Supreme Court of India

MEERA CHAUHANversusHARSH BISHNOI AND ANR.

Citation: 2006 INSC 1005
Decided: 13 December 2006
Disposal: Case Partly allowed
Bench: AR LAKSHMANAN

Holding

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in rejecting the revision and that the trial court’s restoration order was unsustainable; the matter must be reheard with proper evidence and the orders are set aside.

Summary

The suit property was bequeathed to respondent No.2 by a will, but respondent No.1 filed a suit claiming title based on an oral family settlement and obtained an ex‑parte injunction restraining respondent No.2 from transferring the property. While the injunction was in force, the appellant purchased the property from respondent No.2 without knowledge of the suit or injunction. Respondent No.1 subsequently filed a writ petition and a suit for restoration of possession, and also invoked Section 151 CPC. The trial court ordered restoration of possession to respondent No.1, a decision affirmed by the High Court, which had rejected a revision application at the admission stage. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in rejecting the revision and that the trial court’s order was unsustainable because no injunction restraining possession existed, proper oral and documentary evidence was not taken, and the pendency of the writ and suit were ignored. It set aside the orders and directed a fresh hearing with full evidence, emphasizing the limited and exceptional use of Section 151 CPC.

Issues considered

The High Court's propriety in rejecting the revision application at the admission stage.
The trial court's authority to order restoration of possession under Section 151 CPC without proper evidence and in the absence of an injunction restraining possession.
The scope and limits of Section 151 CPC in granting temporary injunctions or restoration of possession.
The effect of the pendency of the writ petition and the suit on the restoration order.
Whether the appellant qualifies as a bona‑fide purchaser without notice.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 151
Specific Relief Act, 1963s. 6

Subjects

Inherent jurisdictionSection 151 CPCRestoration of possessionInterim injunctionBona fide purchaserPendency of suitWrit petitionCivil revisionProperty dispute

Judgment

MEERA CHAUHAN A

HARSH BISHNOI AND ANR.

DECEMBER 13, 2006

[DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN AND TARUN CHATTERJEE, JJ.] B

Code of Civil Procedure, I 908:

Section 15 I-Suit for declaration of title by first party against second
party-Interim order against second party restraining him fi"om alienating C
the property-No injunction restraining him from dispossessing the first
party-Suit property sold to third party-Pendency of suit and interim
injunction not within knowledge of second and third party-Writ Petition by
first party alleging dispossession by second party, pending-Application
under Section I 5 I CPC alleging dispossession allowed by trial court re(ving D
on documenfaJJ' evidence in support of possession offirst party-In Revision,
High Court refusing inte1ference with order of trial court without going into
merit on the ground that dispossession in violation of interim order-On
appeal, held: Rejection of revision application by High Court at the time of
admission was not correct-Dispossession was not in violation of interim
order as there was no such interim order-Trial Court was not justified in E
directing restoration of possession-Trial Court ought to have directed the
parties to advance oral as well as dpcumentary evidence and also considered
the fact of pendency of the suits-Both the courts below also failed to notice
the pendency of the writ petition.

Section I 51-/nherent powers of court-Scope of-Discussed. F

The suit property was bequeathed in favour of respondent No. 2 by
a registered Will by the owner of the property (mother of respondent Nos.
I and 2). After death of his mother, respondent No. 1 applied for mutation
before the Army Authorities and the same was rejected.
G
Respondent No. 1 then filed a suit for declaration of title over the suit
property against respondent No. 2 on the basis of an oral family settlement.
Trial Court granted ex-parte interim order of injunction against respondent
No. 2 from interfering with possession of respondent No. 1.
965 H
966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A When the interim order of injunction was in force, appellant purchased
the suit property from respondent No. 2 and she was put in possession of the
property.

Respondent No. 1 filed Writ Petition alleging forcible alleging
dispossession and seeking restoration of possession. Thereafter he also filed
B a suit seeking restoration of possession. However, the suit was withdrawn
later. Respondent No. l had also filed an application under Section 151 CPC
alleging his dispossession and the same was rejected on the ground that the
suit under the Act was already filed and was pending.

C Appellant made an application for impleadment in the pending suit
and the same was allowed on the ground that neither respondent No. 2
nor appellant had knowledge about the pendency of the suit or the interim
order on the date of sale to the appellant.

. Application under Section 151 CPC reconsidered on direction from
D High Court and then the application was allowed. On consideration of
certain electricity Bills trial court held that resp~ndent No. I was in
possession of the suit property till respondent No. 2 had forcibly
dispossessed him. Revision application against the order of trial court was
rejected by High Court on the ground that dispossession of respondent No.I
was in violation of the injunction order. Hence the present appeal.
E
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. High Court in the facts and circumstances of this case ought
not to have rejected the revisional application at the.admission stage. High
Court proceeded to affirm the order of the trial court only on the ground that
F as an order of injunction passed by that court restraining the appellant and
the respondent no. 2 from interfering with the possession of the respondent
no. I was violated and therefore possession should be restored. This approach
of the High Court, was totally unsustainable as it had failed to notice that no
order of injunction restraining the respondent no. 2 from interfering with
G the possession of the respondent No.I in respect of the suit property was
passed. On the other hand, it was a matter of fact that only an order restraining
the respondent no. 2 from transferring, alienating or encumbering the suit
property was passed till the disposal of the application for injunction. That
apart, the High Court was also not justified in rejecting the civil revisional
application without going into the propriety of the order of the trial court.
H Such being the position, it was improper on the part of the High Court to
MEERA CHAUHAN v. HARSH BISHNOI 967
reject the revisional application in the manner it was done. A
[971-E-H; 972-A-B]

2. Although the triafcourt in its impugned judgment could not prima
facie find title of the responilent No.I in respect of the suit property restoration
of possession in favour of the respondent No.I was, however, directed basing
its finding on the fact of possession at the time of filing of the suit and the B
application for injunction. (972-G-H]

3. Section 151 CPC confers wide powers on the court to make such
orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the
process of the Court. The courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary
order of injunction in the circumstances which are not covered under the C
provisions of Order 39 CPC. However, the inherent power under Section 151
of the Code of Civil Procedure must be exercised only in exceptional
circumstances for which the Code lays down no procedure. At the same time,
it is also well settled that when parties violate order of injunction or stay order
or act in violation of the said order the Court can, by exercising its inherent D
power, put back the parties in the same position as they stood prior to issuance
of the injunction order or give appropriate direction to the police authority to
render aid to the aggrieved parties for the due and proper implementation of
the orders passed in the suit and also order police protection for
implementation of such order. When in the event of utter violation of the
injunction order, the party forcibly dispossesses the other, the Court can order E
restoration of possession to the party wronged. (973-D-H; 974-A)

Manohar v. Hira Lal, AIR (1962) SC 527, referred to.

4. While allowing the application for restoration of possession, the High
Court and the trial court failed to notice the pendency of the writ petition in F
which prayer for restoration for possession was the main issue and the fact
of pendency of suit under Section 6 of the Act. (974-G-H]

5. As per the findings of the trial court, it appears that the respondent
no.I was in possession of the suit property and th?t he was unlawfully
dispossessed from the suit property by the respondent No.2 after relying on G
certain documents produced by him and the court directed restoration of
possession to the respondent No. 1. [974-H; 975-A-B)

6. In order to come to a proper finding of fact that who was in actuaJ
possession, the parties ought to have produced oral evidence along with
documentary evidence. The documents on which reliance was placed by the H
968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 10 S.C.R. -
A respondent no.1 cannot conclusively prove that he was in actual possession of
the suit property at the time of dispossession. For this purpose not only
documentary evidence would be required to be produced but at the same time
oral evidence should also be adduced by the parties particularly when the
parties dispute the question of possession at the appropriate time and also
one party made out a case that possession of the suit property was amicably
B handed over to the other party. In this view of the matter, although for deciding
an application under Section 151 of the CPC, it would not be proper to permit
the parties to adduce oral evidence but in the peculiar facts and circumstances
of this case the trial court ought to have directed the parties to adduce oral
evidence along with documentary evidences and also considered the fact of
C pendency of the suits. The suit filed by the respondent no. I is not a suit for
decree for permanent injunction restraining the respondent no.2 from
interfering with possession of the suit property. There is another aspect of
this matter. At the time of allowing the application for impleadment filed by
the appellant before the trial court, the trial court had come to a finding that
neither the pendency of the suit nor the ex-parte order of injunction was
D within the knowledge of the appellant. Therefore, the appellant was a bona
fide purchaser for value without notice. (975-C-HI

7. Trial court is directed to decide the application for restoration afresh
after permitting the parties to adduce oral and further documentary evidence
E and thereafter come to a conclusion of fact as to who was in actual possession
of the suit property at the rele".ant point of time. [976-A-B]

CIVIL APPEL LA TE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5783 of 2006.

From the final Judgment and order dated 31.8.2005 of the High Court
F of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow in Civil Reivision No.
117 of2005.

Dipankar P. Gupta, V.B. Singh, S.K. Mishra, C.D. Singh, Neeraj Kumar,
Shrish Kumar Misra for the Appellant.

G Respondent No. I in person.

L.N. Rao, Sheetal Prasad Juneja for the Respondents No. 2.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

T ARUN CHATTERJEE,J, Leave granted.
H
MEERA CHAUHAN v. HARSH BISHNOI [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.] 969

Bungalow No.12 at Thimayya Road, Cantonment Lucknow (hereinafter A
referred to as the "Suit property") originally belonged to Smt. Vimla Bishnoi
since deceased who was the mother of the Respondent Nos. I and 2. By a
registered Will executed by her, the suit property was bequeathed in favour
of Anil Bishnoi, who is the respondent No.2 in this appeal. On 15th of May
1996 Smt. Vimla Bishnoi expired. On 11th of June 1996 Harsh Bishnoi, who
is the respondent No. I in this appeal, applied for mutation before the Army B
Authorities, which was rejected by them by an order dated 5th January 1998.

A suit has been filed, being Suit No. 199/2002, in the Court of Civil
Judge (Sr. Div.) Lucknow by the respondent No. I for declaration of title over
the suit property against the respondent No.2 on the basis of an oral family C
settlement of the year 1988. In the plaint, the Respondent No. I herein, has
prayed for permanent injunction restraining the Respondent No.2 from
interfering with his possession over the suit property. In the suit, an application
for injunction restraining the respondent No.2 from transferring, alienating or
encumbering the same has been filed. On 6th May 2002 on the application
for injunction, an ex-parte interim order of injunction restraining the respondent D
No.2 from transferring, alienating or encumbering the suit property was passed.
It is therefore clear that no interim order of injunction was granted by the
Court against the respondent No.2 from interfering with possession of the
respondent No. I in respect of the suit property. According to the respondent
No.2 neither the application for injunction nor the ex-parte interim order of E
injunction was served upon him. When the interim order of injunction was
in force, more precisely on 17th of July 2002, the appellant purchased the
suit property from the respondent No.2 at a consideration of Rs.19 lacs and
she was put into possession of the same on the same date.

Thereafter, a Writ Petition being W.P. No. 4994/2002 was filed by the F
respondent No.I in the High Court of Allahabad, (Bench at Lucknow) on 18th
August 2002 against the State and the Army Authorities as well as the
appellant claiming thereby forcible dispossession during his absence and
praying for restoration of possession.

Subsequent to the filing of the writ petition the respondent No. I on G
20th August 2002 filed a suit being Suit No.402/2002 under Section 6 of the
Specific Relief Act (in short "the Act") before the Civil Judge, Lucknow for
restoration of possession. An application for restoration of possession was
filed by him against the respondent No.2 under Section 151 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, inter alia, on the allegations that he was dispossessed from H
970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A the suit property during the pendency of the suit and interim order of injunction
was in force. However, the application under Section 15 l filed in the suit was
rejected on the ground that the suit under the Act had already been filed and
was pending. More than a year thereafter, more precisely on 22nd September
2004, an application was made at the instance of the respondent No. I for
B withdrawing the suit on the ground that the Writ Petition for possession was
pending in the High Court. The Civil Judge, Lucknow by an order dated
22nd September 2004 allowed the Respondent No. I to withdraw the Suit.
After the application for withdrawal of the Suit was allowed, the appellant
made an application for impleadment in the Suit No. l 99/2002, which was
allowed after hearing the parties. While considering the application for
C impleadment, the trial court made the following observation on the question
of service of notice of injunction order as well as the application for injunction
which is reproduced below:

"On the record there is no document to prove before 17.7.2002 when
the sale deed was executed prior to that the opposite party had
D acknowledged about the interim order passed in this case. · There is
no proof about this knowledge nor there is evidence to the effect that
even third party Smt. Meera had any
knowledge about any interim
order. Opposite party No.3 through here affidavit had stated that she
has purchased her valuable consideration with bona fide and she has
no knowledge that any other person has any claim on disputed property
E at the time of disputed property purchased."

(Underlining is ours)

As noted herein earlier, the application under Section 151 was rejected
by the trial court. Feeling aggrieved by the said order the respondent No. I
F moved a revisional application being C.R. No. 212/2002 before the High Court
which was allowed and the order rejecting the same was set aside. The High
Court directed the trial court to decide the matter on merits after hearing the
parties. In the application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
the respondent No. I alleged his dispossession from the suit property although
G he was claiming to be in possession on the basis of the oral family settlement
of the year 1988 at the time of filing the suit and, therefore, prayed for
restoration of possession.

After the remand, the application under Section 151 was heard in presence
of the appellant and the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and the trial court by an
H
MEERA CHAUHAN v. HARSH BISHNOI [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.) 971

order dated 28th July 2005 allowed the said application directing the respondent A
No.2 and the appellant to restore possession of the suit property, inter-alia,'
on the ground that dispossession of the respondent No. I from the suit
property during the pendency of the suit and the operation of the order of
injunction was not in due course of law.

Feeling aggrieved by the order of the Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) Lucknow, the B
appellant filed a revisional application, which was rejected by the impugned
order by making the following observations:

"I find no illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional in the impugned
order. During the injunction order the plaintiff was dispossessed and C
restoration of possession to the plaintiff was ordered. The trial court
only wanted that the injunction order which has been violated the
same position which existed at the time when the injunction was
granted, should be restored."

Feeling aggrieved thereby, the present Special Leave has been filed for D
which leave is granted.

We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have examined
the impugned order after considering the fact of pendency of the writ petition,
suit filed under Section 6 of the Act and the nature of relief claimed in suit
no 199/2002 as noted herein earlier. We are of the view that the High Court E
in the facts and circumstances of this case ought not to have rejected the
revisional application at the admission stage. Let us, therefore, first consider
whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the revisional application
filed against the order of the trial court allowing the application for restoration
of possession, at the admission stage. As quoted herein above, the High
Court proceeded to affirm the order of the trial court on the basis that the F
respondent No. I was dispossessed during the operation of the injunction
order and also held that the trial court only wanted the order of injunction,
which was violated, should be implemented and that the possession which
existed at the time when the order of injunction was granted should be restored.
Therefore, from the above it is clear that the High Court proceeded to affirm G
the order of the trial court only on the ground that as an order of injunction
passed by that court restraining the appellant and the respondent no. 2 from
interfering with the possession of the respondent no. 1 was violated and
therefore possession should be restored. This approach of the High Court, in
our view, was totally unsustainable as it had failed to notice that no order of
· injunction restraining the respondent no. 2 from interfering with the possession H
972 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. JO S.C.R.

A of the respondent No. I in respect of the suit property was passed: On the
other hand, it was a matter of fact that only an order restraining the respondent
no. 2 from transferring, alienating or encumbering. the suit property was
passed till the disposal of the application for injunction. That apart, in our
view, the High Court was also not justified in rejecting the civil revisional
B application without going into the propriety of the order of the trial comt.
Such being the position, we are of the opinion that it was improper on the
part of the High Court to reject the revisional application in the manner it was
done.

Let us now deal with the order of the trial court allowing the application
C of the respondent No.I under Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure for
restoration of possession. A perusal of the order passed by the trial court on
the application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure reveals that

.
J·
the case of the respondent No. I that he had exclusively got the suit property
by an oral family settlement dated 24th December, 1988 was not prima facie
believed by it. While considering the case of the respondent No. I, the trial
-
D court also took into consideration that the prayer for recording his name
before the Chief Executive Officer, Cantonment Board on the basis of such
oral family settlement was refused. The trial court on the other hand considered
the case of the respondent No.2 made against the application for restoration
in which he claimed the title of the suit property on the basis of the registered
E Wi II executed by the mother of the Respondent Nos. I and 2.

While dealing with this aspect of the matter, the trial court had drawn
an adverse inference against the respondent No. I for not filing any evidence
of ownership and also accepted prima facie the case of the respondent No.2
that he has acquired title to the suit property on the basis of the Will executed
p by his mother. On the basis of this finding, the trial court held that the
ownership of the respondent No. I in respect of the suit property appeared
to be doubtful in view of the fact that the mother of the respondent Nos. I
and 2 was admittedly the owner of the suit property who had executed a Will
bequeathing the suit property in favour of the respondent No.2, as noted
herein earlier.
G
Although the trial court in its impugned judgment could not prima facie
find title of the respondent No. I in respect of the suit property as noted
herein above, restoration of possession in favour of the respondent No. I was,
however, directed basing its finding on the fact of possession at the time of
H filing of the suit and the application for injunction.
MEERA CHAUHAN v. HARSH BISHNOI [T ARUN CHATTERJEE, J.) 973

Before we deal with this question of possession as to who was in actual A
possession at the relevant point of time it would be appropriate to note that
the order for restoration was passed by the trial court on an application under
Section 15 l of the Code of Civil Procedure. A question may arise whether
such an application can be entertained by the Court when specific provision
under Order 39 of t'1e Code of Civil Procedure has been made for grant of
injunction in the form of mandatory order in the exercise of power under the B
said Order. Therefore to decide this aspect of the matter, let us consider the
scope of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 151 reads as
under:-

"151.Saving of inherent powers of Court.- Nothing in this Code shall C
be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the
Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice
or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court."

A bare perusal of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it cannot
be said to be in dispute that Section 151 confers wide powers on the court D
to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent
abuse of the process of the Court.

The power of Section 151 to pass order of injunction in the form of
restoration of possession of the code is not res integra now.
E
In Manohar v. Hira Lal, AIR (1962) SC 527 while dealing with the
power of the Court to pass orders for the ends of justice or to prevent the
abuse of the process of the Court, this Court held that the courts have inherent
jurisdiction to issue temporary order of injunction in the circumstances which
are not covered under the provisions of Order 39 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. However, it was held by this Court in the aforesaid decision that F
the inherent power under Section 15 l of the Code of Civil Procedure must be
exercised only in exceptional circumstances for which the Code lays down no
procedure.

At the same time, it is also well settled that when parties violate order
of injunction or stay order or act in violation of the said order the Court can, G
by exercising its inherent power, put back the parties in the same position as
they stood prior to issuance of the injunction order or give appropriate
direction to the police authority to render aid to the aggrieved parties for the
due and proper implementation of the orders passed in the suit and also order
police protection for implementation of such order. H
974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A It is also well settled that when in the event of utter violation of the
injunction order, the party forcibly dispossesses the other, the Court can
order restoration of possession to the party wronged.

Keeping the aforesaid principles in mind for exercising of power under
Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure, we proceed to consider the facts and
B circumstances of the case and decide whether the High Court as well as the
trial court was justified in the facts and circumstances of the case to direct
restoration of possession.

While considering the question as to who was in possession at the
appropriate time, the trial court came to a finding on consideration of certain
C electricity bills and other materials, that the respondent No. I was in possession
of the suit property till the respondent no.2 had forcibly dispossessed him and
therefore he was entitled to get his possession restored as he was evicted
without following any legal procedure. In the said order, the trial court
considered that although the respondent no. I had not sought protection of
D his possession either in the plaint or in the application for injunction nor any
order of injunction protecting possession was in force, even then it directed
restoration of possession in favour of the respondent No. I only on a finding
that the suit was pending and that the respondent No. I who was in possession
was dispossessed illegally. Accordingly the trial court directed restoration of
possession in the interest of justice against such illegal action.
E
At the risk of repetition, looking to the prayers made in the plaint as
well as in the application for injunction, we do not find that the prayer for
injunction restraining the respondent No.2 from interfering with the possession
of the respondent No. I over the suit property was granted. Respondent No. I
F simply prayed for an order of injunction restraining the respondent No.2 from
transferring, alienating or encumbering the suit property till the disposal of
the application for injunction.

Coming back to the propriety of the order of the trial court, we may
note that while allowing the application for restoration of possession, the
G High Court and the trial court failed to notice the pendency of the writ petition
in which prayer for restoration for possession was the main issue and the fact
of pendency of suit under Section 6 of the Act.

Now, the question before us relates to the issue to be decided as to who
was in possession of the suit property at the time when Suit No. 199/2002
H was filed. As per the findings of the trial court, it appears that the respondent
MEERA CHAUHAN v. HARSH BISHNOI [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.] 975

no. I was in possession of the suit property and that he was unlawfully A
dispossessed from the suit property by the respondent No.2 after relying on
certain documents produced by him and the court directed restoration of
possession to the respondent No. I. In order to find who was in possession
of the suit property the respondent no. I relied on the report of change of
electricity meter dated 9th April, 2002 and photocopy of bail bond dated 14th
January, 2005. Certain other electricity bills of the year 2003 were also filed B
to show that the respondent no. I was the consumer of the electricity in the
suit property. Some other documents to show that address of the respondent
no. I was the suit property were also filed. In order to show that the respondent
no.2 was in possession of the suit property at the time of filing of the suit and
such possession was delivered to the appellant, reliance was placed on the C
rejection of the prayer of the respondent no. I to record his name being in
possession of the same. It also appears that it was the case of the appellant
that possession of the suit property was amicably handed over to the respondent
no.2 by the respondent no. I. In order to come to a proper finding of fact
that who was in actual possession, the parties ought to have produced oral
evidence along with documentary evidence. In our view, the documents on D
which reliance was placed by the respondent no. I cannot conclusively prove
that he was in actual possession of the suit property at the time of
dispossession. For this purpose not only documentary evidence would be
required to be produced but at the same time oral evidence should also be
adduced by the parties particularly when the parties dispute the question of E
possession at the appropriate time and also one party made out a case that
possession of the suit property was amicably handed over to the other party.
In this view of the matter, although for deciding an application under Section
151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it would not be proper to permit the parties
to adduce oral evidence but in th.e peculiar facts and circumstances of this
case we are of the view that the trial court ought to have directed the parties F
to adduce oral evidence along with documentary evidences and also
considered the fact of pendency of the suits as noted herein earlier. The suit
filed by the respondent no. I is not a suit for decree for permanent injunction
restraining the respondent no.2 from interfering with possession of the suit
property. There is another aspect of this matter. We have already noted G
herein earlier that at the time of allowing the application for impleadment filed
by the appellant before the trial court, the trial court had come to a finding
that neither the pendency of the suit nor the ex-parte order of injunction was
within the knowledge of the appellant. Therefore, we are of the view that the
appellant was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. Be that as it
H
976 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. IO S.C.R.

A may, this question may not be very germane in the facts of this case.
That being the position, we set aside the order of the High Court and
the trial court and direct the trial court to decide the application for restoration
afresh after permitting the parties to adduce oral and further documentary
evidence and thereafter come to a conclusion of fact as to who was in actual
B possession of the suit property at the relevant point of time.

It is not now in dispute that in compliance with the order of the trial
court, which was affirmed by the High Court, possession has now been
delivered to the respondent no. I. In the event,_ trial court comes to a finding
C that the respondent no.I was in possession of the suit property at the relevant
time as indicated above, the question of delivery of possession by the
respondent no. I to the appellant shall not arise. However, if the trial court
finds that the respondent no. I was not in possession of the suit property at
the relevant point of time and the respondent no.2 was in possession of the
suit property, in that case the trial court shall direct restoration of possession
·D in favour of the appellant.

The trial court is directed to dispose of the application under Section
151 of the Code of Civil Procedure afresh within a period of three months from
the date of this judgment. If application for injunction is still pending for
adjudication, the same may also be decided at an early date preferably within
E a period of three months from the date of passing of final order on the
application under Section I 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. There
will be no order as to costs.

F K.KT. Appeal partly allowed.

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