MISHRA AND S. ABDUL NAZEER, JJ.]versusSARAH C. URS & ORS.

                         [2019] 13 S.C.R. 1069                              1069


      SIRDAR K.B. RAMACHANDRA RAJ URS. (DEAD)                               A
                           THROUGH LRS.
                                   v.
                      SARAH C. URS & ORS.
                    (Civil Appeal No.6049 of 2007)                          B
                         OCTOBER 24, 2019
      [ARUN MISHRA AND S. ABDUL NAZEER, JJ.]
       Estoppel – When not attracted – Suit property let out to plaintiff
no.2 by the late father of defendant no.1 and defendant no.1 –              C
Father of defendant no.1, represented by defendant no.1 as power
of attorney, entered into an agreement to sell with the plaintiffs for
Rs.1,50,000/- out of which Rs.1,00,000/- was received on the same
day – Plaintiffs continued to have the possession of suit property in
part performance of the agreement and stopped paying rent –
                                                                            D
Defendant no.1 received the balance sale consideration from
plaintiff no.2 and undertook to execute the deed of conveyance –
Defendant no.1 was postponing to execute the registered sale deed
– Suit filed seeking specific performance – Trial court decreed the
suit – Affirmed by the High Court – Plea of defendants-appellants
that the agreement was with the father of defendant no.1 and not            E
with defendant no.1 who did not execute agreement of his share
and thus, the suit could not have been decree in toto – Held: Bare
reading of the agreement makes it clear that the “Vendors” was late
father of the defendant no.1 and not defendant no.1 – Defendant
no.1 acted as power of attorney – Said position may indicate that
                                                                            F
plaintiffs were misled that only father of defendant no.1 was the
exclusive owner of the property – However, the statement of plaintiff
no.2 clearly indicates that he was well aware of the fact that the
property devolved upon, in equal shares and that it was a joint
family property – Ownership of the defendant no.1 was known to
the plaintiffs and in spite of that they did not set up the case to bind    G
his share – They did not plead in the plaint that defendant no.1
owned the property – In the plaint, the plaintiffs did not take the
plea of estoppel and now the case was set up that property had
been sold by defendant no.1 in his capacity – In view of the
agreement and the admission made by the plaintiffs, decree passed
                                                                            H
                                 1069
1070            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2019] 13 S.C.R.


 A     by the courts below modified to the extent of 50 per cent of the
       shares of the late father of defendant no.1 and is set aside with
       respect to the remaining ½ share of the defendant no.1 – Trial court
       to divide the property in two equal proportions and it be given to
       the parties – Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – s.15 – Income Tax Act,
       1961 – s.230-A.
 B
             Disposing of the appeals, the Court
             HELD: 1.1 The concurrent findings are recorded as to
       receipt of consideration and execution of the agreement to sell.
       There is no doubt about it that Plaintiff No.2 was earlier a counsel
 C     and legal advisor to father of defendant no.1, but when the
       agreement had been executed, he was not a lawyer and became a
       Judge of the High Court. There are concurrent findings recorded
       concerning the execution of the agreement, and it has been rightly
       found established that signatures were not obtained on blank
       papers. There is concurrent finding recorded by the courts below
 D     that consideration has been paid. Thus, no case for interference
       is made out in the aforesaid findings. The courts below have found
       that correspondence was made by defendants No.1 to obtain
       Income Tax clearance. The suit has been held not to be barred
       by limitation. Given the facts and material placed on record, no
 E     interference is called for with those findings also. [Paras 16,
       17][1076-A-C]
             1.2 A bare reading of the agreement makes it clear that
       agreement is between late father of defendant no.1 through power
       of attorney, Defendant No.1. The “Vendors” is mentioned as late
 F     father of defendant no.1 and not defendant no.1. Thus, it cannot
       be said that defendant no.1 had executed the agreement on his
       behalf, concerning his share in the property. There is no whisper
       about the same in the agreement. The position mentioned above
       may indicate that plaintiffs were misled by the Power of Attorney
       holder that only late father of defendant no.1 was the exclusive
 G     owner of the property. When the statement of Plaintiff No.2 is
       considered it clearly indicates that he was well aware of the fact
       that Princess Leelavathi owned the property and upon her death
       the property devolved upon, in equal shares and he was aware of
       the other sale deeds executed (Exhs. P 43, P-44, P-45, P-46). It
 H     is clear that plaintiff No.2 was aware as to the extant title of
           SIRDAR K.B. RAMACHANDRA RAJ URS. (DEAD)                       1071
              THROUGH LRS. v. SARAH C. URS & ORS.


defendant no.1 in the property and also the fact that it was a joint     A
family property. In the plaint, the plaintiffs have not taken the
plea of estoppel, and now the case was set up that property had
been sold by defendant no.1 in his capacity without any such plea
in the plaint. Thus, plaintiff No.2 was well aware of the fact as to
the title of defendant no.1 in the property and that late father of
                                                                         B
defendant no.1 did not exclusively own the property. [Paras
20][1079-A-D]
       1.3 There was no possibility of erroneous beliefs in the mind
of the plaintiffs as to title position in the property. No doubt about
it that defendant No.1 acted as a power of attorney, but at the
same time, did not act in his capacity as the owner of the property.     C
The ownership of defendant no.1 was known to the plaintiffs. In
spite of that the plaintiffs have not set up the case to bind his
share. They have not pleaded in the plaint that defendant no.1
owned the property. There is no whisper as to his title in the
plaint. They needed to plead the facts to attract the plea of            D
estoppel. That has not been done. Thus, the agreement which
had been executed was not concerning share of defendant No.1,
but of his late father as his power of attorney. [Paras 22][1081-
F-G]
      1.4 In view of the agreement and the admission made by             E
the plaintiffs, it is appropriate to modify the decree passed by the
courts below to the extent of 50 per cent of the shares of the
deceased late father of defendant no.1 and to set it aside with
respect to the remaining ½ share of defendant No.1 in the
property, since the property devolved under section 15 of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The plaintiffs to be entitled only to        F
the extent of ½ share in the suit property. The decree to the
remaining extent is set aside. The plaintiffs would not be entitled
to refund of any consideration as by now the worth of property
has increased manifold. The trial court to divide the property in
two equal proportions and it be given to the parties. The division       G
be carried out within four months by the Trial Court.
[Paras 23-25][1081-H; 1082-A-C]
      R.S. Madanappa (deceased) v. Chandramma & Anr.
      AIR 1965 SC 1812 : [1965] SCR 283 – relied on.
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1072            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 13 S.C.R.


 A                             Case Law Reference
       [1965] SCR 283                    relied on                Para 18
             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6049
       of 2007.
 B          From the Judgment and Order dated 13.08.2007 of the High Court
       of Karnataka at Bangalore in R.F.A. No. 143 of 2000.
                                            With
             Civil Appeal No. 6050 of 2007.
             A. K. Ganguli, V. Krishnamurthy, Sr. Advs., T. Harish Kumar,
 C
       Yuthister Singh, Navneet Dugar, Parijat Sinha, Advs. for the Appellants.
            Jaideep Gupta, Sr. Adv., Ms. Anushree Menon, Vikas Mehta,
       Abhishek, Advs. for the Respondents.
             The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
 D           ARUN MISHRA, J.
             1. The appeals are preferred against the judgment and order dated
       13.8.2007 passed by the High Court, affirming the judgment and order
       of the trial court decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiff for specific
       performance of an agreement of sale.
 E
              2. The plaintiffs filed the suit concerning suit scheduled property
       inherited by Princess Leelavathi, wife of late K. Basavaraja Urs. She
       had adopted the defendant No.1 and died during the year 1958-59. The
       suit scheduled property along with adjoining properties devolved on late
       K. Basavaraja Urs, father of K.B. Ramachandra Raj Urs, defendant
 F     No.1, in terms of section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The
       Plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 were the close relatives and friend of the family of
       late K. Basavaraja Urs and the 2nd plaintiff apart from being a close
       relative and friend of Defendant No.1, was also a Legal Advisor and
       Advocate of late K. Basavaraja Urs.
 G            3. The property was let out to plaintiff No.2 in the year 1969 by
       late K. Basavaraja Urs and defendant No.1. Late K. Basavaraja Urs
       and defendant No.1 sold the adjoining property to various persons vide
       registered sale deeds. Late K. Basavaraja Urs offered to sell the suit
       scheduled property to the plaintiffs. On 24.4.1979, late K. Basavaraja
       Urs, represented by his son, i.e., defendant No.1 as power of attorney,
 H
          SIRDAR K.B. RAMACHANDRA RAJ URS. (DEAD)                              1073
      THROUGH LRS. v. SARAH C. URS & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]


entered into an agreement to sell with the plaintiffs for a consideration      A
of Rs.1,50,000/- out of which a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- was received on
the same day. The defendant No.1 agreed to obtain a clearance certificate
under section 230-A of the Income Tax Act as also under the provisions
of the Urban Land Ceiling Act. The plaintiffs continued to have the
possession of suit property in part performance of the agreement dated
                                                                               B
24.04.1979 and stopped paying rent.
      4. The defendant No.1 always ensured the plaintiffs to execute
the registered sale deed in terms of suit agreement after obtaining a
clearance certificate from the Income Tax Department and under the
Urban Land Ceiling Act. On 1.6.1993, defendant No.1 received the
balance sale consideration of Rs.50,000/- from 2nd plaintiff and executed      C
a stamped receipt in favour of the plaintiffs with an undertaking to execute
the deed of conveyance.
       5. The defendant No.1, made the correspondence with the Income
Tax Department to obtain the Income Tax clearance. However, the need
to seek permission under the Urban Land Ceiling Authority vanished as          D
per the decision of this Court concerning section 27 of the said Act as
defendant No.1 was postponing to execute the registered sale deed on
one pretext or the other. A legal notice dated 5.6.1990 was served, and
after that, the suit had been filed on 19.9.1990 seeking specific
performance.                                                                   E
       6. Defendant Nos.1, 2, and 4 in their written statements contended
that the 2nd plaintiff claimed to be a close relative of late K. Basavaraja
Urs. He was his lawyer and self-assumed trustee. He obtained the
signatures of defendant no.1 on blank papers, which has been misused
by the 2nd plaintiff to create the agreement in question dated 24.4.1979.      F
It was assured that agreement was obtained as a collateral document to
secure professional charges, which, according to the plaintiff, remained
unpaid.
       7. The defendants denied the receipt of the sale consideration on
24.4.1979 and 1.6.1993 and also the subsequent correspondence between          G
plaintiff No.2 and defendant No.1 and his Tax Consultant. The 2nd plaintiff
was never permitted to put up construction on the property by the
defendant No.1. After the demise of Princess Leelavathi, the suit property
devolved on late K. Basavaraja Urs and defendant No.1. The 1st defendant
has not conveyed his interest in the suit property in favour of plaintiffs.
                                                                               H
1074             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 13 S.C.R.


 A     Defendants contended that no agreement was entered into with the
       plaintiffs. The suit is barred by time.
             8. Defendant No.5, in his written statement, took the plea that the
       property being ancestral could not have been sold by defendant No.1 to
       the detriment of the 5th defendant. There was no legal necessity to sell
 B     the property.
              9. The trial court decreed the suit and recorded a finding that the
       agreement has been executed on 24.4.1979. The defendant No.1 has
       admitted his signatures on the suit agreement dated 24.4.1979 and receipt
       dated 1.6.1983. Defendant No.1 for himself and as a power of attorney
 C     holder of late K. Basavaraja Urs, executed the suit agreement and,
       therefore, he cannot be permitted to contend that he is not a party to the
       suit agreement in his individual capacity. They were required to obtain
       an income tax clearance certificate and after that to execute the registered
       sale deed, in which they have failed. Late K. Basavaraja Urs owned
       vast landed and house properties at Bangalore and Mysore. They were
 D     statutorily bound to obtain a clearance certificate from the Income Tax
       Department, and as they failed to obtain it, they cannot be permitted to
       contend that suit is barred by limitation. The High Court has affirmed
       the findings of the trial court.
              10. The High Court has disbelieved the case set up by defendant
 E     No.1 that he had put his signatures on blank paper. Plaintiff No.2 was
       appointed as Judge of the High Court during September 1978; therefore,
       on 24.4.1979, there was no fiduciary relationship between them. Plaintiffs
       have also produced the original stamped receipt dated 1.6.1983 (Exhibit
       P-19) admitting the receipt of remaining Rs.50,000 by defendants No.1
       in which a sum of Rs.42,000 was paid in cash and Rs.8,000 was paid by
 F     cheque. Defendant No.1 had admitted his signatures on Exh. P-19.
       Defendant No.1 also admitted that he had encashed the cheque. The
       plea of the 1st defendant is false and thus cannot be accepted. The High
       Court has also referred to the order passed by the Income Tax Appellate
       Tribunal wherein the claim of 2nd plaintiff for exemption of Rs.50,000
       under the Income Tax Act, paid to 1st defendant towards the remaining
 G
       sale consideration was allowed in terms of section 54(F) of Income Tax
       Act.
              11. The High Court has further found that the defendant has taken
       an inconsistent and contrary stand. The defendant was visiting 2nd plaintiff
       all along insisting on obtaining Income Tax Clearance Certificate, which
 H
          SIRDAR K.B. RAMACHANDRA RAJ URS. (DEAD)                             1075
      THROUGH LRS. v. SARAH C. URS & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]


was postponed by the defendant No.1 on one pretext or the other. The          A
consideration has been paid under the agreement dated 24.4.1979.
       12. The High Court has found that defendant No.1 has executed
the agreement not only as power of attorney for his father but also as a
son of late K. Basavaraja Urs. The stand of defendant No.1 is inconsistent.
Defendant No.1, allowed the plaintiffs to put up the construction in the      B
suit property. Thus, he was precluded from contending that he was not a
party to the agreement. The High Court has also held that defendant
No.1 has entered into the agreement and the entire consideration has
been received, it is not considered appropriate to grant the liquidated
damage or penalty for the breach of contract. The High Court has also
held that the property was held by Princess Leelavathi, wife of late          C
K. Basavaraja Urs, and after her death, the suit property devolved on
late K. Basavaraj Urs and defendant No.1 under section 15 of Hindu
Succession Act, 1956.
       13. It was submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellants that plaintiff No.2, M.P. Chandrakanta Raj Urs, was         D
elevated as Judge of the High Court. Earlier, he was the Legal Advisor
of the late K. Basavaraja Urs. Thus, he could not have purchased the
property. The agreement was not duly executed, and the suit was barred
by limitation. The findings have been recorded that property was inherited
by K.B. Ram Chandra Raj Urs, i.e., defendant No. 1 from Princess              E
Leelavathi. The agreement was with late K. Basavaraja Urs and not
with defendant No.1. Defendant No.1 did not execute agreement of his
share. The Courts below erred in decreeing the suit in toto. The suit
could have been decreed to the extent of the shares of the late
K. Basavaraja Urs.
                                                                              F
       14. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents
has supported the judgment and decree passed by the courts below. It is
further submitted that no case for interference is made out in the appeals
given the concurrent findings of facts recorded by the courts below. The
appeals deserve to be dismissed.
                                                                              G
       15. We deem it appropriate to place on record that learned counsel
for the parties had taken time to file the compromise, if reached. We
have been informed that no compromise could be arrived at between
the parties. Be that as it may. We proceed to decide the appeals on
merits.
                                                                              H
1076             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 13 S.C.R.


 A            16. The concurrent findings are recorded as to receipt of
       consideration and execution of the agreement to sell. There is no doubt
       about it that M.P. Chandrakanta Raj Urs (Plaintiff No.2) was earlier a
       counsel and legal advisor to K. Basavaraja Urs, but when the agreement
       had been executed, he was not a lawyer and became a Judge of the
       High Court. There are concurrent findings recorded concerning the
 B
       execution of the agreement, and it has been rightly found established
       that signatures were not obtained on blank papers. There is concurrent
       finding recorded by the courts below that consideration has been paid.
       Thus, no case for interference is made out in the aforesaid findings.
             17. The courts below have found that correspondence was made
 C     by defendants No.1 to obtain Income Tax clearance. The suit has been
       held not to be barred by limitation. Given the facts and material placed
       on record, no interference is called for with those findings also.
              18. Learned senior counsel submitted that agreement to sell dated
       24.4.1979 was between “late K. Basavaraja Urs and “Smt. Sarah
 D     C. Urs’, wife of M.P. Chandrakantaraj Urs and P. Chandrakantaraj Urs,
       son of Late R. Putturaj Urs”. There was no dispute concerning ½ share
       of K.B. Ram Chandra Raj Urs, which he had inherited from Princess
       Leelavathi. Thus, the suit could not have been decreed in toto; it could
       have been decreed only to the extent of the share of late K. Basavaraja
 E     Urs in the property. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the
       decision of this Court in R.S. Madanappa (deceased) v. Chandramma
       & Anr., AIR 1965 SC 1812.
              19. The statement of plaintiff No. 2 has been pointed out, indicating
       that he was aware that there were equal shares of K. Basavaraja Urs
 F     and K. B. Ramchandra Raj Urs (defendant No.1) in the property. Thus,
       plaintiff No.2 cannot plead that they were induced by erroneous belief
       while entering into agreement, by the conduct of defendant No.1. The
       plea of estoppel is, thus, not attracted. There is no proper foundation in
       the pleading regarding the plea of estoppel. The submission raised by
       learned counsel on behalf of respondent is that defendant No.1 acted as
 G     power of attorney holder of his father and received the sale consideration
       also. As such he is bound by the plea of estoppel to contend to the
       contrary.
             20. It is necessary to consider the agreement. The agreement is
       extracted hereunder:
 H
    SIRDAR K.B. RAMACHANDRA RAJ URS. (DEAD)                                1077
THROUGH LRS. v. SARAH C. URS & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]


 “THIS AGREEMENT TO SELL is made on 24th day of April                      A
1979 BETWEEN SRI K. BASAVARAJ URS, son of Late
Sri Muddaraj Urs, aged about 84 years, residing at 1-A (old No.5),
Palace Road, Bangalore – 560 001 (hereinafter referred to as the
“VENDOR” which expression shall unless the context otherwise
required include the heirs, assigns, administrators, successors and        B
legal representatives of the VENDOR) of the one part AND
SMT. SARAH C. URS, the wife of Sri M.P. Chandrakantaraj
Urs and SRI P CHANDRAKANTARAJ URS, son of late Sri R
Putturaj Urs, residing at 1B Palace Road, Bangalore – 560001,
(hereinafter called the “PURCHASERS” which expression shall
unless the context otherwise requires to include their heirs, assigns,     C
administrators, successors and legal representatives of the other
part.
    WHEREAS the VENDOR is the absolute owner of the
property at 1B, Palace Road, Bangalore – 560001, an whereas
the VENDOR is desirous of disposing of the said house together             D
with the plot of land, fixtures, fittings, etc. of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees
One Lakh Fifty Thousand only) and the PURCHASERS are
agreeable to buy the same at the said price.
NOW THEREFORE, THIS DEED/ WITNESSETH AS
FOLLOWS:                                                                   E

(1) That the VENDOR shall free from encumbrances the said
    property situated at q-B Palace Road, Bangalore – 560 001,
    and the PURCHASER shall buy the same at the said prices
    and on the conditions hereinafter mentioned;
                                                                           F
(2) That the said property consists of a single-storeyed house
    with the following boundaries:-
     On the EAST: No.1-C
     On the WEST: Vacant land of VENDOR
                                                                           G
     On the NORTH: Storm Drain
     On the SOUTH: By Common Road
(3) That the consideration of the house shall be payable as
    follows:-
                                                                           H
1078      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 13 S.C.R.


 A         A sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Only) paid on the
           date of this agreement and the balance of Rs.5,40,000/-
           (Rupees Fifty Thousand only payable on or before 23.4.1984.
       (4) The VENDOR has delivered possession of the house, which
           is the subject matter of this agreement to the PURCHASERS
 B         on this day.
       (5) This agreement shall subject to permission, express or implied,
           being granted under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)
           Act. In the event such permission is not granted, the advance
           of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) paid shall be
 C         refunded to the PURCHASERS by the VENDOR:
       (6) That in the event of the sale not materializing through the
           default of the VENDOR, the amount of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees
           One Lakh Only) shall be refunded to the PURCHASERS
           with interest at 10 percent per annum from the date hereof to
           the date of refund;
 D
       (7) That in the event of the sale not materializing through the
           default of the PURCHASERS, 10 percent of the
           consideration money shall be forfeited as earnest money and
           the balance refunded by the VENDOR to the
           PURCHASERS out of the advance of Rs.1,00,000/-
 E         (Rupees One lakh only) received by the former;
       (8) VENDOR or his Power of Attorney shall cause all licences
           etc., to be sanctioned for any additions or alterations to be
           made to the premise before the actual transfer of title in terms
           of this agreement.
 F
           IN WITNESS where of the parties have set their hands the
           day and the year first above mentioned.


                                                                    Sd/-
 G                                                               SELLER
                 WITNESSES:
                                  1. Sd/-
                                  2. Sd/-
                                     PURCHASERS”
 H
          SIRDAR K.B. RAMACHANDRA RAJ URS. (DEAD)                                  1079
      THROUGH LRS. v. SARAH C. URS & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]


       A bare reading of the agreement described above makes it clear              A
that agreement is between late K. Basavaraja Urs through power of
attorney, K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs. The “Vendors” is mentioned as
K. Basavaraja Urs and not K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs. Thus, it cannot
be said that K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs had executed the agreement on
his behalf, concerning his share in the property. There is no whisper
                                                                                   B
about the same in the agreement. The position mentioned above may
indicate that plaintiffs were misled by the Power of Attorney holder that
only late K. Basavaraja Urs was the exclusive owner of the property.
When we consider the statement of M.P Chandrakanta Raj Urs (Plaintiff
No.2), it clearly indicates that he was well aware of the fact that Princess
Leelavathi owned the property and upon her death the property devolved             C
upon, in equal shares and he was aware of the other sale deeds executed
(Exhs. P 43, P-44, P-45, P-46). It is clear that plaintiff No.2 was aware
as to the extant title of K.B. Ram Chandra Raj Urs in the property and
also the fact that it was a joint family property. In the plaint, the plaintiffs
have not taken the plea of estoppel, and now the case was set up that
                                                                                   D
property had been sold by defendant No.1 in his capacity without any
such plea in the plaint. Thus, plaintiff No.2 was well aware of the fact as
to the title of K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs in the property and that late
K. Basavaraja Urs did not exclusively own the property.
        21. The plea of estoppel in view the decision of this court in R.S.
Madanappa (deceased) v. Chandramma & Anr., (supra) is not                          E
attracted, in which the Court has held that estoppel by conduct could not
arise when a person concerned knew the right position relating to the
title in property in his possession, he could not plead that he was induced
to hold an erroneous belief because of the conduct of real owner of that
property. This court has observed thus:                                            F
       “6. We will consider the question of estoppel first. The conduct of
       the first defendant from which the learned counsel wants us to
       draw the inference of estoppel consists of her attitude when she
       was served with a notice by the plaintiff, her general attitude
       respecting Bangalore properties as expressed in the letter dated            G
       17th January 1941, written by her to her stepmother and the
       attestation by her and her husband on 3rd October 1944, of the
       will executed on 25th January 1941 by Maddanappa. In the notice
       dated 26th January 1948, by the plaintiff’s lawyer to the first
       defendant it was stated that the plaintiff and the first defendant
                                                                                   H
1080      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 13 S.C.R.


 A     were joint owners of the suit properties which were in possession
       of their father and requested for the cooperation of the first
       defendant in order to effect the division of the properties. A copy
       of this notice was sent to Maddanappa, and he sent a reply to it to
       the plaintiff’s lawyers. The first defendant, however, sent no reply
       at all. We find it difficult to construe the conduct of the first
 B
       defendant in not replying to the notice and is not cooperating with
       the plaintiff in instituting a suit for obtaining possession of the
       properties as justifying the inference of estoppel. It does not mean
       that she impliedly admitted that she had no interest in the properties.
       It is true that in Ex. 15, which is a letter sent by her on 17th
 C     January 1941, to her stepmother she has observed thus:
                 “I have no desire whatsoever in respect of the properties
              which are at Bangalore. Everything belongs to my father.
              He has the sole authority to do anything…. We give our
              consent to anything done by our father. We will not do
 D            anything.”
       But even these statements cannot assist the appellants because
       admittedly, the father knew the true legal position. That is to say;
       the father knew that these properties belonged to Puttananjamma
       and that he had no authority to deal with these properties. No
 E     doubt, in his written statement, Maddanappa had set up a case
       that the properties belonged to him by virtue of the declaration
       made by Puttananjamma at the time of her death, but that case
       has been negatived by the courts below. The father’s possession
       must, therefore, be deemed to have been, to his knowledge, on
       behalf of the plaintiff and the first defendant. There was thus no
 F     possibility of an erroneous belief about his title being created in
       the mind of Maddanappa because of what the first defendant had
       said in her letter to her stepmother.
       7. Insofar as the attestation of the will is concerned, the appellants’
       position is no better. This “will” purports to make a disposition of
 G     the suit properties along with other properties by Maddanappa in
       favour of Defendants 3 to 8. The attestation of the will by the first
       defendant and her husband, would no doubt affix them with the
       knowledge of what Maddanappa was doing, but it cannot operate
       as estoppel against them and in favour of Defendants 3 to 8 or
 H     even in favour of Maddanappa. The will could take effect only
          SIRDAR K.B. RAMACHANDRA RAJ URS. (DEAD)                                1081
      THROUGH LRS. v. SARAH C. URS & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]


       upon the death of Maddanappa and, therefore, no interest in the           A
       property had at all accrued to Defendants 3 to 8, even on the date
       of the suit. So far as Maddanappa is concerned, he, as already
       stated, knew the true position and, therefore, could not say that an
       erroneous belief about his title to the properties was created in his
       mind by reason of the conduct of the first defendant and her
                                                                                 B
       husband in attesting the document. Apart from that, there is nothing
       on the record to show that by reason of the conduct of the first
       defendant Maddanappa altered his position to his disadvantage.
       8. Mr. Venkatarangaiengar, however, says that subsequent to the
       execution of the will, he had effected further improvements in the
       properties and for this purpose, spent his own moneys. According          C
       to him, he would not have done so in the absence of assurance
       like the one given by the first defendant and her husband to the
       effect that they had no objection to the disposition of the suit
       properties by him in any way he chose to make it. The short
       answer to this is that Maddanappa, on his own allegations, was            D
       not only in possession and enjoyment of these properties ever
       since the death of Putananjamma but had made improvements in
       the properties even before the execution of the will. In these
       circumstances, it is clear that the provisions of Section 115 of the
       Indian Evidence Act, which contain the law of estoppel by
       representation, do not help him.”                                         E

        22. Thus, it is clear that there was no possibility of erroneous
beliefs in the mind of the plaintiffs as to title position in the property. No
doubt about it that defendant No.1 has acted as a power of attorney, but
at the same time, did not act in his capacity as the owner of the property.
The ownership of K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs was known to the plaintiffs.            F
In spite of that the plaintiffs have not set up the case to bind the share of
K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs. They have not pleaded in the plaint that
K.B Ramchandra Raj Urs owned the property. There is no whisper as
to the title of K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs in the plaint. They needed to
plead the facts to attract the plea of estoppel. That has not been done.         G
Thus, the agreement which had been executed was not concerning share
of defendant No.1, but of late K. Basavaraja Urs as his power of attorney.
       23. In view of the agreement and the admission made by the
plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that it would be appropriate to modify
the decree passed by the courts below to the extent of 50 per cent of the        H
1082             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 13 S.C.R.


 A     shares of the deceased late K. Basavaraja Urs and to set it aside with
       respect to the remaining ½ share of K.B. Ramchandra Raj Urs
       (defendant No.1) in the property, since the property devolved under
       section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act.
              24. Thus, we hold that the plaintiffs to be entitled only to the extent
 B     of ½ share in the suit property. The decree to the remaining extent is set
       aside. The plaintiffs would not be entitled to refund of any consideration
       as by now the worth of property has increased manifold.
             25. We direct the trial court to divide the property in two equal
       proportions and it be given to the parties. Let the division be carried out
 C     within four months by the Trial Court. The appeals are allowed to the
       extent mentioned above. No costs.


       Divya Pandey                                                Appeals disposed of.


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