
F 275] this Court explained the situation as to whether the writ
petition should be treated to be under Article 226 or under Article
227 of the Constitution of India. That was the case where the ·•
Labour Court passed an order in Revision under the provisions
of Section 28 of the Maharashtra (Recognition of Trade Unions
G and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices)Act, 1971. This order
was confirmed by the Industrial Tribunal under Section 44 of the
said Act where both the courts held that the retrenchment of the
workman did not amount to any unfair labour practice on the
part of the appellant. These orders were challenged by the •
workman by filing the writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of
H
.....

MAVJI C LAKUM v. CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA 1011
[VS. SIRPURKAR, J.]
-·,

the Constitution before the High Court. The learned Single Judge A
dismissed the said writ petition but the order of the learned Single
Judges itself showed that he was considering the writ petition
of the workman which was moved before him invoking the High
Court's jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India. In that writ petition the workman had B
.... ,
requested the High Court to call for the records and proceedings
of the Revision Petition and after perusal thereof to be further
pleased to quash and set aside the said order of the Labour
Court. It was averred in the writ petition that the authorities below,
while interpreting-various provisions of the Maharashtra Act as c
also the Industrial Disputes Act and the rules framed thereunder
had totally lost sight of the object and purpose of these provisions
and had put an interpretation alien to the industrial jurisprudence
and has thus committed serious error of law apparent on the
face of the record which resulted in a serious miscarriage of
D
justjce and also in failure to exercise the jurisdiction vested in
\.
the courts below under the provisions of the Maharashtra Act. It
was further averred that the orders of the courts below had
resulted in infraction of the fundamental rights of the workman.
14. When we see the present petition, the situation is no E
different. What was averred by the respondent in its writ petition
was in the same tone and it was clearly averred that the Tribunal
had ignored the principles of industrial jurisprudence and that
had resulted in miscarriage of justice. In para 16 of the reported
judgment, the court observed: F
·' ' "It is, therefore, obvious that the writ petition invoking
jurisdiction of the High Court both under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution had tried to make out a case for
the High Court's interference seeking issuance of an
appropriate writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the G
Constitution of India. Basic averments for invoking such a
jurisdiction were already pleaded in the writ petition for
the High Court's consideration. It is true, as submitted by
learned counsel for the appellant, that the order of the
learned Single Judge nowhere stated that the Court was H
1012 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R. •

A considering the writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. It is equally true that the learned Single
Judge dismissed the writ petition by observing that the
courts below had appreciated the contentions and rejected
the complaint. But the said observation of the learned ,.....
B Single Judge did not necessarily mean that the learned
,,
Judge was not inclined to interfere under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India only. The said observation equally
supports the conclusion that the learned Judge as not
inclined to interfere under Articles 226 and 227. As seen
c earlier, he was considering the aforesaid writ petition
moved under Article 226, as well as Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. Under these circumstances, it is not
possible to agree with the contention of learned counsel
for the appellant that the learned Single Judge had refused
to interfere only under Article 227 of the Constitution of
D
India when he dismissed the writ petition of the
respondent.."
This Court has further relied upon the decision in the case
of Umaji Keshao Meshram's case (supra). The situation is
E no different in the present case. The respondent had raised the
contentions regarding the order of the Tribunal in the very same
manner. Though the learned Judge observed that he was acting
only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it cannot be
said that the writ petition was disposed of only under Article
F 227 of the Constitution. The writ petition was such as would fall
also under Article 226 of the Constitution which label was already .'
attached to the writ petition. Similar relief was also sought for
by praying for an appropriate writ, order or direction for quashing
the Industrial Tribunal's order. We are, therefore, convinced that
the law laid down in Lokmat's case applies on all fours. In the
G
same para 16 this Court proceeds to observe:
"It was open to the respondent to invoke the jurisdiction of
the High Court both under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India. Once such a jurisdiction was invoked
H and when his writ petition was dismissed on merits, it
MAVJI C LAKUM v. CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA 1013
[VS. SIRPURKAR, J.]
~-.
cannot be said that the learned Single Judge had exercised A
his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India. This conclusion directly flows from the relevant
averments made in the writ petition and the nature of
jurisdiction invoked by the respondent as noted by the
learned Single Judge in his judgment, as seen earlier. B
'
'I ' Consequently, it could not be said that clause 15 of the
' (~ Letters Patent was not attracted for preferring appeal
against the judgment of the learned Single Judge."

Similar observations regarding Articles 226 and 227 of
the Constitution are to be found in the subsequent decision in c
Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai & Ors. [(2003) 6 SCC
675] where the court has followed the law laid down in Umaji
Keshao Meshram's case (supra) as also in Lokmat's case
(supra).
D
1 15. We are, therefore, convinced that the Division Bench
erred in treating the matter falling only under Article 227 of the
J Constitution of India.
"
16. We would have ordinarily remanded the matter to the
Division Bench for consideration on merits. However, we would E
<
desist from doing that in view of the fact that this whole
controversy has started right from 1984 and 24 years have so
far been lost. The appellant, in this case, was discharged in the
year 1984 and since then he is fighting for his rights. True it is
that he has been paid his back-wages in part, however, we are F
convinced that the Tribunal's order setting aside his order of
.> . punishment of discharge was a correct order and the learned
,• Single Judge erred in setting aside that order.
17. When we see the Tribunal's Award, it is clear that firstly
the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the inquiry was fair and G
'' proper. Thereafter in para 7, the Tribunal has considered the
arguments on behalf of the bank to the effect that once the inquiry
has been held to be legal and proper, no interference can be
made as regards the punishment. It is to be noted that the first
charge against the appellant was rough and rude behaviour H
1014 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

. 4.
A with client Gulabchand and company's partner Harenderbhai
Shah, while the second charge was also regarding the rude
behaviour with the higher officeirs of the bank and disobedience
with the work entrusted; the third charge was that he was
instructed to remain present on the bank's account closing day,
B he had gone away; the fourth charge was regarding the breach
of bank's rules pertaining to leave; the fifth charge was with
regard to frequently leaving the place during office hours without l.
permission while the sixth charge was regarding the illegally
making trunk calls on the bank's phone without permission and
c the seventh charge was incurring excessive debts from
outside. It is already seen that cnarges 4 and 6 were held not to
be proved. It was pointed out before the Tribunal on behalf of
the appellant that for Charge Nos.1 and 3, the punishment was
for stopping the increments while it was for Charge No. 2 and 5'
that the punishment of discharge was awarded. For other
D
charges minor punishments of censure, etc., and stopping of ~
two increments were imposed. Thus it was only for the two
charges, namely, Charge Nos.2 and 5 that the punishment of I
discnarge was given to him. In respect of rest of the charges it
was merely a punishment of stopping of increments. It was
E pointed out by the workman and rightly accepted by the Tribunal
that for· long 40 years of his service there was not a single
allegation against the appellant. It was also considered by the
Tribunal that he nad not only properly worKed for 30-31 years
but has also got promotion of Head Peon during this period.
F
18. The Tribunal then took stock of the evidence of
Harendra Shah with whom the appellant allegedly misbehaved. . '·
The Tribunal ultimately chosa to record that the appellant could •,
not have been found guilty of rnisbehaviour. The Tribunal also '
took stock of the evidence of one Shri Desai and came to the
G
conclusion that he did not even know the duties of the appellant
as a Head Peon and that there was no record available and
further according to this witness there was no record available
of the outgoing trunk calls. The Tribunal also noted the fact that
there was no past record of habitual misconduct on the part of
H
MAVJI C LAKUM v. CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA . 1015
[V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

the appellant and, therefore, the Tribunal came to the concfusion A
that there was no sufficient evidence regarding habitual misuse
of the telephoheS. The Tribunal also noted the evidence of Peon
H:K Pandya who had said that the delinquent conduct was good
with him and he was properly discharging his duties. The Tribunal
has also referred t9 the fact that Shri H.K. Pandya has given his B
) signature on the complaint against the appellant not e\,len
knowing about the document on which he was putting his
signature and that he given the signature just because it was
asked from him. The Tribunal also noted the evidence of H.N. ·
Shethia, ·Clerk and recorded a finding that his· evidence was· C
not believable. The Tribunal has further noted that Shri Sethia
used to visit Shri Jadeja withwhorri the appellant had strained ·
relations. The Tribunal further took stock of evidence of one KB.
Mehta who was unable to tell as to whether any action was taken
against the appellant from 1962 to 1980 arid thatthe conduct of
delinquent was good in the bank premises. ihe evidence of D
t other witnesses, namely, Shri Vadhera and Shr'i J.A. Shah was
considered by the Tribunal and the Tribunal ultimately recorded
that there was no record available with the bank regarding the
past history of the delinquent or about his misbehaviour or any
complaint made by any of the staff members. The Tribunal then E
records:
"On overall examination of the examination-in-chief and
the cross-examination made during the whole departmental
inquiry, it appears that the bank's staff did not like the F
delinquent's conduct, whereas the delinquent was under
· an impression that he is discharging his main duties and
he has not to do any other work. This is during the period
from 1982 only .... "
".... it appears that there is no sufficient record or evidence G
against the delinquent so as to impose punishment of
· discharge on the workman. Therefore, the punishment of
... discharge is liable to be set aside. Now, on overall
appreciation, it appears that due to some sort of bitterness
· between the workman and the staff members, the workman H
1016 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

A has committed some misconduct. In my opinion it would
be just, proper and in the interest of justice of punishment
of withholding the increment with future effect is imposed
upon the delinquent and I, therefore, pass the following
order ....... "
B All this suggests that the Tribunal had considered
everything in great details. l

19. In our opinion under Section 11-A of the Industrial
Disputes Act the Tribunal was quite justified in using its
c discretion. The scope of Section 11-A has been explained by
this Court from time to time in Life Insurance Corporation of
India v. R. Dhandapani [(2006) 13 SCC 613; Mahindra Ltd.
V. N.B. Narawade [(2005) 3 SCC 331) and M.P. Electricity
Board v. Jagdish Chandra Sharma [(2005) 3 SCC 401).
Lastly, this Court has held that in L and T Komatsu Ltd. V. N.
0
Uadayakumar [(2008) 1 sec 224) that assaulting or giving
abuses to the superior would justify the dismissal. We have
carefully examined the facts in all the above cases and find that
the appellant's case nowhere comes near the one described in
E all the <!bove four cases. After all the Tribunal has to judge on
the basis of the proved misbehaviour. In this case we have
already recorded that the Tribunal was firstly correct in holding
that the misbehaviour was not wholly proved and whatever
misconduct was proved, did not deserve the extreme
punishment of discharge.
F
20. on this backdrop when we see unusually long judgment . <
of the learned Single Judge, it comes out that the learned Single
Judge held firstly that the Tribunal had exceeded its powers
vested in it under the provisions of Section 11-A of the Industrial
G Disputes Act. The learned Judge, as regards, Section 11-A,
after quoting the same, observed:
"Though the Tribunal was equipped with the power to come
to its own conclusion whether in a given case the
imposition of punishment of discharge or dismissal from
H the service is justified. It is for that purpose that the Tribunal
MAVJI C LAKUM v. CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA 1017
[V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
_,.,j

is authorized, to go into the evidence that has been A
adduced before the Inquiry Officer in details and find out
whether the punishment of discharge or dismissal is
commensurate with the nature of charges proved against
the delinquent."

So far the finding of the learned Single Judge appears to B
be correct. However, the whole thrust of the judgment has
changed merely because the Industrial Tribunal had found the.
inquiry to. be fair and proper. The learned Judge seems to be of
the opinion that if the inquiry is held to be fair and proper, then
the Industrial Tribunal cannot go into.the question of evidence c
or the quantum of punishment. We are afraid that is not the
correct law. Even if the inquiry is found to be fair, that would be
only a finding certifying that all possible opportunities were given
to the delinquent and the principles of natural justice and fair
play were qbserved. That does not mean that the findings arrived D
at were essentially the correct findings. If the Industrial Tribunal
t. comes to the conclusion that the findings could not be supported
bn the basis of the evidence given or further comes to the
conclusion that the punishment given is shockingly
disproportionate, the Industrial Tribunal would still be justified in E
re-appreciating the evidence and/or interfering with the quantum
of punishment. There can be no dispute that power under Section
11-A has to be exercised judiciously and the interference is
possible only when the Tribunal is not satisfied with the findings
and further concludes that punishment imposed by the F
.., Management is highly disproportionate to the degree of guilt of
the workman concerned. Besides, the Tribunal has to give
reasons as to why it is not satisfied either with the findings or
with the quantum of punishment and that such reason should
not be fanciful or whimsical but there should be good reasons.
G
In our opinion the reasons given by the Tribunal were correct
and the treatment given by the Tribunal to the evidence was
perfectly justified. The Tribunal committed no error in observing
....
that for good long 30 years there was no complaint against the
work of the appellant and that such a complaint suddenly
H
1018 SUPREME COURT REl-'ORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

A surfaced only in the year 1982. The Tribunal was justified in
appreciating the fact that the charges were not only trivial and
were not so serious as to entail the extreme punishment of
discharge. Here was the typical example where the evidence
was of a most general nature and the charges were also not
B such as would have invited the extreme punishment. It was not
as if the appellant had abused or had done any physical
altercation with his superiors or colleagues. What was
complained was of his absence on some days and his
argumentative nature. Though the learned Judge had discussed
c all the principles regarding the exercise of powers under Section
11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act as also the doctrine of
proportionality and the Wednesbury's principles, we are afraid
the learned Judge has not applied all these principles properly
to thP present case. The learned Judge has quoted extensively
from the celebrated decision of Mis.Firestone Tyre & Rubber
D
Co. of India P. Ltd. V. The Management [AIR 1973 SC 1227],
however, the learned Judges seems to have ignored the
observations made in para 32 of that decision where it is
observed that:
c
"-
"The words "in the course of adjudication proceeds, the
Tribunal is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal
was not justified" clearly indicate that the Tribunal is now
clothed with the power of re-appraise the evidence in the
domestic enquiry and satisfy itself whether the said
evidence relied on by an employer establishes the
F
misconduct alleged against· a workman. What was
originally a plausible conclusion that could be drawn by an
..
employer from the evidence, has now given place to a
'
satisfaction being arrived at by the Tribunal that the finding
of misconduct is correct ..... The Tribunal is at liberty to
G
consider not only whether the finding of misconduct
recorded by an employer is correct but also to differ from
the said finding if a proper case is made out"
-r-
We are surprised at the following observations of the
H learned Judge in para 7.1:
MAVJI C LAKUM v. CENTRAL BANK OF !NOIA 1019
[VS. SIRP!JRKAR, J.]

"Nowhere during the course of the judgment the Tribunal·· A
appears to have followed the aforesaid guidelines or the
Wednesbliry test. When it was re-appreciating evidence
and on the strength of it, was reaching to different
conclusions and ultimately it has substituted the
punishment, it was incumbent upon it to follow aforesaid B
guidelines. It was only upon finding that the decision of the
authority was illegal or that it was based on material not
relevant or relevant material was not taken into
consideration or that it was so unreasonable,· that no
prudent man could have reached to such decision or that . c
it was disproportionate to the nature of t.he guilt held
established so as to shock the judicial conscience, the
Tribunal could have substituted the penalty. The entire text
of award of the Tribunal does not indicate this.''. .
We are unable to agree with these observations. D
21. On the other hand the Tribunal, in our opinion has
correctly appreciated the evidence and has also correctly
substituted the punishment. In whole of the judgment, the learned
Single Judge has not referred to any of the factual findings
recorded by the Tribunal. In our opinion the judgment of the E
learned Single Judge was wholly incorrect in so far as it dubbed
the Tribunal's judgment as wrong. We approve of the judgment
of the Tribunal and set aside the judgment of the learned Single
Judge.

.. . ' 22. For the above reasons we are of the opinion' that the
Writ Petition filed by the respondent and ultimateiy confirmed
F

by the appellate judgment was incorrectly allowed. We dismiss
the writ petition and restore the Award of the Tribu~al.
23. In view of the above the appeal is allowed. Under the G
circumstances we deem it fit to inflict the cost of Rs.30,000/-
against the Respondent-bank.
K.K.T. Appeal allowed.
H