Holding

The applicability of Section 25-F depends on the determination of retrenchment under Section 2(oo)(bb); since the Tribunal failed to consider this, the appeal is allowed and the matter is remitted for fresh consideration.

Summary

Ramesh Chand was engaged as a casual labourer for a specific microwave project and worked for more than 240 days before the project was completed and the office was abolished. He challenged his termination, arguing that it violated the mandatory requirements of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Industrial Tribunal held his termination illegal, treating it as retrenchment under Section 2(oo)(bb) and ordered reinstatement with 30% back wages; the High Court upheld this order. On appeal, the Supreme Court observed that the Tribunal and the High Court failed to consider whether the termination actually fell within Section 2(oo)(bb), which determines the applicability of Section 25-F. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, remitted the matter to the Tribunal for fresh consideration, and directed a prompt disposal.

Issues considered

Whether the termination of a casual labourer engaged for a specific project, who worked more than 240 days, amounts to retrenchment under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Whether Section 25-F's mandatory requirements apply to such a casual labourer, rendering the termination illegal.
Whether the Tribunal and High Court erred by not first determining the applicability of Section 2(oo)(bb) before applying Section 25-F.

Legislation cited

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 25-F, s. 2(oo)(bb)

Subjects

industrial disputescasual labourretrenchmentterminationSection 25-FSection 2(oo)(bb)employment lawproject-based employmentreinstatementback wages

Judgment

MICROWAVE PROJECT, KOTA AND ANR.
-":
v. A
RAMESH CHAND

JULy 18, 2007

[DR. ARIJIT PASA YAT AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.]
B
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Industrial Disputes Act. 1947:

ss. 25-F and 2(oo){bb)---Casual labourer appointed for spt!cific project
and on completion of work relieved from job-Tribunal and High Court held
that his termination was bad as there was violation of mandatory requirement
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of s.25-F-On appeal, held: Question of applicability of s. 25-F dependent
upon the basic question relating to applicability of s. 2(oo){bb)-That aspect
lost sight of-Matter remitted to tribunal.

The respondent was engaged as a casual labourer for a specific project D
-\ by the appellants. After completion of the work and commissioning of the
4-
project, respondent was relieved from his job. The office of the appeilants was
also abolished as there was no need of work. Respondent raised dispute
challenging his termination.

The Industrial Tribunal held that since the respondent worked for 240 E
days in the establishment of the appellant, his termination was bad as there
was violation of the mandatory requirements of s. 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. Removal from service amounted to retrenchment under s. 2(oo)
and ordered reinstatement ltith 30% back wages. High Court upheld the order.
Hence the present appeal.
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Allowing the appeal and remitting the matter to the tribunal, the Court

HELD: The Tribunal failed to consider the issue in proper perspective.
The effect of s. 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has been
completely lost sight of. There was no dispute that the employment was for a
specific project There was no discussion of the various materials produced
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before the Tribunal. The orders of the High Court proceeded on the basis
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that because there was non-compliance with the requirement ofs. 25-F, the
Award was justified. The question of the applicability of s. 25-F of the Act
would be dependent upon the basic question relating to applicability of
403 H
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 8 S.C.R.
,I

A s.2(oo)(bb) of the Act. That aspect has been lost sight of. (Para 6) (405-E, F) -t-~

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2851 of2005.

From the Judgment & Order dated 04.02.2004 of the High Court of
Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur in D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.
B 194 of2000 with D.B. Civil Misc. Stay Application No. 1155 of2000 in S.B.
Civil Writ Petition No. 4276 of 1999.
,.
V.K. Shukla, A.K. Tripathi and K.K. Mohan for the Appellants. +
Ajay Choudhary for the Respondent.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DR. ARIJIT PASAYA T, J. I. Challenge in this appeal is to the order
passed by a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench,
dismissing the special leave filed by the appellant.
D .
2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
+
Respondent was engaged as a casual labourer by the Assistant Engineer
of the Microwave Project Borabas for the job of fixing of nuts and bolts in
the Microwave Tower. After completion of the work and commissioning of the
E Microwave Towers, respondent was relieved from his job on 1.12.1987. Office
of the Microwave, Kota, was also abolished as there was no need of work
and in any event it was only of casual nature. Respondent raised a dispute
to the effect that there was. termination of his services which is illegal. The
Labour Ministry, Govt. oflndia vide order dated 30.9.1991 referred the following
dispute under Section I 0( I) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the
F 'Act') to the Industrial Tribunal (Central) Kota, Rajasthan.

"Whether the action of the AEN Microwave Project, Kota & LET,
Jaipur in terminating the services of Shri Ramesh Chand, S/o Shri
Jankidas, Casual Labour under AEN Microwave Project, Kota at
Lawatbhata w.e.f. 1.12.1987 is justified? If not, to what relief the
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concerned workman is entitled?"
3. On behalf of the applicant it' was pleaded that he had been engaged
as casual labourer on 8.12.1986 and, therefore, he having worked for more ~
than 240 days in 12 calendar months could not have been terminated. The
appellant took the stand that the respondent was engaged for doing a particular
H
MICROWAVE PROJECT, KOTA 1·. RAMESH CHAND[PASA YA T,J.] 405

work on a casual labour basis. Since the establishment itself was closed after A
. completion of the work there was no scope for accepting the prayer of the
respondent. The Tribunal held that since the respondent worked for 240 days
in the establishment of the present appellant, his termination will be bad as
there was violation of the mandatory requirements of Section 25-F of the Act.
Removal from service amounted to retrenchme.-t under Section 2(oo) of the B
Act. With these conclusions it was held that the respondent was entitled to
be re-employed to continue to be in service along with the 30% back wages.
A writ petition was filed before the High Court. A learned Single Judge by
a very cryptic order held that the Labour Court has held that there was
violation of the requirements of Section 25-F of the Act and, therefore, there
was no legality. The Division Bench came to the similar conclusions. C
4. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that there is no dispute that the engagement was for a specific project. The
Tribunal has categorically noted about these aspects but granted relief to the
respondent. It was noted that the office of the present appellant was under
the Jaipur Division and the new Kota Division has been created after D
bifurcation of the Division.
5. In response, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that it
should be accepted that the project has been completed, yet in view of the
fact that there was bifurcation, the Tribunal was justified in its conclusion.
6. We find that the Tribunal failed to consider the issue~ in proper E
perspective. The effect of Section 2(oo)(bb) has been completely lost sight
of. There was no dispute that the employment was for a specific project.
There was no discJssion of the various materials produced before the Tribunal.
The orders of the High Court proceeded on the basis that because there was
non-compliance with the requirements of Section 25-F. the Award was justified.
The question of the applicability of Section 25-F of the Act would be F
dependent upon the basic question relating to applicability of Section 2(oo)(bb)
of the Act. That aspect has been lost sight of. We, therefore, think it
appropriate to remit the matter to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. Parties
will be permitted to place material in support of their respective stand. As the
matter is pending since long, we request the Tribunal to dispose of the matter G
within a period of four months from the date of receipt of the copy of this
judg1nent.
7. Appeal is allowed with no orders as to costs.
D.G. Appeal allowed.
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