Holding

Because a person becomes a "candidate" only from the date of nomination under Section 79(b), any alleged corrupt practices occurring before that date cannot constitute a corrupt practice under Section 123.

Summary

The respondent, defeated in the 1991 Lok Sabha election, filed an election petition alleging corrupt practices under Sections 123(2), 123(3) and 123(3A) of the Representation of People Act, 1951. The appellant sought dismissal on three grounds: (i) the alleged corrupt acts occurred before he was a "candidate" as defined by the 1970 amendment to Section 79(b), (ii) the petition was vague, lacked material particulars and did not disclose a reasonable cause of action, and (iii) certain annexures were not served. The Supreme Court held that any acts occurring before the date of nomination cannot be treated as acts of a candidate and therefore cannot constitute a corrupt practice under Section 123. It affirmed the High Court’s view that a triable issue existed and rejected the appellant’s claims that the petition was frivolous or that the non‑supply of annexures warranted dismissal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the election petition allowed to proceed.

Issues considered

The effect of the 1970 amendment to Section 79(b) of the Representation of People Act on allegations of corrupt practice made for acts occurring before nomination.
Whether the election petition discloses a reasonable cause of action or is vague, lacking material particulars, frivolous or vexatious.
Whether the non‑supply of annexures that are part of the petition triggers dismissal under Sections 81(3) and 86 of the Act.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedures. Order VII Rule 11(a), s. Order VI Rule 16
Representation of People Act, 1951s. 123(2), s. 123(3), s. 123(3A), s. 79(b), s. 81(1), s. 81(3), s. 83(1)(a), s. 83(1)(b), s. 86

Subjects

election petitioncorrupt practiceRepresentation of People Actcandidate definitionmaterial factsfull particularsnon‑supply of annexuresdismissalreasonable cause of actionpleading standards

Judgment

A MOHAN RAWALE
v.
DAMODAR TJ\TYABA@ DADA.SAHEB AND ORS.

AUGUST 6, 1992

B [M.N. VENKATACHALIAH AND P.B. SAWANT, JJ.J
Representation of People Act, 1951: Sections 123(2)(3) and 3A-£/ec-
tion Petition-Corrupt practice-A/legations pertaining to the period prior to
nomination-R.e/evance of. ·
c
Sections 81, 83 and 86-Election Petition-Proceedings-'Disc/osing a
reasonable cause of action '-What is-Distinction between 'material facts'
and 'full particulars'-What i.;.

Election Petition-Non supply of Annexures-Effect of-Contents set
D out in petition but not· served on respondent-Petition whether should be
dismissed. .

Section 79(b )-Expression 'candidate'-Substitution of by Act 40 of
197o-Effect of.
E The respondent, who was defeated at the elections to the 10th Lok
Sabha from the Bombay South Central Parliamentary Constituency, filed
an election petition challenging the election of the appellant, the returned
candidate alleging corrupt practices under Sections 123(2)(3) and 3(A) of
the Representation of People Act, 1951. The appellant took out chamber
F summons for an order of dismissal of the Election Petition contending that
the memorandum of petition did not disclose a cause of action; that copies
of annexures were not supplied; and that the pleadings were friv!>lous and
vexatious but the High Court dismissed the motion.

In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant
G that: (i) In view of the substituted definition of the expression 'candidate'
in section 79(b), the appellant acquired the status of a candidate only from
the date of filing of nomination; since the allegations of corrupt practices
related to a period prior to the nomination i.e. prior to the appellant
becoming a candidate they would not amount to corrupt practice even if
H they are proved; (ii) The allegations in the election petition relating to the
850'
MOHAN v. DAMODAR 851

period after the commencement of the appellant's candidature are vague, A
bereft of material particulars, frivolous and vexatious and do not disclose
a reasonable cause of action; and (iii) the copies of certain documents
which were an integral part of the proceedings were not supplied.

Disposing the appeal, this Court
B
HELD : 1. The allegations of corrupt practice relating to the period
anterior to the commencement of the candidature cannot be relied. upon
to establish corrupt practice proprio vigore. The view taken by the High
Court fails to take note of and give effect to the substitution of the
definition of the expression 'candidate' in section 79(b). All sub-sections C
of section 123 of the Act refer to the acts of a 'candidate' or his election
agent or any other person with the consent of the candidate or his election
agent. The substituted definition completely excludes the acts by a can-
didate upto the date he is nominated as a candidate. (856-C, 855-E]

2.1. The High Court was right in its view that there was a triable D
issue arising out of the pleadings. An election petition can be rejected
under Order VII Rule 11 (a) C.P.C. if it does not disclose a cause of action.
Pleadings could also be struck out under Order VI Rule 16, inter alia, if
they are scandalous, frivolous or vexatious. A reasonable cause of action
is said to mean a cause of action with some chance of success when only
- the allegations in the pleading are considered. But so long as the claim E
discloses s_ome cause of action or raises some question fit to be decided by
a Judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed is no
-ground for striking it out. The· implications of the liability of the pleadings
to be struck out on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of
action are quite often more known than clearly understood. It does intro- F
duce another special demurer in a new shape. [859 D-E, 856 G-H, 857-A]

2.2. The failure of the pleadings to disclose a reasonable cause of
action is distinct from the absence of'full particulars. There is a distinction
amongst the 'grounds' in Section 8l(l):the 'material facts' in Section
83(l)(a) and 'full particulars' in Section 83(1)(b). Further, the distinction G
between "material facts" and "full particulars" is one of degree. The lines
of distinction are not sharp. "Material facts" are those which a party relies
upon and which, if he does not prove, he fails at the time. The distinction
between 'material facts' and 'particulars' which together constitute the
facts to be proved.or the 'facta probanda' - on the one hand and the H
852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A evidence by which those facts are to be proved - facto probantia - on the
other must be kept clearly distinguished. (857 B-G, 858-G)

Bruce v. Odhams Press Ltd., (1936) 1 K.B. 697; Philipps v. Philipps,
(1878) 4 QBD 127 and William v. Wilcox, (1838) SA & E at page 331,
referred to.
B
Halsburys Laws of England "Pleadings" Vol. 36. para 38; Bullen and
Leake and Jacob's "Precedents of Pleadings" 1975 Ed. at p. 112 and Jacob's
"The Present Importance of Pleadings" (1960) Cu1Tent Legal Problems, 175-
76, referred to.
c 3.1. There is distinction between cases where the non- supply of the
annexures referred to in the body of the election petition incurs the penalty
of dismissal and cases where their non-supply would not entail dismissal.
One of the distinctions underlying this difference is whether the document
is, in itsel.f, an integral part of the pleadings or is merely appended or
D referred to as a possible means of proving the allegations. In the instant
case, the purport and contents of the documents were set out in the election
petition. (859 F-G, 861-D]

3.2. The question whether a particular document produced by the
election petitioner partakes of the nature of and constitutes an integral
E part of the pleadings or whether it is merely material by which the
allegations in the election petition are intended to be proved depends upon
the facts and circumstances of each case and the nature and content of the
pleadings and of the documents. No hard and fast test applicable to all
cases can, or is possible to, be laid down. (861-F]
F
Sahodrabai v. Ram Singh Ahmwar, (1968) 3 S.C.R. 13; U.S. Sasid-
lzaran v. K.Karunakaran & Anr., A.I.R. 1990 S.C. at 924, relied on.

M. Karunanidhi v. H. V. Handa, A.l.R. 1983 SC 558, explained.

G CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. A
3399/92.

From the Judgment and Order dated 24-26.2.92 of the Bombay High
Court in Chamber Summons No. 1179 of 1991.

H , G.L. Sanghi, Arun Jaitly, Makarand D. Adkar, Ejaj" Maqbool, VJ.
(

MOHAN ~·. DAMODAR 853

Francis, Yadhunath Choudhary and Mr. V. Subramanian for the Petitioner. A

R.F. Nariman and M.N. Shroff for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered

Appellant seeks special leave to appeal to this Court from the order B
dated 24/26th February, 1992 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay
in Chamber Summons No. 1179/1991 in Election Petition No. 4/1991.

2. Before the High Court, the first respondent, who was defeated at
the election held on 15th June, 1991, to the 10th Lok Sabha from the South
Central Parliamentary Constituency, called in question the ele~tion of the
c
returned candidate - the appellant. Corrupt practices under Sect.ions
123(2), 123(s) and 123(3A) :lf the Representation of People's Act, 1951
('Act') are alleged. In the proceedings, appellant took out Chamber Sum-
mons for an order of dismissal of the election petition on the ground, inter
alia, that the memorandum of election petition did not disdose a cause of D
action; that copies were not supplied; that the pleadings were frivolous and
vexatious and required to be struck out. The High Court has dismissed this
motion.

3. We have heard Sri G.L. Anghi for the appellant and Shri R.F.
nariman for the respondents. We grant special leave. The appeal is heard E
and is disposed of by this order. A number of grounds appear to have been
taken before the High Court in support of the Chamber Summons. But Sri
Sanghi confined himself to and urged only three contentions in support of
this appeal :
F
(i) The first is that the allegation of corrupt practice under
Sections 123(2), 123(3) and 123(3A) in paras 1 to 20 of
the memorandum of election petition refer to matters long
anterior to 23rd April, 1991 when the nomination papers
were lodged by the appellant and on which date alone
appellant could be said to have legally acquired the status G
of a candidate and that, therefore, the allegations in these
paragraphs relating, as they do, to a period anterior to
23rd April, 1991 even if proved, would not amount to
corrupt practice by a candidate. Accordingly, these plead-
ings require to be struck out. H
854 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A (ii) Secondly, the allegations in other paragraphs of the
petition are vague, bereft of material particulars and do
not disclose a reasonable cause of action.

(iii) Thirdly, the copies of certain documents which were
an integral part of the pleadings were not supplied. Sri
B Sanghi referred to two instences which, according to him,
attract Section 81. One was the non-supply of notes said
to have bee~ prepared by Melind .Ranade (agent of the
first respondent) of the speech of a £ertain sadhvi
Ritambhra in support of the appellant's candidature
c declined by her on 21st May, 1991. The other was the
cassette recording of that speech referred to by the first
respondent in the election petition.

4. On the first point, Sri Sanghi contends that the High Court fell
into an error in not appreciating the effect of the substitution of the
D definition of the expression 'candidate' in Section 79(b) of the Act brought
about by Act 40 of 1970 which, in effe;t, made a person a "candidate" only
from the day he was duly no.minated as a candidate at the election. Sri
Sanghi says that while the old definition required that "any person shall be
declared to have been a candidate as from the time when, with the election
E in prospect, he began to hold himself out as a prospective candidate" the
substituted Section 79(b), however, did away with these words. The effect
of this, says Sri Sanghi, as profound and far-reaching and renders !ill th~
allegations of corrupt practice in paras 1 to 20 in relation to a period prior
to the nomination irrelevant and incapable, in law, even to amount to
allegations of corrupt practice. It is urged that as the candidature could be
F said to have legally commenced only on 23rd April, 1991 even i( all the
allegations of facts cont;i.ined in paras 1 to 20 are deemed to have been
proved by non-traverse or otherwise held proved, they could not establish
corrupt practice. It was accordingly urged that those paragraphs in the
election petit~on require to ~\!. struck out.

5. The High Court rejected this contention and held:

" In my judgment, it would not be appropriate to hold that
the averments contained in the aforesaid paragraphs are
/ un.: necessary or irrelevant. In my view they are very much
H relevant to the facts in issue. The pleadings in these
MOHAN v. DAMODAR 855

paragraphs are the foundation for the cause of action and A
they are material facts which constitute corrupt practice
under Sections 123(2) (3), (3A) of the Act."

The reason for that view, according to the High Court, is :

"It would be seen that the candidature of respondent No. B
1 was finelised on 16th April, 1991 ·and respondent No. 1
and ·his party workers had started campaigning on that
day. In the issue·· of "Samna dated 19th April, 1991 the
candidature of respondent No. 1 was officially and formal-
ly announced by the Shiv-sena party and respondent No. C
1 accepted the candidature by remaining present in the
public meeting held on 19th april, 1991 at Girgaum-Chow-
patty. Respondent No. 1 was introduced to the voters in
the said public meeting and respondent No. 1 also sought
the blessings of Shri Bal Thackeray in the said public
meeting. Respondent No. 1 was thus holding out to be a D
.candidate from 16th April, 1991."

This, we are afraid, is not the correct perception of the matter. the
view fails to take not of and give effect to the substitution of the definition
of the expression "candidate" in section 79(b). All sub-sections of section E
123 of the Act refer to the acts of a 'candidate' or his election agent or any
other person with the consent of the candidate or his election agent. The
substituted definition completely excludes the acts by a candidate upto the
date he is nominated as a candidate. Sri Sanghi, therefore, asks us to take
this position to its logical conclusions and striks out these allegations in the
election petition. F
6. Sri R.F. Nariman for the first respondent found it difficult to
support the view taken by the High Court as to the time at which
appellant's candidature could be said to have commenced. However, Sri
Nariman endeavoured .to contend that even if the allegations in paragraphs
1 to 20 did not, by themselves, establish corrupt practice in law by virtue G
of their commission prior to the appellant becoming a candidate, these
averments and allegations must be read as parts of similar transactions
pleaded in the later and subsequent paragraphs of the memorandum of the
election petition. Sri Nariman said that, at all event, the allegations in
paragraphs 1 to 20 cannot be said to be irrelevant if they can be sustained H
856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A for the purposes of probabalising of furnishing "similar-fact" evidence of
the allegations of corrupt P,ractice made in the later paragraphs of the
election petition.

7. We hold that all the averments in paragraphs 1 to 20 of the
memorandum of electioI). petition in so far as they refer to a period prior
B to 23.4.1991 cannot amount to allegations of corrupt practice. But on the
question whethe~ they are relevant and admissible for other purposes for
the reasons., sub_mitted 'by Sri Nariman we abstain from expressing any
·-
· opinion. This aspect did not engage the attention of the High Court and
was not considered ·by it. It is for the High Court and was not considered
c by it. It is for the High Court to consider them at the appropriate time.
We, therefore, declare that the allegations in paras 1 to 20 relating to the
period anterior to the commencement of the candidature cannot be relied
upon to establish corrupt practice proprio vigore.

8. The second contention of Sri Sanghi is that even the allegations in
D the later paras of the election petition relating to the period after the
commencement of the appellant's candidature are vague, bereft of material
particulars,frivolous and vexatious and do not disclose a reasonable cause
of action. Sri Sanghi submits that Section 86 does not exhaust the grounds
of _dismissal <?f an e~ection petition in limine. An election petition, says
E counsel, can and ought to be rejected if grounds contemplated by Rule 11
of Order 7 Civil Proceducer Code exist.
I
• Sri Sanghi's contention really covers three distinct, though overlap-
ping, ideas. It raises the question -of absence of material particulars, alleges
frivolousness and vexatiousness of the pleadings and· lastly, alleges their
F inability and insufficiency to disclose a reasonable cause of action.
I . '
,,
9. We may take up the last facet first. As Chitty J. obsenred: "There
is some difficulty in affixing a precise meaning to" the expression "discloses
no reasonable cause of action or defence". He said: "In point of law ....
• every cause of action is a reasonable one". [See Republic of Peru v. Pernvian
G Guano co., 1887 36 Ch.D. 489). A reasonable cause of action is said to
mean a cause of action with some chance of success when only the
allegations in the pleading are considered. But so long as the claim dis-
closes some-cause•of action or raises some question fit to be decided by a
Judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succed is no
H ground for striking it out. The implications of the liability of the pleadings
MOHAN v. DAMODAR 857

to be struck out ori the liability of the pleadings to be struck out on the A
ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action are quite often more
known than clearly understood. It does incroduce another special demurer
in a new shape. The failure of the pleadings to disclose a reasonable cause
of action ·is distinct from the absence of full particulars. The distinctions
among the ideas of the "grounds" in Section 81(1); of "material facts" in
Section 83(1)(a) and of "full particulars" in Section 83(l)(b) are obvious. I
The provisions of Section 83{1)(a) and (b) are in the familiar pattern of
Order VI, Rules 2 and 4 and Order 7, Rule l(e) Code of Civil Procedure.
There is a distinction amongst the 'grounds' in Section 81(1); the 'material
facts' in Section 83(1)(a) and 'full particulars; in Section 83(1)(b).
(
- 10. Referring to the importance of pleadings a learned author says :

"Pleadings do not only define the issues between the
parties for the final deci~ion of the court at the trial, they
manifest and exert their importance throughout the whole
process of the litigation ..... They show on their face f
whether a reasonable cause of action or defence is dis-
closed. They provide a guide for the proper mode of trial
and particularly for the trial of preliminary issues of law
or fact. They demonstrate upon which party the burden
of proof lies, and who has the right to open the case. They J
act as a measure for comparing the evidence of a party
with the case which he has pleaded. They determine the.
range of the admissible evidence which the parties should
be prepared to adduce at the trial. They delimit the relief
which the court can award ..... "

(See: Jacob, "The Present Importance of Pleadings" (1960
Current Legal Problems, at 175-76).

Further, the distinction between "material facts" and "full particulars"
is one of degree. The lines of distinction are not sharp. "Material facts" are
those which a party relies upon and which, if he does not prove, he fails at
the time.

In Bntce v. Odltams Press Ltd., (1936) 1 K.B. 697, Scote LJ. said ;
"The word 'material' means necessary for the purpose of formulating a
complete cause of action; and if any one 'material fact' is omitted, the
.,
'
858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

\.. statement of daims i!> bad". The purpose of 'material particulars' is in the
context of the nt~ed to _give the opponent sufficient details of the charge set
up against him and to give him a reasonable opportunity.

Halsbury refers to the function of particulars thus:

"The function of particulars is to carry into operation the
overriding principle that the litigation between the parties,
. and . particularly the trial, should be conducted fairly,
openly and without surprises, and incidentally to reduce
costs ......This function has been variously stated namely
either to limit the generality of the allegations in fhe
pleadings, or to define the issues which have to be tried
and for which discovery is required ....."

(See: "Pleadings" vol. 36 para 38)

) in Bullen and Leake and Jacob's "Precedents of Pleadings" 1975 Ed.
at p. 112 it is stated :

"The· function of particulars is to carry into operation the
overriding principle that the litigation between the parties,
and particularly the trial, should be conducted fairly,
openly and without surprises and incidentally to save
costs. The object of particulars is to "open up" the case of
the opposite party and to compel him to reveal as much
as possible what is going to be proved at the social,
whereas, as cost of the has said, "the old system of pleading
at common layout to conceal as much as possible what
has going to be proved at the trial."

11. The distinction between 'material facts' and 'particulars' which
together constitute the facts to be proved - or the 'facia probanda' - on
the one hand and the evidence by which those facts are to be proved -
facta probaniia - on the other must be ·kept clearly distinguished. In
Pltlipps v. Phillipps, (1878) 4 QBD 127 at p. 133, Brett, L.J. said :

"I will not say that it is easy to express in words what are
the facts which must be stated and what matters need not
be stated ...... The distinction is taken in the very rule itself,
between the facts on whicp the party relies and the
MOHAN v. DAMODAR 859

evidence to prove those facts. Erle C.J. expressed it in this A
way. He said that there were facts that might be called
the allegata probanda, the facts which ought to be proved,
and they were different from the evidence which was
adduced to prove those facts. And it was upon the expres-
sion of opinion of Erle C.J. that rule 4 now r. 7(1) was
drawn. The facts which ought to be stated are the material
B
facts on ·which the party pleading relies."

Lord Denman, CJ. in William v. Wilcox, (1838) 8 A & Eat page 331,
said:

"It is an elementary rule in pleading that, when a state of
c
facts is relied it is enough to allege it simply, without
setting out the subordinate facts which are. the means of
proving it, or the evidence sustaining the allegation."

An election petition can be rejected under Order VII Rule ll(a) D
C.P .C. if it does not disclose a cause of action. Pleadings could also be
struck out under Orde.r VI Rule 16, inter alia, if they are scandalous,
frivolous or vexatious. The latter two expressions meant cases where the
pleadings are obviously frivolous and vaxatious or obviously unsustainable.
E
12. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel on
both sides. We are not persuaded to the view that the order of the High
Court on this aspect of the controversy calls for interference. The High
Court was right in its view that there was a triable issue arising out of the
pleadings. The second contention, in our opinion, is insubstantial.
F
13. The third contention of Sri Sanghi needs to be answered on the
distinction between cases where the non-supply of the annexures referred
to in the body of the election petition incurs the penalty of dismissal and
cases where their non-supply would not entail dismissal. Decided cases lay
down the principles on which the courts act. One of the distinctions G
underlying this difference is whether the document is, in itself, an integral

-
part of the pleadings or is merely appended or referred to as a possible
means of proving the allegations.

In Salwdrabai v. Ram Singh Alzarwar, [1968] 3 SCR 13 at page 19,
this Court observed : H
860 SUP~EME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A "..... We have already pointed out that Section 81(3) speaks
only of the election petition. Pausing here, we would say -
that since the election petition itself reproduced the whole
of the pamphlet in a translation in English, it could be
said that the averments with regard to the pamphlet were
themselves a part of the petition and therefore the
B pamphlet was served upon the respondents although in a
translation and not in original. Even it this be not the case,
we are quite clear that sub- sectio~ (2) of Section 83 has
referenee not to a document which is produced as evidence
of the avennents oj the election petition but to avennents of
c the election petition which are put, not in the election
petition but in the accompanying schedules or annexures.

[Emphasis supplied]
D
In U.S. Sasidharan v. K Kanmakaran & Anr., AIR (1990) SC at 924,
the distinction is brought out :

"The material facts or particulars relating to any corrupt
practice may be contained in a document and the election
E petitioner without pleading the material facts or par-
ticulars of corrupt practice, may refer to the document.
When such·a reference is made in the election petition, a
copy of the document must be supplied inasmuch as by
making a reference to the document and without pleading
F its· contents in the election petition, the docume_nt be-
comes incorporated in the election petition any reference.
In other words it forms an integral part of the election
petition , Sec. 81(3) provides for giving a true copy of the
electionpetition. when a document forms an integral part
of the election petition and a copy of such document is
G not furnished to the respondent along with a copy of the
election petition, the copy of the election petition will not
be a true copy within the meaning of S. 81(3) and, as such,
the court has to dismiss the election petition under S.86(1)
for non-compliance with s.81(3). On the other hand, if the

-
H contents of the document in question are pleaded in the
MOHAN v. DAMODAR 861

election petition, the document does not form an integral A
part of the election petition. ln such a case, a copy of the
document need not be served on the respondent and that
will not be non-compliance with the provision of S.81(3).
The document may be relied upon as an evidence in the
proceedings...... "
B
[Emphasis supplied]

14. Appellant contended before the High Court that the notes made
by Milind Rana.de of the speech of a certain Sadhvi Ritambhra referred to
in the election petition not having been supplied tlie Election Petition must C
be dismissed for non compliance of section 81(3) read with s~ction 86 of
the 'Act'. It was also urged that a 'cassette' recording that speech had not
been supplied.

We have examined this contention of Sri Sanghi in the context ·of the
actual pleadings. In our opinion, they are clearly covered by the letter part D
of the enuunciation in Sasidharan case excerpted above. The Purport and
contents of the documents were set out in the election petition. Shri Sanghi
however, sought to rely upon this Courses pronouncement in the case of
M. Kanmanidhi v. H. V. Handa, AIR (1983) SC 558, as to what was held in
that case held to be the consequence of the non- supply of the photograph E
of the "banner". In that case, the photograph was to be an integral part of
the pleadings.

The question whether a particular document produced by the elec-
tion petitioner partakes of the nature of and constitutes an integral part of
the pleadings or whether it is merely material by which the allggations in F
the election petition are intended to be proved depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case and the nature and content of the pleadings
and of the documents. No hard and fast test applicable to all cases can, or
is possible to, be laid down. Karunanidhi's case did not depart from the

.. principle laid down in earlier cases but merely illustrated one particular
application of the rule to the facts of that case. The third contention is not
substantial either.
G

15. In the result, the first point is held in favour of the appeUant and
the averments and allegations in paras 1 to 20 in so far as they relate to a
period prior to 23.4.1991 are held incapable of amounting to allegations of H
862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992} SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A corrupt practice. Whether they are relevant or admissible for other pur-
poses is a matter which the High Court will decide at the appropriate time.
The other two contentions are rejected. The. appeal is dispose.d of accord-
ingly. No costs.

T.N.A. Appeal disposed of.

....