Holding

The Court held that the status‑quo over the adjacent land must be maintained until the pending title suits are disposed, as the interim order is within the scope of M. Ismail Faruqui and necessary to preserve communal harmony.

Summary

The Supreme Court heard a public‑interest writ petition filed by Mohd. Aslam seeking that the 67.703 acres of land acquired under the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993 be preserved in its present condition until pending title suits before the Allahabad High Court are decided. The petitioners argued that the interim order prohibiting any religious activity on the adjacent land, as earlier ordered by the Court, should be made absolute, relying on the earlier decision in M. Ismail Faruqui. The respondents contended that the interim relief exceeded the scope of that decision and that the petition lacked a proper foundation. The Court examined the purpose of the Act, the relationship between the disputed and adjacent lands, and the observations in M. Ismail Faruqui, concluding that the adjacent land is intrinsically linked to the disputed site and must remain under status‑quo until the suits are disposed. It held that maintaining the status‑quo is essential to preserve communal harmony and to fulfil the objectives of the Act. Consequently, the Court ordered that the earlier interim order remain operative and dismissed the petition.

Issues considered

The scope of the interim order maintaining status‑quo over the adjacent land under the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993.
Whether the interim relief granted is within the parameters set by the Supreme Court's decision in M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India.
Whether the petition can be dismissed on the ground that a similar writ petition filed in the High Court was dismissed and the present petition lacks a proper foundation.
Whether the acquisition of the adjacent land is valid and should be retained until the pending title suits are decided to preserve communal harmony.

Legislation cited

Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993s. 3, s. 4(3), s. 6, s. 7, s. 8

Subjects

public interest litigationAcquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Actstatus quocommunal harmonyAyodhya land disputeinterim relieftitle suitsSection 6 of the ActSection 7 of the ActSupreme CourtArticle 32

Judgment

-~

MOHD. ASLAM @ BHURE A
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

MARCH 31, 2003

[S. RAJENDRA BABU, SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI, B
M.B. SHAH, N. SANTOSH HEGDE AND
DORAISWAMY RAJU, JJ.]

Public interest litigation:
c
Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993-Ayodhya land-
dispute-Relating to erstwhile Ramjanma Bhoomi-Babri Masjid Structure-
Subsequent enactment of 1993 Act-Title suits before High Court-Pendency-
Writ petition before Supreme Court seeking preservation of adjacent land till
final decision in title suits-Interim order passed directing status quo and D
prohibiting religious activity-Disposing of the writ petition-Held: Status
quo having been maintained over a decade and title suits pending before High
Court are reaching final stages, and also preservation ofproperty in its original
condition is absolutely necessary, it is not appropriate to disturb the state of
affairs-Thus interim order to be operative until disposal of title suits in High
~~ E
There has been a long standing communal dispute relating to
erstwhile Ram Janma Bhumi-Babri Masjid Structure in Ayodhya. This
lead to the enactment of Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 19~3.
The object was to maintain harmony between different communities in
,_. the country and to _maintain public order for which it was necessary to F
acquire certain areas in Ayodhya. Thereafter claimants filed title suit
claiming possession of disputed and adjacent land. The petitioner then filed
the present public interest petition seeking preservation of adjacent land
till final decision in title suit. This Court passed an interim order directing
status quo and prohibited any religious activity at the acquired land which G
was modified later. Thereafter on completion of pleadings application was
filed seeking vacation of interim order and final hearing of the petition.

Petitioner contended that the decision of this Court in M. Ismail
Faruqui's case clearly indicates that the purpose of acquisition of the
143 H
14-1 Sl'PRI 'vii l OliRJ RLl'llRIS 120031 3 S CR

A adjacent land is to meet the easement of necessity of proper enjoyment of
the disputed land by its owner who is ultimately to be declared by the High
Court and on consideration of the observations made by this Court with
regard to the extent uf the area required for carrying uut the purpose of
the -\ct would depend on the dcri~ion in farnur of the Muslims or Hindus
B in respect of the disputed land and the scheme to be framed for purposes
of developing a tomplex consisting of museum, library and other
structures, which cannot be done until the suits pending before the High
Court arc settled, therefore, the status quo passed in the interim order
should be made absolute and an appropriate relief be granted.

C Respondents contended that the interim relief granted by this Court
earlier goes be)ond the scope of the decision rendered by this Court in
M. /smuil Fantl/111 "' case and the petition filed by the petitioner should be
dismissed straighta\rny because he had filed a writ petition before the High
Court which came to be dismissed and in this petition there is hardly any
proper foundation laid for granting any relief; and that the allegations
,
D made are vague and do not contain the necessary details to appreciate the
various contentions urged before the Court and several of the prayers
made in the petition have already become infructuous.

Disposing of the writ petition, the Court

E HELD: I. I. The ad,jacent land, though vest in the Central
Government, will lrn,·e to be utilized in different manners depending upon
the outcome of the litigation in respect of the disputed property pending
in the High Court. The acquisition of larger extent of land is incidental to
main purpose. Thus, the two acquired lands are intrinsically connected
F with one another and cannot be separated at this stage of the proceedings
for different treatment during the interregnum. Further, it has also been .,
made clear that if any land becomes superfluous such land will have to
be returned to the owner who may have to initiate appropriate proceedings
to challenge the validity of the acquisition. If land is transferred to any
other body or trust as provided under Section 6 of the Acquisition of
G Certain Arca at Ayudhya Act, II 993 at this stage further complications may
arise. Therefore, .11u111.1· •!'"'\\ill have to be maintained until the suits are
finally disposed uf. The orders of this Court made earlier arc not beyond
the scope of the decision in .\/. lsmwl Furuq111 ·s case that the purpose of
the acquisition of the ad,jaccnt land is to meet the easement of necessity
II of proper enjoyment of the dispuied la11d by its owner. 1154-C-Fl
MOHD. ASLAM@ BHURE v. U.0.1. 145
J.2. Status quo has been maintained from 1992 onwards and no A
activities as are set out in the course of the application have been required
to be done so far. When for a long time, a particular state of affairs has
prevailed - as in the present case for over a decade - and when the
adjudication of the disputes which are pending before the High Court are
reaching final stages, and it is well known that preservation of property B
in its original condition is absolutely necessary to give appropriate reliefs
to the parties on the termination of the proceedings before the courts it
will not be appropriate to disturb that state of affairs. Therefore, the
interim order made by this Court as modified should be operative until
disposal of the suits in the High Court not only to maintain communal
harmony but also to fulfil other objectives of the Act. 1154-G, H; 155-A, Bl C
M Ismail Faruqui etc. v. Union of India and Ors., 119941 Supp. 5 SCR
I, referred to.

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition (C) No. 160 of
20~. D
• (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)

K.N. Raval, Solicitor General, and R.N. Trivedi, Additional Solicitor
General, O.P. Sharma, P.S. Mishra, Kapil Sibal, Y.H. Muchhalla, Dr. Rajeev
Dhavan, S.S. Ray, Ms. Nanita Sharma, Vivek Sharma, Abhishek Atrey, Aamer E
Ahmed Madni, R.C. Gubrele. K.R. Gupta, A. Mariarputham, P. Parmeswaran,
Rajiv Nanda, Pritish Kapoor, C.D. Singh, Manu Shanker Mishra, S. Chandra
Shekhar, Vishnu Sharma, R.K. Singh, Ms. Swarupa Reddy, M.M. Pandey,
Ravi Prakash Gupta, Rakesh Kumar Gupta, Sushendra Kumar Chauhan, S.L.
Harsh, Kirti Srivastava, Huzefa Ahmdi, Ejaz Maqbool, Nakul Dewan, Aslam
Ahmad, Brijesh Kalappz, Akhil Sibal, Shakeel Ahmed, M.A. Siddiqui, T.A. F
Khan, Mohd. Z.A. Khan, Abdul Munnan, Z. Jilani, Shafi Ahmad Khan, S.A.
Kashi, Shakil Ahmed Syed, Mohd. Taiyab Khan, R.C. Verma, Mukesh Venna,
Manish Shanker, Anis Suhrawardy, Ms. Sandhya Goswami, Ms. Hemantika
Wahi, Tripurari Ray, Vishwajit Singh, Krunesh S. Pawar, Ritesh Agrawal,
Ravi Kumar, D.K. Garg and Dharam Vir Singh Rawal, for the appearing G
parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

- RAJENDRA BABU, J. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons in the
Bill ultimately leading to the enactment of the Acquisition of Certain Area H
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) 3 S.C.R.

A at Ayodhya Act, 1993 [hereinafter referred to as 'the Act']. it has been stated
as follows:

··There has been a long-sta11ding dispute relating to the erstwhile Ram
Janma Bhumi-Babri Masjid structure in Ayodhya which led to
communal tension and violence from time to time and ultirnately led
B to the destruction of the disputed structure on 6th December, 1992.
This was followed by wide-:spread communal violence which resulted
in large number of deaths. injuries and destruction of property in
various parts of the country. The said dispute has thus affected the
maintenance of public order and harmony between different
communities in the country. As it is necessary to maintain communal
c harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst the people
of India, it was considered necessary to acquire the site of the disputed
structure and suitable adjacent land for setting up a complex which
could be developed in a planned manner wherein a Ram temple, a
mosque, amenities for pilgrims, a library. museum and other suitable
D facilities can be set up.

2. xxxxxxxxx. •
3. xxxxxxxxx."

ln the Preamble to the Act also, it has been mentioned as follows:
E
'"An act to provide for the acquisition of certain area at Ayodhya and
for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

WHEREAS there has been a long-standing dispute relating to the
structure (including the premises of the inner and outer courtyards of
F such structure), commonly known as the Ram Janma Bhumi-Babri
Masjid, situated in village Kot Ramachandra in Ayodhya, in Pragana
Haveli Avadh, in Tehsil Faizabad Sadar. in the district of Faizabad of
the State of Uttar Pradesh;

AND WHEREAS the said dispute has affected the maintenance of
G public order and harmony between different communities in the
country;

AND WHEREAS 1t 1s necessary to maintain public order and to
promote communal harmony and ihe spirit of common brotherhood

H
amongst the people of India:
·-
MOHD: ASLAM@ BHURE v. U.O.l. [RAJENDRA BABU, J.] 147
AND WHEREAS with a view to achieving the aforesaid objectives, A
it is necessary to acquire certain areas in Ayodhya;

xxx xxx xxx."

In M. Ismail Faruqui etc. v. Union of India and Ors., (1994] Supp. 5
SCR I, the validity of the Act was challenged. This Court examined the
scheme of the Act and held as under by majority of 3:2 : B

"i(a) Sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Act abates all pending suits
and legal proceedings without providing for an alternative dispute-
resolution mechanism for resolution of the dispute between the parties
thereto. This is an extinction of the judicial remedy for resolution of C
the dispute an:ounting to negation of rule of law. Sub-section (3) of
Section 4 of the Act is, therefore, unconstitutional and invalid.

(b) The remaining provisions of the Act do not suffer from any
invalidity on the construction made thereof by us. Sub-section (3) of
Section 4 of the Act is several from the remaining Act. Accordingly,
the challenge to the constitutional validity of the remaining Act, except D
for Sub-section (3) of Section 4 is rejected.

(2) Irrespective of the status of a mosque under the Muslim Law
applicable in the Islamic countries, the status of a mosque under the
Mahomedan Law applicable in secular India is the same and equal to E
that of any other place of worship of any religion; and it does not
enjoy any greater immunity from acquisition in exercise of the
sovereign or prerogative power of the State than that of the places of
worship of the other religions.

(3) The pending suits and other proceedings relating to the disputed F
area within which the structure [including the premises of the inner
and outer courtyards of such structure], commonly known as the Ram
Janma Bhumi-Babri Masjid, stood, stand revived for adjudication of
the dispute therein, together with the interim orders made, except to
the extent the interim orders stand modified by the provisions of
Section 7 of the Act. G
(4) The vesting of the said disputed area in the Central Government
by virtue of Section 3 of the Act is limited, as a statutory receiver,
with the duty for its management and administration according to
Section 7 requiring maintenance of status quo therein under sub-
section (2) of Section 7 of the Act. The duty of the Central Government H
.. ~

148 SUPREME COURT REPOR rs 12003] 3 S.C.R.

A as the statutory receiver is to hand over the disputed area in accordance
with Section 6 of the Act. in terms of the adjudication made in the
suits for implementation of the final decision therein. This is the
purpose for which the disputed area has been so acquired.

(5) The power of the cou11s in making further interim orders in the
B suits is limited to. and circumscribed by. the area outside the ambit
.of Section 7 of the Act

(6) The vesting of the adjacent area. other than the disputed area,
acquired by the Act in the Central Government by virtue of Section
3 of the Act is absolute with the power of management and
C administration thereof in accordance with sub-section (I) of Section
7 of the Act, till its further vesting in any authority or other body or
trustees of any trust in accordance with Section 6 of the Act The
further vesting of the adjacent area, other than the disputed area, in
accordance with Section 6 of the Act has to be made at the time and
in the manner indicated. in view of t11e purpose of its acquisition.
D
(7) The meaning of the word 'vest' in Section 3 and Section 6 of the ...
Act has to be so understood in the different contexts.

(8) Section 8 of the Act is meant for payment of compensation to
owners of the property vesting absolutely in the Central Government,
E the title to which is not in dispute being in excess of the disputed area
which alone is the subject-matter of the revived suits. It does not
apply to the disputed area. title to which has to be adjudicated in the
suits and in respect of which the Central Government is merely the
statutory receiver as indicated. with the duty to restore it to the owner
F in terms of the adjudication made in the suits.

(9) The challenge to acquisition of any pan of the adjacent area on
the ground that it is unnecessary for achieving the professed objective
of settling the long-standing dispute cannot be examined at this stage.
However. the area found to be superfluous on the exact area needed
G for the purpose being determined on adjudication of the dispute. must
be restored to the undisputed owners.

(10) Rejection of the challenge by the undisputed owners to acquisition
of some religious properties in the vicinity of the disputed area, at
this stage is with the liberty granted to them to renew their challenge,
H if necessary at a later appropriate stage, in case of continued retention
MOHD. ASLAM@ BHURE v. U.0.1. [RAJENDRA BABU, J.) 149
··- by the Central Government of their property in excess of the exact A
area determined to be needed on adjudication of the dispute.

( 11) Consequently, the Special Reference No. I of 1993 made by the
I President of India under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India
is superfluous and unnecessary and does not require to be answ~red.
For this reason, we very respectfully decline to answer it and return B
the same.

( 12) The questions relating to the constitutional validity of the said
Act and maintainability of the Special Reference are decided in these
terms."
c
In this proceeding, which is initiated as public interest petition, several
reliefs were claimed but after the interested parties were impleaded and their
pleadings were put forth what has crystallized is as to the manner in which
the adjacent land should be preserved till the final decision in the title suit
pending in the High Court of Allahabad. This Court, on 13.3.2002, while
issuing the rule, made the following order: D
,.
" ...... In the meantime, we direct that on the 67.703 acres of land
located in revenue plot Nos. 159 & I 60 in village Kot Ramchandra
which is vested in the Central Government, no religious activity of
any kind by anyone either symbolic or actual including bhumipuja or E
shila puja, shall be permitted or allowed to take place.

Furthermore, no part of the aforesaid land shall be handed over
by the Government to anyone and the same shall be retained by the
Government till the disposal of this writ petition nor shall any part of
this land be permitted to be occupied or used for any religious purpose F
or in connection therewith.

This is subject to further orders which may be passed in this
case ...... "

The aforesaid order was clarified by another order dated 14.3.2002 in
the following terms: G
"After hearing the learned Attorney General, as there was some
ambiguity in para 3 of our order dated 13th March, 2002, we correct
para 3 of our order as follows:

In the meantime, we direct that on the 67.703 acres of acquired land H
150 SUPREME C'OURT REPORTS [2003] 3 SCR.

A located in various plots detailed in the Schedule to Acquisition of
Central Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993. which is vested in the Central
Government, no religious activity of any kind by anyone either
symbolic or actual including bhumipuja or shila puja. shall be permitted
or allowed to take place."

B Subsequently after the pleadings were completed an application was
filed seeking for vacating the interim order and for final hearing of the
petition. Instead of considering the interim application, we considered we
should dispose of the main matter and hence wt: have finally heard the
matter.

c Learned counsel on both sides in the present case heavily relied upon
the decision in M. Ismail Faruqu1 's case [supra].

The Act, as it was passed by Parliament, anticipated the settlement of
the dispute after obtaining the opinion of this Court and in terms of the said
D opinion. How~ver. the reference made to this Court having been returned to
the President without any opinion thereto and the provisions of Section 4(3)
of the Act by which the pending proceedings stood abated having been declared
to be invalid, the suits and the other proceedings along with the interim
orders stood revived. Therefore. the whole perception of the provisions of the
enactment will have to be made in th~t light. While it is the contention of the
E petitioner that the decision of this Court in M. Ismail Faruqui 's case [supra]
clearly indicates that the purpose of the acquisition of the adjacent land is to
meet the easement of necessity of proper enjoyment of the disputed land by
its owner whr• is ultimately to be declared by the High Court of Allahabad
and on consideration of the various observations made by this Court in the
course of the judgment, particularly that the extent of the area required for
F carrying out the purpose of the Act would depend on the decision in favour
of the Muslims or Hindus in respect of the disputed land and the scheme to
be framed for purposes of developing a complex consisting of museum,
library and other structures. All this cannot be done until the suits pending
before the High Com1 of Allahabad are settled. Therefore. they pray that
G status quo as order~d by this Court in the interim order should be made
absolute and an appropriate rdief be granted in the aforesaid terms.

The Union of India and Others submit that the interim relief granted by
this Court earlier goes beyond the scope of the decision rendered by this
Court in M. Ismail Faruqui 's case [s•Jpra] and the petition filed by the petitioner
H should be dismissed straightaway because he had filed a writ petition before
MOHD. ASLAM@ BHURE v. U.0.1. [RAJENDRA BABU, J.] 151

the High Court of Allahabad which came to be dismissed and in this petition A
there is hardly any proper foundation laid for granting any relief. It is also
pleaded that the allegations made in the petition are vague and do not contain
the necessary details to appreciate the various contentions urged before the
Court and several of the prayers made in the petition !rave already become
infructuous.
B
On several occasions this Court has treated letters; telegrams or post

- cards or news reports as writ petitions. In such petitions, on the basis of
pleadings that emerge in the case after notice to different parties, relief has
been given or refused. Therefore, this Court would not approach matters
where public interest is involved in a technical or a narrow manner. C
Particularly, when this Court has entertained this petition, issued notice to
different parties, new parties have been impleaded and interim order has also
been granted, it would not be appropriate for this Court to dispose of the
petition on that ground.

Filing of the writ petition in the High Court of Allahabad or its dismissal D
will not come in the way of considering this petition. The scope of that writ
petition filed in the High Court is different from what is urged in the present
proceedings which is limited to maintaining status quo during pendency of
suits before the High Court in respect of acquired land.

The Preamble to the Act itself discloses that the objective of the E
enactment is maintenance of harmony between different communities in the
country and to maintain public order. If the acquisition has been effected on
that basis not only of the disputed land but also of adjacent land, this thread
will run through the entire proceedings and we must bear in minJ that when
the dispute is not yet final!y resolved, maintenance of commu.ial harmony F
and peace is absolutely needed. It is no doubt true that when passions run
high, demands are rnade for several types of activities being carried on in the
adjacent land. If any such activities are carried on in such land, even before
the resolution of the dispute pending before the court, it may affect the
harmony and tranquility that has prevailed for so long.
G
Section 6( I) of the Act enables the Central Government to transfer its
right, title and interest or any of them in the area or any part thereof to any
authority or other body, or trusts on such terms and conditions as it may
think fit to impose instead of continuing to retain the same itself. Sections
6(2) and (3) provide for certain arrangements of statutory transfer effected by
Central Government by declaring that the transferee would step into the H
152 SUPREME COURT REPOR rs [1003\ 3 S.CR

A shoes of the Government acquiring the same right, title and interest in the
area in question. As also that Sec11ions 4, 5, 7. 11, so far as may be. would
apply to such transferee as would apply to Central Government.

In the course of the discussion in M. Ismail Faruqui's case [supra]. it
has been observed as follows :
B
''The narration of facts indicates that the acquisition of properties
under the Act affects the rights of both the communities and not
merely those of the Muslim community. The interest claimed by the
Muslims is only over the disputed site where the mosque stood before
its demolition. The objection of the Hindus to this claim has to be
c adjudicated. The remaining entire property acquired under the Act is
such over which no title is claimed by the Muslims. A large part
thereof comprises of properties of Hindus of which the title is no 1
even in dispute. The justification given for acquisition of the !arger
area including the property respecting which title is not disputed is
D that the same is necessary to ensure that the final outcome of
adjudication should not be l'endered meaningless by the existence of
properties belonging to Hind us in the vicinity of the disputed structure
in case the Muslims an: found entitled to the disputed site. This
obviously means that in the event of the Muslims succeeding in the
adjudication of the dispute requiring the disputed structure to be handed
E over to the Muslim community, their success should not be thwa11ed
by denial of proper access to, and enjoyment of rights in, the disputed
area by exercise of rights of ownership of Hindu owners of the adjacent
properties. Obviously, it is for this reason that the adjacent area has
also been acquired to make available to the successful party, that part
F of it which is considered necessary, for proper enjoyment of the fruits
of success on the final outcome to the adjudication. It is clear tl •at one
of the purposes of the acquisition of the adjacent properties is the
ensurement of the effective enjoyment of the disputed site by the
Muslim community in the event of its success in the litigation: and
acquisition of the adjacent area is incidental to the main purpose and
G cannot be termed unreasonable. The "Manas Bhawan" and "Sita ki
Rao.oi"'. both belonging to the Hindus, are buildings which closely
overlook the disputed site a.1d are acquired because they are strategic
in location in relation to the disputed area. The necessity of acquirin.~
adjacent temples or religious buildings in view of their proximity to
H the disputed structure area, which forms a unique class by itself, is
MOHD. ASLAM 'ij) BIIURE v. U.O.L [RAJENDRA BABU . .I.] 153

permissible. (See : I'd. Padmanabha Iyengar v. Government of A.P.. A
AIR 1990 AP 357. and Akhara Shri Braham Bula v. State of Punjab.
AIR ( 1989) P&H 198. We approve the principle stated in these
decisions since it serves a larger purpose.

xxx xxx xxx
B
However, at a later stage when the exact area acquired which is
needed, for achieving the professed purpose of acquisition, can be
determined, it would not merely be permissible but also desirable that
the superfluous excess area is released from acquisition.and reverted
to its earlier owner. The challenge to acquisition of any part of the
adjacent area on the ground that it is unnecessary for achieving the C
objective of settling the rJispute relating to the disputed area cannot
be examined at this stage but, in case the superfluous area is not
returned to its owner even after the exact area needed for the purpose
is finally determined, it would be open to the owner of any such
property to then challenge the superfluous acquisition being unrelated D
to the purpose of acquisition. Rejection of the challenge on this ground
to acquisition at this stage, by the undisputed owners of any such
property situate in the vicinity of the disputed area, is with the
reservation of this liberty to them. There is no contest to their claim
of quashing the acquisition of the adjacent prope1ties by anyone except
the Central Government which seeks to justify the acquisition on the E
basis of necessity. On the construction of the statute made by us. this
appears to be the logical, appropriate and just view to take in respect
of such adjacent properties in which none other than the undisputed
owner claims title and interest.

xxx xxx xxx F
Acquisition of the adjacent undisputed area belonging to Hindus

L has been attacked on the ground that it was unnecessary since
ownership of the same is undisputed. Reason for acquisition of the
large area adjacent to the disputed area has been indicated. It is,
therefore, not unrelated to the resolution of the dispute which is the G
reason for the entire acquisition. Even though. prima facie, the
acquisition of the adjacent area in re,pect of which there is no dispute
of title and which belongs to Hindus may appear to be a slant against
the Hindus, yet on closer scrutiny it is not so since it is for the larger
national purpose of maintaining and promoting communal harmony H

/
-
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] 3 S.C.R.

A and in consonance with the creed of secularism. Once it is found that
it is permissible to acquire an area in excess of the disputed area
alone, adjacent to it, to effectuate the purpose of acquisition of the
disputed area and to imple1m:nt the outcome of the final adjudication
between the parties to ensure that in the event of success of the
Muslim community in the dispute their success remains meaningful,
B the extent of adjacent area considered necessary is in the domain of
policy and not a matter for judicial scrutiny or a ground for testing
the constitutional validity of the enactment. However, it is with the
caveat of the Central Government's duty to restore it to its owner, as
indicated earlier, if it is found later to be unnecessary; and reservation
c of liberty to the owner to challenge the needless acquisition when the
total need has been determined."

From the observations quoted above, it is clear that the adjacent land,
though vest in the Central Government, will have to be utilised in different
manners depending upon the outcome of the litigation in respect of the disputed
D property. Thus the manner or extent to which the adjacent land could be used
would depend upon the final outcome of the pending dispute in the High
Court. The acquisition of larger extent of land is incidental to main purpose.
Thus, the two acquired lands are intrinsically connected with one another and
cannot be separated at this stage of the proceedings for different treatment
E during the interregnum. Further, it has also been made clear that if any land
becomes superfluous such land will have to be returned to the owner who
may have to initiate appropriate proceedings to challenge the validity of the
acquisition as indicated in the course of the judgment of this Court in M.
Ismail Faruqui's case [supra]. If land is. transferred to any other body or trust
as provided under Section 6 of the Act at this stage further complications
F may arise. Therefore, status quo will have to be maintained until suits are
finally disposed of. We hold that the orders of this Court made earlier are not
beyond the scope of the decision in M Ismail Faruqui 's case.

Above all, status quo has been maintained from 1992 onwards and no
activities as are set out in the course of the application have been required
G to be done so far. When for a long time, a particular state of affairs has
prevailed - as in the present case for over a decade - and when the adjudication
of the disputes which are pending before the High Court are reaching final
stages, it will not be appropriate to disturb :hat state of affairs. It is well
known that preservation of property in its original condition is absolutely
H necessary to give appropriate reliefs to the parties on the termination of the
MOHD. ASLAM@ BHURE v. U.0.1. [RAJENDRA BABU. J.] 155

proceedings before the courts and, therefore, we do no think that this is one A
of those cases in which it becomes necessary to disturb that state.

On consideration of the entire matter, we are of the view that the ·Jrder
made by this Court on 13.3.2002, as modified by the order made on 14.3.200.~,
should be operative until disposal of the suits in the High Court of Allahabad
not only to maintain communal harmony but also to fulfil other objecl.ives of B
the Act. The writ petition shall stand disposed of accordingly.

Before parting with the case, we wish to put on record that all the
learned counsel and the parties who appeared in person in arguing the matter
thoroughly have presented their respective cases only on facts and law arising C
in the case without bringing into court in any manner the passion raging
outside whether religious or political. We greatly appreciate this stand of the
Advocates and the parties in the court.

N.J. Petition disposed of.