Holding

Appointments made without the requisite training qualification at the time of recruitment are void, giving the appointees no right to the posts and obviating the need for a hearing before cancellation.

Summary

The appellants were appointed as Urdu teachers in Uttar Pradesh despite not possessing the Basic Teacher's Certificate (B.T.C.) or any equivalent training qualification required by Rule 8 of the U.P. Basic (Teachers) Services Rules, 1981 at the time of their recruitment. Within weeks, the State cancelled their appointments on the ground of this deficiency. The appellants argued that they were denied a hearing and that later government orders equating their Moallim‑e‑Urdu degree with the B.T.C. should validate their service. The Supreme Court held that qualification must exist at the date of recruitment unless the rules expressly allow later compliance, and the earlier government orders did not create such equivalence. Consequently, the appointments were illegal, the appellants had no right to the posts, and no hearing was required before cancellation. The Court dismissed the appeals and ordered no costs.

Issues considered

The validity of appointments made without the mandatory training qualification prescribed by Rule 8 of the U.P. Basic (Teachers) Services Rules, 1981.
Whether the State was required to afford a hearing before cancelling the appointments under principles of natural justice.
Whether subsequent government orders equating the Moallim‑e‑Urdu degree with the B.T.C. could retrospectively validate the appointments.

Legislation cited

U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972

Subjects

service lawappointmentqualificationnatural justiceRule 8teacherscancellationU.P. Basic (Teachers) Services Ruleseligibilityadministrative law

Judgment

-f
I

MOHD. SARTAJ AND ANR. A
V.

STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.

JANUARY 16, 2006

[S.B. SINHA AND P.P. NAOLEKAR, JJ.] B

Service law-Appointment-Cancellation of-On ground of initial
disqualification-Appellants appointed as Urdu teachers in the State of U.P.
lacked training qualification (BTC) prescribed under the Rules at the time of C
initial appointment-Hence, had no right over the post and no hearing was
required before cancellation of their appointment-Cancellation order having
been issued within a very1 short span of appointment, gave no.probability for
any legitimate expectation to appellants regarding continuation of their
service-Qualification obtained at a /a/er stage did not meel requirement of
!he Rules-UP. Basic (Teachers) Services Rules, 1981-Rule 8-Administralive D
law-Nalural Justice-Opportunity of prior hearing.

Appellants were appointed as Urdu teachers in the State of U.P. even
though they lacked the training qualification (BTC) prescribed under the
U.P. Basic (Teachers) Services Rules, 1981 at the time of initial
appointment. However, within a very short span of time, Respondents- E
authorities cancelled their appointment on the ground that they did not
possess the BTC. Appellants filed writ petition before High Court which
stayed the order of cancellation of appointment. Meanwhile, the Appellants
I- acquired BTC qualification. Ultimately, the High Court dismissed the writ
petition holding the appointment of Appellants to be improper and F
directed the State of U.P. to re-advertise the posts.

In appeals to this Court it was contended by the Appellants that
without issuance of any prior notice or giving of opportunity of being
heard, and in any case, the State of U.P. having given equivalence of the
degree possessed by the Appellants, i.e. Moallim-e-Urdu from Jamia Urdu, G
Aligarh, to the BTC, their appointments could not have been cancelled.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD: I. I. The appellants were not qualified and they did not
377 H
tI

378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) I S.C.R.

A possess the B.T.C. or Hindustani Teacher's Certificate or Junior Teacher's
Certificate or Certificate of Teaching or certificate of any other training
course recognized by the State Government as equivalent thereto at the
time of their initial appointment. In view of the basic lack of qualifications,
they could not have been appointed nor their appointment could have been
B continued. Hence the appellants did not hold any right over the post and
therefore no hearing was required before the cancellation of their services.
1388-G-H; 389-AI

1.2. The cancellation order has been issued within a very short span
of time giving no probability for any legitimate expectation to the
C appellants regarding continuation of their service. There was no separate
appointment order issued in favour of the appellants but the memorandum
wherein the list of selected candidates was published, provided that all the
selected candidates must join their respective schools/colleges within 15
days and from this the nature of appointment made cannot be ascertained.
Moreover, the cancellation order itself gives an opportunity that if they
D do hold and possess the B.T.C. qualification along with intermediate
qualification, they may contact and get the same verified by the appointing
authority and they may bring this to the notice of the concerned
authorities. The copy of the order of cancellation was also sent to the
Principal concerned of the institution with the remarks that he should
E relieve Urdu teacher with immediate effect if he did not possess the
certificate of passing the examination of intermediate and B.T.C.; and, if
he possessed these certificates he should submit the same to the office of
the District Basic Education Officer, Muzaffarnagar. Therefore, it is
apparent that any person having the basic qualification for the
appointment can produce it before the concerned official so that immediate
. '
F steps can be taken with regard to the order of cancellation of appointment.
On the above facts, no prejudice has been caused to the appellants by not
serving notice of giving hearing before the order of cancellation was issued.
1389-A-E)

S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan und Ors., 119801 4 SCC 379; State of M.P.
G & Ors. v. Shyumu P~rdi & U/'5 .. 119961 7 SCC 118; M.C. Mehta v. UOI,
119991 6 SCC 237; Aligarh Muslim Universil)' v. Mimsoor Ali Khan, AIR
(2000) SC 2783; Viveka Nand Sethi v. ( 'huirman. J & K Bank ltd. and Urs.,
120051 5 SCC 337 and Stare of UP. , .. Neeraj Awasthi & Urs., JT (2006) I
SC 19, relied on.
H
'{
)

MOHD. SAR TAJ v. STA TE OF U.P. 379
,; Shrawan Kumar Jha & Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors., 119911 Supp. I A
sec 330, distinguished.
Dr.Prit Singh v. S.K. Mangat & Ors., 119931 Supp. I SCC 714; State
of Mi:::oram v. Biakchhawna, 1199511 SCC 156; Gurdeep Singh v. State of.I
& K & Ors.. 119951 Supp I SCC 188; VK. Soodv. Secretary Civil Aviation
& Ors., 119931Supp.3 SCC; J Ranga Swamy v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, B
AIR (1990) SC 535; State of Haryana v. S..l Bahadur, 119721 2 SCC 188;
State of MP. v. Shyama Pardhi, 1199617 SCC 118; State ofOrissa v. Ms.
Binapani Dei, AIR (1967) SC 1269; Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election
Commissioner, New Delhi, AIR (1978) SC 851; K.l. Tripathi v. State Bank
of India, AIR 1984 SC 273; S.K. Sharma v. State Bank of Patiala, 119961 3
SCC 364 and Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P., 119961 5 SCC 450, referred
c
to.

Ashok Kumar Saxena v. Stale of UP. & Ors, (1994) LAB l.C., referred
to.
~ D
Ridge v. Baldwin, (1964) AC 40 and Alji·ed Thangarajah Jaurayappah
' v. W.J Fernando, (1967) 2 AC 337, referred to.

2. It is settled law that the qualification should have been seen which
the candidate possessed on the date of recruitment and not at a later stage
unless rules to that regard permit it. The minimum qualification prescribed E
under Rule 8 should be fulfilled on the date of recruitment. Equivalence
of degree of Moa//ium-e-Urdu, Jamia Urdu Aligarh with that of B.T.C. in
a year subsequent to appointment would not e_ntail the benefit to the
y appellants on the date they were appointed. The appellants could not have
been appointed to the post of Asstt. Teachers without having training
required under Rule 8. That being the case, the appointments of the F
appellants were de hors the Rules and could not be treated to be continued.

' CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 4507-4508
of 2005.

G
" From the Judgment and Order dated 3.2.2004 of the Allahabad High
Court in Writ Petition No. 5011/85 and dated 15.03.04 in Special Appeal No.
_) 81/04.
~
A.S. Qureshi, Shakeel Ahmed, A. Rasheed Qureshi and Ms. Rajani,
C.S. for the Appellants.
G
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006J I S.C.R.

A Subodh Markandeya, Mrs. Chitra Markandeya and B.P. Singh Shakya
for Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

P.P. NAOLEKAR, J. In the year 1984, tht Government of U.P. had
B decided to appoint Urdu teachers in most of the districts of U.P. and the
number of teachers to be appointed for each district was fixed. For the district
of Muzaffamagar, 60 Urdu teachers were to be appointed. In pursuance of
the decision of the Government of U.P., the Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Distt.
Muzaffarnagar by an advertisement dated 15.10.84 invited applications for
C the post of Asstt. Teachers (Urdu). The minimum educational qualification
for the said post as per the advertisement was that the candidates should have
either passed the Higher Secondary, Intermediate or equivalent examination
thereto recognized by the Government (along with Urdu as subject) and
possessed the Basic Teacher's Certificate (B.T.C.), Hindustani Teacher's
Certificate, Junior Teacher's Certificate (J.T.C.), or Certificate of Teaching
D (T.C.) or equivalent thereto, recognized by the Government or any training
equivalent thereto. The advertisement also provided that the higher caste
candidates who were trained by 1974 and those Scheduled Caste, Backward
Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates, who were trained upto 1975 may only
apply because other candidates trained after this period were not going to be
considered. Both the appellants had the High School Degree as well as the
E Intermediate Degree with Urdu as one of the subjects along with Urdu Training
Certificate such as Adib, Adib-e-Mahir and Moallim-e-Urdu from the Jam ia
Urdu, Aligarh. In pursuance of the advertisement issued dated 15.10.84, the
Basic Education Board, Muzaffarnagar conducted an interview and the Upper
Basic Shiksha Adhikari, respondent no.4 herein, on 19.6.85 published a list
F of "'selecteJ candidates, which included the names of the appellants herein.
The list/memorandum itself provided that all the selected candidates were
required to join their respective schools/colleges within the period of 15
days, otherwise their appointment would automatically be deemed to be
cancelled. After receipt of the memorandum both the appellants joined duties
within the stipulated 15 days and started working as per the conditions of
d 'service. However. on 7.8.85. i.e .. within a very short span of their appointment
,
the Urdu Advisory Director of Education, respondent no.2 herein, issued
direction to respondent no.4. regarding the cancellation of the appointment of
the appellants on the ground that they did not possess the Basic Training
Certificate (B.T.C.). Respondent no. 4 vide his letter dated 9.8.85 cancelled
H their appointment and directed them to contact the appointing authority. along
I

--1

MOHD. SARTAJ v. STATE OF U.P. [NAOLEKAR. J.] 381
~
·y' with B.T.C. and Intermediate (Urdu Certificate) for the pu112ose of verification, A
if these documents were in their possession. Being aggrieve~ by the above-
mentioned order, the appellants filed a writ petition before the Lucknow
Bench of the Allahabad High Court on 20.9.85 and the High Court stayed the
operation of the order of cancellation of their appointments.

Meanwhile, the appellants acquired B.T.C. in 1993 and 1995 respectively B
and continued with their service. Before their appointment, on 28.1.85 the
Special Secretary to the U.P. Government by letter informed all heads of
\..-- departments and Chief Officers, U.P. that Hon'bl~ Governor had approved
such candidates who were qualified as Moal/im-e-Urdu from Jamia Urdu,
Aligarh and got the experience of teaching at Higher Secondary School as
eligible for employment in the State services I educational institutions.
c
Similarly, on 21.10.88 the Special Secretary to the U.P. Government passed
.. an order to inform all head of departments and Chief Officers of U.P. that the
candidates with the degree of Moal/im-e-Urdu granted by Jamia Urdu, Aligarh,
and those who had got the experience of teaching upto Higher Secondary
; level had been directed to be appointed as teachers in State services. On D
\ 13.9.94 the Secretary of U.P. Government by his order informed all authorities
of education that Hon'ble Governor had granted sanction to Moa/lim-e-Urdu
for teaching Urdu in junior and senior schools and it was given equivalent
status of B.T.C. Thus by this Circular, degree of Moallim-e-Urdu from Jamia
Urdu, Aligarh was given equivalent status of B.T.C. Certificate.
E
Before the High Court, it was contended by the appellants that the
appointments were cancelled without issuing any prior notice or giving
opportunity of being heard and hence the order of dismissal issued is violative
.;--
of principles of natural justice. It is also urged that the appellants having
higher qualifications than the prescribed ones and hence even if they acquired F
the prescribed qualifications at later stage, the selection arid appointment was
perfectly lawful, just and proper. The argument of the appellants was countered
by the respondents contending therein that the appellants were not entitled to
continue in ser\tice and their appointment was rightly cancelled within the
short. span of time on detecting the error that they did not qua Iify for the
appointment, arid, therefore, 'the compliance of natural justice was not G
~ necessary. The appellants having not possessed the miniinum qualification
--{ under the Rules, their initial appointment itself was bad.

The High Court, relying upon the ruling of this Court in Dr. Pri1 Singh
v.S.K. Mangat and Ors., [1993] Supp. (I) S.C.C. 714, held that appellants'
H
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] I S.C.R.

A appointment was not proper. It further relied on State of Mi:::oram v.
Biakchhawna [1995) I S.C.C. 156, to conclude that it was incumbent on the
authorities to advertise the vacancy strictly by following Rule 8 of the Service
Rules which was not done. It was also pointed out that any selection made
in violation of the relevant rules was illegal and reliance was placed on
Gurdeep Singh v. State ofJ & K. and Ors., [ 1995) Supp. I S.C.C. 188 along
B with the decision of a Division Bench of the Allah<.Jad High Court in Ashok
Kumar Saxena v. State of UP. and Ors., ( 1994) LAB.LC. Reliance was also
placed on V.K. Sood v. Secretary Civil Aviation and Ors., [1993) Supp. 3
S.C.C. and J. Ranga Swamy v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, A.LR. (1990) S.C.
535 to observe that it was the duty of the rule-making authority to regulate
C the method of recruitment and provide necessary qualification after considering
the relevant facts and circumstances.

Regarding the statutory force of Ru le 8, the Court observed that it
could not be modified either by government or by the advertisement as per
this Court's ruling in Srare ofHaryana v. S.J. Bahadur. [1972) 2 S.C.C. 188,
D and, therefore. the advertisement for the posts was in violatiqn of the service
rules. ,

Regarding the non-compliance of natural justice, the Court opined that
in the present case there was no procedural illegality and relied upon the
Srate of Af.P. v. Shyama Pardhi. [1996] 7 S.C.C. 118 where it was observed
E that question of violation of natural justice did not arise in a case where the
pre-requisite minimum qualification for the appointment was not fulfilled
and resulted in the cancellation of the appointment. The Court also opined
that the action of cancellation was taken swiftly within a short interval and
merely because appellants were allowed to continue on the post in pursuance
F of the interim order, would not entitle them to the posts on which they were
illegally appointed.

By order dated 3.2.2004, the Single Judge dismissed the petition and
directed the State Government to re-advertise the post as early as possible
and make such fresh recruitment in accordance with rule. The Court further
G pointed out that State Govt. could amend the existing rule and consider the
petitioners' case by relaxing their age while making fresh recruitment. It was
also pointed out that State Govt.. if desired, could provide appropriate provision
in rule to consider petitioners· case for recruitment at par with other candidates.

Appeal filed against the order was also dismissed by the High Court on
H
,
'1
MOHD. SARTA.1 v. STATE OF U.P. [NAOLEKAR. J.] 383
:>
'y' 15.3.2004. Aggrieved by this, the present appeals had been filed. A
It is contended by the counsel for the appellants that the appellants
having been appointed in pursuance of the advertisement after following due
procedures, cancellation order of their appointment could have been issued
only after giving them an opportunity of being heard. The State is bound to
give a person who is affected by their decision an opportunity of making a B
representation when the right has been created in favour of the appellants by
issuance of appointment orders in their favour. In any case, the State by
~ various orders having given equivalence of the degree obtained by the
appellants, i.e., Moallim-e-Urdu from Jamia Urdu, Aligarh to the B.T.C.,
c
their services could not have been cancelled. It is further urged that appellants'
appointment has been made having possessed of the qualifications as
mentioned in the advertisement and that being the case, it could not have
been cancelled. On the other hand, it is urged by the learned counsel for the
respondents that the recruitment to the pubic services should be held in
accordance with the terms of the recruitment rules and the appellants could
~
not claim any right over the post when they were not qualified to be appointed D
·~
to the said post. The appellants have been given sufficient opportunity in the
order of cancellation itself wherein they have been provided with an
opportunity to produce the B.T.C. Certificate along with Intermediate Urdu
Certificate before the appointing authority in original so that mistake, if any,
committed in cancellation of the appointment could be rectified. It is further
E
urged that in government order, administrative instructions inconsistent with
the statutory rules would be illegal and if any change is to be brought about
it can only be done by suitably amending the rules. The appointment of foe
''\ appellants being contrary to the rules, they cannot claim any right of being
heard before the order of cancellation was issued.
F
The appellants' appointment was made under U.P. Basic (Teachers)
Services Rules, 1981 (hereinafter shall be referred as "Rules") framed under
U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972. Rule 8 of the said Rules prescribes academic
qualifications which reads as under :-

"(I) The essential qualifications of candidates for appointment to a G
post referred to in clause (a) of Rule 5 shall be as shown below
..{ against each:

H
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (20061 I S.C.R.

A Post Academic qualifo.:ations
(i) Mistress of Nursery Certificate of Teaching (Nursery) from a
Schools recognized training institution in Uttar
Pradesh or any other training qualification
recognized by the State Government as
B equivalent thereto.

(ii) Assistant Masters and A Bachelor's Degree from a University
Assistant Mistress established by law in India or a Degree
Junior Basic Schools recognized by the State Government as
equivalent thereto together with the
c training qualification consisting of a Basic
Teacher's Certificate, Hindustani
Teacher's Certificate. Junior Teacher's
Certificate, <;:ertificate of Teaching or any
other training course recognized by the
Government as equivalent thereto:
D
Provided chat the essential qualification
for a candidate who has passed the
required training course shall be the same
which was prescribed for admission to
the said training course.
E

(2) The essential qualification of candidates for appointment to a post
of Assistant Master and Assistant Mistress of Senior Basic School for -.,
teaching Science, Mathematics, Craft or any language other than Hindi
F shall be as follows :-

(i) Intermediate Examination of the Board of High School and
Intermediate Education, Uttar Pradesh, or any other examination
recognized as equivalent thereto by the State Government with science.
mathematics craft or particular language, as the case may be, as one
G of the subjects in which he or she has been examined for the purpose
of such examination; and

(ii) Training qualification consisting of Basic Teacher's Certificate,
Hindustani Teacher's Certificate, Junior Teacher's Certificate,
Certificate of Teaching or any other training course recognized by
H
. \/
MOHD. SARTAJ v. ST ATE OF U.P. [NAOLEKAR. J.)

Government as equivalent thereto."
385
A
The requisite qualification is High School Examination of the Board of
High School and Intermediate Education, U.P. or equivalent qualification
recognized by the State Government together with the training qualification
which consisted either one among the Basic Teacher's Certificate (B.T.C.),
Hindustani Teacher's Certificate, Junior's Teacher's Certificate, Certificate B
of Teaching or any other training course recognized by the State Government
as equivalent thereto. Thus under the Rules, the basic qualification for the
\, post of Asstt. Teacher, apart from the educational qualification, was the training
qualification of the Basic Teacher'.s Certificate or Hindustani Teacher's
Certificate or Junior Teacher's Certificate or Certificate of Teaching or
equivalent training course recognized by the State Government. It is an
c
admitted position by both the parties that these qualifications are required for
appointment to the post of Asstt. Teacher. It is also not the case of the
appellants that the academic qualifications were amended at the time of their
appointment. Thus, admittedly on the date of appointment, the appellants did
.;
not hold the training qualification to be appointed to the post of Asstt. Teachers D
\ as prescribed under Rule 8.

It is the case of the appellants that once appointed their services could
not have been cancelled, without affording them an opportunity of being
heard and giving them a chance tJ explain their position.
E
In the matter of S.l. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and Ors., [1980] 4 S.C.C.
379, this Court has observed that a separate showing of the prejudice caused
is not necessary and the non-observance of natural justice is in itself a prejudice
caused. The Court has relied upon the decision given in State of Orissa v. ·
Ms. Binapani Dei A.LR. ( 1967) S.C. 1269 for the proposition that even if an
administrative action involves civil consequences it must observe rules of
F
natural justice. Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, New
Delhi A.LR. ( 1978) S.C. 851, has also been cited as civil consequences
undoubtedly cover infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of
the civil liberties, material deprivation and non-pecuniary damages. In its
comprehensive connotation everything that affects a citizen in his civil life G
inflicts a civil consequence. The Court has also cited the observation of one
of the judges of House of Lords in Ridge v. Baldwin ( 1964) A.C. 40 for the
purpose that administrative body may in a proper case be bound to give a
person who is affected by their decision an opportunity of making
representation. But all depends on whether he has some right or interest or H
386 sr:PREME COURT REPORTS !2006] I S.l'.R.

A some legitimate expectation of which it would not be fair to deprive him.
Similarly, the Privy Council's decision in the Alj;ed ThangarajahJaurayappah
v. W.J. Fernando (1967) 2 A.C. 337 has also been referred to show that there
are three matters which ah\ays be borne in mind while considering whether
the principle audi alteram partem should be complied or not? First, what is
the nature of property, th~ office held, the status enjoyed or services to be
B performed by the complainant of injustice. Secondly, in what circumstances
or upon what occasions is the person claiming to be entitled to exercise the
measure of control entitled to intervene. Thirdly, when the right to intervene
is proved, what sanctions in fact is the latter entitled to impose upon the
other. It is only upon a consideration of all these matters that the question of
C the application of the principle can properly be determined.
However, in S.l. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and Ors.. (supra). this Court has
also observed as under :-

"In our view the principles of natural justice know of no
D exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any
difference if natural justice had been obser\cd. The non-observance )

of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice
independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It
ill comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who
has been denied justice is not prejudiced. As we said earlier where on
E the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and
under the law only one penalty is permissible, the court may not issue
its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is
not necessary to observe natural justice, but because courts do not
issue futile writs."
F In the matter of Shrawan Kumar Jha and Ors. v. Slate of Bihar and
Ors., [ 1991] Supp. I S.C.C. 330, the appellants were appointed as Asstt.
Teachers and before joining they were supposed to get their certificates and
other qualifications verified from the authorities and as per tile appellants,
they had joined their respective schools. By an order dated November 2,
G 1988. the Dy. Development Commissioner cancelled the appointment of the
appellants because, according to him. the Distt. Superintendent of Education
had no authority to make the appointments and the condition which was the
part of appointment order were not complied with. The Court set aside the
order of cancellation holding that it is settled that no order to the detriment
of the appellants could be passed without complying with the rules of natural
H
./
MOHD. SARTA.J v. STATE OF U.P. [NAOLEKAR. J.] 387
',/ justice. A
Shrawan Kumar Jha (supra) was distinguished in State of M.P. and
Ors. v. Shyama Pardi and Ors. [1996] 7 S.C.C. 118. In this case, the persons,
not possessing the pre-requisite qualifications prescribed by the statutory
rules, were wrongly selected. They have completed their training and were
appointed as Auxiliary Nurse-cum-Midwife. Their servi- .;S were terminated B
without giving any prior notice. Holding it to be illegal, the termination was
challenged before the Service Tribunal and the order of termination was set
\.. aside as the principle of natural justice was not followed. This Court had
found in an appeal that the original petitioners did not possess the pre-requisite
qualificatfons, viz., 10 + 2 with Physics, Chemistry and Biology as subjects.
The rules specifically provided that qualification as condition for appointment
c
to the post. Since the prescribed qualifications had not been satisfied, the
appointment and training was per se illegal and, therefore, the Tribunal was
not right in directing their re-instatement. Shrawan Kumar's case was
distinguished on the ground that they were not disqualified to be appointed
j
but they had not undergone the training and the appointment was set aside D
~ on the ground for want of training. The Court has drawn a distinction between
the initial disqualification for appointment and irregularity in the appointment
and subsequent training for application of the principle of natural justice.

_.. In M.C. Mehta v. VOi, [1999] 6 S.C.C. 237, this Court has laid down
that there can be certain situation in which an order passed in violation of E
natural justice need not be set aside under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. For example, where no prejudice is caused to the person concerned
i,' interference under Article 226 is not necessary.

In the case of Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan, A.LR.
F
(2000) S.C. 2783, this Court considered the question whether on the facts of
the case the employee can invoke the principle of natural justice and whether
it is a case where, even if notice has been given, result would not have been
different and whether it could be said that no prejudice was caused to him,
if on the admitted or proved facts grant of an opportunity would not have
made any difference. The Court referred to the decisions rendered in M.C. G
Mehta vs. VO/ (supra), the exceptions laid down in S.L. Kapoor 's case (supra)
-{ and K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India, A.LR. (1984) S.C. 273, where it has
been laid down that not mere violation of natural justice but de facto prejudice
(other than non-issue of notice) has to be proved. The Court has also placed
reliance in the matter of S.K. Sharma v. State Bank of Patiala, [1996] 3
H
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] I S.C.R.

A S.C.C. 364 and Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P., [ 1996] 5 S.C.C. 450 where ,,.
the principle has been laid down that there must have been some real prejudice
to the complainant. There is no such thing as merely technical infringement
of natural justice. The Court has approved this principle and examined the
case of the employee in that light. In Viveka Nand Sethi v. Chairman, J&K
B Bank ltd. and Ors., (2005] 5 sec 337, this Court has held that the principles
of natural justice are required to be complied with having regard to the fact
situation obtaining therein. It cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. It cannot
be applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts and
circumstances of the case. The principle of natural justice, it is trite, is no
unruly horse. When facts are admitted, an enquiry would be an empty
C formality. Even the principle of estoppel will apply. In another recent judgment
in the case of State of UP. v. Neeraj Awasthi and Ors. JT (2006) I SC 19,
while considering the argument that the principle of natural justice had been
ignored before terminating the service of the employees and, therefore, the
order terminating the service of the employees was bad in law, this Court has
considered the principles of natural justice and the extent and the circumstances
D in which they are attracted. This Court has found in Neeraj Awasthi 's case
)
(supra) that ifthe services of the workmen are governed by the U.P. Industrial
Disputes, they are protected under that law. Rules 42 and 43 of the U.P.
Industrial Disputes Rules lay down that before effecting any retrenchment the
employees concerned would be entitled to notice of one month or in lieu
E thereof pay for one month and 15 days wages for each completed year of ..
service by way of compensation. If retrenchment is to be effected under the
Industrial Disputes Act, the question of complying with the principl~s of
natural justice would not arise. The principles of natural justice would be
attracted only when the services of some persons are terminated by way of
a punitive measure or thereby a stigma is attached. Applying this principle,
F it could very well be seen that discontinuation of the service of the appellants
in the present case was not as a punitive measure but they were discontinued
for the reason that they were not qualified and did not possess the requisite
qualifications for appointment.

G In the present case, the appellants' case fall within the exception laid
down in S.l. Kapoor's case (supra) and other supporting cases, as admittedly,
the appellants were not qualified and they did not possess the 8.T.C. or
Hindustani Teacher's Certificate or Junior Teacher's Certificate or Certificate
of Teaching or certificate of any other training course recognized by the State
Government as equivalent thereto at the time of their initial appointment. In
H view of the basic lack of qualifications. they could not have been appointed
MOHD. SARTAJ v. STA TE OF U.P. [NAOLEKAR. J.) 389

nor their appointment could have been continued. Hence the appellants did A
not hold any right over the post and therefore no hearing was required before
the cancellation of their services. In the present case, the cancellation order
has been issued within a very short span of time giving no probability for any
legitimate expectation to the appellants regarding continuation of their service.
There was no separate appointment order issued in favour of the appellants B
but the memorandum dated 19.6.85 wherein the list of selected candidates
was published, provided that all the selected candidates must join their
\. respective schools/colleges within 15 days and from this the nature of
appointment made cannot be ascertained. Moreover, the cancellation order
itself gives an opportunity that if they do hold and possess the B.T.C.
qualification along with intermediate qualification, they may contact and get C
the same verified on 14.8.85 by the appointing authority and they may bring
this to the notice of the concerned authorities. The copy of the order of
cancellation was also sent to the Principal concerned of the institution with
the remarks that he should relieve Urdu teacher with immediate effect if he
) did not possess the certificate of passing the examination of intermediate and
I
B.T.C.; and, if he possessed these certificates he should submit the same to D
"· the office of the District Basic Education Officer, Muzaffamagar. Therefore,
it is apparent that any person having the basic qualification for the appointment
can produce it before the concerned official so that immediate steps can be
taken with regard to the order of appointment cancellation.
E
In our op in ion, on the above facts no prejudice has been caused to the
appellants by not serving notice of giving hearing before the order of
cancellation was issued.

The contention of <he learned counsel for the appellants is that State by
various orders had given equivalence to the degree of Moal/ium-e-Urdu granted F
by Jamia Urdu, Aligarh with that of Basic Teacher's Certificate, is not correct.
In Government Order dated 28.1.85 the Governor was pleased to approve the
candidates in State services who qualified Moal/ium-e-Urdu granted by Jamia
Urdu, Aligarh and who got experience of teaching Urdu at Higher Secondary
Schools. This order did not provide for equivalence of Moallium-e-Urdu
granted by Jamia Urdu, Aligarh, to that of B.T.C .. In another order dated G
28. I0.88 issued by the Government, which was clarificatory in nature, to all
head~ of departments and Chief of Officials of U.P. Karmik Anubhag. directed
that the candidates who have got degree of Moal/ium-e-Urdu granted by
Jamia Urdu, Aligarh and who had experience of teaching Urdu at Higher
Secondary levels may be appointed in State services. This also does not H
390 SUPREME cot:RT REPORTS (20061 I S.C.R.

A indicate the equivalence of Moa/lium-e-Urdu granted by Jamia Urdu, Aligarh
to that of B.T.C. The aforesaid two orders only indicate that the persons who
are having degree of Moallium-e-Urdu granted by Jamia Urdu, Aligarh, can
be appointed in the State services. The orders do not equate the degree of
Moa/lium-e-Urdu granted by Jamia Lrdu. Aligarh to that of Basic Teacher's
Certificate, Hindustani Teacher's Certificate, Junior Teacher's Certificate,
B Certificate of Teaching or any other training course. indicated in the Rule. As
far as the training is concerned there is no equivalence of the Certificate of
Moa/lium-e-Urdu. It is for the first time by Order dated 13.9.94 the
Government issued an order whereby the Governor granted a sanction that
Moallium-e-Urdu degree for teaching Urdu in Junior I Senior basic sch.iols
C is equivalent to B.T.C .. It is settled law that the qualification should have
been seen which the candidate possessed on the date of recruitment and not
at a later stage unless rules to that regard permit it. The minimum qualification
prescribed under Rule & should be fulfilled on the date of recruitment.
Equivalence of degree of Moalli11111-e-Urd11, Jamia Urdu Aligarh with that of
B.T.C. in the year 1994 would not entail the benefit to the appellants on the
D date they were appointed. The appellants could not have been appointed to
the post of Asstt. Teachers without having training required under Rule 8.
That being the case. the appointments of the appellants were de hors the
Rules and could not be treated to be continued. For the aforesaid reasons, we
do not find any substance in the appeals and are, accordingly. dismissed.
E However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
B.B.B. Appeals dismissed.