Holding

Under section 12(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, only the tenant or the specific family member who builds or acquires another residential building is deemed to have ceased occupation, and this does not terminate the tenancy rights of other heirs.

Summary

Manzoor Hussain, a tenant of a residential premises in Aligarh, died in 1969 leaving a widow, three sons and a daughter who continued to occupy the premises and pay rent. One son, Nairn, built a separate house in the same city in 1978‑80. The Prescribed Authority, relying on section 12(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 and a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court, deemed the tenancy to have ceased and ordered eviction of the remaining family members. The District Judge upheld this order and the High Court dismissed the writ petition. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the definitions of "tenant" and "family" under section 3 of the Act and held that each heir who satisfies the statutory definition becomes a tenant in his own right; the provision in section 12(3) applies only to the tenant or the family member who acquires another dwelling and does not create a deemed vacancy for other heirs. Consequently, the tenancy of the appellant and his siblings continued, the earlier orders were set aside and the petition was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether the definition of "tenant" and "family" under section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings Act, 1972 precludes the concept of joint tenancy among heirs.
Whether the construction of a separate house by one heir triggers a deemed cessation of tenancy and deemed vacancy for all co‑heirs under section 12(3).
Whether the Full Bench decision in Smt. Rama Devi Shakya v. Additional District Judge, Lucknow is consistent with the statutory scheme and should be followed.
Interpretation of section 12(3) in relation to the rights of surviving heirs of a deceased tenant.

Legislation cited

Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972s. 12(3), s. 3(a), s. 3(g)

Subjects

tenancydeemed vacancyUttar Pradesh Urban Buildings Actsection 12(3)heirsjoint tenancyrent controlevictionstatutory interpretation

Judgment

906

A

MOHD. AZEEM
v.

B DISTRICT JUDGE, ALIGARH AND ORS.

April 23, 1985

[D. A. DESAI AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.]

c Uttor Pradesh Urban Bulidings (Regulation Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act
1912, section 12 (3) read with section 3 (a) and 3 (g)-lnterpretation of the phrase
u;/ the tenant or any member of his family .. occurring therein-Deemed ces-
sation of the tenancy and Deemed vacancy of the tenanted premises, when occurs,
explained-Right to occupy the tenanted premises by the heirs uuder section 12, .
clarified.

D Under section 12 (3) of the littar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction Act, 1972. "in the case of a residential building, if the
tenant or any member of his family builds or otherwise acquires in a vacant
state, or gets vacated residential building in the same city, municipality, notified
area or town area in which the building under tenancy is situate, he shall be dee-
med to have ceased to occupy the building under his tenancy: ... ". 'Tenant' ac-
cording to the definition in clause (a)of section of3 the Act in relation to a build-
E ing means: 'a person by whom its rent is payable, and on the tenants' death (1) in
the case of a residential building, such only of his heirs as normally resided with
him in the building at the time of his death,' (2) in the case of a non-residential
building, his heirs.' Under clause (g)of section 3 Or the Act, 'Family' in relation
to a land lord or tenant of a building means: ''his or her-(i) sp (ii) male lineal
descendants; (iii) such parents, grand parents and any unmarried or widowed or
divorced or judicially separated daughter or daughter of a malelineal •descendant,
F as may have been normally residing with him or her, in and includes in relation
to a land 1ord, any family having a leg~! right of residence in that building."

One Manzoor Hussain a tenant of the suit premises localed at Aligarh
died in 1969, leaving behind a widow and three sons-Mohd. Azeem (the appel-
lant), Mohd. Nairn, Mohd. Nadeem-and a daughter Nauzhat, who continued
to live in the tenanted premises on payment of rent by the appellant. The Rent
G Control Inspector submitted a report on June 22. 1983 that Nairn, appellants'
brother, had built a house in 1978 or 1979 and, therefor:, the tenancy must be
deemed to have terminated in view of the provisions contained in section 12 of
the Act. The prescribed Authority ordered the eviction in spite of the contest
that under section 12 the right to occupy by other heirs continued. The revi-
sion before the District Judge failed and the writ petition filed in the lligh
Court of Allahabad was dismissed in /ilnine, in view of the Full Bench decision
H of that High Court in the case of Smt. Rama Devi Shakya and Anr. v. The
MOHD•. AZEEM v. biSTRfCT JUDGE Po1
Additional District Judge, Lucknow & Anr., 1981 Allahabad Rent Cases 305.
Hence the appeal by special leave of the Court. A

AJlowing the petition, the Court,

HELD: 1.1 When the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 defines "tenant" and "family" reference
to personal Jaw is irrelevant and the concept of joint tenancy is foreign, There-
B
fore, when one· of the members of the family built a house or moved into a
vacant premises (other than the tenanted premises in occupation) it cannot be
said that there was a deemed cessation of the tenancy and a deemed vacancy
occurred of the tenanted premises.

1.2 It is true that the legislative purpose behind section 12 appears to be
in keeping with the scheme of the Act-making available as much accommoda-
-~ tion as possible for allotment ·to needy persons.· That being the purpose, the leg-
c
/
is1ature could not have intended to render persons rehab~litated in tenanted pre-
mises homeless.

J .3 As the definition Of "tenant" in clause (a) of section 3 indicates, on
a tenants' death his heirs as normally resided with him would also be tenants
qua residential buildings. The definition does not warrant the view that all the D
heirs will become a body of tenants to give rise to the concept of joint tenancy.
'Each heir satisfying the further qualification in section 3 (a) (1) of the Act in his
o .... n right becomes a tenant and coming the section 12 (3) of the Act, the words
"the tenant or any member of his family" will refer to the heir who has become
a tenant under the statutory definition and members of his family. If everyooe,s
interest was to be wiped out, section 3 had to provide differently and instead of
'he shall be deemed tci have ceased to occupy the building under his tenancy' as E
occurring in sub-section, (3) would have been made to aJI the tenants in sec.
tion 12. ~Family' having been defined, for convenience in the facts of the present
appeal qua Nairn, the definition would cover Naim's wife, his male linealdescen-
dants, his mother and those who are covered by clause f(iii) in the definition
of family. It would not by any stretching embrace the appellant or his brother
Nadeem and the sister. Therefore, when Nadeem built a house and shifted
nto it, the tenancy of the appellant and his brother along with their mother F
and sister did not terminate.

Smt. Rama Devi Shakya and Anr. v. Th~ Additional District Judge,
Lucknow & Anr , 1981 Allahabad Rent Cases 305 overruled.
'
C1v1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 360 G
of 1985.

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.5.1984 of the Allaha-
bad High Court in W.P. No. 4230 of 1984.

Shakee/ Ahmed Syed for the App ellant.
I.S. Sawhney for the Respondents.
9o8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [!985]3 s.C.R.
A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RANGANATH MISRA, J. The appellant, who filed a writ
application before the Allahabad High Court assailing the revi-
sional order of the District Judge of Aligarh, is in appeal by
special leave.
B
One Manzoor Hussain was admittedly the tenant of a pre·
mises located at Aligarh. He died in 1969 leaving behind a widow
and three sons-Mohd. Azeem (the appellant), . Mohd. Nairn,
Mohd. Nadeem-and a daughter-Nuzhat. The widow and the
c sons and the . daughter of Manzoor continued to live in the tenan-
)-
ted premises on payment of rent. It is the case of the appellant
that being the eldest member of the family he was paying that.rent.
The Rent Control Inspector submitted a report on June 22, 1983,
'
that Nairn, appellant's brother, bad bnilt a house four or five years
before in Amir Nisan, a part of the city of Aligarh and, therefore,
0 the tenancy must be deemed to have terminated in view of the
provisions contained in section 12 of the U.P. Urban Buildings
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 ('Act' for
short). When notice was issued from the Court of the Rent Con-
trol and Eviction Officer, Aligarh, respondent 2 herein, the appel-
lant entered contest by filing an affidavit to the affect that he has
E been living with 13 members of his family in the premises and
rent was being collected from him following the death of his father
Manzoor Hussain. Merely because Nairn had built a house in
1980, the tenancy in favour of the other heirs of Manzoor Hussain
would not terminate and in such Circumstances the premises cannot
be held to become vacant and available for allotment to some
F other person. The Prescribed Authority did not accept the conten-
tion of the appellant and held that the house in question must be
deemed to have become vacant when Nairn, who was a member
of the family, had built a house, Appellant carried a revision
before the District Judge, respondent 1, which was dismissed. The ·
revisonal authority placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of the
G
Allahabad High Court in the case of Smt. Rama Devi Shakya and
Anr. v. The Additional Distriet fudge, Lucknow & Anr(lJ. The Full
Bench bad held :

(I) 1981 Allahabad Rent Cases JOS.
H
MOHD AZEEM v. DISfRICT JUDGE (Ranganath Misra, J.) 9o9
"Where one of the co-tenants builds or cttherwise A
acquires another residential building within the meaning
of sub-s. (3) of s. 12, the tenant, namely, the .entire set of
co-tenants shall be deemed to have ceased to .occupy the
building under his sub-tenant. . It cannot be that the
share belonging to the co-tenant in default alone shall
fall vacant." B

The writ application filed by the appellant before the High
Court was summarily dismissed as the Court was of the view that
it was not a fit case for interference under Art. 226 of the
Constitution.
c
At the hearing .the decision of the Full Bench of the Allaha·
bad High Court In Rama D!vi's case was placed before us. ·An ·
attempt was made on the appellant's side to show that the inter-
pretation put on s. 12 (3) of the Act was erroneous and a wrong
conclusion had been reached. Counsel for ·respondent 3 appoin-
D
ted by the Supr~me Court Legal Aid Committee supported the
·judgment and relied upon its conclusion for upholding the Mcision
of the learned District Judge. ·

Reference to some of the provmons of the Act becomes
necessary before we proceed to make an .analysis of the Full E
Bench decision. Chapter Ill of the Act makes provision for
regulation of letting. Section 11 provides that "no person shall
let any building except in pursuance of an allotment order issued
under s. 16". Section 12 makes provision for deemed vacancies
of buildings in certain cases. Sub-s. (3) of s. 12 is relevant for the
disposal for the appeal. That sub-section runs thus : F

"In the case of a residential building, if the tenant
or any member of his family. builds or otherwise acquires
in a vacant state or gets vacated a residential building
• in the same city, municipathity, notified area or town area
in which the building under tenancy is situate, he shall be G
deemed to have ceased to occupy the building under his
tenancy :.... · ·"

As the words "tenant" and "family" occur in sub-s. (3), refer-
ence to the definitions of these two terms is also relevant.
H
910 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (198S] 3 S.C.ii..
A
'Tenant' and family have been defined iu clauses (a) and (g) respec-.
lively of s. 3. 'Tenant' according to the definition in relation to
a building means : 'a person by whom its rent is payable, and on the
tenant's death-(!) in the case, of a residential building, such
only of bis heirs as normally resided with him in the building at
B the time of his death ; (2) in the case of a non-residential buil-
ding, his heirs." 'Family' ·in relation to a landlord or tenant of a
building. means : "his or her-(i) spouse ; (ii) male lineal descen-
dants.: (iii) such parents, grand parents and any unmarried
or widowed of divorced or judicially separated daughter or daugh-
ter of a male lineal descendant, as may have been normally resid-
c ing with him or her, and includes, in relation to a landlord, an)
female having a legal right of residence in that building."

There is no dispute that along with Manzoor his wife, his
three sons and the daughter were living in the disputed premises.
After Manzoor's death, the widow, the three "sons and the daugh-
ter continued to live in· that house. There is reference to payment
D of rent in the order of the Prescribed Authority and in the peti-
tion for Special Leave an assertion has been made that it was the
appellant who had been paying the rent after the death of
Manzoor. This plea has not been controverted. In the setting
of things, the appellant being the eldest son, was naturally expec-
E ted to pay the rent. There is material on record to show that
Azeem and Nairn were already married and have been living along
with their wives in the house along with other members of the
family.

As the definition of 'tenant' indicates, on a tenant's death
his heirs as normally resided with him would also be tenant qua
F
residential buildings. Therefore, the widow, all the three sons and
unmarried daughter became tenants when the Act came into·
force notwithstanding the fact that Manzoor had died in 1969.

We may now revert to s. 12(3) of the Act. Admittedly
we are concerned with a residential building. It is the case of '
G the Prescribed Authority and there is no dispute about it, that
Nairn has built a house in the same city some time in 1980. Naim's
building a house and moving into it cannot wipe out the interest
of the widow, other two sons, including the appellant and the
daughter, if in their own right they were tenants by. satisfying the
requirements of the definition. The words 'if the tenant or any
H
MOHD AZEEM v. oistiliCT JuDGE (Ranganath Misra, !.) 91 i

member of his family' obviously mean, in the facts of the case, A
Nairn and the members of his family and do not relate to the
widow, other two sons and the daughter of Mailzoor. If everyone's
interest was to be wiped out, s. 3 bad to provide differently and
instead of 'he shall be deemed to haye ceased to occupy the
building under his tenancy' as occurring in sub-s. (3) reference
B
would have been ·made to all the tenants.

The ratio of the Full Bench decision to which we shall pre -
sently advert and which has been relied upon by the Prescribed
Authority and the learned District Judge, is bound to lead to
situations which could never have been contemplated· by the
legislature. For instance, if Nairn or Nadeem foun,d inconve- c
nient to live with the other members of family when Manzoor died
and he moved into another house with a view to living separately
and the fact of such a move on his part brought about cessation of
tenancy and the house Manzoor lived in was deemed to have be-
come vacant, the widow, the other sons· and the daughter of D!
Manzoor would immediately find themselves in a very helpless
condition. Or for instance, if one of the sons got an employment
in a Factory located within the same city and for cbnvenience
moved into a Factory quarter for residence, the same result would
ensue to the miserable plight of the other members. Or consider
the case of a divorced daughter of the tenant living with him, E
when she builds or acquires a separate premises with funds provi-
ded by her ex-husband. No sooner she moves into her house,
the father's tenancy comes to an end. Or take the case of an
expanding family. Several sons come of age are married and
many children are born to them. The accommodation becomes
insufficient and one or two of the sons move into a separate house F
to ease the situation. If in such premises, father's tenancy termi-
nates and the house in which -he and members of his family re-
side is deemed to have become vacant, the family would be visited
with hardship knowing no bounds. Take the unhappy and miser-
• able lot of a couple whose infirm son, suffering from a serious
malady highly contagious, is shifted to an ind@pendent residence G ·'
for exclusion. Would that too lead to termination of tenancy qua
the main residential premises ?

In an Act intended to stabilise letting, rent and eviction by
regulation, the legislature could not have evinced such intention.
H ,,
912 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 3 s.c.R..

A It is true that the legislative purpose hehind s. 12 appears to be in
keeping with the scheme of the Act-making available as much
accommodation as possible for allotment to needy persons. That
being the purpo3e, the legislature could not have intended to render
persons rehabilitated in tenanted premises homeless.. In our view,
when the Act defines 'tenant' and 'family' reference to personal
law is irrelevant and the concept of joint tenancy is foreign.

Now a reference to the Full Bench decision. The following
questions had been referred to the Full Bench for decision :

c 1. (a) Whether the view expressed in Budh Sen v. Shee/
Chandra Agarwal, 1977 AWC 553, and Ramesh
Chand Bose v. Gopeshwar Prasad Sharma, 1976
AWC 301, to the effect that the heirs of a tenant
are tenants-in-common and not joint tenants, is
consistent with the view expressed by the Supreme
D Court in Badri Narain v. Rameshwar Dayal, AIR
1951 SC 186?

(b) Do such heirs of a tenant become tenants in
common inter se but remain joint tenants qua the
landlord ?
E
(c) What is the effect of one such heirs acquiring
another building as mentioned in section 12(3) of
U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972?

2. Whether the view expressed· in Shri Nath Tandon v.
F Rent Control & Eviction Officer, 1919 Alld Rent Cases
541, to the effect that a member of the family who
acquires another building should both have been
wholly dependent on him for section 12(3) to be attrac-
ted, is consistent with Explanation (b) to s. 12(3) ?"
G
The Full Bench proceeded on the basis that the heirs become
joint tenants and answered the main problem by saying that if any
member of the family of such joint tenants built or acquired a
house in vacant state the tenancy would be deemed to have ceased.
In framing the questions for reference and in answering the
H referred questions, the definition of 'tenant' was lost sight of.
All the heirs as normally reside with the deceased tenant in the
Mono AZEEM v. oisTRICT JUDGB {Ranganath Misra, i.) 913
l building at the. time of his death become tenants. ' The definition A
does not warrant the view that all the heirs will become a body
of tenants to give rise to the concept of joint tenancy. Each heir
satisfying the further qualification in s, 3(a)(l) of the Act in his
own right becomes a tenont and when we come to s. 12(3) of the
Act, the words "the tenant or any member of his family" will B
refer to the heir who has become a tenant under the statu-
tory definition and members of his family. 'Family' having been
defined, for . convenience if we refer to the facts of th_e present
appeal qua Nairn, the definition would· cover Naim's wife, his
male lineal descendants, his mother and those who are covered
0

by clause {iii) in the definition of family. It would not by any c
stretching embrace the appellant or his brother Nadeem and the
sister. The Full Bench, in our view, fell into an error in work-
ing on the basis of joint tenancy running counter to the scheme
under the Act. The conclusion reached by the Full Bench in
our .view is, therefore, wholly unsustainable and we can~oi
D
exte~d our agreement to the conclusion -that when one of the
members of the family built a house or moved into-~ vacant
premises ·(other than the tenanted. premises in occupation), there
was a deemed cessation of the tenancy and a deemed vacancy
occurred of the tenanted premises.
E
- Now coming to the -facts of the appeal, whe~ Nairn built a
house and shifted into it,_· the tenancy of the appellant and his
brother along . with their mother and sister did not terminate.
They continued to be tenants in their own right being covered by
the definition of 'tenant' and there is no deemed vacancy as held ·
by the . Prescribed· Authority, the learned• District Judge and the
High ·Court. The appeal is . allowed and the decisions of the F
different _forums referred to above are set aside with costs through:
out.· Respondent 2 who by making his order of deemed vacancy
gave rise to . the dispute which ultimately required the appeal to
be brought up here._ in our opinion, must alone bear the costs.
Hearing fee is assessed at· Rs. 2,000. -
G

S.R. · Petition allowed.
--
H'